KARR II v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

First, Karr argues that the charging document lacks facts to support the charges and that the facts alleged in the charging document and admitted to with his plea only amount to the crime of voyeurism. To the extent this is a challenge to the charging document, Karr waived this argument when he pleaded guilty. See Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975) (“[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process” and “(the defendant] may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (alteration in original))). To the extent Karr argues his plea should be withdrawn based on this argument, Karr did not raise a challenge to the validity of his plea in the district court. This court generally will not consider a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, unless an error appears clear from the record. See Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 367-68 (1986), as limited by Smith v. State, 110 Nev. 1009, 1010 n.1, 879 P.2d 60, 61 n.1 (1994) (providing an exception to the rule announced in Bryant where the error clearly appears from the record). Karr fails to demonstrate that an error appears clear from the record. Therefore, we decline to consider this claim on appeal.

Second, Karr argues that 2009 Nev. Stat., ch. 471, § 1, at 2662 (former NRS 200.700(1)) and NRS 200.710(2) are unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. Karr did not argue below that the statutes were unconstitutional, and he does not argue plain error on appeal. See Martinorellan v. State, 131 Nev. 43, 48, 343 P.3d 590, 593 (2015) (stating that “all unpreserved errors are to be reviewed for plain error without regard as to whether they are of constitutional dimension”). Specifically, he does not argue, and thus does not demonstrate, that the alleged errors are clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record and that those errors affected his substantial rights.¹ See Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018). We thus conclude he has forfeited these claims, and we decline to review them on appeal.² See Miller v. State, 121 Nev. 92, 99, 110 P.3d 53, 58 (2005) (stating it is the appellant's burden to demonstrate plain error); see also State u. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Doane), 138 Nev. 896, 900, 521 P.3d 1215, 1221 (2022) (recognizing the Nevada appellate courts “follow the principle of party presentation” and thus “rely on the parties to frame the issues for decisions and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008))); Senjab v. Alhulaibi, 137 Nev. 632, 633-34, 497 P.3d 618, 619 (2021) (“We will not supply an argument on a party's behalf but review only the issues the parties present.”).

Third, Karr argues the district court abused its discretion at sentencing because it relied on impalpable and highly suspect evidence and argument when it imposed sentence. The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987). Generally, this court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by the district court that falls within the parameters of relevant sentencing statutes “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998).

The sentence imposed of 10 years to life in prison with a consecutive prison term of 28 to 72 months is within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes. See NRS 200.710(2); 2005 Nev. Stat., ch. 507, § 29, at 2876; NRS 200.750(2). Karr argues the district court relied on impalpable and highly suspect evidence because the State made improper argument with respect to psychosexual risk assessments by belittling them and their informative value. He also argues that one victim's mother inappropriately mentioned abuse she suffered at the hands of Karr during their marriage while offering victim impact testimony at the sentencing hearing.

Karr fails to demonstrate that the State made improper argument about the psychosexual risk assessments. Instead, the State commented that it had rarely seen a defendant who had been classified as a high risk to reoffend and noted Karr's assessments did not conclude he was a low risk to reoffend. Next, while the victim's mother should not have mentioned the abuse against herself, such comments were brief and her statement was primarily focused on the harm that Karr's criminal behavior in this situation caused her daughter, her niece, and the rest of the family.

Further, Karr fails to demonstrate the district court relied on the above instances in making its decision. The district court made specific findings that it had considered the mitigation evidence provided by the defense, including that Karr participated in counseling and took several classes while in jail and that the psychosexual risk assessments determined he was not a high risk to reoffend. The district court went on to discuss the need to protect and send a message to the community, deterrence, and punishment. After discussing these factors, the district court determined the appropriate sentence was prison. The district court did not make any statements that psychosexual risk assessments are unreliable, nor did it mention the comments by the victim's mother. Thus, we conclude Karr fails to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion at sentencing. Therefore, we conclude he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Fourth, Karr argues his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because his actions amounted to voyeurism rather than use or permit a minor, under age 14, to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance. Regardless of its severity, “[a] sentence within the statutory limits is not ‘cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience.’ ” Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 91.5 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it forbids only an extreme sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime).

As stated above, the sentence imposed is within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes, and Karr does not demonstrate those statutes are unconstitutional. We conclude the sentence imposed is not disproportionate to the crime and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Therefore, we conclude Karr is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Finally, Karr argues the district court violated his due process rights by summarily revoking his bail after he entered his plea. The parties agree this issue is moot based on Karr's conviction. “As a general rule, this court will decline to hear a moot case.” Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 155, 158, 460 P.3d 976, 981 (2020). Nevertheless, Karr urges this court to consider this issue because it is capable of repetition, yet evading review, and because he contends it is an issue of substantial public importance. See id. at 158, 460 P.3d at 982 (stating the standard for the exception to the mootness doctrine). We decline to do so and note Karr has not shown he had a constitutional or statutory right to bail after he pleaded guilty. See NRS 178.484 (recognizing the “[r]ight to bail before conviction”); NRS 176.015(1) (providing the district court with discretion to “commit the defendant or continue or alter the bail” pending sentencing); Bergna v. State, 120 Nev. 869, 872, 102 P.3d 549, 551 (2004) (recognizing that there is no constitutional right to bail after conviction). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While Karr cites to the plain error standard in the reply brief, he fails to present any cogent argument regarding plain error.

2.   Moreover, even were this court to consider Karr's claims on appeal, we conclude Karr fails to demonstrate error plain from the record affecting his substantial rights. See id. (holding that, to demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show that: “(1) there was an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘plain,’ meaning that it is clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record; and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights”).