IN RE: THE ESTATE OF EDWARD L. LENK. (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE (DOCKET NO. 88503-COA) AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (DOCKET NO. 88616-COA)

Robert and Denise Pilkington (Pilkingtons) appeal from a district court order awarding attorney fees and costs (Docket No. 88503-COA) and challenge the district court's order declaring them vexatious litigants through a petition for a writ of mandamus ¹ (Docket No. 88616-COA). These cases were consolidated on appeal. See NRAP 3(b)(2). Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye County; Kimberly A. Wanker, Judge.

These matters arise from a dispute over the distribution of the estate of Edward L. Lenk. Respondents/Real Parties in Interest Hunter Liggett, Jill Rene Stynda, Janet E. Lenk Cohen, Carin Lenk Sloane, and Kristin Noel Lenk (the Lenk heirs) are Lenk's nieces and nephews and are the statutory heirs to his estate. Prior to Lenk's death, Robert created the Lenk Family Trust, which left Lenk's substantial estate to the Pilkingtons, effectively disinheriting the Lenk heirs. Following Lenk's death, the Lenk heirs filed a petition seeking to declare the Lenk Family Trust invalid and alleging Robert engaged in various acts of misconduct regarding the estate (the trust matter).

While the trust matter was ongoing, the parties located assets that were not held in the trust and subsequently opened an estate matter which governed disbursement of all non-trust assets. The district court did not consolidate the two matters but the same district court judge oversaw both. Thereafter, the Lenk heirs and Pilkingtons entered into a settlement agreement where the Pilkingtons stipulated that the trust was invalid and further agreed to pay additional funds in return for the Lenk heirs waiving any claims they may have against the Pilkingtons. The district court subsequently entered an order in both the trust and estate matter adopting the settlement agreement. As a result, the trust was dissolved and all assets previously held in the trust were transferred to the estate matter for disbursement.

Despite the settlement agreement, the Pilkingtons continued to assert claims to the estate funds in both the trust and estate matters, and they also instituted a civil complaint against Nye County Public Administrator Ginger Simpson, the Lenk heirs, Wells Fargo, and the district court judge overseeing both the trust and estate matter (the civil complaint).² Thus, for a period of time the Lenk heirs and the Pilkingtons were involved in three different district court proceedings concerning Lenk's estate and the actions taken in the trust matter.

Following additional motion practice, in which the Pilkingtons continued to assert previously denied arguments, the district court overseeing the estate matter entered an order finally distributing the estate between the Lenk heirs. The Lenk heirs subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b), NRS 155.165, and NRS 18.090, seeking a sum of $429,649.45. Further, the Lenk heirs sought an order declaring the Pilkingtons vexatious. The Pilkingtons filed an opposition which argued that the amount sought appeared to include fees and costs that were accrued in either the trust or civil matters and further argued they were not vexatious. The Lenk heirs subsequently filed two supplemental motions which provided additional argument and evidence supporting their argument that the Pilkingtons were vexatious and seeking additional sums.

The district court subsequently held a hearing on the motion, at which Robert, but not Denise, appeared in person. Robert argued the district court should deny the motion for attorney fees because it appeared the Lenk heirs were seeking attorney fees accrued across all three district court cases and because the motion for attorney fees was untimely. He further asserted there was no judgment authorizing a fee award and that, to the extent the Lenk heirs sought compensatory damages, they must file the motion in the trust matter. Finally, Robert argued he was not vexatious because his bank accounts remained frozen and. thus, he acted reasonably in seeking to unfreeze them.

Following the hearing the district court entered an order declaring the Pilkingtons vexatious litigants and awarding the Lenk heirs $490,079.32 in legal fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b) and NRS 155.165, and $29,141.32 in costs pursuant to NRS 18.090. Regarding the vexatious litigant determination, the district court found the Pilkingtons engaged in harassing litigation for nearly two years, across multiple judicial proceedings and in both appellate courts. This included repeatedly asserting claims that had previously been rejected or dismissed, often by multiple courts. The written order detailed multiple filings that the court concluded lacked a reasonable basis, including the civil complaint and numerous motions filed in both the trust and estate matters. Based on these findings, the district court ordered: (1) the Pilkingtons are enjoined from filing pro se complaints in the Fifth Judicial District Court unless they first submit the complaint to an existing district court judge's chambers for review to determine if the complaint contains cognizable claims; (2) if the complaint contains cognizable claims, the reviewing judge will provide a written finding that the new action has merit or may impact a constitutional right; and (3) if the Pilkingtons do not comply with this procedure, they will be responsible for any fees or costs associated with the defense and/or dismissal of said suit.

Turning to the attorney fees and costs issues, the district court concluded the Lenk heirs were entitled to attorney fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b) because the various filings in the estate matter lacked a reasonable basis and were intended to harass the Lenk heirs. The district court alternatively found the Lenk heirs were entitled to attorney fees as a sanction pursuant to NRS 155.165(2), which permits district courts overseeing probate matters to award ‘sanctions against vexatious litigants. The district court considered the required Brunzell 3 factors and concluded the fees sought were reasonable and necessary. Additionally, the district court found the Lenk heirs were entitled to costs pursuant to NRS 18.090. Ultimately, the district court awarded the Lenk heirs $490,079.32 in legal fees and an additional $29,141.32 in costs.

The Pilkingtons subsequently filed an appeal challenging the portion of the district court's order awarding the Lenk heirs attorney fees and costs and a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the portion of the order declaring them vexatious litigants.⁴ Because the district court relied, in part, on its determination that the Pilkingtons were vexatious litigants in making the attorney fees award, we begin our analysis by examining the Pilkingtons’ petition for mandamus relief challenging the vexatious litigant order.

Petition for writ of mandamus (Docket No. 88616-COA)

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or Capricious exercise of discretion. See NRS 34.160; Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556. 558 (2008). As the supreme court has recognized, a writ petition is the proper means for challenging a district court vexatious litigant order. See Peck v. Crouser, 129 Nev. 120, 124, 295 P.3d 586, 588 (2013). Nonetheless, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it is within the discretion of this court to determine if a petition will be considered. See Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). And the petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted. See Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).

This court reviews an order declaring individuals to be vexatious litigants and setting restrictions on their ability to access the courts for an abuse of discretion. Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 62, 110 P.3d 30, 44 (2005), abrogated on, other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228 n.6, 181 P.3d 670, 672 n.6 (2008). Under NRS 155.165(1), “[t]he [district] court may find that a person ․ is a vexatious litigant if the person files a petition, objection, motion or other pleading which is without merit, [or] intended to harass or annoy ․”

Because vexatious litigant orders limit a litigant's right to access the courts, the court must perform the four-factor analysis outlined in Jordan in declaring individuals to be vexatious litigants. 121 Nev. at 42-44, 110 P.3d at 60-62. This analysis requires that: (1) the litigants be ‘provided reasonable notice of and an opportunity to oppose” the request; (2) the district court “create an adequate record for review,” including an explanation of the reasons it issued the order; (3) the district court find the filings were frivolous or harassing and not simply based on “a showing of litigiousness;” and (4) the order be “narrowly drawn to address the specific problem encountered.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

The Pilkingtons’ writ petition argues the district court abused its discretion because substantial evidence does not support its findings on three of the Jordan factors.⁵ Regarding factor two, whether there is an adequate record for review, the Pilkingtons argue that, during the approximately 18 months of litigation in the estate matter, the district court did not declare any specific filing to be vexatious and thus it cannot now rely on these filings to support a vexatious litigant ruling. The Pilkingtons similarly argue that, because neither this court nor the supreme court declared any appeal vexatious, their appellate filings cannot support a vexatious litigant finding. Finally, the Pilkingtons argue that there remains an ongoing dispute regarding the status of the Wells Fargo accounts and that the district court “cherry-picked” filings to make them appear vexatious.

We conclude the district court properly made a record to support the vexatious litigant order under factor two. Here, the district court noted the Pilkingtons’ constant, repetitive filings across multiple courts and found that the Pilkingtons are uninterested in complying with any ruling they disagree with and instead continually multiply the litigation by filing new motions, petitions, or complaints. The district court further found that, rather than ending the litigation, the Pilkingtons used the settlement agreement as a “springboard” for litigation against not only the Lenk heirs but the district court and the probate commissioner. The district court further found that the primary goal of these filings was to run up litigation costs and harass the Lenk heirs.

These findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Finkel v. Cashman Professional, Inc., 128 Nev. 68, 72-73, 270 P.3d 1259, 1262 (2012) (stating a district court abuses its discretion when its findings are not supported by substantial evidence). Specifically, the record demonstrates that the Pilkingtons repeatedly asserted the claim that their bank accounts remained frozen despite three different district courts rejecting this argument. Notably, when the Pilkingtons’ appeals challenging these decisions were dismissed as untimely, the Pilkingtons simply took their claims to another district court in an attempt to obtain a different result. The Pilkingtons pursuit of their bank account claims is but one example of how they refused to accept any adverse rulings and instead litigated their claims across three different judicial actions and multiple appeals. Moreover, the record reflects that, in discussing these ongoing proceedings, Robert stated that he believed such litigation would be “fun” and that he looked forward to the continued motion practice.

Moreover, to the extent the Pilkingtons claim they cannot be vexatious because none of their individual filings was ever declared vexatious, there is no Nevada law establishing such a requirement for a court to declare individuals vexatious litigants. Under these circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's handling of the second Jordan factor. 121 Nev. at 62, 110 P.3d at 44.

The Pilkingtons’ challenge to the third Jordan factor, whether the filings were frivolous, again rests on the assertion that because the district court never previously found their filings vexatious, it cannot now rely upon these filings to declare them vexatious litigants. Here, the district court found the Pilkingtons’ filings were part of a “course of deception and obfuscation” to conceal their attempts to abscond with Lenk's assets. Further, the district court found the Pilkingtons used the settlement agreement as “a springboard for further malicious and vindictive litigation” and regardless of the legal reasoning, the court found the Pilkingtons continued to challenge every adverse order to inflict financial pain through attorney fees. Once again, these findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Finkel, 128 Nev. at 72-73, 270 P.3d at 1262. And as discussed above, there is no requirement that a court declare each individual filing to be vexatious for such filings to support a vexatious litigant finding.

The Pilkingtons further reason that, so long as they reasonably believed their bank accounts remained frozen, or that the Lenk heirs violated the settlement agreement, their associated filings cannot be frivolous or vexatious. However, the district court determined that the Pilkingtons were not litigating based on a reasonable, if incorrect, belief regarding the status of the bank accounts but instead found the Pilkingtons’ true intent was “to create maximal monetary damage.” Further, while the Pilkingtons assert their intention was only to unfreeze the allegedly frozen accounts, substantial evidence supports the district court's determination that the Pilkingtons were actually using these filings to harass the Lenk heirs in retaliation for being deprived of Lenk's estate. This includes that the Pilkingtons asserted their already dismissed claims regarding the bank accounts in three different courts, initiated litigation against the district judge overseeing the trust matter, continued to litigate the settlement agreement despite the court enforcing it, and Robert's own statements indicating the litigation was “fun” for him. Accordingly, the Pilkingtons challenge to the third factor fails.

Finally, contrary to the Pilkingtons’ assertion, we conclude the vexatious litigant ruling is narrowly tailored (the fourth Jordan factor). The Pilkingtons argue that requiring them to seek leave of court before submitting any pro se complaint or petition in the Fifth Judicial District Court is overly broad and should only be imposed on individuals who have been “highly litigious” against multiple defendants. However, our supreme court has never held that the type of restrictions available to a district court depend on the number of defendants a vexatious litigant has named. Instead, the supreme court has upheld similar restrictions imposed on a vexatious litigant. See Peck, 129 Nev. at 122-23, 295 P.3d at 587 (holding that a court may prohibit a vexatious litigant from filing any new action “without first demonstrating to the court that the proposed case is not frivolous” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, the Pilkingtons have named multiple defendants in their frivolous filings, including naming the district court judge overseeing the trust and estate matter in a civil complaint. Accordingly, we conclude the district court narrowly tailored its restrictions to address the Pilkingtons’ vexatious filings.

Given the record before us, and the detailed findings made by the district court, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in entering the vexatious litigant ruling. Jordan, 121 Nev. at 62, 110 P.3d at 44. Accordingly, the Pilkingtons fail to demonstrate our extraordinary intervention is warranted, and we therefore deny the petition. Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851; see also NRAP 21(b)(1) (permitting this court to deny a petition without an answer).

Appeal from order awarding attorney fees and costs (Docket No. 88503-COA)

We turn now to the Pilkingtons’ challenge to the order awarding the Lenk heirs their attorney fees and costs. The district court awarded $490,079.32 in legal fees and $29,141.32 in costs for a total award of $519,220.64.

This court reviews a district court's award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 114 Nev. 1348, 1352-54, 971 P.2d 383, 385-86 (1998). Here, the district court found the Lenk heirs were entitled to attorney fees under two alternative statutes, NRS 18.010(2)(b), which permits an award of attorney fees upon a finding that the offending party brought or maintained a claim or defense without reasonable grounds, and NRS 155.165(2), which permits a district court to award attorney fees as a sanction in probate matters. The district court further awarded costs pursuant to NRS 18.090, which permits an award of costs in a probate matter.

With regard to attorney fees, the Pilkingtons’ opening brief addresses only whether attorney fees could be properly awarded under NRS 18.010(2)(b). Because the Pilkingtons do not challenge the district court's alternative statutory basis for the award, NRS 155.165(2), they have forfeited any arguments as to whether grounds for an award of fees existed under that statute. See Hung v. Genting Berhad, 138 Nev. 547, 552, 513 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2022) (holding an appellant must successfully challenge all independent alternative grounds supporting an order).

The Pilkingtons do, however, challenge whether the Lenk heirs’ motion for attorney fees was timely filed in accordance with NRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(i), which provides that a motion for attorney fees must be filed no later than 21 days after the written notice of entry of judgment is served. However, NRCP 54(d)(2)(D) expressly states that the provisions of NRCP 54(d)(2)(b) “do not apply to claims for attorney fees as sanctions.” And here, as noted above, the district court found the Lenk heirs were entitled to attorney fees pursuant to NRS 155.165(2), which permits attorney fees as a sanction award. Thus, because the Lenk heirs were awarded attorney fees as a sanction, NRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(i)’s 21-day time limit for seeking attorney fees did not apply, and the Pilkingtons’ timing argument does not provide a basis for relief.⁶

The Pilkingtons further argue the district court abused its discretion because the Lenk heirs improperly sought attorney fees incurred in the trust matter and civil matter without listing these docket numbers on the caption of the motion. But contrary to the Pilkingtons’ argument, the district court's order indicated that it had reviewed the billing statements submitted by the Lenk heirs and, at the hearing on the motion for attorney fees, the Lenk heirs asserted all of the requested fees were incurred in the estate matter. On appeal, the Pilkingtons have failed to identify any specific billing entries for attorney fees that were purportedly incurred in another case. Instead, they generally assert, without explanation, that at least some of the fees must have been incurred in other litigation. Given the Pilkingtons’ failure to identify anything in the record to support their argument, we conclude no relief is warranted on this claim.

Based on the foregoing analysis, and given that the Pilkingtons do not challenge the reasonableness of the attorney fees sought or the district court's analysis of the Brunzell factors, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion by granting the requested attorney fees. See Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 114 Nev. at 1353-54, 971 P.2d at 386 (reviewing an award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion); see also Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (“A point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the jurisdiction of that court,” is forfeited). Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court's award of attorney fees.

Finally, the Pilkingtons argue the Lenk heirs are not entitled to costs pursuant to NRS 18.090 because their memorandum of costs was not timely filed within the five days of entry of judgment required by NRS 18.110. However, this statute also allows for the filing of such memorandum at a “further time as the court or judge may grant.” NRS 18.110(1). In addition, even assuming that the Pilkingtons had an untimeliness argument, they failed to raise this argument before the district court. As a result, this argument is forfeited, and we need not consider it. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc., 97 Nev. at 52, 623 P.2d at 983; see also Eberle v. State ex rel. Nell J. Redfield Trust, 108 Nev. 587, 590, 836 P.2d 67, 69 (1992) (holding that the time limitation set forth in NRS 18.110 is not jurisdictional). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding costs to the Lenk heirs pursuant to NRS 18.090.⁷ Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 114 Nev. at 1352, 971 P.2d at 385 (reviewing an award of costs for abuse of discretion). As a result, we affirm the district court's costs award.

In summary, in Docket No. 88616-COA, we deny the Pilkingtons’ petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's order declaring them vexatious litigants. And in Docket No. 88503-COA, we affirm the district court's order awarding the Lenk heirs their attorney fees and costs.

It is so ORDERED.⁸

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the petition is styled as seeking both mandamus and prohibition relief and summarily requests the issuance of both writs in the conclusion, the petition only substantively addresses mandamus relief, and thus we treat the petition as seeking only mandamus relief.

2.   This court recently affirmed the district court's order dismissing the civil complaint and awarding attorney fees and sanctions against the Pilkingtons. See Pilkington v. Liggett, No. 87936-COA, 2025 WL 1426817 (Nev. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2025) (Order of Affirmance).

3.   Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349-50, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969).

4.   The Pilkingtons argue that this court must apply special scrutiny to the district court's decision because the district court adopted the proposed order declaring them vexatious litigants and granting the motion for attorney fees and costs prepared by the Lenk heirs’ counsel verbatim. This argument does not provide a basis for relief. As this court recognized in Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev. 408, 413-15, 537 P.3d 476, 483-84 (Ct. App. 2023), the mere fact that a district court has adopted a proposed order does not support applying a heightened standard of review or constitute an abuse of discretion supporting reversal of the challenged order.

5.   The Pilkingtons concede they received adequate notice and an opportunity to respond (factor one) and, thus, we do not discuss that factor further in this order.

6.   To the extent the Pilkingtons submitted various motions on July 10, 2025, which generally assert the same or similar timing arguments to those outlined above, we conclude no relief is warranted based on their July 10 filing for the reasons discussed above.

7.   The Pilkingtons do not challenge the amount of costs awarded or whether they were necessary.

8.   Insofar as the Pilkingtons raise arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief.