TON VINH LEE v. INGRID PATIN AN INDIVIDUAL AND PATIN LAW GROUP PLLC NEVADA PROFESSIONAL LLC (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Ton Vinh Lee appeals from a district court post-judgment order granting attorney fees, costs, and interest. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Gloria Sturman, Judge.

Lee filed a defamation claim against respondents, Ingrid Patin and Patin Law Group, PLLC (collectively Patin), alleging that Patin defamed him by posting information on her website about a verdict that Patin obtained against Lee's professional corporation and other dentists on behalf of her client. In 2017, Ingrid Patin and Patin Law Group each conveyed $1,000 offers of judgment to Lee under NRCP 68. Lee allowed the offers to expire without accepting them. The district court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of Patin, finding that Lee admitted that Patin's post was true and concluding that the fair report privilege precluded liability. Lee then appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Patin. See Lee v. Patin, No. 82516, 2022 WL 4180904 (Nev. Sept. 12, 2022) (Order of Affirmance).

While that appeal was pending, Patin moved for attorney fees, costs, and interest under NRCP 68, which the district court granted. Regarding the Beattie v. Thomas, 99 Nev. 579, 588-89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983), good-faith factors, the district court found that Lee brought his defamation claim in good faith, that Patin's offers of judgment were reasonable in timing and amount, and that Lee's decision to reject the offers was unreasonable. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the Beattie good-faith factors weighed in favor of awarding attorney fees, costs, and interest to Patin. The district court ultimately awarded attorney fees and costs for Ingrid Patin and Patin Law Group's trial counsel, Christian Morris and Kerry Doyle, but denied attorney fees and costs for Patin Law Group's appellate counsel, Micah Echols, relating to an early appeal in this case.

Thereafter, Lee appealed the district court order awarding Patin's attorney fees, costs, and interest. See Lee v. Patin, No. 83213, 2024 WL 238082 (Nev. Jan. 22, 2024) (Order of Affirmance). In that appeal, Lee challenged the district court's conclusion that the offers of judgment were reasonable and made in good faith with respect to their timing and amount, pointing to (1) the district court's failure to make a specific finding that the amount of the offers were made in good faith, (2) his theory that the offers of judgment were effectively “in the negative” once his attorney fees were factored into the value of the offers, (3) the fact that the offers were made two years into the case after many unsuccessful dispositive motions, and (4) the district court's recognition that the offers “signaled” Patin's intent “to vigorously litigate the legal issues.” The supreme court affirmed the order granting Patin's attorney fees, costs, and interest and determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its application of the Beattie factors. See Lee, No. 83213, 2024 WL 238082, at *3-4.

Subsequently, Patin filed in district court a motion for attorney fees, costs, and interest incurred in the appeal in Docket No. 83213 pursuant to NRCP 68. Patin asserted that because the district court had previously analyzed the Beattie good-faith factors, and given that the supreme court affirmed the same, the district court's prior resolution of the Beattie good-faith factors had a preclusive effect on the motion. Thus, Patin argued the court only needed to consider the Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969), factors to determine whether the appellate attorney fees that Patin requested were reasonable. In opposition, Lee asserted Patin's offers of judgment were internally contradictory and improperly ambiguous on whether, if accepted, Lee would have to pay Patin and accept judgment in Patin's favor against Lee on his defamation complaint, or whether Patin would pay Lee the offered amount with dismissal of the complaint to follow. Lee also argued that the Beattie factors did not weigh in favor of granting the request.

Thereafter, the district court granted Patin's motion for appellate attorney fees, costs, and interest in the amount of $102,691.25. In its order, the court noted that it previously resolved the Beattie good-faith factors when it awarded Patin attorney fees, costs, and interest in its prior order, which the supreme court affirmed in Docket No. 83213. Thus, the court found that its prior resolution of the Beattie factors was the law of the case. The court then reviewed the Brunzell factors, 85 Nev. at 349, 455 P.2d at 33, and found that the amount of appellate attorney fees was reasonable. The court further noted that Lee did not move to retax costs, and Lee did not challenge the request for post-judgment interest. Thus, the district court granted Patin's motion for appellate attorney fees, costs, and interest in the amount of $102,691.25, and noted that post-judgment interest would accrue until it was satisfied. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Lee argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting the motion for appellate attorney fees, costs, and interest because the district court did not analyze the internally contradictory and ambiguous nature of the offers, did not provide an analysis of the Beattie factors when presented with Lee's argument as to the offers’ internal contradictions, and by relying on its prior analysis of the Beattie good-faith factors. Lee argues that although the supreme court affirmed the prior order granting attorney fees, the issue of the internal contradictions within the offers was not resolved by the supreme court, and thus, these arguments should have been considered by the district court. He also asserts that the offers of judgment were invalid because they contained an impermissible condition that the offers are nullified by an award of damages, attorney fees, costs or interest to Lee, and that the offers were unreasonable in timing and amount and were not brought in good faith. Conversely, Patin asserts, among other things, that the law of the case doctrine precludes Lee's arguments regarding the validity of the offers of judgment or the application of the Beattie good faith factors. Patin further asserts that the district court's original Beattie findings support the award of appellate attorney fees, costs, and interest, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

We review awards of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 80, 319 P.3d 606, 615 (2014); Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 266, 267, 350 P.3d 1139, 1143, 1144 (2015). An abuse of discretion exists where the district court's decision is “arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason.” In re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. 26, 33, 153 P.3d 32, 36-37 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, we will review the district court's application of the law governing those awards de novo. See Logan, 131 Nev. at 264, 350 P.3d at 1141.

“Where a party rejects an offer of judgment and fails to obtain a more favorable outcome, the offering party may recover attorney fees and costs incurred after the offer was made.” Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Murray, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 14, 544 P.3d 904, 912 (2024) (citing NRCP 68(f)(1)(B)). When determining whether to award attorney fees under NRCP 68, the district court must evaluate the factors set forth in Beattie, 99 Nev. at 588-89, 668 P.2d at 274. These factors include (1) “whether the plaintiff's claim was brought in good faith;” (2) “whether the defendant's offer of judgment was reasonable and in good faith in both its timing and amount;” (3) “whether the plaintiffs decision to reject the offer and proceed to trial was grossly unreasonable or in bad faith;” and (4) “whether the fees sought by the offeror are reasonable and justified in amount.” Id. We consistently defer to the district court's “discretion concerning the propriety of granting attorney fees,” if “the record clearly reflects that the district court properly considered the Beattie factors.” See N. Las Vegas Infrastructure Inv. & Constr., LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 139 Nev. 46, 51, 525 P.3d 836, 842 (2023) (quoting Wynn v. Smith, 117 Nev. 6, 13, 16 P.3d 424, 428-29 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the fee-shifting provisions in NRCP 68 extend to attorney fees incurred on and after appeal. In re Est. & Living Tr. of Miller, 125 Nev. 550, 555, 216 P.3d 239, 243 (2009).

Here, Lee challenges the validity of the offers of judgment and asserts the Beattie good-faith factors do not support the award of appellate attorney fees, costs, and interest. However, the Nevada Supreme Court previously upheld the district court's Beattie good faith analysis and the validity of the offers of judgments in resolving his appeal in Docket No. 83213, which affirmed the district court's award of attorney fees, costs, and interest in favor of Patin. See Recontrust Co. v. Zhang, 130 Nev. 1, 7-8, 317 P.3d 814, 818 (2014) (explaining that, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, a court generally cannot reconsider questions decided by the court in an earlier phase); see also Lincicome v. Breckenridge Prop. Fund 2016, LLC, No. 86324, 2024 WL 3841589, *1 (Nev. Aug. 14, 2024) (Order of Affirmance) (“The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings.” (quoting Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975))). The supreme court previously determined that the district court properly considered each of the Beattie factors. See Lee, No. 83213, 2024 WL 238082, at *3. Additionally, the supreme court rejected Lee's assertions that the offers lacked good faith or reasonableness and his challenges to the timing of the offers. Id. Those determinations are the law of the case, which the district court recognized when it subsequently awarded Patin's appellate attorney fees, costs, and interest at issue here. Lee is barred from relitigating those points in this appeal. See Lee, No. 83213, 2024 WL 238082, at *4 (noting that “Lee cannot overcome the district court's comprehensive assessment under Beattie”).

To the extent Lee argues that the offers of judgment were invalid because they contained alleged inconsistences, the supreme court did not expressly address this issue in the previous appeal because it was not raised before the district court or on appeal. Thus, the issue was waived, and the supreme court ultimately determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the Beattie factors, which reflects that the underlying offers of judgment were otherwise valid. Consequently, the law of the case prevents Lee's attempts to relitigate the sufficiency of the offers of judgment with new arguments. Lincicome, 2024 WL 3841589, at *1; Hall, 91 Nev. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. To that end, Lee's argument raised after the prior appeal that the offers of judgment were invalid because they were improperly conditional is likewise without merit pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine. Lincicome, 2024 WL 3841589, at *1; Hall, 91 Nev. at 316, 535 P.2d at 799. Thus, Lee's arguments are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. Accordingly, because he presents no other basis to challenge the award of appellate attorney fees, we necessarily conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) (providing that issues an appellant does not raise on appeal are forfeited). Furthermore, Lee does not challenge the award with respect to costs and interest, and thus, he has forfeited any argument related to the same. See id.

Consistent with the foregoing, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.¹

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Insofar as the parties have raised any other arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they either do not present a basis for their requested relief or need not be reached given the disposition of this appeal.