IRINA BOVTOVIC CAMP IRINA CAMP INNA CAMP IRINA BOVTOVICH AN INDIVIDUAL AND ALEKSANDR BOVTOVICH INDIVIDUALLY AND TOUCAN v. ZOURAB TSISKARIDZE AN INDIVIDUAL (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Irina Bovtovic Camp (Camp) and Aleksandr Bovtovich (Bovtovich) (collectively appellants) appeal from a district court default judgment. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Gloria Sturman, Judge.

Zourab Tsiskaridze filed a civil complaint that alleged appellants took advantage of his age and poor English skills to take control of his bank accounts and steal a home he owned in Nevada. Specifically, Tsiskaridze alleged Camp, who is the mother of Bovtovich, informed him appellants were destitute following the death of her husband, who was a friend of Tsiskaridze's, and convinced him to allow appellants to live in his Nevada home while Tsiskaridze resided in Virginia. At some point, Camp persuaded Tsiskaridze to add her name to the title of the home, ostensibly so she could resolve various issues with the homeowners’ association. In or around 2019, Tsiskaridze sold a restaurant he owned in Virginia and returned to his home country of Georgia. Tsiskaridze alleged that between 2019 and 2023 appellants removed money from his accounts to pay for various bills and to invest in Bovtovich's cryptocurrency company.

In or around 2021, Bovtovich informed Tsiskaridze that he was at risk of being implicated in a money laundering scheme and to protect the home he needed to transfer the title to Camp. Further, Bovtovich convinced Tsiskaridze to transfer additional money to appellants to protect the funds from the money laundering investigation. Upon Tsiskaridze's return to the United States he discovered appellants had withdrawn hundreds of thousands of dollars from his accounts and barred him from returning to the home. Tsiskaridze subsequently filed a civil complaint alleging the above and sought monetary damages and return of the property.

Appellants filed an answer denying the allegations and alleging the complaint was fraudulent based on their belief that Tsiskaridze had not actually signed the verified complaint. Further, appellants alleged various nonparties, including the Henderson Police Department, were involved in a conspiracy to steal the property and funds that appellants claimed they were rightfully entitled to. The parties then proceeded to discovery where appellants refused to sit for depositions or answer discovery requests because they believed the case was “fraudulent.” During the litigation, appellants filed numerous motions or oppositions that generally alleged the district court, Tsiskaridze's counsel, or other third parties were engaging in fraud and falsifying evidence against appellants. Appellants additionally filed two motions to disqualify the district court judge, which were denied, alleging the district court judge behaved unprofessionally and was ignoring the law to favor Tsiskaridze.

Tsiskaridze filed a motion to deem appellants vexatious, arguing appellants’ filings were intended to harass him and his counsel and had no basis in law or fact. Further, Tsiskaridze alleged appellants refused to appear for depositions and would only appear at public court hearings. Tsiskaridze requested the district court limit appellants’ ability to file documents in the underlying litigation. Tsiskaridze additionally filed a motion to strike appellants’ answer and enter default pursuant to NRCP 37, arguing appellants were willfully refusing to participate in discovery. Appellants filed an opposition and countermotion to strike the complaint and requested Tsiskaridze's counsel undergo a mental health examination.

In June 2024, the district court held a hearing on the motion to strike appellants’ answer and the motion to declare appellants’ vexatious litigants.¹ The district court denied the motion to strike appellants’ answer, stating that because the case had an upcoming trial date, the court would rather move forward with trial and instead limit the evidence appellants could present as a result of their discovery violations. Accordingly, the district court denied the motion to strike but entered an order preventing appellants from presenting evidence at trial that was not previously disclosed during discovery. The district court also continued the hearing on the motion to declare appellants vexatious to July 2024.

During the hearing on the vexatious litigant motion, appellants informed the district court “we quit this case four months ago” and that if the court proceeded with trial it could inform the jury “why you're wasting their time ․ when this case was over four months ago.” After Tsiskaridze's counsel interjected, Bovtovich stated “so make a default” because “we're not coming here again.” The district court then warned appellants that if they failed to appear at the July 11 calendar call it would be grounds for striking their answer. The district court then entered a written order declaring appellants vexatious litigants and limiting their ability to file documents in the underlying litigation. The district court held a calendar call on July 11 and appellants did not appear. After confirming appellants were not present, the district court entered an order striking their answer pursuant to EDCR 2.69(c)(5).

Tsiskaridze then filed an application for default judgment and the district court held a prove-up hearing at which it took testimony and reviewed various exhibits. The district court then entered a written order granting default judgment and awarding Tsiskaridze $217,628.36 in compensatory damages, and an additional $217,628.36 in double damages pursuant to NRS 41.1395(1)² , attorney fees, and title to the Nevada property. Appellants now appeal.

Appellants first challenge the order striking their answer “without justification.”³ When a district court imposes case-ending sanctions we apply “a somewhat heightened standard of review.” Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. 56, 65, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048 (2010). “Under this somewhat heightened standard, the district court abuses its discretion if the sanctions are not just.” Id. Further, “an abuse of discretion occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason.” Skender v. Brunsonbuilt Constr. & Dev. Co., 122 Nev. 1430, 1435, 148 P.3d 710, 714 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

EDCR 2.69(c)(5) permits a district court to impose any appropriate sanction for the failure to attend calendar call and/or for the failure to submit required trial materials. See also Five Star Cap. Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1050, 194 P.3d 709, 710 (2008) (noting appropriate sanctions under EDCR 2.69 includes dismissal of an action), holding modified on other grounds by Weddell v. Sharp, 131 Nev. 233, 350 P.3d 80 (2015). Prior to the calendar call, appellants informed the district court they had “quit” the case and that they would not return for future hearings. The district court then warned appellants that should they fail to appear at the calendar call it would strike their answer. Despite this, appellants failed to appear and, on appeal, present no reason for their absence other than their belief that the entire litigation was fraudulent. Considering the district court's clear warning, and appellants’ own statements that they had abandoned the defense of this matter, we conclude the sanctions imposed in this matter were just and that the court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by striking appellants’ answer. See Foster, 126 Nev. at 65, 227 P.3d at 1048; Skender, 122 Nev. at 1435, 148 P.3d at 714. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order striking appellants’ answer.

Appellants next challenge the order granting default judgment, arguing Tsiskaridze submitted fraudulent evidence in support of the judgment. After appellants’ answer was stricken, Tsiskaridze applied for a default judgment under NRCP 55(b)(2). Tsiskaridze presented evidence of his damages at the prove-up hearing conducted by the court. We review a district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Sheehan & Sheehan v. Nelson Malley & Co., 121 Nev. 481, 492, 117 P.3d 219, 226 (2005).

Although appellants argue the district court relied upon fraudulent evidence in reaching its decision, they have failed to identify the allegedly fraudulent evidence or otherwise provide cogent argument challenging the award. Accordingly, we decline to address the argument and affirm the order of the district court granting default judgment. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38.

Appellants also argue the district court was biased against them because the court allegedly ignored clear caselaw or otherwise was disrespectful to them. We conclude relief is unwarranted based on these allegations because appellants have failed to demonstrate the district court's decisions in the underlying case were based on knowledge acquired outside of the proceedings and its decisions did not otherwise reflect “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Canarelli v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 138 Nev. 104, 107, 506 P.3d 334, 337 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that unless an alleged bias has its origins in an extrajudicial source, disqualification is unwarranted absent a showing that the judge formed an opinion based on facts introduced during official judicial proceedings and which reflects deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible); see In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 104 Nev. 784, 789, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1988) (providing that rulings made during official judicial proceedings generally “do not establish legally cognizable grounds for disqualification”); see also Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 439, 216 P.3d 213, 233 (2009) (stating that the burden is on the party asserting bias to establish sufficient factual grounds for disqualification), overruled on other grounds by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 6, 501 P.3d 980, 984 (2022).

Finally, appellants challenge the district court order declaring them vexatious and limiting their ability to file documents in the underlying litigation. This court reviews an order declaring someone a vexatious litigant and setting restrictions on their ability to access the courts for an abuse of discretion. Jordan v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 62, 110 P.3d 30, 44 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz Stew v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228 n.6, 181 P.3d 670, 672 n.6 (2008). Because vexatious litigant orders limit a litigant's right to access the courts, the orders must meet the four factors enumerated in Jordan: (1) the litigant must be provided reasonable notice and an opportunity to oppose the order; (2) the district court must create an adequate record for review, including an explanation of the reasons it issued the order; (3) the district court must find the filings were frivolous or harassing and not simply based on “a showing of litigiousness;” and (4) the order must be narrowly drawn. 121 Nev. at 60-62, 110 P.3d at 42-44.

Here, appellants do not challenge the district court's application of the Jordan factors or the district court's factual findings in support of its order declaring the appellants’ vexatious. Appellants’ disparaging comments about the court's decision do not support a contrary result. Having reviewed the written order, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion because it created an adequate record for review, identified specific frivolous filings, and narrowly limited the order to the underlying proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order declaring appellants’ vexatious.⁴

It is so ORDERED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Honorable Jerry Wiese presided over this hearing because the sitting district court judge was ill.

2.   NRS 41.1395(1) permits an award of double damages for the exploitation of an older person.

3.   Appellants present numerous arguments on appeal alleging various nonparties are colluding to defraud them, create false evidence, or otherwise harm them. Further, appellants appear to challenge all orders issued in this matter on the basis that the entire Eighth Judicial District Court is allegedly engaged in widespread corruption and fraud. However, appellants failed to support these assertions with cogent argument and, thus, we decline to consider them. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (providing that this court need not consider claims that are unsupported by cogent arguments).

4.   Insofar as appellants raise arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief.