LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT AND CCMSI v. DOLPHIS BOUCHER (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and its third-party insurance administrator, CCMSI, appeal a district court order granting a petition for judicial review in a workers’ compensation matter. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Gloria Sturman, Judge.

Respondent Dolphis Boucher worked as a police officer with LVMPD from February 1994 until he retired in October 2020. In 2022, Boucher was diagnosed with aortic valve stenosis and coronary heart disease and sought workers’ compensation benefits. CCMSI accepted the claim for medical benefits only. Boucher appealed, and a hearing officer affirmed the determination, finding Boucher was entitled only to medical benefits because he retired prior to filing his claim.

Boucher thereafter appealed the hearing officer's decision. Before an appeals officer, Boucher argued that while NRS 617.457(14) generally precluded retirees from receiving permanent total disability benefits, section 6 of Senate Bill (S.B.) 153—which enacted NRS 617.457(14)—provided an exception to NRS 617.457(14) for individuals who had completed at least 20 years of creditable service as a police officer on the law's effective date. Boucher argued that because he served as a police officer for over 20 years, the exception to NRS 617.457(14) applied and he was entitled to additional workers’ compensation benefits, rather than only the medical benefits contemplated under NRS 617.457(14). The appeals officer affirmed the hearing officer's decision and found that Boucher was only entitled to medical benefits under NRS 617.457(14).

Boucher petitioned for judicial review in the district court, and the court granted his petition, finding that NRS 617.457(14) did not apply to Boucher based on section 6 of S.B. 153. The court determined that Boucher was therefore entitled to all benefits, monetary and medical, provided under NRS 617.457. This appeal followed.

On appeal, appellants challenge the district court's grant of Boucher's petition for judicial review and argue the appeals officer properly determined that Boucher was only entitled to medical benefits under NRS 617.457.

When reviewing an administrative decision, this court's role “is identical to that of the district court: to review the evidence presented to the agency in order to determine whether the agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious and was thus an abuse of the agency's discretion.” United Exposition Serv. Co. v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev. 421, 423, 851 P.2d 423, 423 (1993). However, this court reviews questions of law de novo. Howard v. City of Las Vegas, 121 Nev. 691, 693, 120 P.3d 410, 411 (2005). Appellate review of a final agency decision is “confined to the record before the agency.” Law Offices of Barry Levinson, P.C. v. Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 362, 184 P.3d 378, 384 (2008).

NRS 617.457 governs heart diseases as occupational diseases for police officers. As relevant here, NRS 617.457(12) provides that a person who is “[p]artially disabled from an occupational [heart] disease” and “[i]ncapable of performing ․ work as a ․ police officer ․ may elect to receive the benefits provided under NRS 616C.440 for a permanent total disability.” But NRS 617.457(14) provides that “[a] person who files a claim for a disease of the heart specified in this section after he or she retires from employment as a ․ police officer is not entitled to receive any compensation for that disease other than medical benefits.”

The limitation set forth in NRS 617.457(14) was initially added to the Nevada Revised Statutes in 2015 through S.B. 153. See 2015 Nev. Stat., ch. 420, § 3, at 2431; City of Las Vegas v. Munson, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 28, 574 P.3d 426, 428-29 (Ct. App. 2025). However, while that limiting language from section 14 was codified into the Nevada Revised Statutes, section 6 of S.B. 153 was not. Section 6 of S.B. 153 provides that NRS 617.457(14) does not apply to persons “who, on the effective date of this section, ha[ve] completed at least 20 years of creditable service” as a police officer. See S.B. 153, 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015). Appellants argue that because the language from S.B. 153 was not codified into NRS 617.457, it cannot be considered binding authority as without codification, there is no notice of legislative policy changes. Consequently, without the incorporation of section 6 of S.B. 153, appellants contend that the plain language of NRS 617.457(14) controls, and under that provision, Boucher is only entitled to receive medical benefits.

We addressed this argument in Munson and concluded that section 6 of S.B. 153 was binding law because it was approved by the governor and enacted into law on June 8, 2015.¹ 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 28, 574 P.3d at 429. We further concluded that its omission from NRS 617.457 is immaterial. Id.; see also NRS 220.170(3) (stating copies of the Nevada Revised Statutes “may be cited as prima facie evidence of the law,” but that such “evidence may be rebutted by proof that the statutes cited differ from the official Statutes of Nevada”); Halverson v. Sec'y of State, 124 Nev. 484, 486-87, 186 P.3d 893, 895-96 (2008) (stating language in a senate bill that was not codified into the Nevada Revised Statutes was still the law because “it was enacted in the official Statutes of Nevada”). Therefore, appellants’ argument fails.² Because section 6 of S.B. 153 constitutes binding law, NRS 617.457(14) does not apply to Boucher as he falls within section 6's outlined exception. Specifically, regardless of when his disablement occurred, Boucher had completed at least 20 years of credible service as a police officer at the time section 6 became effective in 2015—a fact appellants do not dispute. Because NRS 617.457(14) did not apply to Boucher, we conclude the appeals officer erred by determining he was only entitled to medical benefits under that statute. Accordingly, we conclude the district court properly granted Boucher's petition for judicial review.

It is so ORDERED.³

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Munson was published only days after the parties completed briefing in this matter, so neither they nor the appeals officer had the benefit of this opinion during the pendency of the underlying proceedings.

2.   We are also unpersuaded by appellants’ argument that it did not have notice of section 6 of S.B. 153, as it was enacted in 2015, was provided to the public, and because appellants had a reasonable opportunity to familiarize themselves with the information contained therein. See Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 584 F.3d 1232, 1237 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating the government generally provides the level of notice required whenever it “alters substantive rights through enactment of rules of general applicability ․ simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and [ ] affording those within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize themselves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those requirements”).

3.   The parties also dispute the proper calculation for Boucher's monetary disability benefits. However, we note that that the district court, in its order granting the petition for judicial review, explained that Boucher's monetary benefits had not yet been determined and directed appellants to conduct a calculation of those benefits. See Bally's Grand Hotel & Casino v. Reeves, 112 Nev. 1487, 1489, 929 P.2d 936, 937 (1996) (explaining there is appellate jurisdiction to review a district court decision that determined a worker was entitled to benefits but “sent the case back for a calculation of the amount due [the worker] pursuant to the conclusion that she was entitled to benefits”). The calculation of Boucher's monetary disability benefits involves factual determinations that have not yet been made and we decline to make such findings in the first instance. See Ryan's Express Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc., 128 Nev. 289, 299, 279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012) (“An appellate court is not particularly well-suited to make factual determinations in the first instance.”).