IN RE: STEVEN J. SINGER (2025)

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART AND DISMISSING IN PART

Karina Singer appeals from a district court order approving an accounting, awarding attorney fees and costs, and approving a request for final distribution in a trust case. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Veronica Barisich, Judge.¹

The instant appeal involves Karina's assertions of error concerning the district court's order approving respondents Lenore Boekankamp and Natasha Singer's accountings of the Steven J. Singer Living Trust, dated January 15, 2011 (the trust), approving their petition for attorney fees and costs, and approving their petition for final distribution. Karina also challenges several interlocutory orders denying her requests for equitable and declaratory relief concerning her allegations of elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, misappropriation and comingling of trust funds, and the district court's purported failure to enforce the terms of the trust.

Karina, Lenore, and Natasha are the adult daughters of decedent Steven J. Singer, who created the trust as part of his estate plan. The administrative provisions of the trust provide that Steven, Karina, Lenore, and Natasha would serve as co-trustees of the trust during Steven's life, and that Karina, Lenore, and Natasha would continue to serve as co-trustees without substitution in the event of his incapacity and eventual death. The trust also included a majority trustee provision, which provided that any two named trustees, acting together, would have authority to act on behalf of and bind the trust. The trustees were authorized to retain attorneys and other professionals to assist with the administration of the trust estate, and permitted the trustees to provide reasonable compensation to those professionals from the trust.

The beneficiary provisions of the trust specified that, during Steven's life, trust income and principal may be used to provide for his health, maintenance, and support, including payment of living and treatment expenses in the event that Steven moved into an assisted living facility. Further, the trustees were permitted to invade the trust principal in order to make distributions for the health, education, maintenance, and support of Steven's issue, i.e., Karina, Lenore, and Natasha, as long as Steven's care was considered. Following Steven's death, the trust would be distributed in equal one-third shares between Karina, Lenore, and Natasha. The beneficiary terms of the trust also included a no contest clause, which would revoke the share of a “contesting beneficiary” if certain conditions constituting a challenge to the trust were met.

During the year 2015, Steven's treating physician declared him incapacitated due to his diagnoses of multiple sclerosis and dementia, and Lenore and Natasha (acting as majority trustees) determined it would be in Steven's best interest for him to reside in a memory care facility. Around this time, Lenore and Natasha contended that Karina accessed Steven's Clark County Credit Union (CCCU) trust account and used this account to pay her personal expenses. Subsequently, Lenore obtained a guardianship over Steven's person in 2016 and, after obtaining court approval, placed Steven in an assisted living facility. Shortly thereafter, Lenore closed the CCCU account based on the advice of a detective from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and opened a new checking account with Bank of America (BOA). This BOA checking account became the primary account used for Steven's care during the remainder of his lifetime.

Steven remained in an assisted living facility from 2016 until his death in 2020, and Lenore and Natasha used trust funds to pay for his care and maintenance during that time. Although Karina disagreed with many of Lenore and Natasha's (hereinafter the majority trustees’) decisions during this period, she did not initiate any proceedings in the district court to challenge the guardianship, their administration of the trust, or the majority trustees’ use of trust funds during Steven's life.

Following Steven's death, his life insurance proceeds were deposited in a BOA trust account ² and distributed evenly according to the terms of the trust. But, due to a clerical error on the bank's part, Karina received two distributions of $53,873.30, although she was only entitled to one, putting that account in the negative.

Afterwards, both Karina and the majority trustees filed probate cases in the district court. Karina filed a petition to probate Steven's will (which provided that Steven's estate would pour over into the trust after his passing), while the majority trustees filed a petition to assume jurisdiction over the trust, confirm the majority trustees, and for instructions in a separate district court case. The cases were eventually consolidated.

In the proceedings below, both parties filed separate accountings for the period of February 2015 to December 2021. Both parties filed objections to the other's competing accountings. In addition to her own petition for approval of her accounting and objection to the majority trustees’ accountings, Karina also filed several motions requesting relief in the district court, contending that the majority trustees’ actions in filing for guardianship over Steven and placing him in the assisted living facility constituted elder abuse, that these actions violated the terms of the trust, and that the majority trustees should be forced to pay restitution for the monies spent for Steven's care in the assisted living facility, along with any associated attorney fees and costs.

Karina also contended that the majority trustees’ decision to close the CCCU account and open the BOA checking account constituted conversion and comingling of trust funds, on the basis that the new BOA checking account was a “personal account” for the majority trustees rather than a trust account. Karina further argued that the filing of the guardianship action and the separate trust action violated the no contest provision of the trust. Accordingly, Karina asked the district court to remove the majority trustees as trustees, to require them to reimburse the trust for any money associated with the guardianship or Steven's time in the assisted living facility, to require them to pay punitive damages for the use of those funds in association with her elder abuse claims, and to nullify their distribution under the trust due to the violation of the no contest clause.

These matters were addressed over several hearings from February 2021 to July 2024, and the district court entered the following orders relevant to this appeal during that time.

First, the district court entered an order assuming jurisdiction over the trust and confirming Karina, Lenore, and Natasha as trustees on November 30, 2021. In that order, the court found that Steven was competent to manage his own affairs at all times prior to when he was declared incompetent and placed under guardianship. Consequently, the district court found that it would not review issues related to trust accountings, distributions, or withdrawals prior to when Steven was declared incompetent in 2015.

Because the trust allowed the trustees to make discretionary distributions of trust principal for the health, maintenance, and support of Karina, Lenore, and Natasha during Steven's life, the court declined to consider any argument that distributions from the trust to Karina, Lenore, and Natasha from the trust during Steven's life violated the provisions of the trust or constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. Finally, as relevant here, the district court found that the trust allowed Karina, Lenore, and Natasha to use trust funds to pay for attorney fees for the guardianship and the trust administration case, and approved attorney fees and costs requests for the estate's attorney and the firm representing Lenore and Natasha.

Thereafter, Karina filed several documents in the district court, and the district court held a hearing on those matters on March 2, 2022. In its order from the March 2, 2022, hearing, the district court denied Karina's requests for relief and restated its findings regarding Steven's capacity and the availability of attorney fees and costs from the trust. In doing so, the district court also found that the duplicate BOA trust account funds provided to Karina were not hers to keep, ordered Karina to place those funds in interpleader by a certain date, and found that Karina's arguments that the majority trustees misappropriated trust funds by titling the BOA checking account in their names as trustees rather than the name of the trust were without merit in light of Steven's pour over will, which transferred all assets into the trust upon his death.

Following entry of the order from the March 2, 2022, hearing, Karina moved for additional relief. In Karina's motions, she argued that the majority trustees were attempting to defraud the court by “fraudulently” adding a date to the March 2 hearing order, which was previously left blank for the court to fill out, and for submitting the order for the court to sign without her approval. Karina also argued that the majority trustees should be sanctioned and held in contempt for presenting misleading evidence in their accountings (related to her earlier argument that the accounts were comingled/misnamed) and requested that the court require the majority trustees to “disgorge” any monies and attorney fees and costs they spent during Steven's time in the assisted living facility. Karina again presented arguments that the majority trustees violated the terms of the trust by placing Steven in the assisted living facility against his wishes, which constituted elder abuse and breach of fiduciary duty. Additionally, Karina argued, among other things, that the district court should find that the majority trustees violated the no contest clause by initiating the guardianship proceedings in 2016 and filing the trust case after Steven's death.

In its “[o]rder from June 29, 2022, hearing,” the district court denied all of Karina's requests for relief. To the extent that Karina challenged the majority trustees’ actions during the guardianship, the district court found that it did not have jurisdiction to make orders concerning what was already ordered by the guardianship court, including reconsidering already approved attorney fees and costs. Further, the district court found that, to the extent that Karina desired to challenge the majority trustees’ actions prior to Steven's death on grounds of elder abuse and breach of fiduciary duty, she should have done so either in the guardianship action or in a separate trust action. The court also found that the majority trustees’ actions did not violate the no contest clause.

While the other matters identified above were pending before the district court, the parties prepared and filed accountings for the trust. At the request of the court, both parties filed combined briefs in support of and in opposition to each other's accountings prior to the final hearing on the issue. While both parties appeared to agree on the initial starting and ending balances of the accounts, they differed in their final accounting, which would reflect the final balance of the trust prior to distribution.

Following the hearing on the accountings, the district court entered its order approving the majority trustees’ accountings, requests for attorney fees and costs, and the plan for final distribution, and denied Karina's requests for relief regarding the same on July 12, 2024. In so doing, the district court found that the majority trustees’ accountings were supported by substantial evidence and substantially complied with NRS 165.135 (stating the statutory requirements for a trust accounting).

The district court found that Karina received a payment of $53,873.30 from Steven's life insurance, and an additional erroneous payment of the same amount from the BOA trust account. The court found that although it ordered Karina to interplead the BOA trust account funds, she failed to do so, leaving the trust with a potential liability for the missing funds. As to Karina's concerns regarding unauthorized withdrawals in the first accounting, the court found that the majority trustees demonstrated that this error by Bank of America was the source of the majority of her claimed $77,207.11 in unauthorized withdrawals, and, after examining the majority trustees’ accounting, found that only $1,052.05 of the unauthorized withdrawals remain unaccounted for. Nevertheless, the court found that this amount was insufficient to justify prolonging the litigation and that the pending accountings were sufficiently comprehensive to comply with NRS 165.135.

The district court further found no evidence of fraud and that Karina “failed to provide sufficient evidence of accounting errors or a sufficient factual or legal basis” to oppose the majority trustees’ accountings. The court found that there was no comingling as the BOA checking account was used for the interest of the trust and not by the majority trustees. Finally, the district court awarded attorney fees and costs to the trusts’ attorneys. Thus, the district court directed that disbursements be made in accordance with the final disbursement chart, with the exception of a holdback for additional attorney fees and estate taxes. Karina now appeals.

Preliminarily, to the extent that Karina argues that the district court erred by refusing to resolve issues previously decided by the guardianship court, by refusing to order an accounting for the period before 2015, by permitting the trustees to invade the trust principal during Steven's life, and by allowing for the payment of professional fees from the trust, these issues were resolved by the district court's November 30, 2021, order assuming jurisdiction over the trust.

While Karina did not specifically name the November 30, 2021, order in her appellate documents, we note that this order resolved several of her assertions of error on appeal. However, the November 30, 2021, order assuming jurisdiction over the trust was independently appealable under NRS 155.190(l)(h) (“[i]nstructing or appointing a trustee”) and (j) (“[d]irecting or allowing the payment of a[n] ․ attorney's fee”), as it confirmed Karina, Lenore, and Natasha as trustees, provided instructions to the majority trustees as to the accountings, provided instructions that the trustees had the right to invade the trust principal during Steven's life, found that attorney fees were permitted under the terms of the trust, and awarded attorney fees to the estate's attorney and the attorney for the majority trustees.

The majority trustees served the notice of entry of this order on November 30, 2021. Because this order was independently appealable under NRS 155.190(1) (providing for an appeal from certain interlocutory probate orders within 30 days of notice of entry of the order), and Karina did not challenge this order until her notice of appeal in this matter on August 10, 2024, we conclude that these arguments are not properly before this court as Karina should have raised them in a timely appeal from the November 30, 2021, order. Cf. Holiday Inn Downtown v, Barnett, 103 Nev. 60, 63, 732 P.2d 1376, 1378-79 (1987) (concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal as a direct challenge to the final judgment where the appeal was not timely taken from that judgment and was instead taken from an order denying NRCP 60(b) relief, and limiting the scope of review to that order only).

Similarly, the March 2, 2022, order was independently appealable under multiple subsections of NRS 155.190(1), including subsections (h) and (j), which were discussed above, as well as subsection (n) (“[m]aking any decision wherein the amount in controversy equals or exceeds ․ $10,000”), as the district court found that the $53,873.30 in funds from the BOA trust account did not belong to Karina, and awarded attorney fees. The court additionally instructed the trustees as to the comingling provision of the trust by addressing Karina's arguments that the majority trustees comingled funds by placing them in personal bank accounts, and finding that Karina's arguments that the majority trustees misappropriated trust funds by titling the BOA checking account in their names as trustees rather than the name of the trust was without merit in light of Steven's pour over will, which transferred all assets into the trust upon his death.

The majority trustees served the notice of entry for the order from the March 2, 2022, hearing on April 11, 2022. Because Karina did not file her notice of appeal challenging this order until August 10, 2024, we conclude that her appeal is untimely, and that we lack jurisdiction to consider her arguments challenging that order. See Healy v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 103 Nev. 329, 331, 741 P.2d 432, 433 (1987) (providing that this court lacks jurisdiction over an untimely notice of appeal). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal as to the order from the March 2, 2022, hearing and do not consider Karina's arguments related to trust administration prior to the guardianship, alleged invasions of the trust to pay personal expenses, comingling personal funds in trust accounts, and the district court's finding that the trust allows for the payment of professional fees, as these arguments should have been raised in a timely appeal from the order from the March 2, 2022, hearing. See id.³ Thus, to the extent that Karina raises arguments concerning the orders properly before this court that have previously been addressed in the district court's November 30, 2021, order assuming jurisdiction over the trust, and the order from the March 2, 2022, hearing, we decline to consider them. See Healy, 103 Nev. at 331, 741 P.2d at 433; Holiday Inn, 103 Nev. at 63, 732 P.2d at 1378-79.

We now turn to Karina's remaining arguments. “In a matter concerning probate, we defer to a district court's findings of fact and will only disturb them if they are not supported by substantial evidence.” Waldman v. Maini, 124 Nev. 1121, 1129, 195 P.3d 850, 856 (2008). However, this court will review legal issues de novo. Id. at 1130, 195 P.3d at 856.

Karina challenges the district court's order from the June 29, 2022, hearing, which we construe as an interlocutory order merged with the final judgment under Consolidated Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998) (providing generally that interlocutory orders may be considered in the context of an appeal from a final judgment). See also In re Steven J. Singer Living Tr., Docket No. 85403, 2022 WL 16703968 (Nov. 3, 2022) (Order Dismissing Appeal) (dismissing appellant's appeal from the June 29, 2022, order on the basis it was not substantively appealable under any statute or court rule).

As to the order from the June 29, 2022, hearing, Karina argues that the district court erred when it found that the majority trustees did not commit elder abuse or commit a breach of fiduciary duty by placing Steven in the assisted living facility. But as noted above, when rejecting this argument, the district court found that it was without jurisdiction to reconsider the prior orders of the guardianship court and that Karina's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and elder abuse were untimely as they should have been raised during the guardianship proceedings or in separate trust proceedings during Steven's life.

On appeal, Karina does not address the district court's findings that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the prior orders of the guardianship court and that the statute of limitations for her breach of fiduciary duty and elder abuse claims had expired, and instead argues that the district court failed to properly impose civil and criminal penalties for breach of fiduciary duties and elder abuse as alleged against respondents. Because Karina did not address the district court's alternative reasons for denying her requests for relief in the June 29, 2022, order, she has forfeited any challenge to the same, and we affirm the district court's order as to these decisions. See Hung v. Genting Berhad, 138 Nev. 547, 550, 513 P.3d 1285, 1288 (Ct. App. 2022) (stating that “the failure to properly challenge each of the district court's independent alternative grounds leaves them unchallenged and therefore intact, which results in [the forfeiture] of any assignment of error as to any of the independent alternative grounds”).

Next, Karina argues that the district court erred when it determined in its June 29, 2022, order that the majority trustees did not violate the no contest clause. We disagree. This court reviews the terms of a trust de novo, In re W.N. Connell & Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust, 133 Nev. 137, 139, 393 P.3d 1090, 1092 (2017), and construes the trust in a manner effecting the apparent intent of the settlor, Hannam v. Brown, 114 Nev. 350, 356, 956 P.2d 794, 798 (1998).

Here, Article 12 of the trust lists several discrete actions which would be considered a contest of the trust, including “an allegation that [the trust] is invalid” based on “forgery, lack of due execution, lack of capacity, menace, duress, fraud, or undue influence, or revocation of [a testamentary instrument under applicable Nevada law],” challenging a transfer of property on grounds that it was not the transferor's property at the time of the transfer, or filing a creditor's claim against the estate. In the instant matter, the majority trustees filed a petition to assume jurisdiction over the trust, confirm trustees, and petition for instructions, which sought confirmation that real property belonging to Steven had been transferred to the trust.

Karina alleges that filing the trust petition and guardianship actions violate the terms of the no contest clause. However, neither of these actions include an allegation that the trust is invalid, or challenge the trust instrument on grounds of lack of capacity, fraud, or any of the other grounds listed in Article 12 of the trust. We therefore conclude that nothing in this action violates the terms of the no contest clause. See Waldman, 124 Nev. at 1129, 195 P.3d at 856. And, in light of our conclusions above, we affirm the district court's order from the June 29, 2022, hearing.

We now turn to Karina's challenges to the district court's July 12, 2024, order granting the majority trustees’ petition for accounting, final distribution, and award of attorney fees and costs. Specifically, Karina argues that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to consider that her accountings were unopposed and supported by evidence, that the majority trustees’ accountings were inaccurate, and because it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the contested petitions.

Having reviewed Karina's informal brief and the record on appeal, we conclude the argument that her accounting petitions were unopposed is unsupported by the record, as the record supports that the majority trustees filed timely oppositions and omnibus oppositions in response to Karina's petitions as instructed by the district court.⁴ Thus, this argument does not provide a basis for relief.

As to Karina's argument that the majority trustees’ accountings were inaccurate, we conclude this argument likewise does not present a basis for relief. Specifically, Karina argues that the majority trustees submitted fraudulent documents by attaching a December 2020 BOA trust account statement to their accounting showing a negative balance of $53,873.11 in the BOA trust account, while in reality the updated statement from March 2021 reflected a $0.00 balance, showing the negative balance had been satisfied. However, Karina's claims are unsupported by the record, as the March 2021 account statement she relies on reflects a ‘‘forced closed account” transaction, not that liability for the $53,873.11 no longer exists. Further, the record reflects that the majority trustees removed the $53,873.11 debt because BOA failed to file a timely creditor's claim. And, as stated in the July 12, 2024, order granting the majority trustees’ petitions for accounting and distribution, Karina never repaid the $53,873.11 as instructed by the court.

Moreover, Karina has not identified any specific errors in either the accounting or the district court's order approving the final distribution for this court to review. Although Karina's opening brief summarily asserts that the majority trustees failed to provide accurate accountings and that the accountings reflected unexplained withdrawals, she does not adequately present any specific argument to refute the district court's findings in its order. Accordingly, we conclude that these claims are not cogently argued. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (holding that the court need not consider claims that are not cogently argued).

Next, Karina argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees and costs to the attorneys involved in the trust drafting, administration, and the guardianship proceedings. However, Karina did not timely appeal from any of the orders that concluded attorney fees were permitted under the trust. See Healy, 103 Nev. at 331, 741 P.2d at 433 (holding that an untimely notice of appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this court). We therefore lack jurisdiction to address anything other than the reasonableness of the fees awarded. And because Karina presents no arguments challenging the reasonableness of the fees awarded, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the fees requested in the majority trustees’ petition for accounting. See Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat‘l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 350, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969) (reviewing an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion); Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) (providing that issues not raised on appeal are deemed forfeited).

To the extent that Karina contends the district court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing violated NRS 165.143 and her due process rights, we conclude that this argument lacks merit. NRS 165.143 does not require an evidentiary hearing in this circumstance, only a hearing after a beneficiary's demand for an accounting is rejected by a trustee. See NRS 165.143(l)-(6) (stating that if a beneficiary's demand for an accounting is rejected by a trustee (a circumstance which did not occur here), the beneficiary must petition the court to confirm jurisdiction over the trust and to confirm the trustee, after which the clerk shall set the petition for a hearing and the court may enter an order regarding the status of the accounting).

Similarly, we conclude that the district court afforded Karina sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of the accountings, such that her due process rights were not violated by the lack of an evidentiary hearing in this proceeding. See Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007) (holding that procedural due process requires that parties receive “notice and an opportunity to be heard”). For these reasons, we affirm the order approving the majority trustees’ petition for accounting and for final distribution.

Having reviewed Karina's arguments and found no basis for relief, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by approving the majority trustees’ accounting, request for attorney fees and costs, and final distribution. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal as to the March 2, 2022, order, and the August 28, 2024, order, and affirm the remaining orders discussed above.

It is so ORDERED.⁵

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that the Honorable Jessica K. Peterson, Judge, presided over all matters in this case until the case was reassigned on January 9, 2023. Judge Peterson signed the order assuming jurisdiction over the trust, the order from the March 2, 2022, hearing, and the order from the June 29, 2022, hearing. Thereafter, the Honorable Veronica Barisich, Judge, presided over the case and entered the July 12, 2024, order approving the majority trustees’ accountings, request for attorney fees and costs, and request for distribution, as well as the August 28, 2024, order granting Karina's motion for stay.

2.   This account is separate from the BOA checking account mentioned above.

3.   Karina also challenges the district court's August 28, 2024, order granting her motion to stay which required her to post a $500 cost bond. Because there is no statute or court rule authorizing an appeal from such an order, we dismiss Karina's appeal as to the August 28, 2024, order. Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Harrah's Club, 81 Nev. 414, 419. 404 P.2d 902, 905 (1965) (stating that an order denying a stay of proceedings is not appealable), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Casino Operations, Inc. v. Graham, 86 Nev. 764, 765, 476 P.2d 953, 954 (1970).

4.   Further, the majority trustees noted in their combined brief before the court that one of Karina's revised accountings was not properly before the court as it was submitted as an attachment to one of her other moving papers.

5.   Insofar as Karina raises arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief. In light of the above, we deny all pending requests for relief.