THE PEOPLE v. JOSE ANTHONY CENTENO (2026)

Defendant Jose Anthony Centeno appeals his convictions for kidnapping to exact money or valuable things, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, and assault upon a victim under the age of 18 with intent to commit a lewd or lascivious act; he does not challenge his other convictions. He contends the jury was improperly instructed in connection with the kidnapping and assault charges and, to the extent those arguments were waived, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Centeno further asserts insufficient evidence supported the rape, sodomy, and assault charges. We affirm the judgment.¹

Factual and Procedural Background

The Sonoma County District Attorney filed a third amended information charging Centeno with three counts of kidnapping to exact money or valuable things (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (a); counts 1–3; all further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code), three counts of torture (§ 206; counts 4–6), two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 7 and 9), one count of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 8), three counts of assault upon a victim under the age of 18 with intent to commit a lewd or lascivious act (§§ 220, subd. (a)(2), 288; counts 10, 14–15), one count of forcible oral copulation (former § 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 11), and two counts of forcible sexual penetration by foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); counts 12–13). In connection with the kidnapping counts, the information alleged that the victim suffered bodily harm (§ 209, subd. (a)). As to the forcible rape and sodomy counts, the information alleged the victim was either a child under the age of 14 or a minor 14 years of age or older, and that Centeno committed aggravated kidnapping, kidnapped the victim in violation of sections 207 and 209, and bound the victim or another person (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(2), (e)(1) & (5), (j)(1)–(2), (l), (m)). The information alleged 17 aggravating sentencing factors.

These charges arose from the following facts.

Placement of the Siblings with the Centenos

The victims in this case are three siblings: J. Doe (born 2004; JD), Jane Doe 1 (born 2003; JD1), and Jane Doe 2 (born 2002; JD2) (jointly, the siblings). Their older sister, KK, helped care for them because their parents were frequently absent.

In approximately 2006, KK and the siblings were removed from their biological parents’ custody. KK was placed separately from the younger siblings. JD, JD1, and JD2 were placed into foster care with Centeno and his wife, Gina Centeno ² (jointly, the Centenos). The Centenos’ three older biological children were also in the home at that time. At the time of placement, JD was about one year old, JD1 was about three, and JD2 was about four.

Before becoming foster parents, the Centenos underwent a foster care home study which considered, among other things, the family relationships, available sleeping space, security, and financial circumstances, and also included interviews with the Centenos’ biological children. According to the study, discipline in the household ranged from timeouts to the loss of privileges and did not include corporal punishment.

The foster care records documented significant difficulties before and during the siblings’ foster placement. A 30-day assessment reported that JD1 wet the bed, wore diapers, engaged in destructive behavior, and exhibited increased behavioral problems after visits with her biological family. JD could be physically aggressive, and JD2 had difficulty maintaining appropriate physical space with others and also wet the bed. A subsequent assessment noted continued bed-wetting, feces smearing, sleep difficulties, and behavioral problems at school, and characterized the siblings as having special needs. The adoption assessment likewise noted that the siblings feared not having enough food, and that JD showed signs of prenatal substance exposure.

The Centenos adopted the three siblings in 2008. According to JD1 and JD, the siblings initially felt welcome, celebrated holidays and birthdays with the family, and saw their biological family, including KK, regularly. However, around the time of the adoption, KK's visits ceased and, according to JD1, conditions in the household began to deteriorate.

Discipline and Abuse

The siblings’ daily routine became structured and restricted, and discipline escalated. They primarily occupied the upstairs middle bedroom and the downstairs playroom and needed permission to leave those areas. Although the siblings received meals, they did not eat with the rest of the family. JD1 recalled waiting to be called before coming downstairs, changing urine-soiled clothing in the garage, and eating breakfast at the kitchen counter before spending much of the day in the playroom.

JD1 testified that Gina had begun calling her derogatory names by the time she was approximately six years old. JD1 and JD testified that Gina struck them with a wooden spoon and Centeno used belts, shoes, and other objects. They described being punished for, among other things, talking to one another, wetting or soiling themselves, damaging property, and allegedly harming animals. JD1 also testified that, beginning when she was about five, Centeno and Gina sometimes forced the siblings to eat feces and swallow urine as punishment for eliminating outside the bathroom.

Around this same time, the Centenos adopted two infants. The Centenos prohibited JD, JD1, and JD2 from interacting with the two younger children.

In 2010, JD1 and JD2 began attending second grade at a local public school, while JD attended the first grade. During this period, the siblings testified that the Centenos struck them with belts, shoes, and wooden spoons, either deprived them of food or, alternatively, forced them to eat, and made them stand or remain in uncomfortable positions for extended periods. They also described being required to obtain permission to use the bathroom. According to JD1, the siblings sometimes wet or soiled themselves because they were not allowed to talk or the Centenos were not always available to ask. JD1 testified that the Centenos would then punish them for soiling themselves and, on some occasions, forced them to eat feces or swallow urine.

JD described prolonged “time-outs” requiring the siblings to stand in a corner or assume uncomfortable positions for hours. JD1 and JD testified that the Centenos sometimes required them to run barefoot for extended periods in the backyard, which caused the skin on their feet to peel and, at times, bleed. If they did not move fast enough, Centeno or Gina would strike their legs with a broom. JD1 also testified that Centeno once punched JD2 in the face, leaving a substantial bruise.

In September 2010, a program director at the siblings’ school observed a black eye on JD2, bruising on JD, and signs that the siblings feared being struck with a belt. JD1 also spoke with her about Centeno and Gina hitting the siblings, forcing them to run in the backyard, and Gina pulling out JD2's hair. The director, a mandated reporter, contacted child protective services (CPS). CPS investigated, and a social worker spoke with the siblings. The siblings nevertheless remained in the Centenos’ custody.

After the CPS investigation, the Centenos removed the siblings from school, and Gina homeschooled them for approximately one year. According to JD1 and JD, the siblings were punished if they made mistakes in their workbooks or wrote poorly. The punishments included running in the backyard, being struck, and repeatedly writing sentences. Eventually, the homeschooling stopped.

The siblings became increasingly isolated from the other members of the household. In addition to being prohibited from interacting with the other children, the Centenos began confining the siblings to different areas of the house. JD1 testified that, beginning when she was approximately eight years old, she was occasionally placed in a dog-type cage behind a couch in the downstairs playroom. The cage contained a mattress and was equipped with alarms and a camera or monitoring system that alerted the Centenos if she moved or stood up. JD and JD2 also spent time in the cage.

At other times, the siblings occupied the middle upstairs bedroom. JD1 and JD2 slept on a bunkbed, while JD spent a period of several months in the bedroom closet. The siblings testified that alarms and cameras monitored their movements, and Centeno and Gina would hit them if the alarms were triggered.

JD testified that, while living in the closet, the siblings were released only for meals and bathroom trips. JD2 remained in the bedroom and JD1 remained downstairs in the cage. JD also described seeing bruises, red marks, and blood on JD2's feet, and bald spots on her head.

The Centenos’ biological children provided mixed accounts. The Centenos’ oldest biological son testified that Centeno and Gina frequently yelled, and he had seen or heard Centeno strike the siblings. He recognized the sound of Centeno using a belt because Centeno had also hit him with one when he was younger. He also recalled seeing Centeno make the siblings go back and forth in the backyard, although he described the activity as walking rather than running. He described the siblings’ prolonged confinement in the middle upstairs bedroom as “time-outs” that could last weeks or months. By contrast, the Centenos’ biological daughter testified that she never saw Centeno or Gina physically strike the siblings and instead observed them being punished by being sent to separate rooms. The biological children did not observe the siblings’ alleged confinement. Specifically, neither the daughter nor the oldest son recalled seeing the dog-type cage that JD1 and JD described.

Disappearance of JD2

At some point, JD2 disappeared.

According to JD1, she was in the downstairs cage when she heard Centeno take JD2 into the backyard and instruct her to play soccer. Later, JD1 heard Centeno and Gina yelling JD2's name and attempting to wake her. She heard someone say to call 911 and heard the Centenos say the older children should not see what was happening. She did not hear any emergency vehicles. Gina subsequently informed JD1 that JD2 was fine. Several weeks later, Centeno informed JD1 and JD that JD2 had been sent away on a plane. Neither sibling ever saw JD2 again. The Centenos’ biological children believed JD2 had gone to a group home.

Law enforcement later sought evidence concerning JD2's whereabouts. Investigators examined electronic location data, Centeno's construction worksites, border-crossing information, and records relating to group homes and other facilities. They also searched databases using both JD2's birthdate and adopted Social Security numbers, and they obtained familial DNA from KK. Those efforts produced no information establishing what had happened to JD2 or her location.

Heightened Confinement of JD1 and JD

The following information is based on the testimony of JD1 and JD.

After JD2 disappeared, JD1 and JD remained in the middle upstairs bedroom with progressively increased restrictions. The bedroom door was initially locked from the outside and then screwed shut, requiring Centeno to use a power drill to open it. Boards were placed over or around the bunkbed and eventually over the window, limiting the siblings’ ability to see or speak with one another or look outside. Centeno and Gina later installed a radio and fan, which made it more difficult for the siblings to hear each other or activity elsewhere in the house.

The Centenos provided the siblings with oversized T-shirts to wear, which Gina told them not to tear. However, the siblings tore the shirts to make toys and were punished for doing so. Eventually the Centenos stopped providing JD1 and JD with clothing altogether.

There also was continuing physical abuse. Gina struck them with a wooden spoon, forced them to perform squats, and, on some occasions, pushed their heads into bathwater after binding their hands behind their backs. Centeno struck them with a vacuum pipe, vacuum cord, pieces of plywood, and other wooden objects, causing bruises, cuts, and swelling. Centeno also placed shirts over the siblings’ heads and poured water on their faces. The oldest biological son provided corroborating testimony that he had seen marks on JD's arms.

At some point, Centeno replaced the original bunkbed and stopped regularly taking the siblings to the bathroom. Instead, he placed buckets on their beds for them to use as toilets. The buckets sometimes overflowed and they were punished for the resulting mess. Centeno also padlocked chains around the siblings’ ankles and attached the chains to the bunkbed. They remained chained to their beds for approximately two to three years. The oldest biological son testified that he saw the buckets and understood that they were being used as toilets because of the smell of urine and feces.

While the siblings’ confinement increased, the quantity of food provided to them decreased. Their meals were first reduced from three per day to two, then to one per day, and eventually to one meal every other day. The meals included frozen burritos, Pop-Tarts, crackers, cookies, and other prepared foods, with limited amounts of water. JD also described being required to compete with JD1 to finish meals, with the faster eater receiving the other's food and the slower eater being kicked or otherwise punished.

The siblings made several efforts to escape. They attempted to create holes in the ceiling and walls. In one instance, JD1 and JD opened the bedroom window, removed the screen, and climbed onto the roof. They ultimately did not flee because they were afraid to climb down. The Centenos responded to damage or escape attempts by making additional physical modifications to the room.

Sexual Abuse of JD1

JD1 testified that Centeno began sexually abusing her when she was 11 years old. Her first memory of the abuse occurred while she was sleeping. Centeno came into the middle bedroom, forced his penis into her mouth, and struck her when she resisted. The incident ended when Centeno appeared to become concerned by a noise elsewhere in the house.

JD1 described additional sexual assaults after she was chained to the bunkbed. On several occasions, Centeno removed her chain and took her to his biological daughter's former bedroom. During one such incident, Centeno had JD1 (then 13 years old) watch television depicting a woman undressing, then inserted his penis in her vagina. She did not have clothes at that time and believed if she tried to resist Centeno, he would hit her. He provided her food when she said she was hungry and then resumed the sexual assault before returning her to the middle bedroom and chaining her to the bed.

On another occasion, Centeno again took JD1 to the same room and sexually penetrated her vaginally and anally. JD1 told Centeno she did not like it and repeatedly tried to move away, but Centeno threatened to hit her and physically moved her back into position. Centeno then returned her to the middle bedroom, warned her that there were “so many ways” he could hurt her, and reattached the chain. She subsequently told JD what had occurred. JD1 believed she was 13 during this assault, noting: “I remember keeping track of [my age] and reminding myself that I was 13.” On cross-examination, she stated she could have been “13 or 14, not exactly sure,” but believed it occurred within the same year as the prior assault.

JD1 described several other incidents that occurred when she was between 13 and 15 years old. On one occasion when she was 13 years old, Centeno removed JD1's chain, took her to a corner of the bedroom, and made her bend over. JD1 felt Centeno's penis against her back and felt a substance run down her back. Centeno wiped her off and called her “disgusting.” In another instance, Centeno took her to his biological daughter's former bedroom, directed her to turn around, and rubbed his penis against her clothed buttocks. On yet another occasion, Centeno kissed JD1, inserted his finger into her vagina, and asked whether she liked it before returning her to the middle bedroom. On yet another occasion, while JD was being taken to the bathroom, Centeno inserted his finger into JD1's vagina while she remained on the bunkbed and asked whether she was “getting excited.” JD1 believed she was 14 when this occurred. JD1 also described an incident in which Centeno inserted his finger into her anus and threatened to insert a fork there if she defecated in the room again.

JD1 also testified that Centeno touched and pinched or slapped her breasts when she was unclothed, beginning when she was approximately 13 years old. She estimated that this occurred about five times between the ages of 13 and 15.

JD1 acknowledged that, in prior interviews, she had described two memories incorrectly—for example, initially recalling that she was younger during the oral copulation incident and recalling that one rape occurred in a hallway rather than the bedroom. She explained that by “false memory” she meant that she did not remember those events correctly at the time of the earlier interviews. She maintained that the events about which she testified at trial were true and accurately remembered.

Discovery of JD1 and JD

In 2019, Centeno removed JD1 and JD from the middle bedroom and drove them to Mexico. In Mexico, Centeno took the siblings to relatives’ homes before leaving them with his grandniece, Iris Centeno, and returning to the United States. Iris believed JD1 was 13 and JD was 12 at the time. Iris noticed that both siblings had difficulty walking and that they hid and rapidly consumed food. They did not know how to operate a stove or wash their clothes, and JD1 did not know how to wash her hair properly. Iris asked JD1 whether Centeno had sexually abused her, and JD1 disclosed the abuse. Both siblings also described being locked in a room, beaten, and removed from school. JD1 referred to JD2, whom Centeno had not mentioned to Iris. JD1 also disclosed the abuse to a woman the siblings met who spoke English and worked with abused children in the United States.

Mexican law enforcement subsequently arrived at the home where the siblings were staying and took them for questioning. Both described events that had occurred in the Centeno home. Mexican officials temporarily placed them in a facility for children without parents. The siblings were then returned to the United States and taken to a hospital for examination and treatment. At that point, according to JD, they had not seen a doctor since early childhood.

The Siblings’ Return to the United States

Upon returning to the United States, JD1 and JD reunited with KK and her husband, who became their foster parents. They experienced significant difficulties adjusting to ordinary life. JD1 testified that she struggled with anxiety, incontinence, weight, school, and basic household tasks. KK also described the siblings’ difficulty with social interactions, shopping, personal hygiene, and other activities of daily living. Neither sibling exhibited unsafe behavior toward KK's children or pets.

A dependency-court investigator, Penelope Lynn, testified that the siblings required a higher level of support than many of her other clients. They struggled with school, hygiene, dressing, eating, social interactions, and medical care. Both siblings had difficulties regulating food consumption. They also had difficulty understanding finances and internet and social media safety.

Pediatrician James Crawford-Jakubiak evaluated JD1 and JD after their return from Mexico and again in 2023. The siblings’ medical records showed that both had followed roughly normal growth patterns when they were younger but later departed substantially from those trajectories. Crawford-Jakubiak testified that inadequate nutrition can cause such departures, and the siblings exhibited signs of stunted growth. He testified that children recovering from starvation may develop a long-term unhealthy relationship with food, including hiding, stealing, or rapidly consuming it. He did not, however, attribute every physical condition observed in the siblings to a particular cause.

Forensic interviewer Katie Flinn interviewed the siblings in August 2020. She testified that both siblings appeared substantially younger than their chronological ages and exhibited delays in motor and language development. JD1 appeared more like an early elementary-school child than a 17-year-old, while JD similarly displayed the speech patterns, interests, and behavior of a much younger child.

Law enforcement searched the Centenos’ residence where the siblings resided before being moved to Mexico. Officers recovered a digital camera containing photographs of the siblings from 2012 through 2014, as well as motion sensors, cameras, a baby monitor, padlocks, and videotapes bearing the siblings’ names. Officers also detected the odor of urine and feces in the playroom and middle bedroom. Beneath the flooring in the middle bedroom, investigators found stains consistent with urine or feces and a strong, stale odor of human urine.

At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from Dr. Blake Carmichael, a clinical psychologist, concerning child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). Carmichael explained that CSAAS is an educational framework, not a diagnostic tool, and described five components: (1) secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, conflicted, or seemingly unconvincing disclosure; and (5) recantation or retraction. He testified that children may delay disclosure, disclose incrementally, appear emotionally neutral, or have difficulty describing the sequence and duration of repeated events. He also testified that children generally retain core details better than peripheral details.

Defense Evidence

The defense presented testimony from Bradley McAuliff, a psychology professor who specialized in child suggestibility and forensic interviewing, to challenge the reliability of some of the siblings’ recollections. McAuliff was not a clinical psychologist, had not worked directly with victims of child sexual assault, torture, or prolonged captivity, and had never conducted a forensic interview of an actual child abuse victim.

McAuliff testified that repeated or leading questioning can influence children's memories, particularly when children are young or developmentally delayed, and that information from later interviews, family discussions, or social media can become incorporated into memory. He advocated for prompt forensic interviews using open-ended questions. He also testified that he did not consider CSAAS generally accepted in the scientific community. McAuliff acknowledged, however, that physically experienced events may produce stronger memories and that children can be more accurate regarding the core details of such experiences.

The defense also presented testimony from social workers who had worked with the Centenos during the foster care and adoption process. Naomi Louden conducted the initial foster care home study. The Centenos represented that they used timeouts and removal of privileges rather than corporal punishment and understood that corporal punishment was prohibited. Louden's early reports reflected information supplied by the Centenos concerning the siblings’ behavioral difficulties and an incident involving injuries in the household.

Social worker Chanin Michael subsequently worked with the family for approximately two years. Michael described JD1 as small, young, engaging, clean, and well cared for, although she observed some destructive behavior and knew that JD1 wet the bed and sometimes wore diapers. Michael described JD as sometimes physical and aggressive and JD2 as having some bed-wetting, soiling, and boundary issues. She testified that all three siblings appeared to have favorable prognoses. Michael testified that she received no concerning information during her work with the Centenos and that the couple agreed not to use corporal punishment. She prepared an adoption home study and concluded that the Centenos were qualified to adopt. She stopped working with the family after the adoption was finalized in 2008 and therefore had no knowledge of what occurred in the household afterward. Michael testified that, had she known the siblings were being physically punished, locked in rooms, or restrained, she would have changed her adoption recommendation. When she inspected the middle bedroom during the adoption process, she saw no boards, cameras, or chains.

State adoption specialist Amy Lafferty likewise testified that the information available to her in 2008 did not raise concerns about the Centenos’ ability to care for the siblings. Her records did, however, document preexisting concerns, including JD2's history of neglect, abuse, or abandonment before entering foster care, JD's developmental and speech delays, and the siblings’ fears concerning food.

Marriage and family therapist Leslie Hansen conducted home studies and placement visits from approximately 2007 through 2011. After abuse allegations arose in 2010, Hansen prepared an updated report. She testified that the siblings appeared unusually stiff during her meetings with them and that their behavior seemed somewhat scripted. The Centenos described their discipline as timeouts and loss of privileges, while the siblings described being sent to bed, required to sit in front of the television without watching it, and made to run for exercise. Hansen referred the siblings to a therapist and the Centenos to parenting classes.

Finally, social worker Monisha Sashital, who worked with the two younger adopted children, testified that she did not observe anything inappropriate in Gina's interactions with them.

Jury Verdict

The jury found Centeno guilty on all counts. It also found true the conduct enhancements and the circumstances related to the alternative sentencing provisions. The trial court struck the aggravating factor allegations. The court sentenced Centeno to a determinate term of 39 years, an indeterminate term of 21 years to life, and six separate terms of “life without the possibility of parole.” Centeno timely appealed.

Discussion

I. Jury Instructions

Centeno challenges two jury instructions given by the trial court. First, with respect to the counts alleging kidnapping for financial gain (counts 1, 2, and 3), he contends the trial court erred by providing the jury with the pattern CALCRIM No. 1202 instruction, which fails to adequately encompass the definition of “exact.”

Second, Centeno contends the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of the section 220, subdivision (a)(2) charges (counts 10, 14, and 15). According to Centeno, those offenses required an assault that was a separate act from the intended target offense, but CALCRIM No. 890 permitted the jury to find that the same conduct constituting the target offense also constituted the requisite assaultive conduct. He further contends the failure to instruct on this issue violated his substantive rights.

A. Legal Framework

A trial court must sua sponte instruct on “general principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the facts presented at trial” and necessary to the jury's understanding of the case. (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 90.) But “[a]s to pertinent matters falling outside the definition of a ‘general principle of law governing the case,’ ” the defendant must request any clarifying or amplifying instruction. (People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574 (Estrada).)

We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1210.) We first determine the applicable law and then consider whether, viewing the instructions in their entirety, the trial court fully and fairly instructed the jury on that law. (People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111–1112.) In doing so, we presume jurors “ ‘ “are intelligent persons ․ capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1111.)

Thus, a defendant who contends an instruction was susceptible to an erroneous interpretation must demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the instruction in the manner asserted.” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 926.) We consider the entire charge in the context of the trial record, including counsel's arguments, in assessing the instruction's probable impact on the jury. (Ibid.; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202.) “ ‘Instructions should be interpreted ․ to support the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.’ ” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.)

B. CALCRIM No. 1202 – Definition of “Exact”

Centeno contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 1202 because the instruction improperly defined “exact” as “get.” As a result, he argues, the instruction permitted the jury to convict him of aggravated kidnapping without requiring the prosecution to prove that (1) his request was wrongful, and (2) he believed nothing was due to him. He is incorrect.

1. Relevant Background

In connection with the aggravated kidnapping charges alleging that Centeno kidnapped the siblings to exact money or valuable things from a third party (counts 1–3), the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1202 as follows:

The defendant is charged in [counts 1, 2, and 3] with kidnapping [JD1, JD, and JD2] to get from a different person money or something valuable that resulted in bodily harm in violation of Penal Code section 209[, subdivision] (a).

To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

1. The defendant confined or concealed a person;

2. The defendant held or detained that person;

3. The defendant did so to get from a different person money or something valuable;

AND

4. The person did not consent to being confined or concealed.

During trial, the prosecution presented evidence concerning the Centenos’ receipt of Adoption Assistance Program (AAP) payments. JD, JD1, and JD2 were eligible for monthly AAP payments after their adoptions until the age of 18 or 21. The payments were intended to support the siblings’ needs as to food, clothing, shelter, and medical, dental, and mental health care. The Centenos were required to complete forms reassessing their AAP benefits and were also required to report any changes in residence, if the siblings were no longer residing in their home, or if they were no longer providing for the siblings’ basic needs.

The Centenos repeatedly submitted reassessment and direct deposit forms for the siblings, including in 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018. Bank records showed that AAP payments for the five adopted children totaled approximately $686,878 over the years. The payments were initially deposited into a joint account and later into Gina's individual account. The Centenos’ oldest son testified that Gina kept a calendar showing the payment schedule and told him, “[T]hat's how I make my money.”

The prosecutor argued that Centeno sought to continue receiving AAP funding by confining the siblings and concealing his and Gina's abuse. Had the state learned of the abuse, the siblings would have been removed from the home and the AAP payments would have ceased.

2. Waiver

The Attorney General argues Centeno forfeited his challenge to CALCRIM No. 1202 because he did not object to the instruction or request clarification.

Generally, a defendant's failure to object to an instruction forfeits a challenge to that instruction on appeal. (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1260.) A trial court's sua sponte duty to instruct usually extends only to the elements of the charged offense. (Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 574 [“ ‘If the jury would have no difficulty in understanding the statute without guidance, the court need do no more than instruct in statutory language.’ ”].) Thus, a party may not argue on appeal that an instruction correct in law was too general or incomplete and required clarification without first requesting that clarification at trial. (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503.) The failure to object does not, however, forfeit a claim of instructional error affecting a defendant's substantial rights. (§ 1259; People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 (Mitchell).)

Centeno has identified no authority holding that CALCRIM No. 1202 is insufficient to instruct on the elements of a section 209 charge. And, as we explain below, the instruction adequately conveyed the statutory requirement that the defendant act to “exact” money or something valuable from another person. Thus, Centeno identifies no error requiring reversal and his failure to object below waives the issue on appeal.

Even assuming, however, that Centeno's claim concerns an instructional omission affecting his substantive rights, his claim fails on the merits.

3. CALCRIM No. 1202 Adequately Conveyed the Meaning of “Exact”

Section 209, subdivision (a), identifies four alternative circumstances that elevate a kidnapping to aggravated kidnapping: kidnapping “for ransom,” for “reward,” “to commit extortion,” or “to exact from another person any money or valuable thing.” CALCRIM No. 1202 tracks those alternatives. After describing the conduct the defendant must commit against the victim, the instruction provides “[t]he defendant did so” either “for ransom,” “for reward,” “to commit extortion,” or “to get from a different person money or something valuable.” The challenged language corresponds to the fourth statutory alternative: kidnapping “to exact from another person any money or valuable thing.” (§ 209, subd. (a).)

Centeno nevertheless contends “get” does not adequately convey the meaning of “exact.” He argues the term “exact” requires proof that (1) his request was wrongful, and (2) he believed nothing was due to him. The argument fails because “exact,” as used in section 209, does not have the specialized meaning Centeno attributes to it.

“When a word or phrase ‘ “is commonly understood by those familiar with the English language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the law, the court is not required to give an instruction as to its meaning in the absence of a request.” ’ ” (Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 574.) In other words, clarification is required only when a statutory definition of a word is different from the commonly understood meaning. (Id. at pp. 574–575.) Neither party identifies a statutory definition of “exact.” To the contrary, both acknowledge that the Penal Code does not establish a unique or specific definition of the term. We therefore look to the common meaning of “exact.”

Centeno primarily relies on law dictionary definitions of “exaction.” But section 209 does not use the term “exaction,” and the technical definition of that term is not pertinent here. As the Attorney General correctly explains, at the time of section 209’s enactment, “exaction” had a specific technical meaning relating to a wrongful demand by an officer or person acting under color of office for fees or compensation beyond what the law allowed. (1 Bouvier's Law Dict. (14th ed. 1880) p. 550, col. 2 [defining “exaction”].) Section 209, however, is not limited to official actions. The definition of “exaction” therefore sheds no light on the meaning of the statutory term “exact.”

The ordinary meaning of “exact” at the time of section 209’s enactment likewise does not support Centeno's proposed limitations. The 1898 publication of Webster's International Dictionary of the English Language defines “exact” as, among other things, “[t]o demand or require authoritatively or peremptorily, as a right”; “to enforce the payment of, or a yielding of”; and “to compel to yield or furnish.” (Webster's Internat. Dict. of the English Language (1898) p. 518, col. 3 [as of Sept. 18, 2026].) None of those definitions require a showing that the defendant's demand was wrongful or that he believed nothing was due to him. Although the dictionary also defines “exact” as “to wrest, as a fee or reward when none is due,” that definition is incompatible with the broader language of the statute as a whole.³ (Ibid.)

Nor is there a meaningful difference between “exact” and “get” when the use of this verb is evaluated in the context of the entirety of CALCRIM No. 1202. Other language in CALCRIM No. 1202 requires that the defendant “confined or concealed a person” without their consent, and “held or detained” them in order “to get from a different person money or something valuable.” “Get” is commonly understood to mean, among other things, “to gain possession of,” “to obtain by concession or entreaty,” or “to seek out and obtain.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026) [as of Sept. 18, 2026].) As a practical matter, a thing of value that the defendant “get[s]” in the manner required by CALCRIM No. 1202 is “exact[ed]” as described in section 209.

Thus, CALCRIM No. 1202’s use of “get” adequately conveyed the requirement that Centeno kidnapped the siblings for the purpose of obtaining money or something of value from another person. Nothing more was required as there is no reasonable likelihood that CALCRIM No. 1212’s use of “get,” instead of the statutory term “exact,” caused the jury to misapply the law. (See Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579.)⁴

C. CALCRIM No. 890 – Separate Act

Centeno argues the jury was improperly instructed on assault with the intent of committing a lewd and lascivious act on a minor (counts 10, 14, and 15) because section 220 requires the assault to be based on an act separate from the conduct constituting the intended target offense—in this case, the lewd and lascivious act. We are not persuaded. Section 220 requires an assault committed with the requisite intent; it does not require the assaultive conduct to be separate from the conduct completing the intended sex offense.

1. Relevant Background

The jury was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 890, 1110, and 1112. CALCRIM No. 890 sets forth the elements of assault with intent to commit specified crimes in violation of section 220, subdivision (a)(2). That instruction required the prosecution to prove:

(1) “The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to a person”;

(2) “The defendant did that act willfully”;

(3) “When the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone”;

(4) “When the defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply force to a person”; and

(5) “When the defendant acted, he intended to commit a lewd act upon a minor.” (CALCRIM No. 890.)

CALCRIM Nos. 1110 and 1112, which immediately followed CALCRIM No. 890, explained that the intended lewd act required the defendant to “willfully touch[ ] any part of a child's body either on the bare skin or through the clothing.”

2. Waiver

As with Centeno's challenge to CALCRIM No. 1202, the Attorney General argues Centeno forfeited this instructional argument because he did not object below. In response, Centeno argues the requirement of a separate act is “a necessary element of the offense” and therefore implicates his substantive rights.

As previously discussed, the failure to object to an instruction generally forfeits a challenge to that instruction on appeal. (People v. Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1260.) But the failure to object does not forfeit a claim of instructional error affecting the defendant's substantial rights. (§ 1259; Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579.) Because Centeno contends the alleged omission concerns an element of the charged offenses and, alternatively, asserts ineffective assistance of counsel, we reach the merits. As explained below, the instructions correctly state the elements of section 220, subdivision (a)(2), and no additional instruction requiring a separate assaultive act is warranted.

3. Elements of Intent To Commit a Lewd and Lascivious Act Upon a Child Under Penal Code Section 220

Centeno relies on People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463 and People v. Trotter (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1217 (Trotter) to argue that conduct constituting the completed “lewd and lascivious act” cannot also establish the assault element of section 220, subdivision (a)(2). Neither case supports that proposition.

In Davis, the Supreme Court explained that the essential element of a section 220 violation is the intent to commit the act against the victim's will: “ ‘The offense is complete if at any moment during the assault the accused intends to use whatever force may be required.’ ” (People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 509.) Likewise, in Trotter, “[t]he jury was instructed that ‘the specific intent required for the crime of assault with intent to commit rape is satisfied if at any moment during the assault the defendant intends to have sexual intercourse with the victim’ ” and to use force or a threat of force for that purpose. (Trotter, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1223–1224.) The court rejected the defendant's claim that the jury should have received an additional instruction defining “threat of force.” (Id. at p. 1224.) Neither case holds that the assaultive conduct must be separate from the conduct constituting the intended sex offense.

We find People v. Leal (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 782 instructive. There, the defendant entered the victim's residence at night through a window, digitally penetrated her, and engaged in sexual intercourse with her; the victim did not resist as she believed it was her husband. (Id. at pp. 785–786.) The defendant was convicted of both assault with intent to commit rape and of rape and sexual penetration by artifice, pretense or concealment based on the same conduct. (Id. at p. 785.) On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. (Id. at pp. 787, 790.) The court rejected the argument, explaining that the touching of sexual organs without consent is an unlawful use of force and clearly supported a conviction for assault along with supporting the conviction for rape and sexual penetration. (Id. at pp. 790–791.)

Leal thus demonstrates why Centeno's proposed separate-act requirement finds no support in section 220. Conduct constituting the underlying sex offense may also constitute the assault. Harmful or offensive touching sufficient to establish an assault does not cease to be assaultive merely because the same touching also completes the intended sex offense.⁵

The statutory elements of section 220 confirm this conclusion. An assault is an “unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury” on another person. (§ 240.) Section 220, subdivision (a), in turn, is satisfied when the defendant commits an assault with the requisite intent to commit the specified sex offense. (CALCRIM No. 890; People v. Meichtry (1951) 37 Cal.2d 385, 388–389; Trotter, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 1223.) Whether the defendant ultimately completes the intended sex offense is irrelevant. (Trotter, at pp. 1223–1224.)

Nothing in these elements requires two distinct acts. To the contrary, section 220 only requires an “unlawful attempt,” coupled with present ability, and the requisite specific intent. (People v. Dillon (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378 [§ 220 only requires that the defendant had “the specific intent to commit the underlying sexual act” as well as “a specific intent to commit that act without the consent of the victim.”].) The statute does not add a requirement that the assaultive act precede or be independent of the conduct that ultimately completes the intended offense.

Here, CALCRIM No. 890 correctly instructed the jury on each element of a section 220, subdivision (a)(2) violation. It required the jury to find that Centeno committed an act that, by its nature, would directly and probably result in the application of force, that he acted willfully and with present ability, and that he intended to commit a lewd act upon a minor. CALCRIM Nos. 1110 and 1112 then defined the intended lewd act. Nothing in the governing law required the court to instruct that the assaultive act had to be separate from the conduct constituting that act.

Accordingly, Centeno was not entitled to the additional instruction he identifies. Because the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the offense, his substantive rights were not affected, and we find no instructional error. (See People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428.) For the same reason, we reject his claim of constitutional error.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

We review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and presume facts in favor of the judgment that may reasonably be deduced from the evidence. (People v. Sommer (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 696, 702.) A reviewing court neither resolves evidentiary conflicts nor reassesses credibility. (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) Questions of witness credibility and the weight to be given the evidence are “ ‘the exclusive province’ ” of the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) We therefore may not substitute our assessment of witness credibility for that of the jury. (Ibid.)

B. Jane Doe 1's Age

1. Relevant Background

In counts 7, 8, and 9, Centeno was charged with rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), sodomy by force (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)), and rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), respectively. As to each count, the information alleged “One Strike” sentencing circumstances under two alternative provisions of section 667.61. One alleged that Jane Doe 1 was “a child under 14 years of age” within the meaning of subdivisions (j)(1) and (j)(2), while the other alleged that she was “a child 14 years of age or older” within the meaning of subdivisions (l) and (m).

The jury instructions did not require the jury to distinguish between those alternative age allegations. Instead, the court instructed the jury to determine whether “[JD1] was a child under 14 years of age or [JD1] was a minor 14 years of age or older.” The verdict forms likewise did not require the jury to select between the two age categories. Each form asked the jury to find that, “pursuant to Penal Code Section 667.61[, subdivisions] (j)(1), (j)(2), (l) and (m), the victim in the above offense was a child under 14 years of age, or a minor 14 years of age or older.” The jury found the One Strike allegations true.

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury's Findings

Centeno does not challenge the alternative sentencing structure.⁶ Instead, he contends the evidence was insufficient to establish JD1's age when the offenses occurred because her testimony on that point was inconsistent. The argument mistakes a conflict in the evidence for an absence of substantial evidence.

At trial, JD1 repeatedly testified that Centeno sexually assaulted her when she was 13. For example, she testified she was 13 when Centeno brought her to his biological daughter's former bedroom, had her watch television depicting a woman undressing, and then penetrated her vagina with his penis. She reasserted that she believed she was 13 when cross-examined about this assault. She explained she knew her age based on “hearing the holidays pass.” JD1 also testified that she believed she was 13 when Centeno again took her to that bedroom, vaginally and anally penetrated her, physically moved her back into position when she tried to move away, and threatened to hurt her. JD1 again explained the basis for that age recollection: she “remember[ed] keeping track of [her age] and reminding [her]self that [she] was 13.” On cross-examination JD1 acknowledged she could have been “13 or 14, not exactly sure,” but believed the second assault wasn't “far apart” in time from the first rape. When asked whether the assaults occurred in the same month, she did not respond directly but stated they occurred within the same year. No further follow-up questions were asked to narrow down this timeframe.

This evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that JD1 was 13 when Centeno committed the offenses charged in counts 7 through 9. The fact that portions of JD1's testimony reflected uncertainty does not render her affirmative testimony insufficient. “The testimony of a single witness can be sufficient to uphold a conviction—even when there is significant countervailing evidence, or the testimony is subject to justifiable suspicion.” (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1158; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)

Centeno's reliance on People v Mejia (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 86 (Mejia) does not alter that conclusion. In Mejia, the defendant was charged with committing sexual abuse of a child “ ‘on or between June 1, 2004 and September 17, 2004,’ ” but the evidence established only that the abuse began at some unspecified point in June and continued until some unspecified point in September. (Id. at pp. 93–95.) Because the evidence did not establish when within those months the acts occurred, the jury could only speculate whether the first incident occurred early enough in June to satisfy a statutory 90-day requirement. (Id. at p. 95.) Likewise, because there was no evidence establishing when in September the abuse occurred, the jury could only speculate whether it occurred before or after the victim's birthday. (Ibid.)

The deficiency in Mejia was therefore a lack of evidence from which the jury could make the required temporal finding. This case presents the opposite situation. JD1 expressly testified that she believed she was 13 when Centeno raped and sodomized her. She further explained why she remembered being 13: she kept track of her age by listening to the Centenos celebrate holidays and reminding herself of her age. JD1 also testified she believed the assaults occurred during the same year. Thus, unlike in Mejia, the jury was not required to speculate about JD1's age. It had affirmative evidence from which to find that she was 13.

That JD1 later acknowledged on cross-examination she could have been 14 does not compel a different result. Centeno effectively asks us to credit that uncertainty over her testimony that she believed she was 13. We cannot do so. A judgment may not be reversed simply because circumstances might be reconciled with contrary finding. (See, e.g., People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 143.) In fact, Mejia also recognized that “contradictions in [a victim's] testimony merely raised a credibility issue for the jury to resolve.” (Mejia, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)

Centeno similarly argues that uncertainty regarding the sequence of the assaults and JD1's age created two competing inferences, thus establishing neither. But again, the argument conflates conflicting evidence with speculation. In Mejia, the record supplied no evidence from which the jury could determine on which side of the relevant date the offenses occurred. Here, the record affirmatively supported a finding that JD1 was 13. Her testimony that she believed she was 13, together with her explanation of how she tracked her age and the evidence concerning the timing of the assaults, permitted the jury to draw a reasonable inference that she was, in fact, 13.

Where, as here, substantial evidence supports the verdict, we defer to the jury's resolution of conflicts in the evidence and its assessment of witness credibility. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303.) We therefore conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's findings on counts 7 through 9.⁷

C. Assaults To Commit Lewd and Lascivious Acts

Centeno argues his convictions for violating section 220, subdivision (a)(2)—assault with the intent to commit a lewd and lascivious act upon a child (counts 10, 14, and 15)—must be reversed because the only assaultive conduct supporting those convictions was the conduct constituting the completed target offense. Count 10 was based on an incident in which Centeno rubbed his penis against JD1's bottom and counts 14 and 15 were based on two incidents in which Centeno pinched and/or slapped JD1's breasts.

We reject the claim. As explained in part I.C.3., ante, section 220 does not require an assault separate from the conduct constituting the intended sex offense. The question, therefore, is whether substantial evidence supports the assaultive conduct and the requisite intent. It does.

Section 220, subdivision (a)(2), applies to “[a]ny person who assaults another person under 18 years of age with the intent to commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or any violation of Section 264.1, 288, or 289.” As discussed in part I.C.3., ante, the statute does not require the assaultive conduct to be factually distinct from the conduct constituting the target offense. Nor do Davis or Trotter support Centeno's contrary position. Those cases establish that a section 220 violation may be complete even if the defendant does not ultimately complete the intended sex offense. (Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 509; Trotter, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 1223.) They do not hold that completion of the target offense precludes the same conduct from establishing the assault.

People v. Leal, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th 782 is again instructive. As explained above, Leal recognized that harmful or offensive touching constitutes an unlawful use of force sufficient to establish assault, and that the same conduct supporting the completed sex offense may also support an assault-with-intent conviction. (Id. at p. 791; see pt. I.C.3., ante.) We find that reasoning persuasive here.

Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Centeno rubbed his penis against JD1's bottom and, on two separate occasions, pinched and/or slapped her breasts. Centeno does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence establishing those acts. Nor does he challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting any other element of the section 220 charges. Because those acts could constitute the requisite assault and Centeno does not otherwise challenge the evidence supporting the convictions, substantial evidence supports the jury's verdicts on counts 10, 14, and 15. And because we find no error in the convictions, we reject Centeno's claim that they violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Finally, Centeno argues that any waiver of his instructional arguments by failing to object below constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no merit in this argument.

To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to seek supplemental jury instructions, Centeno “ ‘must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958.) As discussed above, the jury instructions were correct as given. Thus, it is unlikely a request by counsel would have altered the instructions given by the court.

Moreover, counsel's decision to not request supplemental instructions requires deference. (People v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711 [in evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “we ‘defer[ ] to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions’ and presume that ‘counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ ”].) The record does not indicate counsel's reasoning for not seeking additional or modified instruction, and we will not speculate because counsel may have had a tactical reason for the decision. (See, e.g., People v. Bonilla (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 649, 657 [“[b]y leaving the jury to its own devices based on the existing instructions, defendants’ counsel could have believed he was increasing defendants’ chance of an acquittal or hung jury”].)

Accordingly, Centeno has not demonstrated he received ineffective assistance.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.⁸

Trial Court: Sonoma County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Troye Shaffer

Counsel:

Scott N. Cameron, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Donna M. Provenzano, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Victoria Ratnikova, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On November 5, 2025, Centeno filed an unopposed request for judicial notice of legislative history excerpts related to Penal Code section 209 and certain dictionary definitions of the term “exaction.” On June 15, 2026, Centeno filed another unopposed request for judicial notice of certain dictionary definitions of the verb “exact.” We now grant these requests.

2.   For ease of comprehension, we refer to Gina Centeno and Iris Centeno by first name.

3.   Centeno filed a “notice of new authority” letter on September 15, 2026, regarding dictionary definitions from 1898 of the terms “fee,” “recompense,” and “stipend.” This court subsequently received but did not file a request for judicial notice from Centeno on September 18, 2026, after the cause had been submitted to the court. The request for judicial notice addressed the same materials provided in his prior letter. We have considered these additional authorities and do not require further briefing from the parties.

4.   Because we find no instructional error, we reject Centeno's argument that the failure to properly instruct violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

5.   To the extent United States v. Bolanos-Hernandez (9th Cir. 2007) 492 F.3d 1140 holds otherwise, we decline to follow it. (Brakke v. Economic Concepts, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 761, 770 [“ ‘[W]hile decisions of federal courts in matters of state law are not binding on state courts, they may be persuasive.’ ”].) We disagree with Bolanos-Hernandez’s conclusion that “the force appears to be in addition to that required to complete intercourse or penetration”; none of the cited California authorities stand for that proposition. (Bolanos-Hernandez, at p. 1147.)

6.   Centeno notes the jury found JD1 was a minor under the age of 14 for purposes of the child molestation allegations, thus resolving any unanimity error on these charges.

7.   Because we conclude the convictions on these counts are supported by substantial evidence, we reject Centeno's argument that the age-related findings under section 667.61, subdivisions (e)(1), (j)(1)–(2), (l), and (m) were insufficient, violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and require reversal.

8.   Because we find no error, we reject Centeno's request for resentencing.

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR: Tucher, P. J. Rodríguez, J.