MATTHEW DOUGLAS v. JEREMY BEAN WARDEN (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Matthew Douglas appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the computation of time served filed on March 4, 2024. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Erika D. Ballou, Judge.

In his petition, Douglas sought the application of statutory credits to his sentence. Douglas neither alleged nor demonstrated that he had exhausted his administrative remedies before filing the petition. See NRS 34.724(1) (“Any person ․ who, after exhausting all available administrative remedies, claims that the time the person has served pursuant to the judgment of conviction has been improperly computed may file a petition ․ to challenge the computation of time that the person has served.”); see also NRS 34.724(2)(c). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Douglas's petition.¹ See NRS 34.810(2) (providing “[t]he court shall dismiss a petition that challenges the computation of time served ․ without prejudice if the court determines that the petitioner did not exhaust all available administrative remedies to resolve such a challenge as required by NRS 34.724”). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.²

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district court erred by denying the petition on the merits because Douglas had not demonstrated he had exhausted all available administrative remedies before filing the petition. Nevertheless, the district court properly denied the requested relief because the petition should have been dismissed without prejudice. See NRS 34.810(2); Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (holding a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is based on the wrong reason). Nothing in this order should be construed as precluding Douglas from filing a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the computation of time served after all available administrative remedies have been exhausted.

2.   To the extent Douglas raises new arguments in his informal brief on appeal, we decline to consider them in the first instance. See State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989).