JULIAN MICHAEL ACOX v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Julian Michael Acox appeals from two judgments of conviction, both entered pursuant to guilty pleas. In district court case no. CR24-0154 (Docket No. 90015), Acox was convicted of sex trafficking an adult. In district court case no. CR23-1352 (Docket No. 90029), Acox was convicted of sex trafficking. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Scott N. Freeman, Judge.

Acox claims the district court erred at sentencing by considering a portion of a victim impact statement that included reference to previous conduct by Acox. Acox contends the reference to previous conduct exceeded the scope of a permissible victim impact statement under NRS 176.015(3) and resulted in a violation of his right to due process, right to confrontation, right to a fair trial, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

During her victim impact statement, the victim from district court case no. CR23-1352 testified about Acox's conduct when he induced her to engage in prostitution. At the end of her statement, the witness stated she was “testifying against [Acox], well, speaking on behalf of multiple victims, victims that were my friends, victim[s] that Mr. Acox has affected their job, beaten them.” Acox objected to this portion of the victim's impact statement. Acox argued he was entitled to notice if the victim intended to offer specific instances of conduct and asked the court to either grant a continuance or make a record that it would not consider the statement when it imposed sentence. The district court stated it was “not going to consider those statements or additional conduct.” Subsequently, the district court imposed the maximum term of 48 to 120 months in prison in both cases, with the sentences to run consecutively.

After pronouncing its sentencing decision, the district court remarked, “It's my hope that the victim and the victims of whom she spoke will see some closure as a result of that sentence.” Acox asserts this statement demonstrates the district court considered the improper victim impact testimony, thereby depriving him of his constitutional rights to due process and confrontation.

NRS 176.015(3)(b) allows a victim to present, at sentencing, a statement that “[r]easonably expresses] any views concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the crime on the victim and the need for restitution.” If an impact statement refers to “specific prior acts of the defendant that fall outside the scope of NRS 176.015(3), ‘due process requires that the accuser be under oath, [and have] an opportunity for cross-examination and ․ reasonable notice of the prior acts which the impact statement will contain’ must be provided.”¹ Cassinelli v. State, 131 Nev. 606, 620, 357 P.3d 349, 359 (Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Buschauer v. State, 106 Nev. 890, 893-94, 804 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1990)).

We are not persuaded the victim's statement exceeded the scope of NRS 176.015(3)(b). Unlike the precedent cited by Acox, the victim's statement did not make references to specific prior acts by Acox. Cf. Buschauer, 106 Nev. at 892-95, 804 P.2d at 1047-49 (finding the defendant's due process rights were violated where the victim impact statement included reference to four specific prior acts of violence); see also Weaver v. State, No. 80306, 2020 WL 6111473 at *1 (Nev. Oct. 15, 2020) (Order of Affirmance) (finding that a victim impact statement did not exceed the scope of NRS 176.015(b)(3) because it “did not refer to specific acts”); Devose v. State, No. 68814, 2018 WL 7892788 (Nev. Feb. 23, 2018) (Order of Affirmance) (finding that a witness's vague mention of prior conduct by defendant “[did] not trigger the protections outlined in Buschauer because there was no reference to a specific prior act”).

Even if the victim's statement exceeded the scope of NRS 176.015(3)(b), the district court commented that it would not consider the statements or additional conduct referenced by the victim, and it did not refer to the objected-to portion of the victim's impact statement in sentencing Acox. Cf. Buschauer, 106 Nev. at 895, 804 P.2d at 1049 (noting that “[b]ased in large part on the impact statement, the court referred to a pattern of wife abuse in sentencing Buschauer”). Here, the district court's reference to “the victim and the victims of whom she spoke” was brief, was made after it had sentenced Acox, and does not appear to have formed the basis for the district court's sentencing decisions based on the record before us. Based on the above, we conclude Acox has not shown the district court erred. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgments of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record reflects that the victim was sworn in prior to providing her victim impact statement and that the district court provided Acox an opportunity to cross-examine the victim.