ROBERT PILKINGTON AND DENISE PILKINGTON HUSBAND AND WIFE INDIVIDUALLY AND JOINTLY v. HUNTER LIGGETT JANET LENK COHEN CARIN LENK SLOANE KRISTIN NOEL PFEIFER JILL RENE STYNDA GINGER SIMPSON GINGER STUMNE AND WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOREIGN FOR PROFIT BUSINESS CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Appellants Robert Pilkington and Denise Pilkington (collectively the Pilkingtons) appeal from a final judgment in a civil matter and post-judgment orders granting attorney fees, costs, and awarding sanctions. Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye County; Steven R. Kosach, Judge.

Although this appeal arises from a civil complaint filed by the Pilkingtons, the underlying claims are related to a probate matter involving the estate of Edward Lenk.

The Estate of Edward Lenk

Edward Lenk passed away on July 19, 2021. On August 4, 2021, respondents Ligget, Cohen, Sloane, Pfeifer, and Stynda (the Lenk heirs), filed a petition to assume jurisdiction of a trust that Robert created for Lenk, which contained the estate's assets and of which Robert was trustee and beneficiary. The Lenk heirs alleged the trust was invalid, that Robert was wasting or pilfering estate assets, and sought an order removing Robert as trustee. Following an emergency hearing, the parties stipulated to the removal of Robert as trustee and the district court then appointed Nye County Public Administrator Ginger Stumne (now Simpson) as trustee of the estate. On August 26, 2021, the district court entered an order freezing all bank accounts holding the estate's assets and ordered Simpson to obtain bank records for various accounts that belonged to the Pilkingtons, to determine if funds had been comingled (the August 26 order).

At a September 14, 2021, status check, the parties discussed various assets that Simpson had located and various outstanding issues, including estate assets that Robert allegedly comingled with his assets. The district court determined the Wells Fargo accounts would remain frozen until Simpson completed her investigation into Robert's claim that those accounts no longer contained any estate assets. The district court directed Wells Fargo to disclose all personal banking account information relating to the frozen accounts to Simpson, dating from August 26, 2016, through September 14, 2021, to assist with her investigation into the allegedly comingled funds. Pursuant to her court ordered obligation to marshal and protect estate assets, Simpson provided these records to the court and Lenk heirs in various filings.

On March 7, 2022, the Lenk heirs filed a motion for summary judgment. Following the motion, the parties engaged in settlement discussions and apparently reached a settlement. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the Pilkingtons agreed to pay the Lenk heirs $60,000 in return for a release of all claims against them. But the settlement agreement seemingly broke down over how the funds would be paid, as the Pilkingtons wanted the Wells Fargo accounts unfrozen first, so they could pay the settlement funds from those accounts. However, the Lenk heirs did not want to unfreeze the accounts until after the settlement payment was made because the Pilkingtons had threatened to file for bankruptcy.

On April 12, 2022, the Lenk heirs filed a petition to ratify the settlement agreement, which the Pilkingtons opposed. The Pilkingtons further filed a countermotion to declare the settlement agreement void and filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The district court held a hearing on both the summary judgment and ratification motions on May 19, 2022.

At the hearing, the Pilkingtons argued the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Wells Fargo accounts because they were opened in Utah and Arizona and thus the court illegally attached their funds. The district court then asked each Pilkington whether they wished to proceed with the settlement because the district court's reading of the written settlement agreement suggested it could simply order Wells Fargo to wire funds from the frozen accounts to pay the settlement amount, which would resolve the dispute. The district court further stated that, if they did not wish to go forward with the settlement, the court would rule on the motion for summary judgment. Following additional argument from Robert, both he and Denise stated they wished to go forward with the settlement and that the district court could enter an order directing Wells Fargo to pay the settlement funds from the frozen accounts. The district court subsequently entered an order ratifying the settlement.

Robert subsequently filed a motion to vacate various allegedly void orders.¹ Specifically, Robert argued the orders freezing the Pilkingtons’ bank accounts and distributing their personal bank account information were void, and sought to unfreeze the Wells Fargo accounts, which he maintained remained frozen following the settlement. The motion expressly argued that the August 26, 2021, order and the September 27, 2021, order, which collectively froze and refused to release the Wells Fargo bank accounts were illegal and thus void. In addition, Robert argued the disclosure of the bank information violated Nevada law and, as a result, the district court lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enter the August 26 and September 27 orders.

The Lenk heirs opposed the motion, and relevant to this appeal, argued “[t]he frozen assets held by the Pilkingtons belonged to Edward L. Lenk.” The Lenk heirs reasoned that, because the district court found the trust was invalid and that the Pilkingtons had no authority to remove estate assets, the funds that were initially frozen belonged to Lenk's estate. The opposition further disputed Robert's legal arguments. The district court denied the motion finding it had jurisdiction to issue the orders regarding the Wells Fargo accounts and the bank account information.

Simpson subsequently filed a petition for partial distribution of the estate and the Pilkingtons filed an opposition to Simpson's petition. The Pilkingtons claimed the Lenk heirs’ opposition to the motion to vacate void orders asserted a claim to the Wells Fargo bank accounts, based on the above cited sentence which argued the frozen funds belonged to the estate. On March 8, 2023, the district court entered an order granting Simpson's petition and found the Wells Fargo accounts were not frozen. In so doing, the district court rejected the Pilkingtons’ various arguments regarding the bank accounts and the bank records as well as the Lenk heirs’ alleged attempt to assert a claim to the Wells Fargo accounts.

The underlying complaint

The Pilkingtons subsequently filed a civil complaint against the Lenk heirs, Judge Kimberly Wanker, who oversaw the estate matter, Wells Fargo, and Simpson.² The complaint alleged Simpson provided the September 27, 2021, order from the estate case, which permitted her to obtain the Pilkingtons’ financial records, to Wells Fargo and unlawfully obtained their financial records from August 26, 2016, through the date she provided the order to Wells Fargo. Further, the Pilkingtons argued the Lenk heirs breached the settlement agreement by stating in their opposition to the motion to vacate void orders that “[t]he frozen assets held by the Pilkingtons belonged to Edward L. Lenk.” The complaint alleged the bank accounts remained frozen and that the Lenks were asserting a claim to these accounts through their post-settlement filings in the estate case. The Pilkingtons asserted various claims, which generally alleged respondents violated the settlement agreement, various Nevada statutes, and various federal laws by first freezing the bank accounts, obtaining the Pilkingtons’ personal financial records, and subsequently failing to unfreeze the bank accounts.

The Lenk heirs then filed a motion to dismiss. Relevant to this appeal, the Lenk heirs argued the Pilkingtons’ complaint was barred by claim and issue preclusion because their arguments regarding the unlawful attachment and distribution of financial records were rejected in the estate matter. Specifically, the Lenk heirs argued that not only did the March 8, 2023, order in the estate case, which approved the partial distribution, reject the Pilkingtons’ arguments, but various other orders, including the order denying their countermotion to declare the settlement void, similarly rejected the Pilkingtons’ claims. Attached to the motion to dismiss was an email exchange between Robert and the Lenk heirs’ attorney.

The Lenk heirs then filed a supplement to their motion to dismiss which attached numerous exhibits, consisting of various emails and written correspondence between Robert and the Lenk heirs’ attorney. Although titled as a supplement to the motion to dismiss, the filing actually sought to have the Pilkingtons declared vexatious litigants without addressing anything relevant to the motion to dismiss.

In response, the Pilkingtons filed a request for leave to conduct discovery pursuant to NRCP 56(f) or, in the alternative, an opposition to the motion to dismiss. The Pilkingtons argued the exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss and its supplement transformed it into a motion for summary judgment and thus the motion was premature. The Pilkingtons provided an affidavit stating they intended to depose the defendants as well as numerous Wells Fargo employees. Turning to their opposition, the Pilkingtons argued preclusion did not apply because the complained of conduct arose after the estate matter closed. Specifically, the Pilkingtons argued the estate matter closed on July 19, 2022, the date the district court dismissed them from the case, but that their complaint was premised on the Lenk heirs’ opposition to the motion to vacate void orders. Further, the Pilkingtons argued the March 8, 2023, partial disbursement order from the estate case was void because it was entered after the Pilkingtons filed suit against Judge Wanker, and thus she should not have entered any additional orders; the order addressed matters that were currently on appeal with the supreme court; and because it was entered without the Pilkingtons receiving a copy of the proposed order prior to entry.

The Lenk heirs filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss and an opposition to the Pilkingtons’ request to conduct discovery pursuant to NRCP 56. The Lenk heirs argued the attached exhibits were provided in support of their request to deem the Pilkingtons vexatious litigants. Turning to the preclusion issue, the Lenk heirs argued that the complained of conduct arose during the course of the estate matter and prior to the entry of the March 8, 2023, order and, thus, preclusion applied.

The district court held a hearing on June 26, 2023, and subsequently entered a written order granting the Lenk heirs’ motion to dismiss. The order notes the Lenk heirs withdrew their request to deem the Pilkingtons vexatious litigants in light of their pending motion for attorney fees and costs in the estate matter. The court granted the motion to dismiss, finding the district court in the estate matter previously rejected the Pilkingtons’ various arguments regarding the freezing of the bank accounts, the distribution of their financial records, and the alleged breach of the settlement agreement. The district court found that the orders addressing these issues in the estate case, including but not limited to the March 8, 2023, order, were final orders and claim and issue preclusion applied to bar the Pilkingtons’ claims against the Lenk heirs.

Simpson filed her own special motion to dismiss where she argued the district court should dismiss the claims against her because: (1) the Pilkingtons failed to obtain leave of the appointing court before bringing suit; (2) she was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity; (3) she is protected by the litigation privilege; and (4) dismissal was required by Nevada's anti-SLAPP scheme. The Pilkingtons opposed the motion, arguing they were not required to obtain leave of the appointing court because the settlement agreement contained a choice of law provision. Turning to the remaining arguments, the Pilkingtons argued the anti-SLAPP arguments, quasi-judicial immunity argument, and litigation privilege argument were based “upon the same nucleus of Nevada Statute[s] and case law” and thus they would address them together. They argued that because Simpson allegedly violated NRS Chapter 239A ³ , her actions were not shielded by quasi-judicial immunity or the litigation privilege. Further, the Pilkingtons argued their personal financial records were not of public interest and they had a likelihood of success on the merits because the district court's orders directing Simpson to obtain the financial records violated NRS Chapter 239A.

The district court held a hearing on Simpson's special motion to dismiss and subsequently entered a written order granting the motion. The district court found the Pilkingtons failed to comply with the Borton doctrine ⁴ , which requires litigants to obtain leave of court before suing a court appointed trustee and that the settlement agreement did not abrogate this requirement. Further, the district court found Simpson was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as a court appointed trustee and was further entitled to the litigation privilege. Turning to the anti-SLAPP arguments, the district court found Simpson's actions or statements regarding the financial records constituted a good-faith communication pursuant to NRS 41.637(3), which defines good faith communications as statements made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body. The court found the Pilkingtons failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and that the Pilkingtons failed to allege Simpson made any false or untruthful communication. The district court then invited the parties to address whether it should award sanctions pursuant to NRS 41.670(1)(b).

Simpson subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees and anti-SLAPP penalties. Simpson argued she was entitled to attorney fees amounting to $48,745 pursuant to NRS 41.670, which mandates a court award attorney fees if it grants an anti-SLAPP motion. Further, Simpson sought an award of fees pursuant to NRS 18.010(2)(b). The Pilkingtons opposed the requests for attorney fees.⁵

After a lengthy hearing, the district court granted Simpson's request for attorney fees and costs. The district court awarded Simpson $72,527 ⁶ in attorney fees and $902.58 in costs. Furthermore, the district court sanctioned the Pilkingtons $10,000 pursuant to NRS 41.670(1)(b) after finding “that the litigation brought against Defendant Simpson was a sham litigation. It was both objectively and subjectively baseless[.]” The district court further found “[t]his suit was entirely designed to use the judicial process itself as a weapon to inflict injury, in the form of anxiety and attorney fees” and that it “was designed to harass, and to injure. Nothing more.”

The Lenk heirs also sought an award of attorney fees and costs, which the Pilkingtons opposed. Ultimately, the district court found the Lenk heirs were entitled to their attorney fees and costs pursuant to NRS 7.085 and NRS 18.010(2)(b), concluding “the circumstances here easily support an award of attorney's fees against the Pilkingtons’ sanctionable conduct” and that the Pilkingtons’ goal was to harass “the Lenk Heirs with retaliatory and specious claims under the auspices of their civil complaint.” As a result, the district court awarded the Lenk heirs $71,614 in attorney fees and $671.48 in costs.

The Pilkingtons now appeal the orders dismissing their complaint, as well as the orders awarding respondents attorney fees and costs, and imposing sanctions. We begin our examination of the Pilkingtons’ challenges with the order dismissing their claims against the Lenk heirs.

The Lenk dismissal order

An order granting an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). A decision to dismiss a complaint under NRCP 12(b)(5) is rigorously reviewed on appeal, with all alleged facts in the complaint and the attached documents presumed true and all inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff.⁷ Id. Dismissing a complaint is appropriate “only if it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] could prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.” Id. at 228, 181 P.3d at 672.⁸

On appeal, the Pilkingtons argue the district court erred by dismissing this matter based on both issue and claim preclusion. Claim preclusion applies to bar “all grounds of recovery that were or could have been brought in the first case.” Flue Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1054-55, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (2008). The supreme court has established a three-part test to determine whether claim preclusion applies: “(1) the parties or their privies are the same, (2) the final judgment is valid, and (3) the subsequent action is based on the same claims or any part of them that were or could have been brought in the first case.” Id. at 1054, 194 P.3d at 713. Issue preclusion bars subsequent litigation when: (1) “the issue decided in the prior litigation [is] identical to the issue presented in the current action;” (2) the prior ruling was decided on the merits and is final; (3) the party against whom issue preclusion is sought is identical to, or in privity with, the party in the prior action; and (4) “the issue was actually and necessarily litigated.” Id. at 1055, 194 P.3d at 713.

Here, the parties are the same in both this matter and the estate action, such that the parties prong of the Five Star test is satisfied for both issue and claim preclusion. Regarding claim preclusion, the Pilkingtons seem to assert they are challenging the third prong, whether their claims regarding the bank accounts and bank records were brought, or could have been brought, in the estate matter. See id. at 1054, 194 P.3d at 713. Further, for both claim and issue preclusion, the Pilkingtons claim they are not challenging the existence of a final order because they contend the only relevant final order is the July 2022, order dismissing them from the estate case. Finally, with regard to issue preclusion, the Pilkingtons dispute whether the issues raised in the two actions were the same and whether the issues they raised in the underlying complaint were actually and necessarily litigated in the estate matter. See id. at 1055, 194 P.3d at 713.

We conclude the district court did not err by finding the March 8, 2023, order constituted a final order for preclusion purposes. See Waldman v. Maini, 124 Nev. 1121, 1129, 195 P.3d 580, 856 (2008) (“[W]e treat probate matters in the same manner as all other civil cases[.]”); Univ. of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 110 Nev. 581, 598, 879 P.2d 1180, 1191 (1994) (holding for res judicata purposes, an order is final if it was decided on the merits).

Here, despite contesting whether the issues presented below were litigated in the estate action, the Pilkingtons acknowledge—both below and on appeal—that they filed various motions in the estate matter asserting their bank accounts were improperly frozen, that the Lenk heirs asserted a new claim against their accounts, and that their personal bank records were illegally shared with the Lenk heirs. In granting the Lenk heirs’ motion to dismiss, the district court found that the estate court's post-settlement rulings, including the March 8, 2023, order partially distributing the Lenk estate assets, expressly rejected these claims on their merits and was final. The record before us—including the March 8 order—and the fact that, at various points in the litigation, the Pilkingtons acknowledged the estate court rejected their arguments, supports this determination. While the Pilkingtons attempt to argue that these orders should not be considered for various reasons ⁹ , it is well established that a litigant cannot avoid the application of issue or claim preclusion by collaterally challenging the validity of a prior final order. See Five Star Capital Corp., 124 Nev. at 1057 n.41, 194 P.3d at 714 n.41 (holding appellant could not avoid the application of claim preclusion by collaterally challenging the prior final order). Thus, because the record supports the district court's conclusion that the estate court had previously and finally rejected the Pilkingtons’ arguments that formed the basis of their claims against the Lenk heirs, we affirm the dismissal of these claims on claim and issue preclusion grounds.

The Simpson order

The district court granted Simpson's special motion to dismiss on multiple grounds, including finding that Simpson was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because she was a court-appointed trustee and the Pilkingtons failed to allege she acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction. Quasi-judicial immunity is a common law principle that shields court-appointed individuals who perform functions integral to the judicial process from suit based on their performance of these functions. See State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 609, 616, 55 P.3d 420, 424 (2002). On appeal, the Pilkingtons fail to meaningfully address the district court's determination that Simpson was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. They assert the court erred in concluding Simpson enjoyed quasi-judicial immunity because “the relevant exception at issue ․ is discretionary-function immunity under NRS 41.032(2)”, which they contend Simpson was not entitled to.

But the district court did not grant the motion to dismiss based on NRS 41.032(2), which provides an exception to Nevada's waiver of sovereign immunity for state agencies and their employees who perform discretionary acts. See Glover-Armont v. Cargile, 134 Nev. 361, 366, 426 P.3d 45, 51 (Ct. App. 2018). And the Pilkingtons offer no explanation or cogent argument as to why they believe discretionary act immunity under this statute, as opposed to quasi-judicial immunity, would be the relevant inquiry here. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38. Nor do they present any argument regarding the findings or conclusions on which the district court determined the Pilkingtons’ claims against Simpson were barred by quasi-judicial immunity. As a result, they have waived any arguments on these points. See Bongioui, 122 Nev. at 569 n.5, 138 P.3d at 443 n.5. And because the Pilkingtons failed to challenge the district court's quasi-judicial immunity findings, we affirm the district court's order dismissing the complaint against Simpson. See id; see also Hang v. Berhad, 138 Nev. 547, 552, 513 P.3d 1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2022) (holding an appellant must successfully challenge all independent alternative grounds supporting an order).

The sanction order

The Pilkingtons next challenge the district court's decision to grant Simpson's motion for sanctions and sanction the Pilkingtons $10,000 pursuant to NRS 41.670(1)(b) (providing that “[t]he court may award, in addition to reasonable costs and attorney's fees awarded pursuant to paragraph (a), an amount of up to $10,000 to the person against whom the action was brought”). In awarding sanctions, the district court found Robert used “his position as a document preparer to place every asset of the decedent subject to and under his own control” and engaged in “theft” of the Lenk estate. To buttress its conclusion that a full sanction award was warranted, the district court provided a summary of the Pilkingtons’ actions regarding the apparent theft of estate assets and the subsequent litigation it spawned. Turning to the underlying litigation, the district court determined the suit was an attack on the court-appointed trustee, who was “charged with unwinding the Pilkingtons’ sinister plot to abscond the decedent's estate” and “inflicted needless expense and anxiety” on Simpson. The district court concluded that simply awarding Simpson attorney fees was insufficient because of the Pilkintons’ “fondness for abusive litigation[ and] ever expanding frivolous claims” and that the suit “sought to drain public coffers through the forced defense of these public officers.”

On appeal, the Pilkingtons argue the purpose of our anti-SLAPP statute is to protect First Amendment rights and because not all speech is protected by the First Amendment, not all speech is protected by our anti-SLAPP statute. The central premise of the Pilkingtons’ argument is that Simpson committed a crime by requesting and distributing their financial records and thus these actions were not in furtherance of her constitutional right to free speech such that the anti-SLAPP statute applied.

We conclude the district court did not err in imposing $10,000 in sanctions on the Pilkingtons under NRS 41.670(1)(b). Here, it is uncontested Simpson obtained the Pilkingtons’ personal bank records and provided them to the court and the Lenk heirs, pursuant to a court order stemming from her appointment as trustee in the estate case and her efforts to assist the estate case court in resolving that matter. Notably, the Pilkingtons do not argue that NRS 41.637(3) (identifying written or oral statements made in furtherance of an issue under consideration by a judicial body as good faith communications under the anti-SLAPP scheme) does not apply to communications made pursuant to a court order, such as Simpson's providing of these materials to the court and the Lenk heirs. Instead, the Pilkingtons argue that, before engaging in an NRS 41.637 analysis, courts must first determine if the complained of communication is protected by the First Amendment. Contrary to the Pilkingtons’ contention, our supreme court has rejected the argument that courts must engage in a First Amendment analysis when determining if Nevada's anti-SLAPP scheme applies. See Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 12, 432 P.3d 746, 749 (2019) (holding that “a moving party seeking protection under NRS 41.660 need only demonstrate that his or her conduct falls within one of four statutorily defined categories of [good faith communications], rather than address difficult questions for First Amendment law”). And here, it is undisputed Simpson obtained and distributed the financial documents “in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a [ ] judicial body,” and thus falls within one of the statutorily defined categories of speech protected by the anti-SLAPP scheme. See NRS 41.637(3). Thus, the Pilkingtons’ assertion that Simpson's speech was not protected by the First Amendment does not provide a basis for relief from the sanctions order. And because the Simpsons do not challenge the amount of sanctions imposed, we affirm the district court's award of the $10,000 sanction pursuant to NRS 41.670(1)(b).

Attorney fees and costs

Finally, turning to the awards of attorney fees and costs to the Lenk heirs and Simpson, we affirm these awards as the Pilkingtons fail to present cogent arguments in support of reversal. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38. They simply argue, in a conclusory manner, that the awards of fees and costs are “unwarranted by the record and ․ legally unsupportable.” In essence, their arguments presume that this court will reverse the granting of the motions to dismiss and thus will necessarily reverse the awards of attorney fees and costs. Because we affirm the granting of the motions to dismiss, and because the Pilkingtons presented no cogent argument challenging the award of fees, we affirm the orders of the district court awarding fees and costs. See id.

In sum, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court's orders dismissing the Pilkingtons’ claims against the Lenk heirs and Simpon and the denial of the Pilkingtons’ request for discovery. We further affirm the district court's denial of then’ post-judgment motion for relief from the dismissal orders, the award of sanctions to Simpson, and its award of attorney fees and costs to Simpson and the Lenk heirs.

It is so ORDERED.¹⁰

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The motion to vacate void orders explicitly indicated it was filed by only Robert and not Denise.

2.   Judge Wanker and Wells Fargo were subsequently dismissed from this matter and thus we do not discuss the claims asserted against them.

3.   NRS Chapter 239A governs the disclosure of financial information to governmental agencies.

4.   See Bertsch v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 240, 244, 396 P.3d 769, 772-73 (2017) (adopting the Barton doctrine).

5.   Subsequent to the filing of their opposition to Simpson's fees motion, the Pilkingtons filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to NRCP 59 or alternatively a motion for NRCP 60(b) relief. The district court denied the motion and the Pilkingtons listed the order denying the motion amongst those being challenged in their notice of appeal, but they fail to present any arguments regarding this decision, and thus have waived any challenge to that order. See Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 122 Nev. 556, 569 n.5, 138 P.3d 433, 443 n.5 (2006) (issues not raised in an appellant's opening brief are deemed waived).

6.   Due to “subsequent developments of the case,” the district court ordered Simpson to file a supplement to their request for attorney fees which reflected additional fees incurred for additional motion practice and hearing appearances. As a result of this supplemental work, the district court ultimately awarded $72,527, which was more than Simpson sought in her initial motion. However, the Pilkingtons present no argument on appeal regarding this increase.

7.   As a threshold matter, the Pilkingtons argue the district court was required to convert the underlying motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment because the Lenk heirs attached numerous exhibits to their motion practice. We reject this argument. A review of the record demonstrates all but one of the cited exhibits were attached to the Lenk heirs’ supplement, which sought an order declaring the Pilkingtons vexatious litigants and did not address whether dismissal was warranted. And while the Lenk heirs did attach an email from Robert to their attorney to their motion to dismiss, there is no indication the district court considered the email when adjudicating the motion to dismiss nor did the Lenk heirs cite to the email in support of their preclusion arguments. Accordingly, we review the district court's order under the motion to dismiss standard. See Engelson v. Dignity Health, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 58, 542 P.3d 430, 436-37 (Ct. App. 2023) (discussing when a court must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment). Further, given our resolution of the conversion issue, we necessarily affirm the district court's denial of the Pilkingtons’ request to conduct discovery.

8.   The Pilkingtons argue that, because the district court adopted the proposed orders granting the motions to dismiss verbatim, we are required to apply heightened scrutiny on appeal. We reject this argument, as adopting draft orders verbatim does not affect our standard of review. See Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 44, 537 P.3d 476, 483-84 (Ct. App. 2023) (discussing a series of cases which decline to apply a heightened standard of review to cases where the district court adopted a proposed disposition verbatim or nearly verbatim).

9.   To avoid preclusion, the Pilkingtons suggest this court can ignore all orders from the estate case issued after July 19, 2022, (the date they were dismissed from that action) even though they continued to file motions in that case presenting the arguments that form the basis for their underlying complaint against the Lenk heirs. Because they fail to develop any cogent argument on this point and present no authority to support it, we do not consider it. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (providing that this court need not consider claims that are unsupported by cogent arguments).

10.   Insofar as the Pilkingtons raise arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief.