JECORY KEMP v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Jecory Kemp appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on January 9, 2025. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jacqueline M. Bluth, Judge.

Kemp filed his petition more than two years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on June 7, 2022. See Kemp v. State, No. 83383-COA, 2022 WL 1536931 (Nev. Ct. App. May 13, 2022) (Order of Affirmance). Thus, Kemp's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Kemp's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause: cause for the delay and undue prejudice. See id. “[T]o demonstrate good cause, a petitioner must show that an impediment external to the defense prevented him or her from complying with the state procedural default rules.” Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003).

Kemp did not allege in his petition below good cause to overcome the procedural bar.¹ See Chappell v. State, 137 Nev. 780, 787, 501 P.3d 935, 949 (2021) (providing that “a petitioner's explanation of good cause and prejudice for each procedurally barred claim must be made on the face of the petition”). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Kemp's petition as procedurally barred. See State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005) (“Application of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory.”). Accordingly,² we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his “answer” to the State's response, Kemp argued he had good cause for the delay because he believed former counsel was going to file his postconviction habeas petition based on a “promise.” However, the record does not indicate that Kemp obtained permission from the district court to file this answer, see NRS 34.750(5), and the district court did not consider this argument in its written order. Therefore, we decline to consider the arguments contained in Kemp's answer in the first instance on appeal. See State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989).

2.   Insofar as Kemp raises claims on appeal that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief.