LESLIE FASSARI v. PAUL FASSARI (2025)

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

Leslie Fassari appeals from a district court order dismissing a divorce complaint. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Vincent Ochoa, Judge.

Leslie and respondent Paul Fassari were married in California in 2012. They have no children together. At some point, the couple moved to South Carolina. Around June 2, 2024, they separated and Leslie moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. On November 5, 2024, Leslie filed for divorce in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division.

In her complaint, Leslie sought a decree of divorce that would dissolve the bonds of matrimony between the parties. Leslie's complaint also included requests for the district court to adjudicate the rights to the parties’ marital assets and property, determine that the property owned by the parties before marriage was their sole and separate property, resolve the issue of marital waste, award alimony, and award attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, Leslie served Paul with the summons and divorce complaint according to NRCP 4.3(a) (providing for service outside Nevada but within the United States). Paul did not answer the divorce complaint but instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and requested attorney fees and costs for having to bring the motion.

In his motion, Paul argued that without personal jurisdiction over him the district court could not adjudicate the incidences of marriage, including determining the distribution of the marital property, issues of marital waste, and whether alimony should be awarded. Thus, Paul argued that the only remedy available to Leslie would be a decree of divorce granting dissolution of marriage without adjudicating the incidences of the marriage, which he maintained is disfavored under the Nevada Supreme Court's holding in Gojack v. Second Judicial District Court, 95 Nev. 443, 445, 596 P.2d 237, 239 (1979) (“[W]hen a trial court proceeds to enter a judgment or decree of divorce, it shall contemporaneously dispose of the community property of the parties.”). Accordingly, he argued that the district court should decline to exercise its in rem jurisdiction and dismiss the complaint in its entirety.

In turn, Leslie argued, among other things, that Paul consented to personal jurisdiction in Nevada by requesting affirmative relief in the form of attorney fees and costs. Therefore, Leslie argued that the district court could properly exercise in personam jurisdiction over Paul and could enter a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage and adjudicating the incidences of the marriage, including property distribution. In the alternative, Leslie argued that the district court should enter a decree of divorce that dissolved the marriage of the parties under the district court's exercise of its in rem jurisdiction and allow the parties to litigate the other issues where both parties were subject to the personal jurisdiction of the state court, presumedly South Carolina.

In doing so, Leslie argued that failure to grant a divorce would not only violate years of public policy allowing litigants to move to Nevada to obtain divorces, but would also violate her equitable interests, as South Carolina law would prevent her from filing for divorce in that jurisdiction until one year following her separation from Paul. See S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-10(5) (1979) (allowing divorce “on the application of either party if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart without cohabitation for a period of one year”).

After the hearing, the district court entered an order dismissing Leslie's complaint. In its order, the district court cited Davies v. Eighth, Judicial District Court, No. 58784, 2012 WL 763200 (Nev. Mar. 8, 2012) (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition), as the basis for its finding that it must obtain in personam jurisdiction over both parties before it could adjudicate the “incidences of the marriage,” or in this case, Leslie's claims for division of marital assets and property, determination of separate property, marital waste, and her request for alimony. See also Simpson v. O'Donnell, 98 Nev. 516, 518, 654 P.2d 1020, 1021 (1982) (holding that the district court is required to obtain in personam jurisdiction over both parties to a divorce prior to adjudicating the incidences of the marriage).¹

Ultimately, the district court found that Paul “ha[d] no ties to the State of Nevada, and the parties have neither resided in nor visited Nevada at any point during their marriage.” Therefore, the court concluded that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Paul, and that exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would violate notions of due process unless it accepted Leslie's contention that he waived his personal jurisdiction defense by requesting affirmative relief in the form of attorney fees and costs.

Relying on Hansen v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 116 Nev. 650, 6 P.3d 982 (2000), and NRCP 12, the district court reasoned that a personal jurisdiction defense is not waived when it is joined with any other defense or objection. Thus, the district court implicitly construed Paul's request for attorney fees and costs to be a defense or objection under this rule, thereby concluding that Paul did not purposefully avail himself of the district court's jurisdiction.²

After determining that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Paul, the district court found that bifurcated divorce proceedings, like the one proposed by Leslie,³ are disfavored in Nevada. Citing the Nevada Supreme Court's rationale in Gojack, 95 Nev. at 445, 596 P.2d at 239, the district court found that entry of a divorce decree dissolving only the bonds of matrimony between the parties (and leaving the marital property issues unresolved) would lead to “numerous problems.” These problems include the unresolved effect of such a decree upon the character of the property and whether, after dissolution of the marriage, the property would be held by the parties as tenants in common or through some other manner of ownership. Therefore, the district court declined to exercise its in rem jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of the parties. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Leslie's complaint for divorce. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Leslie advances two primary assertions of error. First, Leslie argues that the district court erred in its determination that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Paul, as he waived his personal jurisdiction defense by requesting affirmative relief in the form of attorney fees and costs. Second, in the alternative, Leslie argues that even if the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Paul, it could still exercise in rem jurisdiction over the status of the marriage and grant her request for divorce. Thus, Leslie argues that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to dissolve the marriage pursuant to in rem jurisdiction.

In his answering brief, Paul argues that he did not consent to personal jurisdiction in Nevada as his request for attorney fees and costs did not constitute a request for affirmative relief. And because the district court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over him, Paul argues that it did not err when it dismissed the portion of Leslie's complaint requesting relief regarding incidences of the marriage. Further, Paul argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Leslie's remaining cause of action—for dissolution of the marriage—based on issues of public policy and Nevada's stated disfavor towards bifurcated divorces.

We agree with Leslie in part and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings related to her request for dissolution of marriage. However, we affirm the district court's order with respect to its determination that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Paul, and its dismissal of Leslie's other claims related to the incidences of the marriage.

Under Nevada law, it is “well settled that a divorce proceeding is an in rem proceeding ⁴ in which a court has jurisdiction to change the marital status of the parties even when only one party to a marriage is a bona fide resident of the state in which that court is located.” Simpson, 98 Nev. at 517, 654 P.2d at 1021 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev. 632, 634, 497 P.3d 618, 619-20 (2021) (holding that NRS 125.020, Nevada's divorce-jurisdiction statute, provides our family courts with subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce complaints). It is equally settled that the district court is required to obtain in personam jurisdiction ⁵ over both parties to a divorce action before adjudicating the incidences of the parties’ marriage. Simpson, 98 Nev. at 518, 654 P.2d at 1021.

Here, both parties concede that the district court had in rem jurisdiction to dissolve the parties’ marriage. See Simpson, 98 Nev. at 517, 654 P.2d at 1021. The issue is whether the district court abused its discretion in declining to grant the divorce. In doing so, we first address whether the district court erred in finding that it did not have in personam, or personal, jurisdiction, over Paul.

Leslie challenges the district court's finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Paul because Paul asked for affirmative relief in the form of attorney fees and costs in his motion to dismiss. Paul contends that his request for fees and costs does not constitute affirmative relief and therefore does not subject him to the jurisdiction of the Nevada courts.

We review a district court's determination of personal jurisdiction de novo. Fulbright & Jaworski LLP u. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. 30, 35, 342 P.3d 997, 1001 (2015). “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction over a party to a civil action on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.” NRS 14.065(1). Due process requires a nonresident defendant to have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Dogra v. Liles, 129 Nev. 932, 937, 314 P.3d 952, 955 (2013) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). But even when a nonresident defendant lacks minimum contacts with the forum state, he or she may still waive or consent to the forum state's jurisdiction. See generally 21 C.J.S. Courts § 72 (collecting cases).

While the doctrine of special appearances once enforced rigorous and unforgiving pleading rules in order to retain a personal jurisdiction defense, Nevada has “abrogate[d] the doctrine of special/general appearances.” Hansen, 116 Nev. at 656, 6 P.3d at 985. “Now, before a defendant files a responsive pleading such as an answer, that defendant may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction ․ and such a defense is not waived by being joined with one or more other defenses.” Id. at 656, 6 P.3d at 986. Some jurisdictions, however, have found an exception to this rule when a defendant is simultaneously seeking affirmative relief.

In Nevada, our supreme court has “assume[d] without deciding” that “seeking affirmative relief from a court subjects a litigant to that court's jurisdiction and cannot simultaneously be done while the litigant objects to the court's exercise of jurisdiction.” Dogra, 129 Nev. at 939, 314 P.3d at 957. To reach this conclusion, the court noted that “[o]rdinarily, a litigant seeks affirmative relief when he or she alleges wrongful conduct against another and seeks damages or equitable relief thereon, or defends against an action by denying or asserting defenses to allegations made against him or her.” Id.

We likewise assume without deciding that seeking affirmative relief from a court subjects a litigant to that court's jurisdiction and cannot simultaneously be done while the litigant objects to the court's exercise of jurisdiction. Dogra, 129 Nev. at 939, 314 P.3d at 957. Affirmative relief in this context is that which “could have been maintained independently of the plaintiff's action.” Affirmative Relief, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009); see Dogra, 129 Nev. at 939-40, 314 P.3d at 957 (favorably citing the Black's Law Dictionary definition in the context of affirmative relief subjecting a defendant to jurisdiction of court). The Ninth Circuit, interpreting FRCP 12, the parallel to NRCP 12, has held that a party who “has filed a timely and unambiguous objection to the court's jurisdiction” has not consented to jurisdiction “even if the party has preserved its own options by simultaneously asserting whatever claims or defenses it has against the plaintiff.” SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007).

We recognize, however, that the Nevada appellate courts have not specifically addressed whether a request for attorney fees and costs falls within the purview of affirmative relief. Other jurisdictions have held that a request for attorney fees and costs alone is not a request for affirmative relief that subjects a defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. See, e.g., Meyer v. Hatto, 198 P.3d 552, 557 (Wyo. 2008) (holding in a contracts action that “the better approach is to conclude that a motion for attorneys’ fees [and costs] is not an affirmative action that invokes personal jurisdiction”); Grange Ins. Ass'n v. State, 757 P.2d 933, 940 (Wash. 1988) (using the 5th ed. Black's Law definition to hold that attorney fees were not affirmative relief because they depended on the plaintiffs claim); but see Johnson v. Johnson, 662 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Kan. 1983) (holding a defendant made a general appearance by moving for attorney fees several days after a special appearance objecting to jurisdiction).

Here, Paul continuously objected to the district court's jurisdiction over him and sought no relief beyond what he might have been entitled to as a defendant. See SEC, 504 F.3d at 1149. Paul did not raise any additional claims, nor did he seek redress for a harm. See Grange, 757 P.2d at 940. Therefore, Paul did not seek affirmative relief, and consequently his actions directed toward the court did not constitute waiver or consent to this jurisdiction. See Dogra, 129 Nev. at 939, 314 P.3d at 957. As a result, the district court could not adjudicate the incidences of the marriage involving property outside of Nevada or impair Paul's rights. See Simpson, 98 Nev. at 518, 654 P.2d at 1021 (requiring the district court to obtain in personam jurisdiction over both parties before it can adjudicate the incidences of the marriage).

Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the district court's order finding it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Paul based on his request for attorney fees and costs. Finally, the parties appear to agree that Paul did not have minimum contacts with Nevada such that the district court could otherwise exercise personal jurisdiction over him. See Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. Therefore, we affirm in part the district court's order that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Paul.

We next determine whether the district court nonetheless should have granted the dissolution of the marriage pursuant to its in rem jurisdiction. Here, Leslie argues that the district court had jurisdiction to alter the marital status of the couple by virtue of her residence in Nevada for over six weeks. See NRS 125.020(2) (requiring a party to reside in Nevada for six weeks prior to filing for divorce); Simpson, 98 Nev. at 517, 654 P.2d at 1021. Leslie further argues that because she satisfied the pleading and jurisdictional requirements of NRS 125.010 and NRS 125.020—demonstrating that the parties were incompatible in marriage and that she had resided in Nevada for a period of longer than six weeks—the district court was required to dissolve the marriage under the doctrine of divisible divorce.

Paul argues that although the district court had the ability to exercise jurisdiction, the court did not abuse the discretion afforded to it under NRS 125.120 (“In any action for divorce when it appears to the court that grounds for divorce exist, the court in its discretion may grant a divorce to either party.”), because the statute's use of the term “may” means granting a divorce is permissive and not mandatory.

We generally review a district court's decision whether to grant or deny a divorce for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Williams, 120 Nev, 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129 (2004). Butin ad we review an issue of statutory interpretation de novo. Kay v. Nunez, 122 Nev. 1100, 1104, 146 P.3d 801, 804 (2006). To that end, we generally agree that the use of “may” in a statute is permissive whereas the use of “must” is mandatory. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Baker Ranches, Inc., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 36, 573 P.3d 1240, 1244 (2025) (recognizing that “[i]t is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that statutes using the word ‘may’ are generally directory and permissive in nature, while those that employ the term ‘shall’ are presumptively mandatory” (quoting Nev. Comm'n on Ethics v. JMA/Lucchesi, 110 Nev. 1, 9-10, 866 P.2d 297, 302 (1994))).

In this case, we start by reviewing NRS 125.120 to determine what discretion the statute gives a district court when deciding whether to grant a divorce. When “interpreting a statute, we begin with its plain meaning and consider the statute as a whole, awarding meaning to each word, phrase, and provision, while striving to avoid interpretations that render any words superfluous or meaningless.” Knickmeyer v. State ex. rel. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 675, 679, 408 P.3d 161, 166 (Ct. App. 2017). “Under the whole text canon, provisions within a common statutory scheme are interpreted harmoniously with one another in accordance with the general purpose of the statutes.” Urias v. First Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 24, 568 P.3d 576, 581 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under NRS 125.010, “[d]ivorce from the bonds of matrimony may be obtained” for several causes, including “incompatibility.” After satisfying a basis under NRS 125.010, divorce “may be obtained ․ by verified complaint to the district court of any county ․ [i]n which the plaintiff resides.” NRS 125.020(l)(c); Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev. 632, 634, 497 P.3d 618, 619-20 (2021) (recognizing NRS 125.020 as Nevada's divorce-jurisdiction statute). As relevant here, NRS 125.020(2) further provides that:

[u]nless the cause of action accrued within the county while the plaintiff and defendant were actually domiciled therein, no court has jurisdiction to grant a divorce unless either the plaintiff or defendant has been resident of the State for a period of not less than 6 weeks preceding the commencement of the action.

Nevertheless, “[i]n any action for divorce when it appears to the court that grounds for divorce exist, the court in its discretion may grant a divorce to either party.” NRS 125.120. Both parties acknowledge that the use of “may” in these statutes indicates discretion. Leslie argues that the proper reading of NRS 125.120 is that the district court has discretion in determining “whether the grounds for divorce exist” as set forth in NRS 125.120. Paul argues that satisfying NRS 125.010 and NRS 125.020 does not guarantee a divorce, and that the district court may consider other pertinent factors in exercising its discretion. In this case, Paul argued that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant a divorce because it would have required the parties to litigate the incidences of the marriage, including property distribution and alimony, in another forum.

Although the use of “may” in a statute is generally permissive, the legislature defines the use of “may” in the NRS as a “right, privilege, or power.” See NRS 0.025. Thus, when interpreting NRS 125.120, it is reasonable to read the statute as stating: “[i]n any action for divorce when it appears to the court that grounds for divorce exist, the court in its discretion [has the ‘right, privilege, or power’ to] grant a divorce to either party.”

Moreover, a district court's exercise of discretion must conform to the appropriate legal standards. See 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 920 (2019) (“[E]ven with respect to a discretionary matter a trial court must exercise its discretion in accordance with correct legal standards.”). And here, the statute limits that discretion to the extent “it appears to the court that the grounds for divorce exist.” NRS 125.120. Under the whole text cannon, Urias, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 24, 568 P.3d at 581, we conclude that the provisions of NRS 125.010 (naming the “causes for divorce”) and NRS 125.020 (identifying jurisdictional requirements for divorce complaints) constitute the grounds for divorce under NRS 125.120. Thus, a district court abuses its discretion when it denies a divorce under NRS 125.120 without considering whether the moving party presented adequate statutory grounds for divorce under NRS 125.010 and NRS 125.020.

Further, we conclude that the proper interpretation of “may” as used in NRS 125.010 (providing that divorce “may be obtained” for any of the listed causes) and NRS 125.020 (providing divorce “may be obtained” if the moving party meets jurisdictional requirements) confers the “right, privilege, or power” to the district court to grant a divorce for a plaintiff, who satisfies the statutory and jurisdictional requirements, but does not confer discretion to the court to deny a divorce when those requirements are met. See, e.g., 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 24 (2019) (stating that “[w]here a statutory ground of divorce is plainly shown to exist, the court has no discretionary right to deny a divorce”).

The Nevada Supreme Court's interpretations of previous versions of NRS 125.120 are consistent with our conclusion. In interpreting this statute, and similar amendments, our supreme court has consistently held that it was only necessary for the district court to determine that the statutory conditions for granting a divorce were satisfied prior to exercising its discretion to grant a divorce. See George v. George, 56 Nev. 12, 18, 41 P.2d 1059, 1059 (1935) (rejecting the appellant's argument that the respondent needed to introduce evidence beyond the statutory requirement of five years without cohabitation to present adequate grounds for divorce); Fausone v. Fausone, 75 Nev. 222, 226-27, 338 P.2d 68, 69-70 (1959) (applying George and holding that there was “no error in the court's exercise of its discretion in granting respondent a decree of divorce on the [statutory] ground of three years’ separation of the parties and in refusing to make findings of the other issues”); Kohlsaat v. Kohlsaat, 62 Nev. 485, 489-90, 155 P.2d 474, 476 (1945) (holding that the district court did not err by declining to make further findings of fact once sufficient statutory grounds for divorce were shown).

In this case, the district court did not consider whether Leslie's complaint for divorce met the statutory requirements of NRS 125.020 in denying her a divorce, which it recognized it could have granted based on the in rem jurisdiction granted to courts under the statute. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint without considering whether the complaint complied with NRS 125.020. Further, the district court did not base its dismissal order on its lack of in rem jurisdiction to grant a divorce, but instead dismissed the complaint because Nevada disfavors bifurcated divorce proceedings, relying on Gojack v. Second Judicial District Court, 95 Nev. 443, 445, 596 P.2d 237, 238 (1979), and because South Carolina is the situs of the majority of the marital property.

In its order, the district court stated that it was “not inclined to bifurcate the divorce based on the availability of a more proper forum.” In doing so, the court first relied upon Gojack for its finding that the bifurcation of divorce proceedings is highly disfavored by the Nevada Supreme Court and should generally be avoided due to the “numerous problems inevitably flowing from an interim divorce decree.” 95 Nev. at 445, 596 P.2d at 239.

Leslie argues that Gojack is inapposite, as she is not requesting a bifurcated divorce decree, but rather a divisible divorce. Paul argues that entry of a decree of divorce only resolving the status of the marriage would encroach upon Nevada's precedent “disfavoring” bifurcated divorce proceedings and interpreting NRS 125.150 to require simultaneous adjudication of the marital status and the incidences of the marriage. See Gojack, 95 Nev. at 445, 596 P.2d at 238 (stating that “[i]n granting a divorce, the court ․ [s]hall make [a] disposition of the community property of the parties”); Smith v. Smith, 100 Nev. 610, 613 n.1, 691 P.2d 428, 431 n.1 (1984) (holding that bifurcated divorces “should generally be avoided”).

To the extent that the district court relied upon Gojack as authority to dismiss Leslie's divorce complaint, we conclude this was in error. The holding of Gojack is limited: under the relevant statute, the district court must only make a distribution of the property of the parties if it is capable of doing so. See NRS 125.150(l)(b) (“In granting a divorce, the court ․ [s]hall, to the extent practicable, make an equal disposition of the community property of the parties.” (emphasis added)); see also Gojack, 95 Nev. at 446, 596 P.3d at 239 (“On the basis of what we find to be a rather clear statutory mandate, we conclude that in the context of this divorce proceeding, respondent is without legal authority to enter divisible judgments.” (emphasis added)); Smith, 100 Nev at 614 n.1, 691 P.2d at 431 n.1.

And here, under Simpson (which was decided three years following Gojack) and general principles of due process, the district court does not have jurisdiction over the incidences of the marriage. Thus, it is impracticable for the district court to enter anything other than a decree of divorce dissolving the parties’ marriage. See Simpson, 98 Nev. at 518, 654 P.2d at 1021. For these reasons, we conclude that Gojack is inapplicable because its holding is limited to bifurcated divorces and does not apply to divisible divorces, like the one at issue here. Thus, we conclude that the holding of Gojack does not support a legal standard for denying Leslie a divorce.

Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the district court's order finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Paul and that the court could not adjudicate the incidences of the marriage in Nevada. However, we reverse and remand the portion of the district court's order dismissing Leslie's complaint as to her request for divorce to determine if she satisfied the requirements of NRS 125.120, which would then require the court to grant an in rem divorce even if the incidences of the marriage ultimately may be properly decided in another forum. Therefore, we also reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this order.

It is so ORDERED.⁶

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the proceedings below, the district court and the parties relied upon Davies, 2012 WL 763200, for this proposition. We briefly note that Davies is an unpublished order predating January 1, 2016, and therefore uncitable. See NRAP 36(c)(3). Thus, we only rely upon Simpson for the purposes of this order.

2.   To the extent that the district court did not rule on Leslie's assertion that Paul's request for attorney fees and costs constituted affirmative relief outside the scope of a motion to dismiss, we conclude the district court's silence on this issue constituted a denial of her request. See Bd. of Gallery of History, Inc. v. Datecs Corp., 116 Nev. 286, 289, 994 P.2d 1149, 1150 (2000) (concluding that a district court's failure to rule on a request constituted denial of that request).

3.   We note that the proceeding Leslie requested is actually a divisible divorce, or a request for a divorce decree under the doctrine of divisible divorce. See Divorce, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (expressing the second definition of “divisible divorce” as a type of divorce that can be “granted when the court has subject-matter jurisdiction but lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant-spouse”). Although the definition of “bifurcated divorce” cross-references the definition of “divisible divorce” in Black's, we conclude that the term “bifurcated divorce” as used in Gojack does not apply to proceedings involving non-resident defendants, but rather to proceedings “whereby the marriage itself is dissolved but the issues incident to the divorce, such as alimony, child custody, and visitation, are reserved until a later proceeding.” See id. (referring bifurcated divorce to the definition of divisible divorce and defining both under the entry for divisible divorce); but see Doctrine of Divisible Divorce, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining the doctrine of divisible divorce as “[t]he view that dissolution of a marriage is in rem, affecting marital status, and can be decided separately from issues related to child custody and property rights”).

4.   “[A] judgment in rem is pronounced on the status of the particular subject matter of an action, or rendered in an action instituted against property ․ without regard to the persons having a beneficial interest in the property.” 15 Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Judgments § 101 (2025). A decree of divorce is traditionally regarded as a judgment in rem because it determines the marital status of the parties, and thus, only requires that the res, or marital status, be before the court upon proper notice. See 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 8 (footnotes omitted).

5.   A judgment rendered under in personam jurisdiction imposes a personal liability or obligation in favor of another, which may “follow the person of the obligor” and is “enforceable wherever he or she may be found.” 15 Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Judgments § 101 (2025). Thus, a court's exercise of in personam, or personal jurisdiction, is predicated upon due process and the traditional minimum contacts analysis for general or specific personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., M.I.A.W. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 33, 570 P.3d 150, 154 (2025) (discussing the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction).

6.   Insofar as the parties raise arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and concluded that they do not present a basis for relief.