RH KIDS LLC CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY v. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY BUT SOLELY AS TRUSTEE FOR RCF ACQUISITION TRUST NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATION (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

RH Kids, LLC, appeals from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Ronald J. Israel, Judge.

RH Kids sued respondent U.S. Bank National Association for quiet title and declaratory and injunctive relief. RH Kids alleged that it was the owner of the relevant property, that a deed of trust encumbered the property, and that U.S Bank was the beneficiary of the deed of trust. RH Kids further alleged, among other things, that the deed of trust had been extinguished as a matter of law under NRS 106.240. That statute provides that a lien on real property is conclusively presumed to be discharged “10 years after the debt secured by the mortgage or deed of trust according to the terms thereof or any recorded written extension thereof become[s] wholly due.” NRS 106.240. According to RH Kids, U.S. Bank's interest in the subject property, as the beneficiary of the deed of trust, was extinguished under NRS 106.240, which was triggered by an alleged notice of intent to accelerate the underlying debt in a letter sent to the original borrower in 2011.

U.S. Bank filed a motion to dismiss on December 15, 2024, asserting the facts as alleged were insufficient to state a claim for which relief could be granted. U.S. Bank contended, among other things, that none of the events discussed in RH Kids’ complaint triggered NRS 106.240’s ten-year period, and thus NRS 106.240 did not extinguish the deed of trust.

On January 2, 2024, RH Kids submitted an amended complaint, which included additional information concerning RH Kids’ wrongful foreclosure claim but was otherwise substantially similar to its original complaint. RH Kids thereafter filed an opposition to U.S Bank's motion to dismiss, contending that the motion to dismiss became moot upon the filing of the amended complaint but it did not challenge the merits of the arguments raised in the motion to dismiss. U.S. Bank subsequently filed a reply, asserting that the arguments contained within the motion to dismiss applied to both the original and the amended complaints. U.S. Bank contended that RH Kids simply recycled the allegations raised in its original complaint and that the arguments raised in the motion to dismiss applied equally to the original and the amended complaints.

The district court subsequently issued a written order granting the motion to dismiss. The district court noted that RH Kids filed an amended complaint but that the amended complaint should be stricken because RH Kids filed it without leave of the court. However, the district court also determined that dismissal was warranted even if the amended complaint was not stricken because the allegations raised in the amended complaint did not materially differ from those raised in the original complaint.

Specifically, citing to LV Debt Collect, LLC v. Bank of New York Mellon, 139 Nev. 232, 534 P.3d 693 (2023), the district court determined that RH Kids’ assertion that NRS 106.240 extinguished the deed of trust failed. The court also determined that RH Kids’ remaining allegations were barred by claim preclusion or failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. This appeal followed.

On appeal, RH Kids contends that the district court erroneously granted the motion to dismiss. It argues the court erred by failing to consider the allegations within the amended complaint and by striking the amended complaint. RH Kids also argues that the amended complaint caused the motion to dismiss to become moot and that the district court therefore should not have considered it.

This court reviews an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under NRCP 12(b)(5) de novo. Brown v. Eddie World, Inc., 131 Nev. 150, 152. 348 P.3d 1002, 1003 (2015). We rigorously review a district court order granting an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, accepting all of the plaintiffs factual allegations as true and drawing every reasonable inference in the plaintiff's favor to determine whether the allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim “only if it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.” Id. at 228, 181 P.3d at 672.

RH Kids’ assertion that the district court did not consider the allegations raised within the amended complaint is without merit.¹ Rather, the court specifically stated that it reviewed the amended complaint and determined that the allegations contained within the amended complaint did not materially differ from those raised in the original complaint. The court determined that dismissal was warranted after considering the allegations raised in the amended complaint. Accordingly, RH Kids is not entitled to relief based on this argument.

Turning to RH Kids’ contention that its amended complaint caused the motion to dismiss to become moot, we conclude RH Kids is not entitled to relief. While the “general rule is that filing an amended complaint moots pending motions to dismiss,” district courts are not required to reject a pending motion to dismiss after an opposing party has filed an amended complaint but rather “may exercise their discretion and apply a pending motion to dismiss to portions of an amended complaint that are substantially identical to the original complaint.” Crawford v. Tilley, 15 F.4th 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pettaway v. Nat'l Recovery Sols., LLC, 955 F.3d 299, 303-04 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]hen a plaintiff properly amends her complaint after a defendant has filed a motion to dismiss that is still pending, the district court has the option of either denying the pending motion as moot or evaluating the motion in light of the facts alleged in the amended complaint.”).

Here, as noted by the district court, the claims and the legal arguments contained within the amended complaint were substantially similar to those raised in the original complaint. In light of the substantial similarity between the amended complaint and the original complaint, RH Kids does not demonstrate the district court should have declined to consider the motion to dismiss. See McQuiston v. City of Los Angeles, 564 F. App'x. 303, 305-06 (9th Cir. 2014) (approving of the district court's decision to construe a motion for judgment on the pleadings as applying to an after-filed amended complaint where the amended complaint included substantially the same substantive arguments and there was no prejudice to plaintiff); Shame on You Prods., Inc. v. Banks, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (stating “[i]t would waste both the court's and the parties’ resources to deny the motion and require defendants to file an identical motion directed to the first amended complaint” when the issues and arguments would be identical), aff'd sub nom. Shame on You Prods., Inc. v. Banks, 690 F. App'x 519 (9th Cir. 2017).

In addition, we note RH Kids does not challenge the district court's determination that the amended complaint and the original complaint were not materially different and it does not argue that it suffered prejudice from the district court's consideration of the motion to dismiss. See Crawford, 15 F.4th at 759; McQuiston, 564 F. App'x. at 305-06. RH Kids likewise fails to present arguments concerning the bases upon which the district court concluded dismissal was warranted. RH Kids has thus forfeited any arguments related to the aforementioned issues. See Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) (providing that issues an appellant does not raise on appeal are forfeited); see also Hung v. Genting Berhad, 138 Nev. 547, 549-50, 513 P.3d 1285, 1287-88 (Ct. App. 2022) (providing that an appellant generally must challenge all the independent alternative grounds relied upon by the district court, otherwise the ruling will be affirmed). Accordingly, we conclude RH Kids fails to demonstrate the district court erred by granting the motion to dismiss, see Brown, 131 Nev. at 152, 348 P.3d at 1003; Holland, 139 Nev. at 486, 540 P.3d at 1084, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that RH Kids timely submitted its amended complaint pursuant to NRCP 15(a)(1)(B), and it was thus permitted to file an amended complaint as a matter of course. Accordingly, the district court erroneously struck RH Kids’ amended complaint for failing to seek leave of the district court prior to filing that document. However, this error was harmless, because, as outlined in this order, the district court properly granted U.S. Bank's motion to dismiss on the merits. See Wyeth v. Rowatt, 126 Nev. 446, 465, 244 P.3d 765, 778 (2010) (explaining that, to establish an error is not harmless and reversal is warranted, “the movant must show that the error affects the party's substantial rights so that, but for the alleged error, a different result might reasonably have been reached”).