GEORGE STEVEN HUDSON v. THE STATE OF NEVADA MELISSA BROWN DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR WHITE PINE COUNTY ELY NEVADA WHITE PINE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT AND ELY JUSTICE COURT WHITE PINE COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICE DEPUTY SHANE BROWN ALSO DEPUTIES 457 AND 458 420 453 AND 1159 (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

George Steven Hudson appeals from a district court order dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus filed on December 6, 2024.¹ First Judicial District Court, Carson City; Jason Woodbury, Judge.

In his petition, Hudson requested that the district court dismiss all charges “in this matter” and in district court case no. 24-CR-00116-7K. He also claimed that various people and agencies involved in district court case no. 24-CR-00116-7K committed unlawful acts against him,² and that evidence would show he was a victim and not a suspect.

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, NRS 34.160, or to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). However, a writ of mandamus will not issue if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.170. A petitioner “carri[es] the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted.” Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). “We generally review a district court's grant or denial of writ relief for an abuse of discretion.” Koller v. State, 122 Nev. 223, 226, 130 P.3d 653, 655 (2006).

The district court determined that, “[i]nsofar as the Petition is comprehensible at all, its primary objective appears to be dismissal of criminal charges pending against [Hudson] in White Pine County.” The district court concluded that Hudson had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him because (1) he could defend against his criminal charges, and seek dismissal of his charges, in his criminal case; and (2) any purported civil causes of action could be addressed in a civil complaint. The district court further concluded that Hudson failed to identify any specific and mandatory duty that any named official or agency is neglecting or refusing to perform. After review, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Hudson failed to demonstrate extraordinary relief was warranted. Accordingly,³ we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Hudson filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter. As the filing fee has already been waived, we take no action on the motion.

2.   These acts include, but are not limited to, “breach of duty[ ] and/or discretion,” emotional distress, false imprisonment, slander and defamation, discrimination, targeting, harassment, profiling, and tampering with documents or evidence.

3.   In his notice of appeal and informal brief, Hudson appears to argue he is entitled to relief for the reasons expressed in various pleadings filed in different district court cases. To the extent Hudson raises additional argument in his pro se notice of appeal, such claims were improperly raised, and we do not consider them. See NRAP 3(c) (providing the contents of a notice of appeal); see also NRAP 28(k) (stating an appellant “proceeding without assistance of counsel may file the form brief provided by the clerk of the Supreme Court in lieu of the brief described in Rule 28(a)”). Moreover, Hudson may not incorporate by reference arguments raised in pleadings before the district court in his informal brief. See NRAP 28(e)(2). Therefore, we decline to consider any such claims.Insofar as Hudson raises other arguments not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they either need not be reached or do not present a basis for relief