STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF v. << (2026)

This is a juvenile delinquency matter. Appellant is the juvenile, L.V.,¹ and Appellee is the State of Louisiana (“State”). In August and October 2025, respectively, the juvenile court adjudicated L.V. delinquent and rendered a disposition ordering that L.V. be placed with the Office of Juvenile Justice (“OJJ”) in a non-secure facility for nine months, with this disposition to be served concurrently with another disposition. Prior to doing so, however, the trial court denied a Motion to Suppress and “Motion to Dismiss Petition for Failure to Timely Prosecute” (“Motion to Dismiss”) filed by L.V. Now, L.V. seeks review of the juvenile court's denial of those pleadings. For the following reasons, we find the juvenile court did not err in denying L.V.’s Motions to Suppress and Dismiss, and we affirm L.V.’s adjudication of delinquency and disposition.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petition and Motions

On June 20, 2025, the State filed a Petition asserting that L.V. violated La. R.S. 14:95.8(B), “Illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile.”² When L.V. appeared for his answer hearing on June 24, 2025, he denied the charge. During the answer hearing, the juvenile court set L.V.’s adjudication hearing for July 28, 2025. The record contains no objection from counsel for L.V. regarding this date.

However, on June 25, 2025, counsel for L.V. then filed an omnibus motion, which included his Motion to Suppress. On July 23, 2025, L.V. amended his Motion to Suppress. With his Motion to Suppress, L.V. sought to suppress a gun seized by officers from his person when they searched him and sought to suppress subsequent statements he made. In light of L.V.’s Motion to Suppress, the juvenile court converted the July 28, 2025 adjudication hearing into a hearing on L.V.’s Motion to Suppress; and, again, the record contains no objection from counsel for L.V. regarding this decision by the juvenile court. On the day of the motions hearing, the juvenile court reset the matter because L.V.’s counsel was not present. The juvenile court found good cause to extend the time delays under La. Ch.C. art. 877 ³ and continued the matter without date pending further orders from the court. Then, on July 31, 2025, L.V. filed his Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the State did not timely prosecute this matter. Ultimately, the juvenile court held the motions hearing on August 5, 2025.

Motions Hearing

Detective Blake Delaune's Testimony

Relative to L.V.’s Motion to Suppress, Detective Blake Delaune (“Detective Delaune”) testified for the State and identified himself as part of the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) Violent Crime Abatement and Investigation Team (“VCAIT”), with this position requiring him to do “a lot of surveillance, undercover work, and assist[ing] other detectives with violent crimes, gun related offenses, [and] narcotics investigations.” Detective Delaune explained that his work prior to and while serving on VCAIT provided him with experience in reading “body language” and “gestures” to detect concealed firearms. In this regard, Detective Delaune stated that “commonly[,] people conceal firearms in their front waistband area.” Detective Delaune elaborated:

Most people who [I have] dealt with [carry] those firearms unholstered, which can cause the firearm to shift and move as they walk. Also, carrying a firearm in your front waistband is uncomfortable. So, a lot of people adjust it and reposition it and things of that nature which indicates to me that they may be in possession of a firearm.

When asked whether he participated in an investigation on June 12, 2025, in New Orleans East, Detective Delaune answered affirmatively, explaining he was assisting the “STRIKE or GRIP Team,”⁴ which he identified as a “proactive unit” that “rid[es] around [in] areas where there ha[s] been gun violence and violent crimes” so as to “attempt[ ] to deter those violent crimes [from] occurring.” Detective Delaune testified that during his ride around in a surveillance vehicle on that date, he:

Observed two subjects. One appeared to be a juvenile; he was wearing all black․ As I was watching him, I would observe him constantly adjust a bulge in his front waistband area. He also had a ski mask on top of his head. I saw his face, he appeared to be a juvenile. I advised the [STRIKE/] GRIP Team officers of my suspicion of a juvenile being in possession of a firearm, and they conducted a [Terry 5] Stop, and once they conducted a [Terry] Stop, that subject was in fact a juvenile in possession of a firearm.

Detective Delaune clarified that after he relayed his suspicion to the STRIKE/GRIP Team and those officers tried to stop the individual, the individual initially attempted to flee. According to Detective Delaune, the STRIKE/GRIP Team officers were nonetheless able to apprehend the individual.

Officer Rashaad Ramie's Testimony

Next, Officer Rashaad Ramie (“Officer Ramie”) testified on behalf of the State, identifying himself as an officer in the NOPD's STRIKE/GRIP Team, which he described as “a city-wide proactive unit” whose “goal is to take drugs and guns off the street.” Officer Ramie explained that he became involved in an investigation on June 12, 2025, while patrolling in New Orleans East when Detective Delaune informed the STRIKE/GRIP Team via radio “that he observed a juvenile, or a person he believed to be a juvenile [later identified as L.V.], attired in all black clothing with a ski mask” and whom the detective believed had “concealed a large firearm or a firearm with an extended magazine” on his right side. According to Officer Ramie, the detective believed this to be true because the individual “favored his right side and ․ kept adjusting his waistband.” Officer Ramie testified that after receiving Detective Delaune's dispatch, he and other uniformed officers located the individual and positioned their marked NOPD vehicles in front of and behind the individual to try to prevent him from running. As Officer Ramie explained, the individual did in fact try to run before realizing he could not go anywhere because an NOPD vehicle was blocking his path, whereupon Officer Ramie exited his vehicle and instructed the individual not to run.

Thereafter, according to Officer Ramie, he observed a bulge on the individual's right side of his waist, which is where Detective Delaune reported that he suspected the individual had a concealed firearm. Officer Ramie testified the individual raised his arms in the air, at which time he “tapped” the bulge “to see if it was a gun[ ] ․ to confirm.” Upon doing so, as explained by Officer Ramie, he “felt the extended magazine, or the magazine” and removed the firearm from the individual, after which another officer handcuffed the individual. Officer Ramie testified that his partner then provided the individual with his Miranda rights ⁶ before the officers placed him in the back of one of the NOPD vehicles.

Officer Ramie explained he thereafter proceeded to have a brief conversation with the individual, during which he “jokingly asked” where the rest of the bullets were because the officers only recovered three rounds from the gun. As Officer Ramie stated, the individual “advised that he was going to pick more [bullets] up” as he had “just picked the gun up.” When counsel for the State asked Officer Ramie if this constituted an interrogation based on his experience and training with NOPD, he responded, “No. It was just a conversation. I was wondering why he had three bullets in a gun. That makes no sense.” The record reveals Officer Ramie also asked L.V. whether he had planned to run when the officers first stopped him. Officer Ramie attested that he did not ask any “interrogating-type questions” during this brief interaction.

Rulings

At the conclusion of the motions hearing, the juvenile court denied L.V.’s Motions to Suppress and Dismiss. L.V. subsequently filed a writ application with this Court regarding the denial of his Motion to Dismiss, which this Court denied. State of Louisiana in the Interest of L.V., unpub., 2025-0500 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/13/25). Following the writ denial, on August 14, 2025, the juvenile court adjudicated L.V. delinquent for the offense of illegal possession of a handgun (second offense) by a juvenile. Then, in October 2025, the juvenile court ordered that L.V. be placed with the OJJ in a non-secure facility for nine months, with that disposition to run concurrently with another disposition he was serving. L.V.’s appeal to this Court followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, L.V. asserts two assignments of error:

1. The [juvenile] court erred by denying [L.V.]’s Motion to Suppress, allowing the State to introduce and rely upon statements obtained from L.V. during custodial interrogation after he had been handcuffed and placed in the police unit, where the questioning was reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses from a juvenile, as well as evidence retrieved from the defendant after an illegal search without probable cause.

2. The [juvenile] court erred by denying [L.V.’s Motion] to Dismiss for Failure to Timely Prosecute.

Before discussing the merits of these assignments of error, we must address certain preliminary matters.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

Whether L.V.’s Appeal was Timely Filed

As noted previously, the juvenile court signed the disposition judgment on October 24, 2025. Then, on November 17, 2025, L.V. filed his Motion for Appeal. Louisiana Children's Code Article 332(A) provides that “appeals shall be taken within fifteen days from the mailing of notice of the judgment.”⁷ During our initial review of the record in this case, we determined it did not reflect whether the juvenile court mailed the disposition judgment. Rather, the judgment itself stated: “This judgment is to be placed in the Blue Folder and uploaded to DigiCourt,” an online court management system.⁸ Below that statement was a heading—“EMAIL” with four names and email addresses underneath, including email addresses for then-counsel for L.V. and counsel for the State. Accordingly, on March 12, 2026, this Court ordered the Clerk of Court for the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court (“Clerk of Court”) to supplement the record with the Notice of Signing of Judgment. On March 16, 2026, we received a response to our Order from the court reporter for the juvenile court. Therein, the court reporter explained that after receiving our Order, on March 13, 2026, she prepared a Notice of Judgment for the disposition judgment and provided it to the Clerk of Court to file and distribute to counsel of record in order to “correct[ ]” the record's “deficiency.” Additionally, the court reporter attached a copy of the Notice of Judgment, which is dated March 13, 2026.

In light of the foregoing, we must determine whether L.V.’s appeal was timely under the fifteen-day deadline provided in La. Ch.C. art. 332(A). Resolution of this hinges on what action(s) initiated that deadline—the juvenile court placing the judgment “in the Blue Folder,” uploading it to the court management system, and emailing it to counsel of record in October 2025 or the court reporter providing the Notice of Judgment to the Clerk of Court to file and distribute to counsel of record in March 2026. In State in Interest of K.B., this Court faced a similar quandary. 2023-0409 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/26/23), 372 So.3d 864. Therein, this Court likewise ordered the Clerk of Court to supplement the record with the notice of signing regarding the subject judgment and, in response, received an “email chain” with the Clerk of Court explaining this was the method “by which counsel for [the juvenile] received the ․ judgment.” Id. at p. 14, 372 So.3d at 876. In determining whether the email initiated the fifteen-day deadline for filing an appeal under La. Ch.C. art. 332(A), this Court emphasized that the Article “specifies that the time period begins upon mailing of the judgment and does not provide emailing as an alternative method even if that [was] the custom of the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court.” Id. at p. 15, 372 So.3d at 877. Further, this Court noted an inability to “locate[ ] any cases in which a court has held that an email is sufficient to initiate the fifteen-day period outlined in La. Ch.C. art. 332(A)” and observed that “[a]ppeals are favored in law and any doubt shall be resolved in favor of maintaining, rather than dismissing an appeal.” Id. at pp. 15-16, 372 So.3d at 877 (quoting Modicue v. Prince of Peace Auto Sale, LLC, 54,095, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/21), 328 So.3d 1239, 1246).

Likewise, we have not located any cases in which a court has held that emailing a judgment combined with placing it in a folder and uploading it to a court management system is sufficient to initiate the fifteen-day period outlined in La. Ch.C. art. 332(A). Moreover, we are mindful that any doubt regarding L.V.’s right to appeal should be resolved in his favor. Thus, in the matter sub judice, we find it was not until the court reporter provided the Notice of Judgment to the Clerk of Court for filing and distribution in March 2026 that the deadline for appealing commenced. This is a clear and unambiguous interpretation of La. Ch.C. art. 332(A). See State in Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p. 15, 372 So.3d at 876 (explaining that “[w]hen a law is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it shall be applied as written” (quoting State in Interest of A.S., 2017-0028, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/10/17), 220 So.3d 179, 183)). Therefore, we hold that L.V.’s November 2025 Motion for Appeal—i.e., filed prior to the March 2026 Notice of Judgment—was timely, and we will consider the merits of his appeal. Before doing so though, we must address another preliminary matter.

Applicability of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure

Louisiana Children's Code Article 104 states that “[w]here procedures are not provided in this Code, or otherwise by law, the court shall proceed in accordance with” the Louisiana “Code of Criminal Procedure in a delinquency proceeding and in a criminal trial of an adult.” Additionally, La. Ch.C. art. 803, which is in the section of the Louisiana Children's Code labeled “Title VIII. Delinquency,” provides that “[t]he provisions of this Title shall govern and regulate delinquency proceedings of courts exercising juvenile jurisdiction.” It further states that if “procedures are not provided in this Title, or otherwise by [the Louisiana Children's] Code,” then “the court shall proceed in accordance with the [Louisiana] Code of Criminal Procedure.” La. Ch.C. art. 803. See also State in Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, pp. 16-17, 372 So.3d at 877 (citing State in Interest of C.H., 2021-0516, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/26/22), 335 So.3d 451, 462). Thus, this Opinion will apply the Louisiana Children's Code when possible and the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure in the absence of an applicable Children's Code provision.

ERRORS PATENT REVIEW

In accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, we review criminal appeals for errors patent. An error patent is one “that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2). As this Court has previously explained, “the Louisiana Children's Code does not specify whether a juvenile delinquency proceeding is entitled to an errors patent review.” State in Interest of K.B., 2023-0409, p. 17, 372 So.3d at 877 (citing State in Interest of C.H., 2021-0516, p. 19, 335 So.3d at 463). Nonetheless, “this Court has found that La. Ch.C. art. 104 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, when read in conjunction with each other, mandate an errors patent review,” such that we have “adopted the practice of conducting an errors patent review” in juvenile delinquency cases. Id. at p. 17, 372 So.3d at 877-78. After reviewing the record, we find one potential error patent requiring discussion but not reversal—the untimeliness of L.V.’s adjudication hearing. See State in Interest of D.J.S., 2018-239, p. 8 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/26/18), 255 So.3d 1177, 1183 (finding the untimeliness of the juvenile's adjudication hearing constituted a potential error patent). Because this is the same issue raised by L.V. in his second assignment of error, we will address it in our discussion instead of in this section. For continuity, we will address that assignment of error next, i.e., at the start of our discussion, even though L.V. raised it as his second assignment of error.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error Number Two: The Juvenile Court's Denial of L.V.’s Motion to Dismiss

In his second assignment of error, L.V. argues the juvenile court erred by denying his Motion to Dismiss on the basis the State failed to timely prosecute the case. Louisiana Children's Code Article 877(A) provides, in pertinent part, that when the State charges a juvenile with a crime other than “a crime of violence” and the juvenile is “continued in custody,” then his “adjudication hearing shall commence within thirty days of [his] appearance to answer the petition.”⁹ Further, La. Ch.C. art. 877(C) states that “[i]f the hearing has not been commenced timely, upon motion of the child, the court shall release a child continued in custody and shall dismiss the petition.” As the Louisiana Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he time limits in [La. Ch.C. art.] 877 are mandatory.” State in Interest of J.M., 2013-2573, p. 3 (La. 12/9/14), 156 So.3d 1161, 1163. However, the last part of La. Ch.C. art. 877 provides that “[f]or good cause, the court may extend such period.” La. Ch.C. art. 877(D). “What constitutes good cause, i.e., legally sufficient reason,” is “determined on a case-by-case basis and must be fully supported by the record.” State in Interest of R.W., 2016-1187, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/2/17), 213 So.3d 13, 17 (citing State ex rel. S.R., 2008-0785, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/8/08), 995 So.2d 63, 66). The juvenile court has broad discretion in making a good cause determination. Id. (citing State ex rel. R.G., 2006-1625, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/18/07), 963 So.2d 475, 477). On appeal, the appellate court determines whether the juvenile court abused that discretion. State in Interest of M.B., 2019-0931, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/12/20), 292 So.3d 930, 938.

One instance of a good cause extension occurs when counsel for the juvenile fails to object to the setting of the adjudication hearing outside the time limit set in La. Ch.C. art. 877(A). State in Interest of D.J.S., 2018-239, p. 9 (La. App. 3 Cir. 9/26/18), 255 So.3d 1177, 1183 (quoting State in the Interest of D.B., 2014-85, pp. 2-4 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/7/14), 141 So.3d 296, 298-99). That is, if “[t]he record does not indicate that counsel for [the juvenile] objected ․ to the setting of the hearing date” beyond the timeframe set by La. Ch.C. art. 877(A), then “counsel for [the juvenile] acquiesced in the delay, serving as the functional equivalent of a good cause extension of the time limits.” State in Interest of R.W., 2018-0069, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/23/18), 246 So.3d 619, 622 (citing La. Ch.C. art. 877(D)). This rule stems from the “contemporaneous objection” rule established in La. C.Cr.P. art. 841. See State in Interest of L.D., 2024-0784, 786, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/17/25) 409 So.3d 265, 268 n.2 (citing State ex rel. Q.U.O., 39,303, pp. 4-5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/27/04), 886 So.2d 1188, 1191). That rule provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence.” La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A).

Additionally, when analyzing whether good cause exists, the juvenile court “should be mindful of those situations or causes beyond the control of the State that may impinge on its ability to prepare for a hearing.” State in Interest of R.W., 2016-1187, p. 6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/2/17), 213 So.3d 13, 17 (citing State in the Interest of R.D.C., Jr., 1993-1865 (La. 2/28/94), 632 So.2d 745, 749). In this regard, the absence of key people for the defense serves as good cause for delaying the adjudication hearing. State in Interest of D.M., 2012-787, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/13), 119 So.3d 763, 768. Further, if a defense motion prevented the State from proceeding, then this serves as a good cause justification for extending the adjudication hearing deadline. State in Interest of T.Q., 2025-0787, p. 20 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/13/26), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 1045907, at *11.

Turning to the matter sub judice, L.V. appeared to answer the State's Petition on June 24, 2025; but the juvenile court did not hold his adjudication hearing until August 14, 2025. Thus, on the face of the record, L.V.’s adjudication hearing was untimely under La. Ch.C. art. 877(A). The juvenile court initially set the adjudication hearing for July 28, 2025, i.e., a few days past the thirty-day deadline. The record contains nothing demonstrating counsel for L.V. objected to the juvenile court setting the adjudication hearing after La. Ch.C. art. 877’s thirty-day deadline. It was only after the agreed upon date of July 28, 2025, that counsel for L.V. filed his Motion to Dismiss (on July 31, 2025). In other words, L.V. failed to contemporaneously object to the initial July 28, 2025 setting prior to that date, such that this silence constituted an extension of the time period for good cause and L.V.’s acquiescence in same. See State in Interest of D.J.S., 2018-239, p. 9, 255 So.3d at 1183 (citation omitted); State in Interest of R.W., 2018-0069, p. 6, 246 So.3d at 622.

Moreover, after the juvenile court set the adjudication hearing for July 28, 2025, certain things—out of the State's control—prevented the matter from proceeding to adjudication. State in Interest of R.W., 2016-1187, p. 6, 213 So.3d at 17 (citation omitted). L.V.’s counsel filed his Motion to Suppress, which required resolution before the adjudication. See State in Interest of T.Q., 2025-0787, p. 20, ___ So.3d at ___, 2026 WL 1045907, at *11. That is, to be prepared for the ultimate adjudication hearing, the State needed to know whether the juvenile court would or would not suppress the firearm and L.V.’s statements, the subject matter of his Motion to Suppress. Thus, the juvenile court converted the July 28, 2025 adjudication hearing into a motions hearing, and the record contains no objection from counsel for L.V. in this regard. See State in Interest of R.W., 2018-0069, p. 6, 246 So.3d at 622 (citing La. Ch.C. art. 877(D)). Then, on the date of the motions hearing, counsel for the juvenile was not present, thereby requiring the juvenile court to reschedule the motions hearing which in turn pushed back the adjudication hearing. See State in Interest of D.M., 2012-787, pp. 7-8, 119 So.3d at 768. At that time, the juvenile court found good cause for the extension. Then, when the juvenile court held the August 5, 2025 motions hearing and denied L.V.’s Motions, counsel for L.V. informed the juvenile court that he intended to seek supervisory review with this Court and did in fact do so, thereby adding to the delay in holding the adjudication hearing. Based on the record and foregoing jurisprudence, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause for extending the adjudication deadline in this case. This assignment of error is without merit.

Assignment of Error Number One: The Juvenile Court's Denial of L.V.’s Motion to Suppress

In his first assignment of error, L.V. asserts the juvenile court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress insofar as the officers “retrieved [evidence] from [him] after an illegal search without probable cause.” Further, L.V. contends the juvenile court erred by denying his Motion to Suppress because the statements he made to Officer Ramie were “fruit of the poisonous tree of the illegal stop” and obtained during a custodial interrogation with the aim of eliciting an incriminating response. In this latter regard, L.V. asserts the statements were inadmissible under Miranda, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), and Louisiana's heightened juvenile-confession protections. Countering, the State contends the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop based on the officers observing L.V. wearing a ski mask; his “youthful” appearance; his “fidget[ing] with and adjusting a bulging object concealed in his pants waistband”; and his unprovoked attempt to flee. The State asserts that after the officers stopped L.V., they were permitted to search him without a warrant because this constituted a search incident to a lawful arrest, a “well-established exception to the warrant requirement.” Finally, the State argues the officers did not subject L.V. to a custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes as the officers merely asked him “questions ․ attendant to a standard arrest under these circumstances.” As the State contends, the officers’ questions were not “designed to elicit an incriminating response, because neither of the questions asked pertained to a criminal offense, let alone the criminal offense L.V. was eventually charged with committing.” For purposes of discussion, we will separate the district court's denial of L.V.’s Motion to Suppress the evidence and the statements; but, before doing so, we delineate the standard of review applicable to motions to suppress.

Standard of Review

This Court has previously held that a juvenile “court is vested with great discretion when ruling on a motion to suppress.” State in Interest of K.L., 2016-1151, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/10/17), 217 So.3d 628, 630 (citing State v. Williams, 1995-1971, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/16/95), 665 So.2d 112, 116). The reason a juvenile court's “ruling on a motion to suppress the evidence is entitled to great weight” is “because the [juvenile] judge ha[d] the opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony.” State in Interest of P.L., 2011-1173, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/11/12), 81 So.3d 983, 986 (citing State in Interest of J.S., 2008-1401, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/18/09), 6 So.3d 904, 908). The appellate court should not reverse any factual and credibility determinations made by the juvenile court “in the absence of a clear abuse of the juvenile court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not adequately supported by reliable evidence.” State in Interest of C.H., 2015-1024, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/6/15), 183 So.3d 567, 570 (citing State v. Green, 1994-0887, p. 11 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 281). Regarding any legal findings made by the juvenile court in ruling on the motion to suppress, those “are subject to a de novo standard of review.” Id. (citing State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751). The appellate court “may consider all pertinent evidence given at the trial of the case” when reviewing a juvenile court's ruling on a motion to suppress. State in Interest of K.B.J., 2023-0734, p. 4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/19/24), 383 So.3d 943, 948 (citing State v. Landor, 2020-0336, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/21), 318 So.3d 225, 228).

The Juvenile Court's Denial of L.V.’s Motion to Suppress the Evidence

If a juvenile believes that officers unconstitutionally obtained evidence against him, he may file a motion to suppress pursuant to La. Ch.C. art. 872. That Article provides that a “child may move to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Louisiana.” Louisiana Children's Code Article 872 provides for suppression in juvenile matters because both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is titled “Searches and Seizures; Warrants[,]” provides that people have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and that this right “shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Similarly, La. Const. art. 1, § 5, states:

Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.

Based on the foregoing and “[s]ubject only to a few well-established exceptions, a search or seizure conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is constitutionally prohibited.” State in Interest of K.B.J., 2023-0734, p. 3, 383 So.3d at 947 (citing State v. Baker, 2020-1253, pp. 3-4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/1/21), 332 So.3d 692, 695). Thus, if the juvenile establishes “a warrantless search or seizure occurred, the burden of proof shifts to the State to affirmatively show it was justified under one of the narrow exceptions to the rule requiring a search warrant.” Id. (first citing La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D);¹⁰ and then citing State v. Cyprian, 2021-0287, pp. 11-12 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 271, 281).

One such exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest. State v. Jones, 2012-0438, p. 18 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/13/13), 119 So.3d 9, 21. As this Court has explained, “During a search incident to a lawful arrest, the officer may search the suspect's person and the area within his immediate control in order to remove weapons and prevent destruction of evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Jerome, 2007-1243, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/16/08), 983 So.2d 214, 216). The reason this is permissible is because “there is always some danger that the person arrested may seek to use a weapon, or that evidence may be concealed or destroyed.” Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 398 So.2d 1112, 1114 (La. 1981)). Accordingly, “[t]o safeguard himself and others, and to prevent the loss of evidence, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, warrantless search of the arrestee's person.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). An officer can perform a “search incident to a lawful arrest not only ․ without a warrant, but ․ also ․ whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the person arrested has a weapon or is about to destroy evidence.” Id. at p. 19, 119 So.3d at 21 (citing State v. Warren, 2005-2248, p. 14 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1227).

As the Louisiana Supreme Court has explained, “It is well established searches incident to arrest conducted immediately before formal arrest are valid if probable cause to arrest existed prior to the search.” State v. Sherman, 2005-0779, p. 9 (La. 4/4/06), 931 So.2d 286, 292. That is, “the fruits of the search cannot be necessary to support the probable cause to arrest.” Id. (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2564, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 n.6 (1980)). But, if “probable cause exists to justify a lawful arrest,” then “a search incidental to that arrest is permissible and requires no further justification.” State v. Gayton, 2013-1613, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/10/14), 156 So.3d 738, 747 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)). This Court has summarized probable cause for a lawful arrest as follows:

“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer, and of which he has reasonable and trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify a man of ordinary caution in the belief that the accused has committed an offense.” Probable cause is a non-technical concept, weighing “factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” This standard does not require that “the police officers know at the time of the arrest that the particular crime has definitely been committed; it is sufficient that it is reasonably probable that the crime has been committed under the totality of the known circumstances.” The concept is fluid, “turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” “The fundamental philosophy behind the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that common rumor or report is not an adequate basis for the arrest of a person.”

“The determination of probable cause, unlike the determination of guilt at trial, does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or near a preponderance standard demands. Our review is “based on an assessment of the collective knowledge possessed by all of the police involved in the investigation․” “Deference should be given to the experience of the policemen who were present at the time of the incident. A certain look or gesture may not mean anything to the ordinary person; however, a policeman has sound judgment based on long experience to interpret these acts.” Furthermore, “[t]he reputation of the area is an articulable fact upon which a police officer may legitimately rely.”

After examining the events leading up [to] the arrest, the trial judge should “decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable cause.”

Id. at pp. 10-11, 156 So.3d at 746-47 (internal citation omitted). With these principles in mind, we consider whether Officer Ramie and his fellow officers had probable cause to arrest L.V. so as to justify the search of his person prior to same.

As summarized previously, Detective Delaune testified he had experience in determining when a person is concealing a firearm and described the behaviors they exhibit when doing so. Detective Delaune stated L.V. was not only exhibiting such behavior but appeared to be a minor and, for some reason, was wearing a ski mask in June in New Orleans. In light of his suspicion that L.V. was a minor in possession of a concealed firearm, Detective Delaune relayed this information to the STRIKE/GRIP Team, which included Officer Ramie. During his testimony, Officer Ramie explained he agreed with Detective Delaune's assessment that L.V. was likely concealing a firearm in light of the bulge he saw on L.V.’s right side, precisely the area Detective Delaune pinpointed. Further, as both Detective Delaune and Officer Ramie testified, the reasons they were patrolling in this particular area of the city was due to its high crime issues. And, as Officer Ramie testified, L.V. initially attempted to run when approached by the officers and only ceased doing so when he determined it was futile. Considering the collective knowledge and experience of the police officers regarding L.V.’s behavior and youthful appearance, the bulge in L.V.’s waistband, the reputation of the area where the police observed L.V., and L.V.’s attempt to flee, from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, these all amount to probable cause. Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying L.V.’s Motion to Suppress insofar as the firearm was concerned.

The Juvenile Court's Denial of L.V.’s Motion to Suppress His Statements

L.V. also argues the juvenile court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress regarding the statements he made to Officer Ramie in the back of the NOPD vehicle while handcuffed. We begin with L.V.’s contention that the statements were the “fruit of the poisonous tree of the illegal stop.” This Court recently summarized the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine as follows:

“the [fruit of the poisonous tree] doctrine serves to exclude from evidence the direct and indirect products of illegal violations of the Fourth Amendment” to the United States Constitution. Also known as “[t]he exclusionary rule,” it “bars, as illegal ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ any physical and verbal evidence obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.” Not only does “[t]he rule extend[ ] to ․ primary evidence obtained during or as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure,” but also to “evidence later discovered and found to be a derivative of illegality.” However, as this Court has further explained, “[w]hen there is no primary illegality, the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree theory’ does not apply.” Accordingly, a trial court should not suppress evidence or statements subsequently obtained if the initial interaction with the defendant was not illegal.

State v. McFarland, 2025-0654, p. 30 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/6/26), ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 925645, at *13 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Hill, 2025-0316, pp. 18-19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/25), 418 So.3d 1119, 1132). In the preceding section of this Opinion, we found there was no initial illegality in the officers’ warrantless search of L.V.’s person because this was a search incident to a lawful arrest. Because there was no initial illegality surrounding the stop and search of L.V., the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to his subsequent statements. This argument is without merit.

We must nonetheless turn to L.V.’s argument that the juvenile court should have suppressed his statements because they were not free and voluntary. Louisiana Children's Code Article 881.1(A) states that “[a] confession made by an accused child without a knowing and voluntary waiver shall not be admissible unless the [S]tate proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it was freely and voluntarily given and was not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises.” Louisiana Children's Code Article 881.1(B) lists factors a court is to consider when ruling on the admissibility of a juvenile's confession. As the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal has explained, “a totality of the circumstances standard is used as the basis for determining the admissibility of juvenile confessions” and statements. State in Interest of C.H., 2015-1024, p. 6, 183 So.3d at 571 (citations omitted).

In considering the juvenile court's admission of a juvenile's statements, appellate courts should also look to the substance of the statements and consider them within the context of the broader record because “[t]he erroneous admission of a[n] ․ involuntary confession [or statement] is subject to harmless error analysis.” State in Interest of D.S., 2018-0458, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/3/18), 255 So.3d 1209, 1215 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). See also State in Interest of D.H., 2016-0963, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/15/17), 214 So.3d 92, 96 (explaining that “it is the duty of the reviewing court to consider the remaining evidence against the [juvenile] to determine whether the admission of the involuntary confession [or statement] at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, a juvenile must prove “that he was prejudiced or that there was error in” the juvenile court's denial of his motion to suppress. State in Interest of D.S., 2019-0458, p. 10, 255 So.3d at 1215. If “the only evidence presented by the State was the testimony of the officers who were present” when the juvenile made the confession or statement, then this was not harmless error. State in Interest of D.H., 2016-0963, p. 7, 214 So.3d at 96. By contrast, if the record contains other evidence, and “[n]othing in the record indicates that the factual determinations and credibility assessments by the [j]uvenile [c]ourt was [sic] attributable to [the juvenile's] statement[s],” then “any error in the [j]uvenile [c]ourt's judgment denying the [juvenile’]s motion to suppress the statement [was] harmless.” State in Interest of D.S., 2018-0458, pp. 10-11, 255 So.3d at 1216. This is true even if the juvenile's statement “was the product of coercion.” State in Interest of N.F., 2013-589, p. 11 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 124 So.3d 1262, 1271.

Turning to the matter sub judice, the State alleged L.V. violated La. R.S. 14:95.8, “Illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile.” Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:95.8(A) states that “[i]t is unlawful for any person who has not attained the age of eighteen years knowingly to possess any handgun on his person. Any person possessing any handgun in violation of this Section commits the offense of illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile.” There is no dispute that L.V. was under the age of eighteen years old on the date of his interaction with Officer Ramie and the other officers. Further, Officer Ramie testified that he removed a gun from L.V.’s waistband on that day right after observing L.V. adjusting the gun in his waistband. While L.V. challenged the admissibility of the handgun, he did not deny possessing it and knowingly doing so. And, as we held in the prior section, the juvenile court did not err in denying L.V.’s Motion to Suppress regarding the handgun. Simply put, the record contains proof of the elements of the charged offense—L.V. was underage and knowingly possessed a handgun. Though L.V. contends he did not freely and voluntarily give his statements to Officer Ramie, he has not shown how those statements prejudiced him, and he has not demonstrated that the juvenile court attributed any factual determinations or credibility assessments to those statements. Rather, Officer Ramie's testimony about removing a gun from L.V.’s possession was the incriminating evidence, not the statements L.V. made about whether he planned to run when the officers stopped him and about obtaining more bullets. Thus, we pretermit discussion of whether L.V. freely and voluntarily gave his statements. We do so because even if L.V. did not freely and voluntarily give his statements, the juvenile court's admission of same was harmless error, so our discussion would merely amount to dicta. In sum, L.V.’s assignment of error regarding his Motion to Suppress is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's denial of L.V.’s Motions to Suppress and Dismiss, as well as L.V.’s adjudication of delinquency and disposition for same.

AFFIRMED

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to the requirements of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings as set forth in La. Ch.C. art. 412, as well as in Rules 5-1 and 5-2 of the Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, this Opinion will refer to the juvenile by his initials only, L.V.

2.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:95.8 provides, in pertinent partA. It is unlawful for any person who has not attained the age of eighteen years knowingly to possess any handgun on his person. Any person possessing any handgun in violation of this Section commits the offense of illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile.․[(B.)] (2) On a second conviction, the offender shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars and imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than two years.Based on the record, L.V. pled guilty to violating La. R.S. 14:95.8 in February 2024.

3.   As discussed more fully later in this Opinion, La. Ch.C. art. 877(A) provides that when a child is charged with a crime other than “a crime of violence” and “the child is continued in custody,” then his “adjudication hearing shall commence within thirty days of [his] appearance to answer the petition.”

4.   Detective Delaune explained the unit is called the GRIP Team now but used to be referred to as the STRIKE Team. This Opinion will use both names for clarity.

5.   See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

6.   See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).

7.   Louisiana Children's Code Article 332(A) further provides that if a party files a motion for new trial, then “the delay for appeal commences to run from the date of the mailing of notice of denial of the new trial motion.” Neither party filed a motion for new trial in the matter sub judice.Regarding the computation of time in juvenile matters, La. Ch.C. art. 114 provides:A. In computing a period of time allowed or prescribed by law or by order of court, the date of the act, event, or default after which the period begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period is to be included, unless it is a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a legal holiday.B. A half-holiday is considered as a legal holiday.C. A legal holiday is to be included in the computation of a period of time allowed or prescribed, except in any one of the following instances:(1) It is expressly excluded.(2) It would otherwise be the last day of the period, except that, for purposes of calculating a release date from an order of commitment, a legal holiday shall be included if it is the last day of the period.(3) The period is less than seven days.D. All Saturdays and Sundays are also considered as legal holidays.

8.   Under La. C.E. art. 201, which is titled “Judicial notice of adjudicative facts generally,” this Court takes judicial notice that DigiCourt is an online court management system.

9.   Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:2(B) defines “crime of violence” and enumerates the offenses that qualify as a crime of violence. The crime the State alleged L.V. committed, illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile, is not listed as a crime of violence in La. R.S. 14:2(B).

10.   The Louisiana Children's Code does not establish which party bears the burden of proof on a motion to suppress in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. However, La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D) delineates the burden of proof in criminal proceedings as follows:On the trial of a motion to suppress filed under the provisions of this Article, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the ground of his motion, except that the state shall have the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant or of any evidence seized without a warrant.

Judge Dale N. Atkins