CHRIS JONES v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Chris Jones appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 25, 2024. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Nadia Krall, Judge.

Jones argues the district court erred by denying his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to invalidate a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that, but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 987-88, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Both components of the inquiry must be shown. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). We give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). A petitioner must raise claims supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

According to the arrest report, Jones arrived at his father's residence and rang the doorbell. Jones’ father did not answer and heard Jones break the window near the front door. Jones attempted to unlock the front door through the window. Jones’ father swatted at Jones’ hand as he attempted to unlock the door, and Jones cut his finger and face on the broken glass. Eventually, Jones unlocked the door, entered the residence, took the family dog, and left. As he was walking out of the neighborhood, Jones stopped and began going through a neighbor's trash can. The neighbor argued with Jones, during which time the dog fled from Jones and ran back to Jones’ father, who was standing outside his door. Police officers subsequently contacted Jones, where they observed “fresh cuts” to Jones’ hands and face. Jones’ father informed the police that “he had video of the incident from his [R]ing doorbell but that he could not access it at [that] time.” As a result of this incident, Jones was initially charged with home invasion constituting domestic violence; however, Jones subsequently pleaded guilty to coercion.

In his petition, Jones claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mother, brother, and neighbor, as well as his father's Ring doorbell video.¹ Jones contended that these witnesses would have proved he did not break the window that day but rather did so weeks earlier and that he did not threaten or force his father to do anything. He further claimed that the video would have shown he did not break the window that day.

Jones failed to allege specific facts indicating he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial had counsel conducted a more thorough investigation.² Jones conceded in his petition that he interacted with his mother, brother, and neighbor at the time of the offense, indicating he was aware that these witnesses could have provided statements at the time he entered his guilty plea. Likewise. Jones did not allege that he was unaware the residence, which he claimed to own and reside in,³ had a Ring doorbell camera or that video of the incident existed when he entered his plea. Rather, Jones stated at the plea canvass and in his guilty plea agreement that he had discussed his case and his possible defenses with counsel before entering his plea.

Moreover. Jones received a substantial benefit from entering his guilty plea. Jones was not eligible for probation on the charge of home invasion due to a prior burglary conviction, see NRS 205.067(2). but he was eligible for probation on the charge of felony coercion, see NRS 176A.100(1)(c), which also carried a lesser maximum sentence, compare NRS 205.067(2) (requiring, for invasion of the home, a minimum term of imprisonment not less than one year and a maximum term of not more than ten years), with NRS 207.190(2)(a) (requiring, for felony coercion, a minimum term of imprisonment not less than one year and a maximum term of not more than six years). Indeed, the State agreed not to oppose probation and to allow Jones to withdraw his plea and to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge if he successfully completed probation. In light of the foregoing, Jones failed to allege specific facts that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle him to relief. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying these claims.

Second, Jones claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to (1 “apply the reasonable person analysis test” for coercion; (2) challenge the validity of the coercion statute; and (3) discover that his constitutional rights were violated when the police arrested him without probable cause. These claims were outside the scope of claims permissible in a postconviction habeas petition challenging a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea. See NRS 34.810(1)(a) (stating a postconviction habeas petition stemming from a guilty plea may allege only “that the plea was involuntarily or unknowingly entered or that the plea was entered without the effective assistance of counsel”); see also Gonzales v. State, 137 Nev. 398, 403-04, 492 P.3d 556, 562 (2021) (allowing claims that counsel was ineffective at sentencing in a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus following a guilty plea). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying these claims.

Third, Jones claimed counsel coerced his guilty plea. In particular, Jones contended that counsel told him “we'll release you today or in a few days only if you sign today” and that he would be placed on probation for a period of two to five years. Jones’ claim is belied by the record. At the plea canvass, Jones stated no one had forced or threatened him or promised him anything in order for him to plead guilty. He also stated that he read and understood everything in the guilty plea agreement, in which he affirmed that (1) he understood the sentencing judge had discretion in determining whether to grant probation, (2) he had not been “promised or guaranteed any particular sentence by anyone,” (3) he understood the sentencing judge was not obligated to accept recommendations from his counsel or the State, and (4) he was not acting “under duress or coercion or by virtue of any promises of leniency, except those set forth in this agreement.” Therefore, Jones failed to allege specific facts that were not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle him to relief. See Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. 1032, 1038, 194 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2008) (“Further, a defendant may generally not repudiate [his] assertions, made in open court, that the plea is voluntary.”). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Jones also claimed the State “withheld” exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 3 73 U.S. 83 (1963). In particular, Jones contended that the State “had an opportunity to obtain the video from the incident from the Ring doorbell” and that it did not obtain statements from the aforementioned witnesses even though it knew they had knowledge of the incident. A petitioner may challenge the validity of their guilty plea based on the State's failure to disclose material exculpatory information prior to entry of the plea.⁴ See State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 195, 275 P.3d 91, 93 (2012). However, Jones did not allege the State had the video or the witness statements in its possession, custody, or control. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (“It is well settled that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.” (emphasis added)); Wade v. State, 114 Nev. 914, 920, 966 P.2d 160, 164 (1998) (stating the State has a duty “to provide the defendant with all potentially exculpatory evidence in its control or possession” (emphasis added)). Nor did he allege that defense counsel could not reasonably obtain this evidence from other sources. See Steese v. State, 114 Nev. 479, 495, 960 P.2d 321, 331 (1998) (“Brady does not require the State to disclose evidence which is available to the defendant from other sources, including diligent investigation by the defense.”). Therefore. Jones failed to allege specific facts that were not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle him to relief. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.

In light of the foregoing,⁵ we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.⁶

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

cc: Hon. Nadia Krall, District Judge

Chris Jones

Attorney General/Carson City

Clark County District Attorney

Eighth District Court Clerk

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent Jones argues on appeal that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his “roommate,” he did not raise this claim in his petition, and we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989).

2.   We note that Jones asserted he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's alleged deficiencies. However, Jones’ subjective assertion is not dispositive of the prejudice inquiry. See Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017) (“Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies.”).

3.   In his reply to the State's response below, Jones alleged he purchased the property with funds he obtained from a settlement, that he discussed this fact with counsel, and that counsel confirmed this fact with his father.

4.   For this reason, we conclude the district court erred in determining Jones’ Brady claims were outside the scope of claims permissible in a postconviction habeas petition stemming from a guilty plea. Nonetheless, we affirm the district court's decision for the reasons stated herein. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (holding a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is based on the wrong reason).

5.   Jones does not present any argument regarding the denial of his motion to appoint counsel. Thus, we conclude Jones fails to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion by denying said motion.

6.   In light of this order, Jones’ motion for status check filed on October 14, 2025, is denied as moot.