ISIAH TAYLOR v. WARDEN BEAN (2024)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Isiah Taylor appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the computation of time served, filed on March 20, 2024. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Erika D. Ballou, Judge.

In his petition, Taylor sought the application of statutory credits to his sentence. Taylor neither alleged nor demonstrated that he had exhausted his administrative remedies before filing the petition. See NRS 34.724(1) (“Any person ․ who, after exhausting all available administrative remedies, claims that the time the person has served pursuant to the judgment of conviction has been improperly computed may file a petition ․ to challenge the computation of time that the person has served.”); see also NRS 34.724(2)(c). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Taylor's petition.¹ See NRS 34.810(2) (providing “[t]he court shall dismiss a petition that challenges the computation of time served ․ without prejudice if the court determines that the petitioner did not exhaust all available administrative remedies to resolve such a challenge as required by NRS 34.724”).² Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Gibbons, C.J.

Bulla, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district court erred by denying the petition on the merits because Taylor had not demonstrated that he had exhausted all available administrative remedies before filing the petition. Nevertheless, the district court properly denied the requested relief because the petition should have been dismissed without prejudice. See NRS 34.810(2); Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (holding a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is based on the wrong reason). Nothing in this order should be construed as precluding Taylor from filing a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the computation of time served after all available administrative remedies have been exhausted.

2.   To the extent Taylor challenges the district court's failure to hold a hearing on his petition, we conclude the district court did not err by denying his petition without a hearing. To the extent Taylor presents claims in his briefing on appeal that were not previously presented in the proceedings below, we decline to consider them in the first instance. See State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989).