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MATTHEW DOUGLAS, Appellant, v. JEREMY BEAN, WARDEN, Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Matthew Douglas appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the computation of time served filed on October 29, 2024. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Erika D. Ballou, Judge.
In his petition, Douglas claimed his credit history report erroneously stated he had to serve 5,479 days in prison. He contended that he was sentenced to a maximum aggregate term of 180 months in prison and, thus, he only had to serve 5,475 days in prison. Douglas neither alleged nor demonstrated that he had exhausted his administrative remedies before filing the petition.1 See NRS 34.724(1) (“Any person ․ who, after exhausting all available administrative remedies, claims that the time the person has served pursuant to the judgment of conviction has been improperly computed may file a petition ․ to challenge the computation of time that the person has served.”); see also NRS 34.724(2)(c). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Douglas’ petition.2 See NRS 34.810(2) (providing “[t]he court shall dismiss a petition that challenges the computation of time served ․ without prejudice if the court determines that the petitioner did not exhaust all available administrative remedies to resolve such a challenge as required by NRS 34.724”).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Bulla, C.J.
Gibbons, J.
Westbrook, J.
FOOTNOTES
1. We note that the statutory form for a time-computation petition includes questions relating to the grievance of claims, see NRS 34.733, and that Douglas’ petition omitted several of the questions presented on the statutory form, including the questions related to the grievance of claims.
2. The district court erred in failing to determine whether Douglas had exhausted his administrative remedies. See NRS 34.724(1), (2)(c). Nevertheless, the district court properly denied the requested relief because the petition should have been dismissed without prejudice. See NRS 34.810(2); see also Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (holding a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is based on the wrong reason). Nothing in this order should be construed as precluding Douglas from filing a postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of time served after all available administrative remedies have been exhausted.
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Docket No: No. 90395-COA
Decided: October 20, 2025
Court: Court of Appeals of Nevada.
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