SHAUNTAY WHEATON v. MR GITTER WARDEN (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Shauntay Wheaton appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on March 17, 2025. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Danielle K. Pieper, Judge.

Wheaton filed his petition more than 22 years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on June 11, 2002. See Wheaton v. State, Docket No. 37553 (Order of Affirmance, May 14, 2002). Thus, Wheaton's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Moreover, Wheaton's petition was successive because he had previously filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus that was decided on the merits, and it constituted an abuse of the writ as he raised claims new and different from those raised in his previous petitions.¹ See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS 34.810(3). Wheaton's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(4). Further, because the State specifically pleaded laches, Wheaton was required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the State. See NRS 34.800(2).

In his petition, Wheaton claimed the juvenile and trial courts erred by failing to conduct a competency or certification hearing. Wheaton contended that he could not have presented this claim in a timely petition because his claim was based on a new rule announced in In re D.C., Jr., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 25, 546 P.3d 810 (2024). That case did not announce a new rule regarding when competency or certification hearings must be held; rather, the supreme court clarified that the application of the Dusky ² standard for competency is context-specific, and thus, the level of ability or comprehension a child must have to be found competent under NRS 62D.140 depends on the facts and circumstances of a given case. See id. at 815-17; cf. Nika v. State, 124 Nev. 1272, 1286, 198 P.3d 839, 849 (2008) (explaining that the Nevada Supreme has “defined a rule as being new when it overrules precedent, disapproves a practice sanctioned by prior cases, or overturns a long-standing practice uniformly approved by lower courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Because In re D.C., Jr. did not announce a new rule applicable to his case, Wheaton failed to demonstrate good cause to overcome the procedural bars. See Bejarano v. State, 122 Nev. 1066, 1072, 146 P.3d 265, 270 (2006) (“Good cause for failing to file a timely petition or raise a claim in a previous proceeding may be established where the factual or legal basis for the claim was not reasonably available.”). Further, Wheaton failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. See NRS 34.800(2). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim as procedurally barred.

Wheaton also claimed the Nevada Department of Corrections was not applying statutory credits to his minimum sentences. A postconviction habeas petition “must not challenge both the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence and the computation of time that the petitioner has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction.” NRS 34.738(3). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in determining that this claim had to be raised in a separation petition.³ Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Wheaton v. State, Docket No. 44093 (Order of Affirmance and Limited Remand to Correct the Judgment of Conviction, Mar. 24, 2006) (affirming the denial of Wheaton's first postconviction habeas petition). Wheaton filed a second postconviction habeas petition on July 1, 2019. He did not appeal from the denial of this petition.

2.   Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

3.   We note that the district court was required to dismiss the portion of the petition challenging the computation of time served without prejudice. See NRS 34.738(3). Nonetheless, we affirm the district court's judgment as it properly declined to grant the requested relief. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (explaining that a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is based on the wrong reason). Nothing in this order precludes Wheaton from filing a separate postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of time served.