RAJEEV SINGH v. DAIMLER TRUCK FINANCIAL SERVICES USA LLC (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Rajeev Singh appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Carli Lynn Kierny, Judge.

In 2015, nonparty RTAS Transport LLC ¹ entered into a financing agreement with nonparty Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA, LLC (MBFS), to finance the purchase of a commercial trucking vehicle. Singh, as RTAS's managing member, signed the financing agreement on RTAS's behalf. However, Singh additionally signed the financing agreement as a guarantor should RTAS fail to fulfill its obligations. MBFS subsequently sold its rights and obligations with respect to all litigation or claims arising out of its financial services businesses in the United States to respondent Daimler Truck Financial Services USA, LLC (DTFS).

RTAS defaulted on the loan and DTFS repossessed the vehicle and sold it at a repossession sale for $10,200. DTFS then filed suit against RTAS and Singh alleging that following the repossession sale, there remained a $28,376.77 deficiency. DTFS attached a copy of the financing agreement and a declaration attesting that DTFS purchased MBFS's rights and obligations relating to the claim. Singh filed an answer, and this matter proceeded to discovery.

On July 12, 2024, DTFS served various requests for admission on Singh via mail. The requests required Singh to admit or deny: (1) he entered into the attached retail installment contract; (2) he failed to perform his obligations under the contract; (3) DTFS notified him of the repossession sale as required by law, (4) the vehicle was sold in a commercially reasonable manner; (5) the deficiency due after the sale was $28,376.77; and (6) DTFS is entitled to the judgment requested in the complaint. Singh failed to respond to these requests.

On September 17, 2024, DTFS moved for summary judgment based solely on Singh's failure to respond to the requests for admission. DTFS maintained that because Singh failed to respond, the requests were deemed admitted and the admissions entitled DTFS to summary judgment. Singh responded but instead of addressing the requests for admission, Singh argued DTFS was not entitled to summary judgment due to various alleged factual inaccuracies and that it was unclear whether DTFS had standing to pursue the debt.² DTFS filed a reply, and Singh filed a sur-response, which did not address his failure to respond to the requests for admission. At the subsequent hearing, the district court orally granted summary judgment finding that the requests were deemed admitted and that the admissions entitled DTFS to summary judgment. The district court then entered a written order memorializing that decision. Singh now appeals.

On appeal, Singh largely repeats his arguments from his oppositions to the motion for summary judgment but additionally argues that he never received the requests for admission and that they must have been lost in the mail or never sent. Other than this single argument regarding an alleged lack of service, Singh presents no argument challenging the district court's basis for its decision, namely his failure to respond to the requests for admission.

We conclude that Singh has forfeited his argument that he did not receive the requests for admission, and thus they should not have been deemed admitted, because he failed to raise it before the district court despite filing an opposition and sur response and presenting argument at the hearing. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (providing that “[a] point not urged in the trial court” is forfeited and will not be considered on appeal). Because Singh's remaining arguments do not challenge the actual basis for the district court's order, we conclude he has likewise forfeited any such challenge. See Powell v. Liberty Mat. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) (stating issues that are not raised in appellant's opening brief are forfeited). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order awarding summary judgment on the basis that Singh failed to respond to the requests for admission and thus they are deemed admitted, such that no genuine dispute of material fact remained.³

It is so ORDERED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The supreme court previously dismissed RTAS as a party to this appeal.

2.   Insofar as Singh disputes whether DTFS is the real party in interest with standing to enforce the loan, we conclude relief is unwarranted because the record demonstrates that MBFS assigned its interest in the loan agreement to DTFS, see NRCP 17(a) (providing that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest”); Szilagyi v. Testa, 999 Nev. 834, 838, 673 P.2d 495, 498 (1983) (holding a real party in interest “is one who possesses the right, to enforce the claim and has a significant interest in the litigation”), and Singh offers no argument or explanation as to why that assignment was insufficient to establish DTFS's standing to enforce the loan. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (providing that this court need not consider claims that are unsupported by cogent arguments).

3.   Insofar as Singh raises arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they either do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given our disposition of this matter.