RONALD LEE SMITH v. RACHEL SMITH (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Ronald Lee Smith appeals from a district court decree of divorce. Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye County; Robert W. Lane, Judge.

Ronald and respondent Rachel Smith have one child together, O.S. (born in November 2013), and were married in September 2015. In April 2024, Rachel filed a complaint for divorce and child custody, seeking joint legal and primary physical custody of O.S. Rachel alleged that Ronald was exhibiting irrational and hostile behavior toward her and O.S. and thus she sought and obtained a temporary protection order (TPO) in April 2024. In May 2024, Rachel filed a motion for temporary orders, indicating that the parties make a living operating an Airbnb out of the marital residence, which was the only source of income. She requested exclusive possession of the marital residence to sell it because she and Ronald had fallen behind on payments and were at risk of foreclosure. Thereafter, the district court granted the motion to list the marital residence for sale.

Because Ronald failed to file an answer or any other filing since being served with the complaint, Rachel requested a prove-up hearing in July 2024. Rachel filed a subsequent motion to confirm sale of the marital residence. The proposed sale was a private sale for the total price of $444,000. The prove-up hearing was scheduled for September 16, 2024. Shortly before the prove-up hearing, Ronald began participating in the case and filed various pro-se filings. He filed a motion for temporary orders on September 10, requesting, among other things, that the parties share custody of O.S., and an order staying the sale of the marital residence. Ronald also sought an order for discovery of community debts in excess of $100,000, which included a Small Business Administration Economic Injury Disaster Loan the parties were behind on. Ronald filed various exhibits to his motion. The parties were present at the September 16 hearing, and Ronald objected to the offer of $444,000 on the marital residence, indicating it was not a fair offer. The district court continued the matter for an evidentiary hearing.

Before the evidentiary hearing, Rachel filed her pretrial memorandum, which stated that Ronald caused offers for the sale of the marital residence to be rescinded after he harassed parties to the sale. She alleged that while there was an offer for the marital residence to be purchased at $444,000, that offer was reneged upon, and the current offer for sale of the residence was $300,000. Rachel thus requested an unequal distribution of funds to compensate for the money lost due to Ronald's actions. She listed witnesses she intended to use at the evidentiary hearing, including a real estate agent and the home loan holder. She further alleged that Ronald's mental health had declined, and she was forced to initiate the divorce proceedings to establish the parties’ parenting time schedule, to pay their community bills, and to place the marital residence for sale to avoid foreclosure. She further requested that she be awarded sole legal and physical custody of O.S., with Ronald receiving supervised parenting time.

Thereafter, the district court held an evidentiary hearing. Both parties were present, and Ronald represented himself. Rachel's witnesses (the real estate agent and the home loan holder) provided testimony as to the marital home and loan. The court heard testimony from the real estate agent that Ronald posted information on the internet that hindered the sale of the marital residence, and as a result, the parties lost an offer for $444,000, and the next best offer for sale of the residence was $300,000. The real estate agent also testified that Ronald made several bad repairs on the marital residence resulting in code compliance issues. The loan holder on the marital residence testified that Rachel was willing to sell the marital residence, but Ronald refused to sign off. Moreover, Rachel provided testimony as to her efforts to sell the marital residence, the assets and debts at issue, and how she was the primary caregiver for O.S. Ronald did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, but he did give an opening statement and closing statement and cross-examined the witnesses.

Subsequently, the district court issued its decree of divorce. The decree noted that, pursuant to the evidence at the evidentiary hearing, Ronald incurred $6,000 of community waste/debt while staying at expensive hotel rooms in Las Vegas during the divorce. Additionally, the court noted that it heard testimony regarding the fact that the parties lost an offer for $444,000 on the marital residence and the next best offer was for $300,000. The court further noted that while Ronald asserted that the parties had incurred over $100,000 in alleged community debt, he failed to provide any evidence of said debt. As such, the court found compelling reasons to award Rachel an unequal distribution of community property, so the court found it fair and equitable to award Ronald 50 percent of the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence, while awarding Rachel all other personal property, plus a vacant plot of land, to compensate her for the waste committed by Ronald. The court determined that Ronald would receive $5,000 more than Rachel from the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence as an equalization payment for the vacant plot of land it awarded to Rachel. According to testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the personal property awarded to Rachel was worth approximately $40,000, and included an RV, trailer, tractor, excavator, go-kart, 4-Wheeler, and two vehicles. Additionally, the court found that the testimony at the evidentiary hearing supported that Ronald had been violating the TPO by reaching out to Rachel, having others reach out to Rachel, and attempting to play video games with O.S. on the internet. Thus, the court awarded Rachel sole legal and primary physical custody of O.S., subject to Ronald receiving supervised parenting time, which the court determined was in O.S.’s best interest. This appeal followed.

Ronald argues in his informal brief that the district court deprived him of procedural due process by failing to enforce the mandatory disclosure rules under NRCP 16.2, allowing the evidentiary hearing to proceed without financial disclosures from Rachel, and allowing undisclosed witnesses to testify. Ronald further argues that due to these errors, Rachel was awarded an unequal distribution of community property.¹

Ronald has not provided this court with a copy of the transcript from the evidentiary hearing demonstrating that he raised these issues during the hearing, and thus, it is unclear if Ronald preserved these alleged errors for review on appeal. See Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (explaining that when an appellant “fails to include necessary documentation in the record, we necessarily presume that the missing [documents] support[ ] the district court's decision”); see also Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (explaining that points not urged in the trial court are forfeited and will not be considered on appeal). Nevertheless, we review Ronald's due process arguments for plain error. See Hamm v. Arrowcreek Homeowners’ Ass'n, 124 Nev. 290, 300, 183 P.3d 895, 903 (2008), abrogated on other grounds by Saticoy Bay, LLC, Series 9720 Hitching Rail v. Peccole Ranch Cmty. Ass'n, 137 Nev. 516, 495 P.3d 492 (2021).

“[P]rocedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Due process is satisfied where interested parties are given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mesi v. Mesi, 136 Nev. 748, 750, 478 P.3d 366, 369 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

NRCP 16.2 requires the early and full disclosure of all financial records in family court proceedings. And each party in a family law action is required to complete, file, and serve a General Financial Disclosure Form. See NRCP 16.2(c), NRCP 16.205(c).

Ronald asserts that he was not properly served with Rachel's financial disclosure form (FDF) and other financial disclosures pursuant to NRCP 16.2, and that Rachel's witnesses were not disclosed to him. Thus, Ronald argues his due process rights were violated as the district court nevertheless permitted the evidentiary hearing to proceed. However, we are not persuaded by these arguments. The record demonstrates that Ronald was served with Rachel's FDF, which contained a certificate of service indicating she mailed a copy by the U.S. mail to Ronald at the California address he listed as his address on various filings in this case. Additionally, Rachel's pretrial memorandum, which outlined her list of witnesses and documents to be used at the evidentiary hearing, was also mailed to Ronald at the same address. Because service of the aforementioned documents was complete upon mailing, see NRCP 5(b)(2)(C) (providing that service of a document is complete upon the mailing of a copy of the document to the appropriate party's last known address), Ronald had adequate notice of Rachel's filings to be used and witnesses to appear at the evidentiary hearing, see Matter of Guardianship of D.M.F., 139 Nev. 342, 351, 535 P.3d 1154, 1163 (2023) (stating that “[n]otice is sufficient to satisfy due process where it is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections”).

And to the extent Ronald asserts that Rachel mailed her financial disclosures and other documents to him at an incorrect address or address where he did not reside, the onus was on him to update the district court with his current address, as he clearly was aware that he was a party in the litigation as evidenced by his filings in the action. See 66 C.J.S. Notice § 15 n.1 (2025) (explaining that a party has the duty to keep the court informed of any change in address). Thus, Ronald's contentions that his due process rights were violated as the evidentiary hearing was allowed to proceed without full disclosures from Rachel are without merit.²

Next, we consider Ronald's contentions concerning the district court's divorce determinations. Ronald maintains that the district court's failure to allow him to introduce his own financial statements and exhibits resulted in an unequal distribution of the parties’ community property.

The district court must equally divide community property unless it finds a compelling reason for making an unequal distribution and sets forth in writing the reasons for doing so. NRS 125.150(1)(b). This court reviews the district court's decisions concerning the disposition of community property for an abuse of discretion. Kogod v. Cioffi-Kogod, 135 Nev. 64, 75, 439 P.3d 397, 406 (2019). We defer to the district court's factual findings and will not disturb them unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment. Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007).

Here, Ronald does not present any specific challenges to the district court's detailed written findings supporting the unequal distribution, but instead, contends that he was unable to present evidence at the evidentiary hearing. However, this court is unable to evaluate Ronald's claims, or the alleged errors regarding the district court's determinations, as Ronald failed to request the transcripts from the evidentiary hearing. As a result, this court cannot assess whether the district court failed to properly consider Ronald's arguments regarding the division of property as he suggests or what evidence he was unable to submit. Thus, we necessarily presume that the transcripts from the evidentiary hearing support the district court's factual findings and ultimate decision. See Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 603, 172 P.3d at 135. Indeed, without a copy of the entire transcript, we are unable to meaningfully review Ronald's challenges regarding the evidence and arguments presented at the evidentiary hearing.

Further, while Ronald argues that he was unable to present evidence at the evidentiary hearing, he offers no indication of what evidence or testimony he would have presented and offers no explanation as to how that evidence or testimony would have produced a different result in this case. Therefore, he has not presented a cogent argument in support of reversing the divorce decree's property distribution. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d. at 1288 n.38.

Additionally, although Ronald disputes the testimony Rachel's witnesses gave or asserts that the evidence should have been viewed in a different manner, it was the district court's responsibility, as trier of fact, to weigh witness credibility and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. We do not reweigh the credibility of witnesses or the evidence presented to the district court. See Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 103, 86 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004) (stating that appellate courts do not reweigh the credibility of witnesses on appeal); Quintero v. McDonald, 116 Nev. 1181, 1184, 14 P.3d 522, 524 (2000) (refusing to reweigh evidence on appeal). Because this court defers to the district court's factual findings and will not disturb them unless clearly erroneous, see Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244, we can discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's decree of divorce.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing analysis, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.³

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ronald only challenges the district court's custody determination to the extent that he argues he was denied the opportunity to advocate for O.S. But because he does not explain how he was denied the opportunity to advocate for O.S. and has not provided a transcript from the evidentiary hearing for our review, he has not established a basis for relief. See Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (noting that it is appellant's burden to ensure that a proper appellate record is prepared and that, if the appellant fails to do so, “we necessarily presume that the missing [documents] support[ ] the district court's decision”); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d. 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (declining to consider issues that are not supported by cogent argument).

2.   To the extent Ronald also challenges the scope of the evidentiary hearing, suggesting he was unaware that the hearing was going to address all the pending issues in the divorce and not just the issue of the sale of the marital residence, we are unpersuaded by this argument. The record reflects that the September 16 hearing was specifically continued for an evidentiary hearing on the remaining issues.

3.   Insofar as Ronald raises other arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude they do not present a basis for relief.