ADAM JAY EISENHAUER v. WARDEN NETHANJAH BREITENBACH LOVELOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTER AND THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Adam Jay Eisenhauer appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on October 2, 2024. Tenth Judicial District Court, Churchill County; Thomas L. Stockard, Judge.

Eisenhauer contends the district court erred by denying his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland). To demonstrate prejudice sufficient to invalidate a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea,¹ a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Both components of the inquiry—deficiency and prejudice—must be shown. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. We give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). A petitioner must raise claims supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

In his petition, Eisenhauer contended trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that NRS 171.010 ² lacked an enacting clause as required by Article 4, Section 23 of the Nevada Constitution. The Statutes of Nevada contain the constitutionally mandated enacting clauses, see 1957 Nev. Stat., ch. 2, § 1 at 1 (NRS 171.010), and NRS 220.110—which dictates the contents of the NRS—does not mandate that the enacting clauses be republished in the Nevada Revised Statutes. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that NRS 171.010 was properly enacted and that Eisenhauer failed to demonstrate trial counsel's performance was deficient or resulting prejudice.

Eisenhauer also contended trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him for attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14 because the relevant statutes—NRS 193.153 ³ and NRS 201.230—were repealed and therefore invalid. While the laws in effect prior to 1957 were repealed in 1957, they were simultaneously reenacted as the Nevada Revised Statutes in the same senate bill. See 1957 Nev. Stat., ch. 2, §§ 1, 3, at 1-2. And the simultaneous repeal of any source law would not have affected a statute's validity. See 1957 Nev. Stat., ch. 2, § 4(2), at 2 (“The provisions of Nevada Revised Statutes as enacted by this act shall be considered as substituted in a continuing way for the provisions of the prior laws and statutes repealed by section 3 of this act.”); see also Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6(1); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“[T]he term ‘jurisdiction’ means ․ the court's statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 183, 251 P.3d 163, 168 (2011) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's authority to render a judgment in a particular category of case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Eisenhauer failed to demonstrate the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction, he failed to demonstrate trial counsel's performance was deficient or resulting prejudice.

On appeal, Eisenhauer alleges the district court erred by not ordering the State to respond to the constitutional arguments he raised in his reply. We review a district court's decision to order answers and supplemental pleadings for abuse of discretion. See Miles v. State, 120 Nev. 383, 385, 91 P.3d 588, 589 (2004) (observing the district court has broad authority to order answers and supplemental pleadings). NRS 34.745(1) only requires the district court to order the State to file a response or answer to a petition within 45 days or “[t]ake other action that the judge or justice deems appropriate,” and NRS 34.750(5) states that “[n]o further pleadings may be filed except as ordered by the court.” Here, after receiving Eisenhauer's petition, the district court ordered the State to respond to Eisenhauer's petition to “assist the Court in determining whether [Eisenhauer] is entitled to any relief.” The State responded to each of Eisenhauer's claims, and nothing in the record indicates Eisenhauer moved the district court for an order directing further briefing by the State. Eisenhauer therefore has not demonstrated the district court abused its discretion by not requiring any additional action by the State. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Eisenhauer entered his plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). An Alford plea is equivalent to a guilty plea insofar as how the court treats a defendant. State v. Lewis, 124 Nev. 132, 133 n.1, 178 P.3d 146, 147 n.1 (2008), overruled on other grounds by State v. Harris, 131 Nev. 551, 556, 355 P.3d 791, 793-94 (2015).

2.   NRS 171.010 gives jurisdiction to the State of Nevada over public offenses committed in the State of Nevada, except those “where it is by law cognizable exclusively in the courts of the United States.”

3.   Formerly NRS 193.330.