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The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jose Solano LANDAETA, Defendant and Appellant.
Jose Solano Landaeta appeals a judgment convicting him of first degree murder and sentencing him to prison for a term of 26 years to life. He contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury that a person who kills as a result of provocation and in the heat of passion is guilty of voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 570), or of murder in the second degree (CALCRIM No. 522), rather than first degree murder. In the published portion of the opinion, we address an apparent tension between two decisions of our Supreme Court and explain why the claimed errors—assuming without deciding that the instructions should have been given—must be deemed harmless in light of the jury's first degree murder verdict. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we explain why we are unpersuaded by Landaeta's remaining claims that the trial court made several prejudicial evidentiary errors and also violated his due process rights by failing to suspend the criminal proceedings when presented with substantial evidence that raised a doubt about his competence to stand trial.
BACKGROUND
Landaeta was charged by amended information with a single count of murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)), with a sentence enhancement for his use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022(b)(1)), for the killing of Karina Castro on September 8, 2022. The amended information also alleged several sentencing factors in aggravation, as well as that Landaeta was ineligible for probation because he personally inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the crime. (§ 1203.075, subd. (a).)
At trial, evidence was presented that Landaeta and Castro began dating in 2019. At the time of the killing, Castro lived with her and Landaeta's then-20-month-old daughter, as well as Castro's 7-year-old daughter. Landaeta had lived with them briefly but moved out in July 2021, and was staying with his father at the time of the killing. Landaeta's mother and brother lived in the same apartment complex with Castro and the children.
On the morning of the killing, Landaeta went to work as usual, but at around 11:00 a.m., after his manager observed him texting “quite ferociously” on his cell phone—i.e., he “was focused on his cell phone and he was texting as fast as his little fingers would go on company time”—Landaeta said he was not feeling well and left work early. Messages extracted from Landaeta's and Castro's phones and messaging applications were introduced as evidence at trial.2
On the night before the killing, Castro and Landaeta engaged in a long text exchange. Castro began by asking Landaeta if he could FaceTime her, and in her initial messages, she tried to reestablish a connection and explained that she cares about him. Among other texts, she wrote: “i was tryna just talk” — “been thinkin bout u,” and later, “u kno damn well how much i do care about yur ass rafa[3 ] after 3–4 years?” Landaeta rebuffed her, although some of the texts are difficult to interpret because they refer to unidentified people and to incidents that are not fully explained on the record. He wrote, for example, “You said if they killed me, you aint gon care, so i already knw how you feel,” to which Castro answered, “i would care i was saying if they came after me it seems that u don't care.” Castro later wrote, “every times i tell u the truth u don't wanna hear it,” to which Landaeta responded, “I heard what you said, so now i knw.” Castro then replied, “just like i herd wat you said” — “puttin a target on my back right” — “i already had me lo hit me up tryna check me”4 — “i got the girls dude.” Landaeta responded, “Nope, you did that to yoself” — “I been tried to tell you.”
The conversation eventually turned to the subject of their daughter, with Castro writing, “how am I supposed to work with [her]” — “u ain't around weekdays.” Landaeta responded, “So im straight, talk to me about my daughter n thas it.” Castro replied, “so this how we gunna end our shit?” — “really” — “????” — “r u fuckin serious,” to which Landaeta responded, “You told me how you feel n im not wid that.”
In subsequent texts, Castro again tried to explain that she cared about him, writing, for example, “fucked up if I ever loose u tf” — “I already been goin tbru it not talkin to u”5 — “I was tryna call u to apologize,” followed by a sad eyes emoji and “if u would let me.” Landaeta responded, “Yeaa well ima start lookin fa anotha girl that actually care,” and Castro answered, “i been care tf” — “u all I care about n our kids” — “please call me rafa” — “I really need to talk to you.” Landaeta wrote, “I don't deserve to be treated like the scumbags you go for,” and Castro responded with multiple texts to which Landaeta did not reply, including: “please can I apologize” — “I won't bother u anymore” — “I was hella outa pocket” — “but u acted like u don't care if I get taken out that shit hurt” — “rafa” — “please can we talk” — “how much do I beg u for ur attention or a day with u?” — “my mental state has been shit” — “since this shit” — “u the only comfort I got,” followed by six sad face emojis.
Castro grew angry in her subsequent texts, writing: “never said i wouldn't care. u didn't hear me right” — “if i didn't care, i wouldn't have you around [our daughter]” — “and if u wana treat me like shit, then good luck tryna see her or take her again cuz i don't deserve that” — “since the last time we fucked u haven't givin a shit i deserve someone who cares about my well being too” — “u wana tell ppl to take me out i can tell the homies you let a n***a suck ur dick see who gets taken out then” — “maybe that's why but he's got issues with u” — “bitches” — “i kno shit that will get u 6 ft under remember that wen wen u wana put salt on my name for a n***a I'm not with[.]” About an hour later, Castro added, “ ‘damn n u go to you get bitches haha damn i see why u won't fuck wit me i'm not young enough” — “now I kno wat ur case was for.”
The following morning, starting around 9:15 a.m., Castro and Landaeta began exchanging messages again. During the course of the exchange, Castro messaged, “send ur momma my way too lol” — “i'll handle her ass as well please give me a reason.” When Castro wrote, “u a fuckin rapist to cuz that female was under age,” Landaeta replied with the ninja emoji. When Castro responded, “see if the homies gunna like that,” Landaeta replied with four clapping hands emojis and four more ninja emojis. Castro wrote in one message of Landaeta “lettin n***as suck u up cuz u thought u was goin to jail,” to which Landaeta responded with a series of laughing and clapping emojis. Castro then sent a screenshot of their message followed by more laughing emojis. Landaeta responded with more ninja emojis. Referring to the screenshots, Castro messaged, “thank u for my posts to ig [Instagram],” and then “now i hope u get ur shit shut down” — “n taken out.” She continued, “[daughter] don't need a gay n***a for a dad,” and “u gunna loose everything” and “u gay.” Landaeta continued to reply with, among other messages, more ninja and laughing emojis.
At one point, Castro messaged, “epa [East Palo Alto] gunna kno,” and “west side metro [mateo] gunna kno rafa[ ] like dick,” and “imma. blast this shit everywhere.” Landaeta responded, “Fuk around n find out.” The messages continued with Castro threatening to out Landaeta as gay and Landaeta responding with insults and more ninja and laughing emojis. During the exchange, Castro threatened that Landaeta would never be around her kids again and messaged him, “u got a target on ur back now too.” Landaeta replied, “Lol, u wish bitch, u wish.” Castro messaged, “i already got a green light” and “show ur face around here i wish u would ur mom gunna have to move too [ ] after I'm done.” Landaeta replied, “keep pushing it bitch ․ i knw why you fuk d.o.z.”6 Castro added, “tell yo mom to plan [ur] fuckin service” — “cu i'm done with this shit” — “ur homies kno now” — “u a f****t and a pedo.” When Landaeta responded, “Keep hoping bitch,” Castro replied, “haha” — “it's good i'm on the phone now makin ahit[7 ] happen.” Two minutes later, she added, “i got everyone on my page lookin at these messages [laughing emoji] it's bad on u.” She added “i got someone out there right now haha” — “lookin for u” — “remember I kno ur dad addy.” During the course of this exchange, Landaeta responded “lol” several times, and inserted at least 20 laughing-while-crying emojis and a dozen clapping-hands emojis.
As the exchange continued, Castro repeatedly threatened Landaeta, and in response, Landaeta continued to insult her and send ninja emojis. Castro messaged, “don't show ur face around here lol i should find ur paperwork n print it out so ppl can hide there teenagers” and “lol i think imma print all this out n cover ur moms door.” Landaeta replied, “Bitch, i jus know you be lying bout everything so im quite amused,” “Lol ․ you run your mouth soo much itz annoying,” and “Lol i think u need a hug.” She added, “wait till i find out where u work” and “imma have someone on u all times.” Around 10:30 a.m., Castro messaged “I got my n***a on his way.” Landaeta replied, “Itz alright D.O. Rydah keep telling yourself you was a good mom.” A minute later Castro messaged, “i'll take ur mom out too” — “see if i'm playin” — “fuck u n ur family.” That was followed by two more messages from Castro, the first saying that their daughter “will have my last name” and the second saying that “u will have no right to my kid.”
Also that morning, Landaeta received a message from a mutual acquaintance that read, “say its not true what your bm [baby momma] posted on her Ig blooood.” When Landaeta asked what Castro posted, the acquaintance responded, “She posted a video saying you got sucked up by a n***a bloooood.” Landaeta replied, “Wooww blood that bitch is fkn psycho” and “Im not gon lie broo, she lookin ta get smoked blood.” Landaeta followed up with, “Bitch is all bad blood, she needa get 86ed.” In response to the acquaintance's message, “imagine everyone who she got as a friend on Ig seen that shit,” Landaeta replied, “I knw blood but theres nothin i can do, unless i handle the bitch.” Landaeta immediately followed up this message with “but honestly ․ I aint even trippin, she be lyin like fukk soo I mean whatever bro big whoop” and “[i]t aint gon faze me.” After exchanging several more messages, Landaeta added, “Ima have ta do what i gotta do broo,” followed by the 100 and four blood emojis. In response to a message that read, “Its not worth it my n***,” Landaeta replied, “Itz bad broo, ima West Mataz ․ If nobody gon do then ill do it thas been our creed for ages,” followed by another 100 and a blood emoji.
At 9:38 a.m., Landaeta changed his Instagram profile to state, among other things, “Believe what you want- the streetz dnt lie, or sleep” followed by four blood emojis. At 11:46 a.m., shortly before the killing, he posted an Instagram story showing the entrance to Castro's apartment complex.
Three witnesses testified that around noon, they were on a walk when they came across two people, later identified as Landaeta and Castro, arguing in the street. The witnesses watched as Landaeta retrieved a sword from his car, “stomp[ed]” towards Castro, and hit her twice with the sword—once in the right shoulder and again in the neck area. Castro attempted to flee but Landaeta caught up to her and hit her six to eight more times with the sword. One of the witnesses described Castro after the attack as having had her neck “nearly severed.” Crime scene photos shown to the jury, and testimony by the prosecution's criminalist, confirmed that Castro's head had been almost severed from her neck.
As the police were investigating at the scene of the crime, Landaeta and his mother approached an officer and Landaeta said, “ ‘She was trying to kill me. I'm sorry.’ ” The officer described Landaeta as sweating and breathing heavily with “a thousand-yard stare.” After determining that Landaeta had a “slight” fever, he was transported to the hospital before being taken to jail.
Landaeta testified that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia at age 14 or 15 but was “very high functioning” when he took medication. In the past, extreme stress and high anxiety triggered his psychotic episodes. When he had episodes, he became “paranoid,” believed he was being chased or persecuted, and felt “unsafe.” He would “space out” and “start shutting down.” At the time of the killing, his personal life was “extreme[ly] stress[ful].” As a result, he took his medication “just once” in the five days before the killing.
Landaeta testified that at the time of the killing he believed that Castro “was living a double life” but he could not “figure out what the second life was.” Castro did not want him to know about that life; it was “kind of illegal.” “A lot of things” he discovered about Castro made him concerned for his safety. For example, the Saturday before the killing, Castro showed him a bag containing “about a pound of crystal methamphetamine[ ],” and asked him to protect her because “someone was causing her problems.” The next day, Castro sent him an address so that he could talk to the person or “kick his ass and tell him to leave her alone.”
On September 6 or 7, he and Castro argued. He believed Castro was seeing someone new who was “abusive” and he had heard that the man “dropped out of whatever gang he was [in].” Landaeta did not want the individual around his child. During the disagreement Castro said she “wouldn't care” if Landaeta was killed, which made him “paranoid” that “something [was] going to happen.”
On the morning of the killing, he woke up “very disorientated” and “smelled [his] food” at breakfast thinking his father was trying to poison him. He went to work and read Castro's text messages from the night before, which were “negative and aggressive,” and he began texting her on Snapchat. He learned from the acquaintance what Castro had posted on Instagram, that she was “shaming me and telling everybody on social media going kind of global and telling everybody I was gay, I was pedo, I didn't take care of my daughter, I'm never there for my daughter, I'm not a good dad. Just kind of just shaming me as best she can. Just kind of I guess getting everybody ready to go ahead and approve that I needed to be killed.” He “believed there w[ere] going to be people coming after” him. When asked whether he feared for his safety, Landaeta responded, “I felt like something was getting insinuated,” but acknowledged that since he was in a “crisis” he “was probably exaggerating things a little bit.” Castro's messages mentioning his mother caused him to believe her life was in danger. Landaeta explained that during the text exchanges, he felt “[v]ery distressed,” like his “blood was boiling,” “[v]ery disorientated,” “kind of light-headed,” and “sick to [his] stomach.” He experienced “electrifying” “anxiety” and “started feeling very sick.” He believed there was a hit already underway at his mother's apartment. He testified that he “thought that there was going to be multiple gang members ․ that were going to show up at my mother's house. I don't know how many. Maybe five or six, or maybe like ten. I wasn't sure.”
He left work in Berkeley, traveled home to Hayward and “got ready for war” by retrieving the sword. He explained that he did not own a gun, so the only weapon he had was the decorative sword. He changed into a shirt depicting Kakashi—a character from the anime Naruto—believing the shirt would make him braver. He donned a “very thick” sweater for “added armor,” believing he was “going to have to go to war against guns.” He drove across the Bay to San Carlos, where Castro lived. Landaeta testified that a final text message from Castro, which is not in evidence, “popped up” on his phone screen as he was leaving Hayward that said: “I'm going to take out your mom. I have an N-word on the way.” He added that he did not open it and Castro deleted it on her phone. Once he arrived at Castro's home, he posted the photograph of the apartment complex on Instagram so that if anyone saw it, they could come to his aid. A psychiatrist who testified later during the trial reported that Landaeta had told him that the drive from Berkeley to Hayward and then to San Carlos had taken an hour.
Seeing Castro in her car, Landaeta testified that he “swerved in” and parked in front of her. He got out of his vehicle, stood by the door without holding any weapons, and waited for Castro to get out, intending to “talk [Castro] down” and “deescalate the whole situation.” While in her car, Castro made a phone call, and Landaeta thought she was trying to determine whether “the hit men were coming.” When Castro finally exited her car, she “started marching at [him] like a soldier initiating an attack” with a knife in her left hand.
Landaeta initially “froze,” but when Castro got “really close” to him, she looked at his heart, and he believed she would stab him there. She “lunged” at him, and he “went into shock” and a “full episode.” He was not “too sure what happened” after that. When asked by defense counsel whether he recalled retrieving the sword from his car, he said he did not know. He recalled trying to dodge Castro's knife and “jumping in the car.” When asked, “Do you recall coming out of the car and fighting back or attacking her or anything,” he answered, “I think so, but I just don't know how.” He explained, “I felt like I did get out of the car, but, like, I just don't remember how I got out of the car.” His first memory after seeing Castro with the knife was “[r]unning back to the scene and hearing the sirens.” He thought the police would shoot him, so he took a “detour,” called his mother, and told her to pick him up from “down the street.” Then he turned himself in. He was still having “an episode” and felt “[d]isorientated” when he spoke to the police. He “forgot how to talk” and felt “paranoid because there w[ere] supposed to be like ten hit men after” him. While in the hospital and later in jail, he was “all blank” and could not speak. The episode lasted for two months before he “snapped back into reality.”
Near the beginning of cross-examination, Landaeta denied that he killed Castro. When the prosecutor then moved to introduce three audio files into evidence, Landaeta asked to take a bathroom break. Once outside the courtroom, he briefly refused to return for cross-examination. Back in the courtroom, the court advised Landaeta to speak with counsel about the possible consequences of failing to complete cross-examination, and after a brief discussion he agreed to continue his testimony. Once cross-examination recommenced, however—with the prosecutor asking Landaeta whether he recognized his voice on the audio recording—Landaeta looked down and refused to answer any questions. The trial was adjourned for the day and Landaeta was returned to jail.
Landaeta's mother confirmed that schizophrenia ran in her family and that Landaeta was diagnosed after an episode when he was 15 years old. When she saw Landaeta the weekend before the killing, she thought “[s]omething [was] going on with him” and became worried he would have an episode. When he called her after the killing, he spoke in the “very strange voice” that she associated with him having an episode, and he “breath[ed] heavily” over the phone. When she found him about a block away, he was “kind of shaky,” “drooling,” and his eyes were “a little bit dilated.”
Landaeta's father also testified about his son's mental health struggles beginning when Landaeta was around seven or eight, including several later hospitalizations. He described an interaction with him a few days before the killing in which Landaeta was “really agitated” and “too overacting” about a birthday gift Landaeta was planning for him. When he saw Landaeta in jail two weeks after the killing, Landaeta was uncommunicative and “spaced out.” He went to see Landaeta regularly in jail and he remained uncommunicative until November 2022.
On cross-examination, Landaeta's father was asked about a recorded jail visit that occurred in October 2023 during which he asked Landaeta if he knew what he did and Landaeta replied, “Yeah, I know what I did․ I fucking killed a bitch because she was going to kill my family. That's allowed. That—you can actually do that. It's in the law. Like you are allowed to kill somebody because they're threatening your family.” In another visit the same month, Landaeta told his father that he had “a way for myself to get out and dismissed, you know? There's a law in the penal code that will dismiss me, I just gotta file the right motion.” Landaeta added that he had “like two or three ways I can get out,” and when his father told him to explain them to his lawyer, he complained that the lawyer was not listening to him and “still wants to do this Kakashi thing, he's been studying it all year, I don't know.” On redirect, his father testified that Landaeta appeared “really strange” during these visits, that “he was erratically talking, talking, talking things that was not—it was really—I didn't recognize him.”
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented testimony by numerous mental health professionals regarding Landaeta's mental condition shortly after the crime and at the time of trial. The clinical social worker who supervised the jail throughout Landaeta's time there testified that in the days after the killing, Landaeta was “selectively” mute but made eye contact and responded to the commands of custody staff and took his psychiatric medication. By November 2022, Landaeta was speaking to staff and had developed a normal routine.
In September 2023, shortly before trial, Landaeta stopped taking his medication and began displaying signs of mental deterioration, including becoming “malodorous” and having a disorganized cell. A jail counselor who saw Landaeta on September 24 after he had been off his medication for 10 days testified that, as she approached the cell door, Landaeta punched the cell window or door, then stared blankly past her, smiled, and stopped smiling. When she asked about the punching, Landaeta stated he was “becoming Takashi. That's our only strategy for me to go to the hospital.” When asked why he stopped taking medication, he stated he would not take it until he could go home. With respect to his case, Landaeta told the counselor that “his ex-girlfriend threatened to kill his mom so he took care of it.” He said he was feeling anxious and had “racing thoughts” about the case and the trial, but “did not endorse any other further mental health symptoms or psych acuity” at that time.
A jail psychologist contacted Landaeta in his cell on September 25. Landaeta said he was hearing voices but they were “too soft” to tell what they were saying. He spoke “appropriately” and denied “command auditory hallucinations.” He did not appear to her to be “internally preoccupied” as someone with auditory hallucinations would. Landaeta explained to her that he had stopped taking his medication because he thought it would “make [him] better for court” and “help [his] defense better.”
On September 28, Landaeta was transferred to the Acute Stabilization Unit (ASU) at the jail because he stopped taking his medication and was deemed “gravely disabled”—i.e., not showering, eating, or maintaining his housing, and being “disorganized and dysphoric.” A nurse testified that when Landaeta arrived, he “smil[ed], check[ed] out” his surroundings, made “good eye contact” with everyone greeting him, and greeted people in return. Landaeta was “very excited” and said in a “very high-pitched voice,” “ ‘I'm happy to be on ASU.’ ” When the nurse spoke with Landaeta “a couple hours later,” his cell “was very organized” and “neat.” He wanted to shower “immediately,” denied experiencing auditory hallucinations, and appeared not “internally preoccupied.”
The psychiatrist who met with Landaeta in the ASU testified that Landaeta told her that he “stopped taking his medication two weeks ago believing his case would be thrown out once he is found incompetent to stand trial.” During their interaction, he was “very cooperative,” made eye contact, and answered her questions in a “very linear and appropriate manner.” She did not believe he suffered from a mental health condition at that time, but was instead trying to have his case dismissed. She opined that suffering from schizophrenia at age 15 is “very, very rare” and would have involved multiple hospitalizations and “a lot of care.” She explained that schizophrenia is a progressive, degenerative disease where the individual becomes “more neurocognitively impaired.” Twenty years of symptoms “would be quite debilitating,” and even if symptoms could be controlled, the disease would progress. She noted that agitation was “very atypical” for psychosis or schizophrenia and that Landaeta's behavior was more impulsive, which is not a part of schizophrenia.
Finally, the psychiatrist testified that Landaeta's presentation at ASU was inconsistent with schizophrenia. She noted that when Landaeta felt his needs were accommodated, he was “amicable” and cooperative, but “act[ed] up” when his needs were not met fast enough. She believed his issues were “behavioral and to a point where he was very aware what was going on.” In her opinion, Landaeta stopped taking medication to appear unstable. He said he felt “good” and was “more stabilized” as soon as he took medication in the ASU, which was impossible and inconsistent with genuine psychotic disorder because medication takes “a few days” to work. She noted that he changed his behavior around authority figures and doctors when he knew he was being observed. He did not speak to people he believed would not meet his needs. Rather, he “direct[ed] his attention to someone who was more agreeable to” him and engaged in conversation with that person until that person presented him with an obstacle. Then he would tell the person “that they were fired” and stop talking. Landaeta was released from the ASU on September 30, after spending “a very short time” there.
A second psychiatrist who met with Landaeta while he was in the ASU testified that he too did not observe “any active psychotic symptoms.” He opined that being diagnosed with schizophrenia at age 15 was “rare,” and that claimed symptoms at age seven or eight was “incredibly rare.” He noted that Landaeta exhibited attention-seeking behaviors in front of others but not when he was observed from a location where he could not see others observing him. The psychiatrist also testified that, while Landaeta displayed improvement with one dose of antipsychotic medication, it generally took a week or two for improvement to occur. He opined, “By the time I saw him, he had only had one dose of antipsychotic medication. And if his behaviors of presentation prior to his admission were due to a psychotic illness, it would be highly unlikely after one dose of medication that he would have significantly improved.” He believed that Landaeta displayed antisocial behavior, not schizophrenia.
The prosecution also offered opinions by experts regarding Landaeta's mental health at the time of the killing. Clinical and forensic psychologist Rami Mogannam met with Landaeta in jail on July 26 and August 9, 2023, interviewed him, and reviewed police reports, witness statements, and the messages exchanged between Landaeta and Castro. Based on this information, he opined that Landaeta was not suffering from symptoms of mental illness at the time of the offense.
Mogannam testified that he did not observe any symptoms of mental illness during his interviews. When describing the offense, Landaeta told Mogannam that he turned into Kakashi, which gave him “the strength and the power to defend himself and to handle the situation that he believed he needed to handle.” Landaeta claimed to be in a delusional state where “he turned into Kakashi during the actual acts, and then said he snapped out of it soon after or immediately after.” Landaeta said he killed Castro after “she put her neck out and told [him] to kill her” and that he “wanted to give her her honor and didn't want her to suffer anymore[,] so he used one swing on her neck.” He claimed that immediately after the murder, he told his mother in Spanish that he “took [Castro] out and then said, ‘come get me.’ ” Mogannam opined that Landaeta's description of the events was inconsistent with a genuine mental health condition because genuine symptoms slowly wax and wane over time but someone does not “just ․ snap out of it.” Mogannam also noted that Landaeta's trial testimony was inconsistent with the statements he made to him, and with the presence of a mental health condition. The messages exchanged with Castro before the killing strengthened Mogannam's opinion that Landaeta was not suffering from a mental illness during the murder because they were linear conversations and made sense.
Like the psychiatrist who treated Landaeta in the ASU, Mogannam acknowledged that Landaeta suffered from some mental illness but questioned the accuracy of Landaeta's initial schizophrenia diagnosis. He also opined that Landaeta's muteness for months in jail was volitional because truly catatonic patients do not respond to instructions, and that his answering questions on direct examination at trial but remaining silent during cross-examination was also inconsistent with catatonia.
Psychiatrist Zachary Torry similarly opined, based on his interview with Landaeta in which Landaeta had detailed the events that led up the killing, that there was no “overlap” between the murder and mental illness. Torry opined that Landaeta was “very likely” malingering his mental illness. He testified that Landaeta's not speaking after his arrest was voluntary, not catatonia, which is “very rare” and characterized by an inability to speak and muscle rigidity that requires immediate treatment. Torry noted that when he asked Landaeta why he regained his ability to speak, Landaeta “said he thought about his lawyer and that his lawyer needs him and that he was the only one that could help.”
Finally, the prosecutor offered testimony by a San Mateo County Sheriff's Deputy as to Landaeta's conduct after he stopped answering questions on cross-examination. The deputy testified that after the jurors were excused and began exiting the courtroom, Landaeta “lifted his head, opened his eyes,” “looked at [him] and engaged in conversation.”
In closing argument, the prosecutor characterized the case as follows: “This is a domestic violence murder. The defendant and the victim, the mother of his child, got into an argument. He got mad. The defendant was angry. The defendant talks to his homie and tells him exactly what he's gonna do. [¶] ․ [¶] ․ He's angry, and he does it. Brutally murdering the mother of his child in broad daylight in San Carlos in front of four eyewitnesses. That, ladies and gentlemen, is a first degree murder.” Defense counsel argued the killing was self-defense: Landaeta went to Castro's home that morning to deescalate the situation because he was afraid for himself and his family. “He got over there in a state of panic, and he was confronted by Karina Castro who came at him with a knife” and he defended himself.
The jury found Landaeta guilty of first degree murder and found the sentence enhancement allegation true. In a bifurcated trial, the jury also found true the sentencing factors alleged in aggravation, including that the crime “was carried out with planning.”
DISCUSSION
I.
Prior to trial, Landaeta requested that the jury be instructed on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter pursuant to CALCRIM No. 570. It reads in relevant part: “A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. [¶] The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion if: [¶] 1. The defendant was provoked; [¶] 2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured (his/her) reasoning or judgment; [¶] AND [¶] 3. The provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment. [¶] Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without due deliberation and reflection. [¶] ․ The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not kill as the result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.” Before closing arguments began, the trial court refused the instruction, which Landaeta contends was error.
In a related claim, Landaeta also contends the court should have instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 522, which reads in relevant part: “Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree. The weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or second degree murder.” Unlike CALCRIM No. 570, CALCRIM No. 522 “ ‘is a pinpoint instruction to which a defendant is entitled only upon request.’ ” (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 384, 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 523 P.3d 323.) Although he acknowledges that his trial counsel did not request that the jury be instructed with it, Landaeta contends that any such request would have proved futile in light of the court's refusal to give CALCRIM No. 570. (See People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7–8, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 195, 459 P.3d 1 [parties are excused for failing to raise an issue at trial when it would have been futile to do so].)
We need not decide whether there was substantial evidence warranting these two instructions because, even if we assume error, we conclude that it was harmless.
The parties agree that any error in failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter may be found harmless only if it is clear “beyond a reasonable doubt that [it] did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; see People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260 & fn. 7, 311 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 533 P.3d 908 (Schuller).) Even under that standard, however, the omission of an instruction is not prejudicial if “ ‘the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions.’ ” (People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 98–99, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 146 P.3d 531.) The Attorney General notes that here the jury found under CALCRIM 521 that Landaeta acted deliberately—he “carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill.” The instruction further explained that “[a] decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration is not deliberate and premeditated.” Under CALCRIM No. 570, the jury would have been asked to decide whether Landaeta “acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that obscured [his] reasoning or judgment” and whether he was under the influence of an emotion that caused him “to act without due deliberation and reflection.” Thus, according to the Attorney General, by finding Landaeta guilty of first degree murder, the jury necessarily resolved the factual question posed by CALCRIM No. 570 adversely to him.
Although not discussed by the Attorney General, we also note that the jury found true the aggravating circumstance that the crime “was carried out with planning pursuant to [section] 1170(b)(2).” (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8).) In his closing argument on the aggravating factors, the prosecutor argued: “Think about all the things that the defendant did to plan to commit this crime. He told his boss he felt sick. He left work. When he got home, he changed his clothes from his work clothes to all black. He found a weapon. He gathered the weapon. He told his friend what he was going to do. He drove an hour to get to the victim to kill her.” The jury was instructed that planning “refers to conduct before the crime, preparing for its commission.” Although no new evidence was presented at this phase of the trial and the prosecutor himself argued that the facts that supported planning were the same facts that supported premeditation and deliberation, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 3230 that it could not find the aggravating factor true unless the People proved “that the defendant's conduct was distinctively worse than an ordinary commission of the underlying crime.”8 The resulting true finding amounts to a second instance in which the jury found that Landaeta engaged in conduct inconsistent with acting in the heat of passion. (See, e.g., People v. Van Ronk (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 824, 217 Cal.Rptr. 581 [“[A] person cannot plot in advance to kill in the heat of passion”].)
Like other courts before us, we must grapple with two decisions by our Supreme Court that appear to stand in some tension. First, in People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777 (Berry), the court concluded that the trial court erred by failing to instruct on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. (Id. at pp. 515–516, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777.) Turning to the question of prejudice, the court noted that “the instructions made passing reference to heat of passion and provocation for the purpose of distinguishing between murder of the first and second degrees,” but “[t]here was no clear direction to the jury to consider the evidence of [the victim's] course of provocatory conduct so as to determine whether defendant ․ was provoked into committing the homicide under a heat of passion.” (Id. at p. 518, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777.) Without such “clear direction,” the court concluded that “the jury's determination that defendant was guilty of murder of the first degree under the instructions given did not necessarily indicate that ‘the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions’ [citation]—in other words that the jury had found that defendant had not killed [the victim] under a heat of passion.” (Ibid.)
Second, in People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290 (Wharton), the trial court refused to give the following special jury instruction requested by the defendant: “ ‘A defendant may act in the heat of passion at the time of the killing as a result of a series of events which occur over a considerable period of time. [¶] When the provocation extends for a long time, you must take such period of time into account in determining whether there was a sufficient cooling period for the passion to subside. The burden is on the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion.’ ” (Id. at p. 569, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court should have given the requested instruction because it covered two points not covered by the standard instructions on provocation—that provocation could occur over a considerable period of time, and that if it occurred over such a period, “the jury ‘must’ take that period of time into account in determining the effect of the cooling-off period.” (Id. at p. 570, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) With respect to prejudice, the court wrote that “[s]ignificantly, the jury was otherwise given comprehensive instructions on provocation and heat of passion and nothing in those instructions precluded the jury from finding adequate provocation resulting from conduct occurring over a considerable period of time.” (Id. at p. 572, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) The court then supplied an additional rationale for finding the error harmless: “By finding defendant was guilty of first degree murder, the jury necessarily found defendant premeditated and deliberated the killing. This state of mind, involving planning and deliberate action, is manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passion—even if that state of mind was achieved after a considerable period of provocatory conduct—and clearly demonstrates that defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to give his requested instruction.” (Id. at p. 572, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.)9
In People v. Peau (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 823, 830, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, the court relied on Wharton in holding that a defendant's “conviction of first degree murder renders any failure to give a heat-of-passion instruction harmless because the jury necessarily found that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” The court acknowledged “some tension” between the holdings in Berry and Wharton, but noted that Berry “did not even mention that first degree murder must be willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Instead, it focused only on the fact that the instruction distinguishing between first and second degree murder in that case ‘made passing reference to heat of passion and provocation for the purpose of distinguishing between’ the two types of murder.” (Id. at p. 831, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 237.) Peau explained: “We think this strongly suggests that the sole issue considered in Berry was whether the error was harmless because the jury received some instruction on the concepts of heat of passion and provocation, not whether the error was harmless because the jury found the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated and such a finding was inconsistent with a finding that the defendant acted in a heat of passion.” (Id. at pp. 831–832, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 237.)
We are uncertain whether the Berry court failed to consider the requirements for first degree murder or whether it would have found the distinction Peau draws to be meaningful. Berry began its discussion of prejudice as follows: “In accordance with the dictates of People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720–721, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913 [(Sedeno)], [ ] we have examined the instructions given to determine whether the jury necessarily resolved, although in a different setting, that defendant had not committed the homicide in a heat of passion induced by the provocation of [the victim].” (Berry, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 518, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777.) Sedeno was the case in which the Supreme Court first articulated the principle applied with opposite results in Berry and Wharton—that “in some circumstances it is possible to determine that although an instruction on a lesser included offense was erroneously omitted, the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions.” (Sedeno, at p. 721, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) The trial court's error in Sedeno was the failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter based on the defendant's diminished capacity. The court found the error harmless because “the jury necessarily rejected defendant's evidence that his diminished capacity negated intent to kill when it found the shooting to be first degree rather than second degree murder.” (Ibid.) Berry was decided only two years after Sedeno, by a court that included five of the same justices.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Berry court did not explain why it believed the jury might have rendered a different verdict if it had received clear direction “to consider the evidence of [the victim's] course of provocatory conduct so as to determine whether defendant ․ was provoked into committing the homicide under a heat of passion.” (Berry, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 518, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777.)10 Landaeta's briefing does not propose an explanation either, although he similarly contends that the jurors in his case “may well have decided differently” and “declined to find first degree” if they had been expressly directed to consider the effect of provocation or heat of passion on his decision-making.
Landaeta's cursory treatment of the issue notwithstanding, we can conceive of some reasons why the absence of a voluntary manslaughter instruction—coupled with the absence in this case of CALCRIM No. 522—might increase the likelihood that the jury would return a first degree murder verdict.
First, in a murder case, instructing the jury about voluntary manslaughter effectively raises the People's burden with respect to malice by requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that provocation was lacking. (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 462, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066.) The court in Wharton, where the jury did receive the instruction, pointed out that “the jury was told that the prosecution bore the burden of proving defendant did not act while under the heat of passion.” (Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 570, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.)
Second, while CALCRIM No. 521 and its CALJIC analogue each define deliberation in a way that would be inconsistent with acting in the heat of passion (although only the CALJIC instruction uses that phrase), the concept of provocation is missing from both. The voluntary manslaughter instruction focuses the jury's attention both on the victim's provocatory conduct and on whether that conduct caused an emotional response that prevented the defendant from “deliberating” within the meaning of the instruction. (Cf. People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 491, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677 [“where ․ substantial evidence sufficient to inform the court that defendant is relying upon the defense of diminished responsibility is received, it must on its own motion instruct the jury as to the legal significance of such evidence, for such an instruction is ‘necessary for the jury to be fully and fairly charged upon the relevant law’ ”], italics added.)
Third, the effect of omitting the instruction can be amplified by the attorneys’ closing arguments, which necessarily take into account what instructions the court will—and will not—give. Here, it was the prosecution that called attention to Castro's provocatory conduct, arguing that Landaeta was not in fear for his life but killed her after becoming angered by her texts and social media posts. “[A]ccusing him of being a pedophile, a rapist, or somebody that beats women. Those are the things that made him angry, made him angry enough to kill the mother of his child.” And: “The defendant was talking about the messages that made him angry, mad, not fearful. Angry and mad. Because that's what this is. This is a killing out of anger. This is domestic violence, classic domestic violence. Killing the mother of your child because you're angry with her.” And again: “This is an argument where he's getting angry because she is saying very inflammatory things. And he acted because of that anger, not because of any fear.” When it presented this argument, the prosecution was aware the jurors would receive no express instruction that it was required to prove the absence of provocation or that they should consider whether Castro's conduct provoked in Landaeta a heat of passion that could reduce his culpability. While defense counsel could nonetheless have argued the point based on the definition of deliberation in CALCRIM No. 521, the argument would have had a firmer footing if there were explicit instructions on the concepts. No such argument was attempted. While we cannot know with certainty whether or to what extent the closing arguments would have differed if the court had granted the defense request for CALCRIM No. 570, it is possible that it would have triggered changes in substance or strategy on one or both sides.
But the supposition that a voluntary manslaughter instruction would make a difference to a jury that returned a first degree murder verdict resembles the reasoning in People v. Modesto (1963) 59 Cal.2d 722, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33, which Sedeno overruled. Modesto held that the failure to instruct on manslaughter was reversible per se as a violation of the defendant's state constitutional right “to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence.” (Modesto, at p. 730, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33.) The Modesto court declined to find the error harmless under the theory that “the jury could have reached a verdict of first instead of second degree murder only by rejecting the evidence of manslaughter and that therefore the jury passed on every material issue presented by the evidence.” (Id. at p. 731, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33.) Regarding the jury's choice of first degree murder, the court wrote: “Since we do not know what effect an instruction that the jury could return a verdict of manslaughter would have had on its deliberations, we cannot conclude that it necessarily rejected the evidence of manslaughter.” (Ibid.) Although Sedeno overruled Modesto insofar it held that “the erroneous failure to give an instruction on a lesser included offense is necessarily prejudicial,” it reasoned based on the first degree murder verdict that “there can be no prejudice to the defendant since the evidence that would support a finding that only the lesser offense was committed has been rejected by the jury.” (Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913, italics added.) Under Sedeno, the error is harmless if “it reasonably appears from the verdict and the instructions given that the jury rejected the evidence tending to prove the lesser offense.” (Ibid.) In Wharton, the court concluded that the jury “necessarily” found that the defendant premeditated and deliberated the killing, which was “manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passion—even if that state of mind was achieved after a considerable period of provocatory conduct.” (Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 572, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.)
The fact that Wharton used categorical language does not mean that it intended to establish a bright-line rule that a first degree murder verdict necessarily establishes the harmlessness of any error in failing to instruct on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter—an error that was not present in that case. (See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1182, 1195, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 521, 969 P.2d 613 [“[i]t is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court”].) As the court pointed out, the jury “was otherwise given comprehensive instructions on provocation and heat of passion,” with the only omission being the requested pinpoint instruction to consider the duration of the provocation and its effect on the cooling-off period. (Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 572, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) The question before the court, therefore, was whether that omission was harmless in light of the other instructions given—and the court itself found it “significant[ ]” that the jury had been instructed on the relevant concepts. (Ibid.) If the first degree murder verdict were conclusive on the question, it would not be significant that the jury received other instructions on heat of passion and provocation.
There are also later cases in which the Supreme Court has not applied the categorical rule suggested by Wharton’s language. In People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614, the court concluded that any error in failing to instruct on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter—on one of the four killings for which the defendant was tried—was harmless because the jury was instructed under the CALJIC equivalent of CALCRIM No. 522 that “evidence of provocation could be considered in determining the degree of the murder,” and under other instructions that if the jurors “harbored a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant committed first degree or second degree murder, or harbored a reasonable doubt as to whether the killing was murder or manslaughter,[11 ] they must give defendant the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict of guilty of the lesser offense.” (Manriquez, at p. 586, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 878, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135 [noting that the CALJIC analogue to CALCRIM 522 “relates the evidence of provocation to the specific legal issue of premeditation and deliberation”].) In other words, rather than treat the first degree murder verdict as itself conclusive on the question of prejudice, the court reasoned based on these other instructions that “the jury would have returned the same verdict of first degree murder ․ even if the voluntary manslaughter instruction refused by the trial court had been given.” (Manriquez, at p. 586, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614.)
The Attorney General cites People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649, in which the court held that any error in failing to instruct on involuntary manslaughter based on voluntary intoxication was harmless in light of the jury's first degree murder verdict. (Id. at p. 1228, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649.) But in reaching that conclusion, the court pointed out that the jury had been instructed “on the effect of voluntary intoxication on defendant's ability to premeditate and deliberate”—specifically, that “ ‘[i]f the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, you should consider that fact in deciding whether defendant had the required mental state.’ ” (Id. at p. 1228 & fn. 13, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 367 P.3d 649; cf. People v. Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal.2d 522, 528–529, 219 P.2d 9 [error in failing to instruct on intoxication was not “ameliorated” by general instruction on requirement of acting knowingly and willfully because it “did not direct the jury's attention to the applicable partial defense of intoxication”]; see also People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 690–691, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887 [failure to instruct on theft as lesser included offense of robbery was harmless because “the jury was given special instructions highlighting the issue of ‘after-formed intent’ ” and “was told explicitly that it could not find a robbery if it accepted defendant's claim of ‘after-formed intent’ ”].) Thus, we do not see that Rangel stands for the proposition that a first degree murder verdict alone is conclusive.
But Manriquez and Rangel may have referred to these other instructions only because they showed even more clearly why any error was harmless. In neither case did the court indicate that it was responding to an argument that the jury might have viewed the evidence differently, and therefore have delivered a different verdict, if it had received manslaughter instructions. Moreover, other cases decided after Berry create additional doubt about the viability of Landaeta's theory. (See, e.g., People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 665, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970 [failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter was harmless in light of special circumstance findings that the defendant intentionally murdered the deputy for the purpose of perfecting his escape and was lying in wait]; People v. Barrett (2025) 17 Cal.5th 897, 995–996, 333 Cal.Rptr.3d 757, 570 P.3d 739 [any error in using former version of CALJIC No. 8.72 was harmless because “[b]y convicting defendant of first degree premeditated murder while lying in wait ․ the jury necessarily rejected the notion that defendant ․ committed voluntary manslaughter ․ under adequate provocation”]; People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 276, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013 [“The jury, by convicting Bray of first degree murder rather than second degree murder, necessarily rejected the possibility that the only natural and probable consequence of the crime she aided and abetted was involuntary manslaughter, a less serious crime”]; People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1197, 264 Cal.Rptr. 852, 783 P.2d 211 [“any error in instructing on manslaughter is clearly harmless in light of the jury's first degree murder verdict which demonstrates that the jury specifically found that the killing was intentional”]; see also Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 265, 311 Cal.Rptr.3d 830, 533 P.3d 908 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [stating that “[w]hile voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion is ‘manifestly inconsistent’ with premeditation and deliberation ([Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 572, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290]), voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense is not”].)12
After 50 years, Berry still appears to have no company in concluding that a defendant who was convicted of first degree murder was prejudiced by the omission of a voluntary manslaughter instruction. At least given the brevity of its analysis, including the lack of any discussion of premeditation and deliberation, we are not persuaded that its conclusion is consistent with the approach the Supreme Court has taken in later cases. And where cases differ in their approach, we are required to follow the more recent authority. (Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 176, fn. 6, 162 Cal.Rptr.3d 796.) If Landaeta believes that the tension between Berry and Wharton should be resolved in a different way, we conclude he must press his argument with the court that rendered those decisions.
Lastly, Landaeta does not argue that the harmless-error analysis applicable to the failure to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 522 differs from that applicable to CALCRIM No. 570, except that the prejudice standard is lower for CALCRIM No. 522. (Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 571, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290 [failure to give a pinpoint instruction is evaluated for prejudice under the standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 299 P.2d 243].) Accordingly, we conclude that any error in the omission of CALCRIM No. 522 was harmless for the same reasons discussed above.
II.-V.**
Landaeta argues that the trial court erred by excluding under Evidence Code section 352 testimony regarding Castro's involvement with narcotics dealing and her allegedly poor parenting.
A.
Prior to trial, the prosecution moved in limine to exclude evidence of the following under Evidence Code section 352: (1) All references to how Castro was earning money; (2) All references to any narcotics or drug use; (3) Any reference to Child Protective Services’ involvement or reports as it pertains to Castro's children; and (4) All evidence or opinion testimony concerning whether or not the victim was a good mother to her children.
At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor acknowledged that all of Castro's statements made in the days leading up to the murder would be admissible. The prosecutor argued, however, that he was “aware of many unflattering things contained in the victim's phone and social media which are inflammatory and not relevant, some of them [the] ways in which she may have been making money, references to Child Protective Services coming to the apartment on prior occasions, things like that are not relevant to this proceeding and I want an order excluding them. And it may very well be that the defense has no intention of bringing up any of this stuff, but I want to make sure we address it before the bell is rung.” Acknowledging the breadth of the prosecutor's motion, the trial court asked defense counsel to detail “what sort of statements” he was seeking to utilize.
First, defense counsel indicated that he intended to introduce (1) Landaeta's own statement to a third party that he saw a “large quantity of crystal methamphetamine in her possession on the weekend [before the murder]” and (2) statements made by Castro's father, which were made to and recorded by the police shortly after the murder, that Castro “sold narcotics and had issues with her mother because she would cut her mother off because her mother was unable to pay for narcotics.” Defense counsel argued that this testimony was relevant to Landaeta's fear for purposes of self-defense: “What is his state of mind about viewing that kind of evidence and believing that she's connected, and she through several of the Instagram things says that she's connected and she's got—she's green lighting people to come put a hit on my client and his mother and his brother.” The court disagreed and excluded as irrelevant “any reference as to how Ms. Castro was earning money. Excluded is any reference to any narcotics or drug use.”13
Defense counsel also indicated that he intended to introduce through testimony by Landaeta's mother that Child Protective Services interviewed her regarding the condition of Castro's home. Counsel explained, “There is quite a bit of incidents with Child Protective Services. [¶] They spoke with [Landaeta's mother] about ․ the children and the state in which the house was found. There were I believe three cats and a dog that had defecated all over the apartment. Child Protective Services was interested, and they interviewed [Landaeta's mother] as part of that as to whether the kids were being taken care of or not.” Counsel argued that the issues with Castro's parenting were relevant to Landaeta's mental health. He explained that Landaeta “has paranoid chronic schizophrenia, and it caused a lot of stress. His daughter was basically not being cared for well, or at least that was the perception that was given to him by that, and I would ask that some of it be permissible as far as its effect on [Landaeta].” Counsel added, “it caused my client quite a bit of mental distress and duress and placed him in the situation in which he found himself on September 8th. That, in addition to repeated cyberbullying and then threats towards his mother, his brother, and himself.” The trial court excluded any reference to Child Protective Services involvement as it pertains to Castro's children and “evidence or opinion testimony concerning whether or not the victim was a good mother to her children” on the ground that it was irrelevant. The court explained, “Poor mothering or concerns about deprivation of parental guidance, it's not imperfect self-defense. You've made it very clear, ․ that these were affirmative threats by Ms. Castro to kill the defendant, his mother, and his brother. Nothing about her child rearing. So I'm not seeing, even with your client's purported mental illness—which I'm not doubting. There is certainly ample proof of it—his feelings around her mothering, whether or not she is a poor mother and there is animal feces in the house ․ pertains to imperfect self-defense. To me, it just sounds completely irrelevant.”
After making the in limine ruling, the court added, “You gentlemen know what the evidence is. I don't. I think what my limited understanding is of the circumstances surrounding the events of September 8, 2022, certainly—all evidence must be shown to the other side before it is presented in court. [¶] ․ [¶] ․ If you are presented with something that you think is outside the parameters of any court's ruling, just bring it to my attention.”
At trial, in response to defense counsel's query, the court clarified that the ruling “prohibiting the presentation of evidence ․ [that] the victim engaged in the sale of narcotics does not prohibit your client from testifying to anything.” Accordingly, Landaeta testified as set forth above that Castro possessed a large quantity of methamphetamine a few days before the murder.
On appeal, Landaeta contends that, absent the trial court's in limine ruling, he would have presented testimony by Castro's father regarding Castro's involvement in narcotics dealing and by his mother regarding care and custody issues that had arisen between Landaeta and Castro. He argues that the evidence of Castro's drug sales “would have corroborated his testimony that he feared Castro's threats were real” and would have explained why he went to Castro's home equipped with a sword. The evidence of Castro's allegedly poor parenting would explain “the anger underlying the relationship between [Landaeta] and Castro and the potential for explosive emotion,” as well as why he “was being so cavalier in his responses to Castro in their texting sessions, particularly when it came to Castro's references to custody of the two children” and thus negate the likelihood that the jury “interpreted [his] nonchalance as bad parenting: not caring or participating in the care of the children.”
B.
Landaeta's argument regarding the exclusion of testimony regarding Castro's care of her children has been forfeited. Generally, “[a] tentative pretrial evidentiary ruling, made without fully knowing what the trial evidence would show, will not preserve the issue for appeal if the appellant could have, but did not, renew the objection or offer of proof and press for a final ruling in the changed context of the trial evidence itself.’ ” (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 133.) In addition, as Attorney General argues, Landaeta's argument was also forfeited because the ground asserted for admission at the pretrial hearing is not the same ground asserted on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a) [“A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice and it appears of record that ․ [¶] [t]he substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means”]; People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 108 [challenges to the “ ‘ “admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal” ’ ”].)
Insofar as Landaeta argues that the expected testimony is relevant to dispel concerns by the jury that he did not care about his children, no such argument was raised at the pretrial hearing. Nor did Landaeta argue for the admission of such testimony on this basis after the relevant texts were admitted. We will not consider this argument for the first time on appeal.
Landaeta's argument that the expected testimony was relevant to establish “the potential for explosive emotion” was also forfeited. At the pretrial hearing, Landaeta argued, somewhat broadly, that the expected testimony was relevant to his “mental state” at the time of the murder. The court understood counsel's argument, however, to be related to his self-defense claim, not a heat-of-passion defense, and counsel made no attempt to clarify his argument or the court's ruling. Nor did counsel attempt to reargue the admissibility of this evidence in connection with Landaeta's trial testimony. The failure to make any attempt to admit this evidence for this purpose after the in limine ruling forfeits the argument on appeal.
C.
As to the exclusion of the expected testimony by Castro's father about his daughter's alleged narcotics sales, Landaeta argued at the pretrial hearing that this evidence was relevant because it corroborated his claim that he was actually and reasonably afraid of Castro's threats. On appeal, he asserts a slightly expanded argument. He contends that the evidence would also have served to rebut the prosecution's argument at trial that Landaeta's act of stopping to retrieve the sword before going to Castro's home was evidence of his intent and premeditation. He suggests that the evidence of Castro's involvement in drug sales corroborated his alternative explanation for why he retrieved the sword—that he believed that upon arrival he would face “ ‘a group of people, not just Castro,’ ” and thus needed it for protection.
The court clarified during trial that Landaeta was permitted to testify about Castro's drug sales, but his counsel did not attempt at that time to introduce the expected testimony by Castro's father to corroborate his testimony. Assuming that Landaeta did not forfeit his claim by this failure, we agree that this evidence may have been relevant to self-defense or provocation, notwithstanding the Attorney General's argument to the contrary. Corroboration of Landaeta's testimony that Castro was involved in narcotics dealing could support the reasonableness of his belief that she associated with gang members and that the threats she made toward him and his family were not idle talk, making it more likely that they would cause him (or a reasonable person in his position) to experience fear or anger.
Nonetheless, we find any error in the court's ruling to be harmless. Contrary to Landaeta's argument, the exclusion of evidence that Castro had sold drugs to her mother at some point in the past did not preclude him from asserting a defense. Landaeta testified that he believed Castro was engaged in illegal activity, including selling drugs, and that her new boyfriend had dropped out of a gang. As a result of Castro's messages and Instagram posts, he believed his and his mother's lives were in danger. When he went to Castro's home that morning, he believed people with guns were already at the apartment complex. Castro's messages supported the reasonableness of his belief that she was involved with gang members. While the proffered evidence may have provided some corroboration for his testimony that she was involved in illegal activity, there was nothing in it to support his claim that he believed gang members were at the apartment complex that morning, necessitating his being armed with a weapon. Any error in the exclusion of the evidence did not rise to the level of federal constitutional error that would require us to find it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) And applying the standard under People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836, we do not find it reasonably likely that in the absence of the error Landaeta would have achieved a more favorable result. Whatever the excluded evidence might have added to what was already before the jury, it was not significant enough to make a different outcome reasonably probable.
III.
Landaeta contends that the court abused its discretion by admitting over his objection an unnecessary and highly inflammatory photograph that depicted the victim's head hanging from her body that had been taken after the body had been rolled over to stage the photograph. He argues that Evidence Code section 352 required exclusion of the photograph.
A.
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed in limine motions requesting that all crime scene and autopsy photographs be excluded under Evidence Code section 352, or alternatively, that the number of such photographs be limited. At the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor sought to admit only four photographs of Castro's body at the crime scene—People's Exhibit Nos. 9, 10, 60, and 61—and six autopsy photographs—People's Exhibit Nos. 101–106. The court observed that the prosecutor had originally submitted about 30 crime scene photographs and 30 autopsy photographs but had narrowed them to “a far smaller sampling” and that each of the crime scene photographs showed Castro from “a distinctly different perspective.” Despite the limited number, defense counsel objected to Exhibit No. 61 the ground that the image was irrelevant and, even if relevant, its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value. The prosecutor argued that Exhibit No. 61 was “extremely relevant to demonstrate the type of injury [and] the extent of the injury suffered by the victim,” and because it “shows the severity of the injury,” it is “relevant given the potential self-defense claim.” The trial court overruled Landaeta's objection and held that the crime scene photographs would be admissible at trial. The court explained: “They are certainly photographs that have a gruesome quality to them, but that does not outweigh what the probative value is. And any—I think it's fair to say that any photographs of a decedent from a homicide scene are going to be somewhat prejudicial to the person accused of having committed the crime. The question is not are they prejudicial? The question is are they substantially prejudicial such that it's going to preclude the trier of fact from giving the defendant a fair trial? [¶] I appreciate the degree to which the prosecution has narrowed the number of the photographs that they are seeking to utilize. [¶] I am going to make an order that all photographs of the decedent in this case shall not be displayed on the TV screen or on the screen in the courtroom. They may be shown to the witness. They may be published to the jury as an individual act, meaning they can be handed out to the jurors in the jury box, but they are not to be displayed or projected in any way to the courtroom.”
Subsequently, Exhibit No. 61 was proffered for admission during the testimony of the prosecution's criminalist. When asked by the trial court whether defense counsel had any objection, counsel answered, “No objection.” The photograph was admitted and the witness described it as showing Castro's upper body after she was turned on her back with her head “barely attached” and the “inside of her neck ․ exposed.”
B.
The Attorney General argues that Landaeta forfeited this argument by failing to reassert his objection when the photograph was introduced during trial. While the Attorney General is correct that “[t]he general rule is that ‘when an in limine ruling that evidence is admissible has been made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually offered to preserve the issue for appeal,’ ” here, the court's ruling on the in limine motion was “sufficiently definite and express” to preserve the claim. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 547.)
C.
“ ‘The admission of photographs of a victim lies within the broad discretion of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory. [Citations.] The court's exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is outweighed by their prejudicial effect.’ ” (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 975–976 (Heard).) Here, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the “gruesome quality” of the photograph did not outweigh its probative value.
The photograph was relevant. As the Attorney General explains, “no other photograph provides as accurate a depiction of Castro's wounds and the state of her body at the crime scene. People's Exhibit Nos. 9 and 10 do not clearly show Castro's severed head—just a mass of tissue and blood where her neck should be from relatively far away. People's Exhibit No. 60 shows only her lower half and a blood trail. People's Exhibit Nos. 101 and 102 show only Castro's legs on the autopsy table. People's Exhibit No. 103 shows the defensive wound on Castro's finger. People's Exhibit No. 104 shows the deep injury to [Castro's] shoulder. People's Exhibit Nos. 105 and 106 are much more sanitized pictures of Castro's neck wound with the blood wiped away and not showing the extent to which appellant severed her neck. It is only People's Exhibit No. 61 that truly shows the extent of what appellant did to her.” As argued, the evidence was relevant to prove that the murder was premeditated and deliberate, and to rebut Landaeta's self-defense claim. For these reasons, the photograph did more than merely establish that a human being had been killed. (See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1137, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated by People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 408–409 [photographs “which do not reveal the manner of death” and “appear to go only to the issue whether a human being had been killed” are not relevant where fact of death is not at issue in trial].) Contrary to Landaeta's argument, it is “ ‘immaterial for purposes of determining the relevance of evidence that other evidence may establish the same point.’ ” (Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 975.) “Nor were the photographs somehow rendered irrelevant simply because defendant did not dispute the cause of death or the nature and extent of the victim's injuries.” (Ibid.) As the court explained in Heard, “ ‘the jury was entitled to see the physical details of the crime scene and the injuries defendant inflicted on his victim[ ].’ ” (Ibid.)
The court also did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the relevance of the photograph was not outweighed by the likelihood of undue prejudice. As Landaeta argues, the exercise of discretion under section 352 requires a balancing: “The jury can, and must, be shielded from depictions that sensationalize an alleged crime, or are unnecessarily gruesome, but the jury cannot be shielded from an accurate depiction of the charged crimes that does not unnecessarily play upon the emotions of the jurors.” (People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 238.) In Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 976, the court observed that “victim photographs and other graphic items of evidence in murder cases always are disturbing” but that, if relevant, the fact alone that the photographs “are graphic and unpleasant to consider does not render the introduction of those images unduly prejudicial.” Here, the photograph is, as the court observed, “gruesome,” but Landaeta's crime was gruesome and the photograph fairly depicts his violent conduct. Landaeta acknowledges that an unpleasant positioning of a body does not automatically render a photograph inadmissible (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243) and concedes that the jury was told that the photograph was taken by the crime scene investigators after moving the body. Finally, the trial court made efforts to lessen the emotional impact of the evidence by precluding the prosecution from enlarging and displaying the image on a projector.
In any event, even if trial court erred in admitting the one photograph in question, the error was harmless in light of the remaining photographs that were admitted at trial. (See People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 21 [erroneous admission of a photograph was harmless under Watson standard].) Landaeta did not object to the admission of the four other photographs that depicted the injury to Castro's neck—two from the crime scene that showed the blood and gore of her injury at a short distance and two from the autopsy that partially showed the severity of the injury up close, but after her body had been cleaned up. With the admission of these exhibits, the jury had before it several visual images of Castro's injuries. While Landaeta describes Exhibit 61 as a “step beyond” the other photographs, we are confident the additional photograph had minimal, if any, inflammatory impact on the jury. It is not reasonably probable that Landaeta would have obtained a more favorable result if the trial court had excluded Exhibit 61.
IV.
Landaeta contends the trial court erred by refusing to suspend the criminal proceedings when his counsel declared a doubt as to his competency on the eve of trial. “ ‘ “Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ․ and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.” ’ ” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1032.) “A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he or she lacks the ability to consult with defense counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings.” (People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 575; § 1367, subd. (a) [a person is incompetent to stand trial “if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner”].)
“Penal Code section 1368 requires that criminal proceedings be suspended and competency proceedings be commenced if ‘a doubt arises in the mind of the judge’ regarding the defendant's competence (id., subd. (a)) and defense counsel concurs (id., subd. (b)). This court has construed that provision, in conformity with the requirements of federal constitutional law, as meaning that an accused has the right ‘to a hearing on present sanity if he comes forward with substantial evidence that he is incapable, because of mental illness, of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense.’ [Citations.] ‘Once such substantial evidence appears, a doubt as to the sanity of the accused exists, no matter how persuasive other evidence—testimony of prosecution witnesses or the court's own observations of the accused—may be to the contrary.’ [Citation.] As we have explained in more recent cases, substantial evidence for this purpose is evidence ‘that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt’ as to competence, and the duty to conduct a competency hearing ‘may arise at any time prior to judgment.’ ” (People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 231.)
Once a competency hearing has been held, however, and “the defendant is found competent to stand trial, a trial court may rely on that finding unless the court “ ‘ “is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence” casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding.’ ” (People v. Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 231.) “[T]he duty to suspend is not triggered by information that substantially duplicates evidence already considered at an earlier, formal inquiry into the defendant's competence, and that when faced with evidence of relatively minor changes in the defendant's mental state, the court may rely on a prior competency finding rather than convening a new hearing to cover largely the same ground.” (In re Sims (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 762, 783.)
“On appeal, our task is to examine ‘the inferences that were to be drawn from the undisputed evidence’ and to ask ‘whether, in light of what was then known, the failure to make further inquiry into [the defendant]’s competence to stand trial, denied him a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 269.) We review for substantial evidence a trial court's finding of no substantial change of circumstances or no new evidence casting serious doubt on the validity of an initial competency determination. (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 220.) We review for an abuse of discretion the court's decision not to reinstate competency proceedings. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 33; People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033 [A “trial judge's decision not to order a competency hearing is entitled to great deference, because the trial court is in the best position to observe the defendant during trial”].)
A.
In January 2023, the court found Landaeta competent to stand trial after he was evaluated by two court-appointed experts, Jeff Gould and Stephanie Young.
In May 2023, after Landaeta pled not guilty by reason of insanity, the court ordered additional psychological evaluations by two experts: Zachary Torry, M.D. (forensic psychiatrist) and Rami Mogannam, Ph.D. In August 2023, both experts filed reports opining that Landaeta did not meet the criteria to be found not guilty by reason of insanity.
In October 2023, on the eve of trial, Landaeta's counsel declared a doubt as to Landaeta's competency. The prosecution objected to further competency proceedings on the ground that there was no new and substantial evidence to support suspension of the trial and argued that “it's also abundantly clear based on the records we received yesterday that the defendant is malingering. The defendant makes statements in the records to the effect of he wanted to go off of his medications because he wanted to appear not competent because it would help his court case.” In response, the court clarified that “[w]hat he specifically said as it's memorialized in the records is that if he were found incompetent, the charges would be dismissed.”
Landaeta's counsel disagreed that Landaeta was malingering and asserted that he was not currently competent to stand trial. He explained, “He voluntarily went off his medications two weeks ago․ I've only been able to see him three times for 20 minutes one time, 30 minutes another, and then two minutes the last time I tried to see him on the 4th and for very short periods of time. He is exhibiting all types of psychoses. [¶] The 20 minutes that I was able to see him on September 25th, he was laughing maniacally. He defecated and began laughing, again, saying that he needs a nap. And I—he asked me to call the guards at that point in time. That was in a contact visit. [¶] Again, I saw him on the 28th of September for about 30 minutes. He did talk about just proceeding on the guilt phase of this and not the insanity phase. He also talked about relieving me as counsel potentially. He exhibited all kinds of mental issues. [¶] The last time I saw him was for two minutes. He walked in on the third floor behind the glass, and I asked him one question and he froze and then he walked out. I have tried to see him on probably about 16, 17 other occasions. [¶] In addition to what you ordered me to see him yesterday, I attempted in the morning after our hearing, again at noon, and then again in the evening, and today I made copious calls and he's basically refused me seeing him. [¶] And so with that, based on his behavior right now, I think as counsel, it's almost impossible for me to try and prepare him for trial. And therefore, I do think that he's currently incompetent.” Landaeta's counsel also indicated that he had consulted with two confidential psychiatrists who both agreed that “there is malingering, but underneath the malingering they think he may have deeper issues.”
The trial court denied Landaeta's request to suspend the proceedings. Initially, the court observed that the new evidence presented is “consistent with the position that he is malingering his mental health symptoms in an effort to delay the trial and assist in a finding of incompetence.” The court noted that Dr. Torry's report from August 2023 included results from two tests designed to assess the possibility of malingering, both of which indicated that Landaeta was “very likely to be malingering.” The court found that Torry's findings were corroborated by clinical notes from Landaeta's providers dated October 1, 2023, which read, “ ‘During initial observation, he was mostly mute, not responding to questions. However, minutes later during med pass, he followed direction, was sitting upright with good eye contact and linear organized thought process. He did not appear to be responding to stimuli not present’ ” and “ ‘The patient's presentation quickly improved upon admission to the ASU and after one dose of antipsychotic medication, which would be atypical of a genuine psychotic disorder.’ ” The court also noted that the clinical records included Landaeta's statement referenced by the prosecutor that he believes this case will be thrown out once he is found incompetent to stand trial. Given the above, the court found it “very interesting ․ that his cessation of his taking of psychiatric medications was on September 10th, two days before his pretrial conference.”
The court also found that Landaeta was, at the time of the hearing, “oriented to time and place” and was “capable of rational and logical thought and decision making.” The court explained, “So it is during a brief period of time between September 10th and ․ when he was admitted to the Acute Stabilization Unit that he was not medicated, but there isn't anything in the records to suggest that as of today's date, October 6th, there is any reason to believe that there is any substantial evidence justifying a new suspension of the criminal proceedings and a new evaluation.”
B.
Initially, Landaeta argues that the evidence that he had gone off his medication and was refusing to meet with counsel required a new competency proceeding under Rodas. We disagree. In Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at page 223, the court held that “when a formerly incompetent defendant has been restored to competence solely or primarily through administration of medication, evidence that the defendant is no longer taking his medication and is again exhibiting signs of incompetence will generally establish such a change in circumstances and will call for additional, formal investigation before trial may proceed. In the face of such evidence, a trial court's failure to suspend proceedings violates the constitutional guarantee of due process in criminal trials.” Here, however, Landaeta was never found incompetent to stand trial. He was examined by two experts who agreed that he was competent. While they acknowledged that he was taking prescription medications for his diagnosed schizophrenia and that “his symptoms appear to be effectively managed with his antipsychotic medication,” their conclusions that he was competent were not conditioned on his continuing to take medication. At most, Dr. Gould opined, “Mr. Landaeta's current competency may be a result of his compliance with taking the antipsychotic medication Risperdal. His continued competency is likely dependent on his compliance with taking this medication. If he were to discontinue taking his antipsychotic medication in the future, he may experience an exacerbation of his psychotic symptoms. These psychotic symptoms may then impair his competency to stand trial at that time.” Accordingly, Rodas in distinguishable.
The record supports the trial court's conclusion that Landaeta's voluntary cessation of medication lasted no longer than what appears to be two weeks and that after brief treatment in the ASU, he was returned to his prior unit. More importantly, the evidence before the court did not indicate that Landaeta's failure to take his medication significantly impacted his mental health. Upon his arrival at the ASU, Landaeta, who initially presented as mute, was within minutes following “direction, was sitting upright with good eye contact and linear organized thought process. He did not appear to be responding to stimuli not present” and his “presentation quickly improved upon admission to the ASU and after one dose of antipsychotic medication.” Finally, at the time of the hearing, Landaeta was again on medication and appeared to the court to be competent. Accordingly, no new evidence or changed circumstances required suspension of the criminal proceedings and reevaluation of Landaeta's competency. Given the evidence that Landaeta was malingering and intentionally trying to disrupt the trial, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel's request to reinstate competency proceedings.
V.
Landaeta contends that he was deprived of his right to due process when the trial court failed sua sponte to suspend the proceedings when his conduct at trial and additional trial testimony raised a substantial doubt as to his competency. (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847 [“The court's duty to conduct a competency hearing may arise at any time prior to judgment”].) He argues that the following “new evidence” compelled additional competency proceedings: “(1) appellant had reported to jail staff that he believed his lawyer had told him not to take his medication as a ‘strategy,’ (2) appellant not only refused to attend court but often refused to talk to his lawyer at the jail, and (3)—of the most consequence—appellant ceased responding during cross-examination: he went mute during his own examination. It was also quite apparent that the therapeutic effect of his Risperdal prescription had yet to catch up with appellant's earlier abeyance. Orally administered Risperdal takes time—several weeks—to take effect.”
The additional details regarding Landaeta's treatment in the ASU that were elicited at trial do not constitute new evidence of changed circumstances. Landaeta suggests that the trial testimony regarding his statements made to jail staff while in the ASU “was new and fresh evidence that [his] psychiatric demons may be getting the better of him.” His statements, however, are not evidence that he was actually suffering from delusions as a result of briefly stopping his medication. While the testimony at trial by various mental health practitioners may have provided a fuller picture of what happened in the month leading up to trial, the additional evidence is fully consistent with what the court understood when it denied defense counsel's request to suspend proceedings prior to trial—Landaeta was malingering in order to disrupt the trial. And again, as explained in Rodas, supra, 6 Cal.5th at pages 234 to 235, “the duty to suspend is not triggered by information that substantially duplicates evidence already considered at an earlier, formal inquiry into the defendant's competence; when faced with evidence of relatively minor changes in the defendant's mental state, the court may rely on a prior competency finding rather than convening a new hearing to cover largely the same ground.”
The expert's testimony at trial that the medication Landaeta was prescribed can take time to be effective is also not sufficient to suggest incompetency in this case. While the evidence was undisputed that Landaeta stopped taking his medication for a period of approximately two weeks, his mental health practitioners uniformly agreed that he was not suffering symptoms of schizophrenia as a result. Testimony that medication can take time to become effective does not establish incompetence absent any evidence that he was suffering from symptoms of his mental illness.
Landaeta's refusal to attend court and talk to his lawyer is also not new evidence of incompetency or changed circumstances. Landaeta cites authority holding that a finding of incompetence to stand trial may be affirmed “based solely on a defendant's ‘incapab[ility] of ․ cooperating with counsel.’ ” (People v. Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 85.) But his refusal to talk to counsel or attend trial is not necessarily evidence that he is incapable of cooperating with counsel. (People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 576 [“Defendant's unwillingness to cooperate with counsel does not demonstrate incompetence,” and “defendant's courtroom outburst[ ] or other disruptive conduct” was not “necessarily an indicator that he was unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense”].) The record supports the trial court's finding that Landaeta “willfully refused to participate in his trial.”
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1. Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2. Exhibits containing photographs of the phones displaying the messages and documents listing the messages were provided to the jury. Prosecution witnesses also read some of the texts aloud as part of their testimony and provided opinions as to the meaning of certain words in context. To the extent possible, we retain the original text, including lack of punctuation, used in the messages as reflected in the exhibits. We use em dashes between quotations to reflect the break between sequential messages.
3. Landaeta's middle name is Rafael and it appears from the record that “Rafa” was used by some people to refer to him.
4. The detective who read the text messages into the record was unable to explain what this text meant.
5. The detective testified that he did not know what “tbru” means, although the context suggests it may be a misspelling of “thru.”
6. The detective testified that D.O. stands for dropouts.
7. The detective opined that “ahit” was “shit” misspelled because “shit” was more appropriate in context, the letters “a” and “s” are next to each other on a keyboard, and in connection with a prior message Castro corrected “ahit” to “shit.”
8. The jury sent a note that asked, “Can we get a clarification of what ‘distinctively worse planning’ would look like?” The court referred the jurors back to CALCRIM No. 3230 and added that “the qualifying term ‘distinctively worse’ relates to the defendant's conduct.” Since “conduct” is potentially ambiguous, the trial court might have said more precisely that the jury had to find that Landaeta's planning made his manner of committing the crime distinctively worse than an ordinary commission of first degree murder (or when compared to other ways a first degree murder could be committed). (See Chavez Zepeda v. Superior Court (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 65, 89–91, 315 Cal.Rptr.3d 202.)
9. Wharton found the error harmless based on CALJIC No. 8.20, which reads: “If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.”
10. Berry also did not explain why the “passing reference” in the instructions “to heat of passion and provocation for the purpose of distinguishing between murders of the first and second degrees” (Berry, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 518, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777)—which we understand to be a reference to CALCRIM No. 522 or a version thereof—was not clear enough for this purpose. Landaeta notes that the jury in Peau, unlike here, was instructed with CALCRIM No. 522, but because a version of the instruction was also given in some form in both Wharton and Berry, it is unlikely to explain why they arrived at opposite results.
11. We presume this is a reference to the instructions given with respect to the other three killings. (Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 583, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614.)
12. With one exception, our sister courts have uniformly held that the omission of an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was harmless where the jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder. (See People v. Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1071–1072, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 343; People v. Franklin (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 881, 892, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 647]; Peau, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 831–832, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 237; People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1245–1246, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 454.) The exception is People v. Ramirez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1488, 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 783, which offered no substantive analysis and, without citing Wharton, stated simply that it was bound by Berry.
FOOTNOTE. See footnote *, ante.
13. At the hearing, defense counsel also stated that “there are several statements by her about people in EPA knowing, and so questions of gang involvement.” There was no dispute, however, that Castro's messages to Landaeta suggesting her gang involvement were admissible and it does not appear that any specific additional evidence regarding her possible gang affiliation was identified by defendant and excluded by the court.
GOLDMAN, J. FN** Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
WE CONCUR: BROWN, P. J. MOORMAN, J.**
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Docket No: A169790
Decided: October 26, 2026
Court: Court of Appeal, First District, California.
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