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BRIAN BANUELOS-HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
This petition for writ of mandate is brought by petitioner Brian Banuelos-Hernandez to direct respondent Superior Court of Contra Costa County (respondent court) to set aside its order of August 8, 2025, retracting an earlier order of the same date dismissing this criminal action (dismissal order). Respondent court retracted the dismissal order just hours after making it under the belief that it was an abuse of discretion.
For reasons set forth post, we direct the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate compelling respondent court to vacate its order retracting the dismissal order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We limit our recitation of facts to those relevant to our disposition of this writ proceeding.
On August 28, 2024, petitioner was charged with: count 1, a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) (driving under the influence of alcohol), and count 2, a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b) (driving with a 0.8-percent blood-alcohol content). Petitioner was arraigned on December 4, 2024, and pled not guilty to all charges.
On February 13, 2025, a change of plea hearing was held. However, the prosecution, real party in interest (real party), had not yet provided full discovery so respondent court held a second change of plea hearing on April 24, 2025. On May 13, 2025, petitioner filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code 1 section 1538.5, which real party opposed.
On June 13, 2025, the parties appeared for hearing on the section 1538.5 motion. Real party requested an “oral 1050” continuance.2 The trial court granted the continuance over petitioner's objection and rescheduled the hearing for August 8, 2025. Respondent court then stated that “absent unusual or emergency circumstances—and by that I mean death or hospitalization or something similar—no DA 1050 will be considered nor granted.”
On the next hearing date, August 8, real party stated that it “believed” real party was ready and had sent subpoenas to “CHP Oakland”; however, when real party called “CHP Oakland” the day prior to the hearing to confirm timing, the subpoena clerk stated there was no record of the subpoenas. Real party then requested another “oral 1050” continuance, which petitioner objected to for lack of good cause.3 Respondent court stated, “The oral motion by the District Attorney to continue the case is denied. [¶] ․ [¶] The People not being ready to proceed with the case today, the case is dismissed.” The hearing ended at 9:05 a.m.
The same day, at 12:43 p.m., respondent court emailed the parties, requesting they return to court at 3:30 p.m. At the appearance, respondent court informed the parties it “made a mistake” in dismissing the case. Respondent court explained that, under People v. Brown (2023) 14 Cal.5th 530 (Brown), its dismissal was “an abuse of discretion ․” Respondent court thus retracted its dismissal.
Petitioner objected, citing Vallejo v. Superior Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 132, 147 (Vallejo), for the proposition that a “trial court loses jurisdiction over a criminal matter when a discretionary dispositive order is issued in a defendant's favor.” Respondent court, however, insisted that Vallejo was not on point and that its action was an abuse of discretion. Respondent court went on to state: “I had a tickling in my gut when I [ordered the dismissal], that I shouldn't have. And I will just also confess that I was frustrated by the People's inability to proceed with that motion today.” Petitioner noted that Brown re-affirmed a trial court's discretion to dismiss a case pursuant to section 1385, to which respondent court answered that section 1385 “was not the basis of the dismissal ․ At no point did I mention that it was under 1385. It was simply because the People were not prepared to proceed with their evidence and indicated they did not have witnesses available.” Thus, with the dismissal order retracted, respondent court set a future date for a hearing on petitioner's section 1538.5 motion.
Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate with the appellate division of the respondent court, which was denied. Petitioner then filed the instant petition for writ of mandate with this court. Real party submitted an informal response, and petitioner filed a reply.
On December 11, 2025, we issued an order to show cause and requested a return from real party. Real party complied, filing a return, after which petitioner filed a reply.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends respondent court made a statutorily authorized discretionary order dismissing the case which divested it of jurisdiction. As such, petitioner continues, respondent court's subsequent order to retract the dismissal order was voidable and must be set aside.
Real party counters that: 1) respondent court lacked statutory authority to dismiss the case and, thus, retained jurisdiction to retract the dismissal order; 2) even if the dismissal order was valid, it was interim in nature and, thus, could be retracted; and 3) alternatively, real party's return to order to show cause (return) should be construed as a request for writ of mandate or prohibition because, even if the dismissal order was final, respondent court's attempt to retract it “[p]roduced [t]he [p]roper [o]utcome [u]nder [t]he [l]aw ․” We address each issue in turn, post.
I. Respondent court had discretion under section 1385 to dismiss this criminal action.
The parties dispute whether respondent court was authorized to dismiss this criminal action in the first place. It was.
“A trial court's discretionary power to dismiss an action for a criminal offense has been recognized by statute since 1850. (Stats. 1850, ch. 119, § 629, p. 323.) With slight changes, the provision became section 1385 when the Penal Code was enacted in 1872.” (People v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110, 117.) Section 1385, subdivision (a) states in relevant part: “The judge ․ may, either on motion of the court or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal shall be stated orally on the record.” As the California Supreme Court instructs, this provision is “broad and permits dismissal under a variety of circumstances.” (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 273 (Hatch); People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470, 482 [“Section 1385 permits dismissals in the interest of justice in any situation where the Legislature has not clearly evidenced a contrary intent”].)
As real party notes, respondent court did not reference section 1385 when dismissing this case after denying the prosecution's oral request for another continuance. Moreover, later, when retracting the dismissal order and citing to Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th 530, respondent court affirmatively denied relying on section 1385. These circumstances, we conclude, do not alter our analysis.
A trial court or magistrate, when exercising its discretion under section 1385, need not affirmatively invoke the statute or use “certain ‘magic words’ ” to dismiss a case. (See Hatch, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 273 [holding the trial court did not need to use “certain ‘magic words’ ” when dismissing a case for insufficient evidence under § 1385].)
Moreover, while respondent court may have denied dismissing this case pursuant to section 1385, it pointed to no other source of authority for its ruling. Respondent court simply insisted its dismissal order was “an abuse of discretion” without identifying the source of its discretion. Interestingly, respondent court reached this conclusion after reviewing Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th 530, a case that in fact confirms a trial court has discretion to dismiss a criminal action under circumstances comparable to ours. As Brown holds, “it is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny continuance of a suppression hearing when it is reasonably foreseeable that dismissal of the case will result, unless dismissal would be in furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a).)” (Id. at p. 549.) Thus, while dismissal under section 1385 is “disfavored” under these circumstances, a trial court nonetheless retains the power to dismiss “if, under the totality of the circumstances, after weighing ‘ “the constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society represented by the People” ’ [citation], the court finds that dismissal would be ‘in furtherance of justice’ (§ 1385, subd. (a)). In conducting this inquiry, a court may consider whether the prosecution acted abusively or in bad faith [citation], whether the defendant has suffered prejudice [citation], society's interest in the prosecution of the crime [citation], and other relevant factors.” (Brown, at pp. 548–549.)
Thus, while respondent court may have been correct to question the scope of its discretion under section 1385 to dismiss this case after denying the prosecutor's oral motion to continue the suppression hearing for lack of good cause,4 respondent court was incorrect to conclude that, under Brown, it had no discretion to dismiss in light of the prosecution's lack of readiness to proceed. In any event, it is well established that, in a writ proceeding, just as on appeal, we review a trial court's ruling, not its reasoning. (Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 138; Mireskandari v. Gallagher (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 346, 358.) And here, we conclude respondent court's dismissal order—made on the record and without objection—was valid.
II. Respondent court lost jurisdiction after dismissing this action.
A. The dismissal order was a final judgment that could not be retracted or modified to correct judicial error.
The question remains whether respondent court was authorized to recall the dismissal order upon deciding it was an abuse of its discretion. We conclude not.
“While a trial court has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider erroneous orders, this is limited to interim matters.” (Conservatorship of Christopher B. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 809, 816 (Christopher B.).) Thus, once a trial court exercises its discretion to dismiss a criminal action in its entirety, it loses jurisdiction to correct a judicial error. (People v. Hampton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 840, 846 (Hampton); Vallejo, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 147 [court loses jurisdiction when “a discretionary dispositive order is issued in the defendant's favor”].) This is true even if the trial court's order constitutes an abuse of discretion. As Christopher B. explains: “Although a trial court retains jurisdiction to correct clerical error (i.e., an error in the recording of a judgment) at any time, it does not have jurisdiction to correct judicial error in an entered judgment (i.e., an error in rendering a deliberate ‘exercise of judicial discretion’). (In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705 [citations]; see id. at pp. 704, 706–707 [omission of a recidivist finding in pronouncement of judgment cannot be corrected in trial court, and must be deemed an acquittal of the finding].) Correction of judicial error, ‘being in excess of the court's jurisdiction is ineffective for any purpose’ (id. at p. 708), in other words, void (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 343(3), p. 953). It does not matter that a court or moving party acted under a mistake as long as the court ‘was performing the act it intended to perform.’ ” (Christopher B., at p. 816; accord, Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 285, 293 (Smith) [“when the discretionary judicial act has been performed in the defendant's favor, the judgment or order is immune from this kind of trial court attack”].)
Further, as the case law makes clear, where the trial court lacks jurisdiction to correct a judicial error in dismissing a criminal action, “its subsequent orders are void on their face.” (Christopher B., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 817.) Stated otherwise, “[i]t is ․ the order of dismissal that is effective, not the order[ ] attempting to backpedal from it.” (Id. at p. 817.)
Applying these principals here, respondent court lost jurisdiction to correct any judicial error, including any abuse of its discretion, when it ordered dismissal of this case. As such, respondent court's subsequent order attempting to retract the dismissal order was void and must be set aside. (Christopher B., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 817; Smith, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at pp. 287, 293 [where the criminal court lacked authority to vacate a dismissal “entered deliberately but upon an erroneous factual basis,” the appropriate remedy was to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing court to vacate its order setting aside the dismissal]; Vallejo, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 151 [similar].)
B. Real party's contrary arguments lack merit.
Real party insists that respondent court's dismissal of the case was “interim in nature and able to be modified within a few hours.” Not so.
“In general, a dismissal of an entire criminal action is a final order that leaves a court without jurisdiction to reinstate the case.” (Hampton, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 846; see ibid. [“Once the court has dismissed the action, it loses jurisdiction to correct judicial error”]; cf. People v. Nesbitt (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 227, 243 [“dismissal of a count on an issue of law, when others are still to be tried, may be viewed as interim and reconsidered, particularly when there is no prejudice to the defendant”]; In re Anthony H. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 159, 161–162, 165 [trial court made an “interim ruling” when dismissing a robbery count while the minor still faced charges of obstructing a peace officer and grant theft of a person].)
Real party, insisting the dismissal order was not final even though it dismissed the entire action, notes that the court minutes were not entered into the record until after respondent court retracted the dismissal order to prove the dismissal order was not yet final. However, the California Supreme Court has rejected the so-called minute-entry rule as a basis for establishing jurisdiction. As the court explains: “[T]o apply the minute-entry rule to determine whether jurisdiction remains in the trial court would have the inequitable effect of making jurisdiction depend upon whether—and how promptly—the clerk of the court performed his or her ministerial duties.” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 351; see People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471 [entering judgment in the minutes is “a clerical function”], superseded by statute on other grounds as explained in People v. Turner (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1268.) As such, real party's reliance on the court minutes is misplaced.
Real party also insists section 1385 contains a window of time where an order, such as the dismissal order, remains interim rather than final and, thus, may be modified or retracted. This argument likewise fails.
Section 1385, subdivision (a) states in relevant part: “The court shall also set forth the reasons [for dismissal] in an order entered upon the minutes if requested by either party ․” The court's failure to set forth reasons for the dismissal in the order, at the request of a party, can be “fatal and is alone sufficient to invalidate the dismissal ․” (People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945.) According to real party, the fact that the statute gives each party the right to request that the court set forth its reasons for dismissal in the court minutes “necessarily implies that the dismissal is not complete until the statutory window created by Section 1385 closes ․, when the minutes are officially entered.” We disagree. Nothing in the statutory language establishes a jurisdictional window wherein a judge or magistrate may retract a dismissal order, notwithstanding the right of the parties to ask the court to set forth its reasoning. Nor does real party provide case law to support such a window. We have found none. And, even assuming for the sake of argument section 1385 impliedly creates this window, in our case, it is undisputed neither real party nor petitioner asked respondent court to set forth its reasons for the dismissal order. As such, even if there was a jurisdictional window, it would make no difference here.
Real party also contends that, even if the court erred when retracting the dismissal order, “the error should be deemed harmless because [real party] would have successfully appealed the [dismissal] order in light of the decision in Brown. (See Brown, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 534.)” Again, real party provides no authority for its proposition that a harmless error analysis applies when a trial court acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Nor do we know of any. Real party's contention thus fails.
Finally, real party claims that “public policy supports respondent's actions and the interim nature of the initial order.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) This argument is also unpersuasive. Real party relies on People v. DeLouize (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1223 (DeLouize) for the proposition that reconsideration of an erroneous decision can be supported by public policy. However, DeLouize is distinguishable. There, the issue was the trial court's attempt to retract an order granting a new trial, which, according to the California Supreme Court, is “not final in the sense of being a final resolution of the case or a final determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence.” (Id. at p. 1231.) As such, the court noted, allowing reconsideration of such orders “conserves judicial resources ․ and [the] expense of a second trial.” (Id. at p. 1232.) To the contrary, prohibiting reconsideration of final orders and judgments, such as the one at issue in this case, “preserve[s] confidence in the integrity of judicial procedures ․” (Id. at p. 1232.) Thus, DeLouize does not help real party; rather, it supports our conclusion that the dismissal order was a final order that respondent court had no authority to retract.
III. We decline to construe real party's return as a writ petition.
Lastly, real party asks that we construe its return to our order to show cause as an affirmative request for writ relief. In doing so, real party argues that, “because the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction here, [real party] is entitled to a writ of mandate and/or prohibition. Given the writ is available as an equitable remedy for [respondent court's] denying the continuance motion (and appeal is available for the dismissal order), the balance of equities weigh [sic] in favor of construing this filing as an affirmative writ of mandate and/or prohibition even if this Court finds that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to retract its dismissal.” There are several problems with this argument.
As an initial matter, real party repeatedly states that we should construe its return as an affirmative request for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition “because the consequence of [respondent court's order retracting the dismissal] was the correct outcome under the law.” (Boldface and capitalization omitted.) However, real party fails to identify any particular act or prohibition that this court should compel upon respondent court. While real party mentions both respondent court's denial of its oral continuance motion and its dismissal order, real party does not provide this court with a reasoned analysis, supported by relevant authority, explaining how either of these rulings could be appropriately reviewed by writ petition. As such, real party has not met its burden to demonstrate that writ relief would be appropriate here. (Upshaw v. Superior Court (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 489, 497–498, fn. 4 [writ petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate the propriety of writ review].)
In particular, to the extent real party is asking for writ relief from respondent court's denial of its oral continuance motion on August 8, 2025, real party forfeited its right to such relief by neglecting to raise a timely objection to the ruling before respondent court, before the case was dismissed. (Hanrahan v. Superior Court (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 432, 434 [“an appellate court will not issue a writ of prohibition until objection to the action or anticipated action of a lower court has been made to and overruled by that court”].)
To the extent real party is asking for writ relief from the dismissal order, real party has also failed to demonstrate its request is timely—or otherwise appropriate. “[A] writ petition should be entertained only where there is no adequate remedy by appeal and the remedy by appeal is not made inadequate by a party's having neglected to submit his notice of appeal for filing within the time allowed.” (Mauro B. v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 949, 953, italics omitted; see Code Civ. Proc. § 1086 [writ relief available when there is not “a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law”].)
As real party acknowledges, a party aggrieved by an erroneous order of dismissal must ordinarily seek review on appeal. “ ‘ “[W]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction.” ’ [Citation.] When[, as here,] a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable. [Citations.] That is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by ‘principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res judicata.’ [Citation.] Errors which are merely in excess of jurisdiction should be challenged directly, for example by motion to vacate the judgment, or on appeal, and are generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final unless ‘unusual circumstances were present which prevented an earlier and more appropriate attack.’ ” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 661; accord, DeLouize, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1231 [“judicial error in the making of a final order or judgment ‘may not be corrected except pursuant to statutory procedures’ or on the limited grounds available for a collateral attack”].)
In this case, real party has not demonstrated that “unusual circumstances” prevent a more appropriate attack. (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.) While appearing to acknowledge the statutory period for filing an appeal has lapsed,5 real party claims that the “time to file notice of appeal has not run as [respondent court] reversed the earlier decision [to dismiss the case] on the same day. The appellate period would only begin if this Court grants Petitioner's request.” If true, it would appear real party indeed has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such that writ relief would be unavailable. In any event, given that neither party has presented for our review the issue of whether the dismissal order is appealable, we decline to address it for purposes of these proceedings.
Accordingly, for these reasons, we decline to exercise our discretion to construe real party's return as a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to vacate its August 8, 2025, order retracting the dismissal order of the same date.
Trial Court: Superior Court of Contra Costa County
Trial Judge: Michael Nieto
Counsel: Ellen McDonnell, Contra Costa County Public Defender, Sarah Eisenhart, Assistant Public Defender, Dante O'Connell, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Diana Becton, Contra Costa County District Attorney, Angela Dib and Saron Tesfai, Deputy District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.
FOOTNOTES
1. All undesignated statutory citations herein are to the Penal Code.
2. Real party subpoenaed two officers for the hearing; however, one of the officers present had not witnessed “many of the events” that were being contested by the section 1538.5 motion and the other subpoena was sent to the incorrect officer who shared the same last name as the intended officer. Real party noticed this mistake and sent the subpoena to the correct officer two days before the hearing; however, the officer worked a “graveyard shift” and likely “ha[d]n't been able to see it.” Real party did not file a written continuance motion in advance of the hearing.
3. In objecting to the continuance, petitioner cited to People v. Collins (1925) 195 Cal. 325, 333, and other case law for the proposition that “the time to ascertain availability is when the hearing date is set, and that last-minute attempts to ascertain whether a witness is available are insufficient to show good cause.”
4. Real party contends respondent court abused its discretion by denying its oral continuance motion and, consequentially, dismissing the case. However, as discussed ante, real party has not appealed the court's rulings. As such, the issue of whether respondent court committed an abuse of discretion in these regards is not properly before us at this time.
5. Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.853(a), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after a judgment or order is rendered. Moreover, “[i]t is well established that a petition for writ of mandamus must be filed within the same statutory period as prescribed for appeals.” (People v. Municipal Court (Mercer) (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 749, 752.) Here, the dismissal order was made on August 8, 2025, such that the 30-day period would have elapsed on or about September 8, 2025—months before real party filed its return to our order to show cause.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR: Simons, J. Burns, J.
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Docket No: A174508
Decided: November 17, 2026
Court: Court of Appeal, First District, California.
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