JON DAVID ANDERSON v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Jon David Anderson appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of using a controlled substance. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Kathleen A. Sigurdson, Judge.

Anderson pleaded guilty in 2007 and then absconded prior to sentencing. He was not arrested on the resulting bench warrant until 2025. Anderson was sentenced to serve 12 to 30 months in prison; that sentence was suspended as required by statute, and he was placed on probation not to exceed one year. As a condition of probation, Anderson was ordered to serve 364 days flat time in jail.

First, Anderson argues the probation condition requiring him to serve 364 days of flat time in jail constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it is disproportionate to the crime. He argues that the crime to which he pleaded guilty in 2007 is now considered a misdemeanor punishable by only up to six months in jail. Regardless of its severity, “[a] sentence within the statutory limits is not ‘cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience.’ ” Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it forbids only an extreme sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime).

The sentence imposed is within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes at the time Anderson was convicted, see 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 203, § 24, at 546-47; 1999 Nev. Stat., ch. 288, § 1, at 1187; see also State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Pullin), 124 Nev. 564, 567, 188 P.3d 1079, 1081 (2008) (holding that “the proper penalty is the penalty in effect at the time of the commission of the offense and not the penalty in effect at the time of sentencing”), and Anderson does not allege that those statutes are unconstitutional. We conclude the sentence imposed is not disproportionate to the crime and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, Anderson is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Anderson also argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing the probation condition that he serve 364 days flat time in jail. He contends he will likely serve more time pursuant to this probation condition than he would have had he been sentenced to the suspended prison term. Further, he argues the jail term swallows the whole of his probationary term thus demonstrating this probation condition is actually his “ultimate sentence.”

The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987). Generally, this court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by the district court that falls within the parameters of relevant sentencing statutes “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998).

As stated above, the sentence imposed is within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes. And Anderson does not allege that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. While a person cannot be sentenced to flat time as part of their ultimate sentence, see Haney v. State, 124 Nev. 408, 414, 185 P.3d 350, 354 (2008), a person can be ordered to serve flat time as a condition of probation, see id. at 414 n.21, 185 P.3d at 354 n.21 (concluding “that flat time as a condition of probation is within the district court's discretion”); see also NRS 176A.400 (granting the district court broad discretion to fix the terms and conditions of probation); 1999 Nev. Stat., ch. 288, § 1, at 1187 (former version of NRS 193.130) (explicitly providing for the probation condition of up to one year in jail for category E felonies). Having considered the sentence and the crime, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Anderson and imposing a condition of probation that he serve a flat term of 364 days in jail. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.