PEOPLE v. MAJOR (2026)

On or about April 17, 2026, the instant application for remission of forfeiture of bail, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 540.30, was filed on behalf of Bankers Insurance Company, All-Pro Bail Agency, and Yohance Perry (collectively, the “Obligors”).¹ Obligors' application consisted of a notice of motion, affidavit of Yohance Perry with Exhibit A, memorandum of law, and a proposed order. On or about May 7, 2026, the People submitted an affirmation in opposition to Obligors' motion, together with a memorandum of law. At the request of Obligors' counsel, oral arguments were conducted before the Court on May 12, 2026.

Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and the arguments advanced by the parties, the Court denied Obligors' application on the record with leave to renew provided Obligors make a further legal and factual showing (see Transcript at pp. 38-39). Specifically, the Court afforded Obligors the opportunity to renew their application upon a showing (1) that this Court is authorized to entertain an application to vacate or set aside the forfeiture of the bail bond, effectively reversing Greenburgh Town Court's forfeiture decision;² and (2) that Mr. Perry, as opposed to Bankers Insurance Company, is liable for payment of the $100,000, as well as details regarding the financial impact to Mr. Perry (see id.). The Court agreed to defer entry of a written order pending receipt of Obligors' renewed application. Obligors thereafter submitted a supplemental memorandum of law in further support of their motion, together with the transcript of the May 12, 2026, proceedings.

While the Court will treat Obligors' supplemental memorandum as a renewed application, Obligors have nevertheless failed to supply the Court with the required information noted above. First, Obligors have provided no legal authority authorizing this Court to convert the motion from one for remission of forfeiture of bail to one for vacatur of forfeiture. As the Court is unaware of any authority allowing for a vacatur application to be brought in a court other than the court that declared the forfeiture pursuant to CPL § 540.10, the Court will not now consider such an application, and Obligors' application will be deemed solely a request for remission of forfeiture.

Issue of Ripeness

At the outset, and upon due consideration of the parties' arguments, the Court agrees with Obligors that the instant application is not premature and is ripe for determination.³ The plain language of CPL § 540.30(2) requires only that an application be made within one year after the forfeiture of bail is declared. “The bail bond is deemed forfeited when the defendant's nonappearance is entered on the minutes of the court coupled with the court's declaration that the bond is 'forfeited'” (People v Empire Bonding & Ins. Co., 196 AD3d 21, 24 [1st Dept 2021]). Accordingly, the forfeiture of the bail bond in this case was declared on April 22, 2025, which triggered Obligors' one-year time limit.

There is no statutory requirement that the money be paid before a surety is entitled to relief, and the People have not provided any legal authority standing for such proposition. Notably, the term “remission” is defined neither in CPL § 540.30 nor in the definitions of terms listed in CPL § 500.10. When statutory terms are not defined, courts may look to dictionary definitions as guidance on a word's ordinary and commonly understood meaning (see People v Williams, 37 NY3d 314, 317-318 [2021]; People v Andujar, 30 NY3d 160, 163 [2017]). The definitions of the term “remission” include “[a] cancellation or extinguishment of all or part of a financial obligation; a release of a debt or claim” and “relief from a forfeiture or penalty” (Black's Law Dictionary [12th ed 2024], remission). Thus, where payment on a bail bond has not yet been made, an order of remission would simply serve to relieve the surety's obligation in whole or in part.

Remission of Forfeiture

Pursuant to CPL § 540.30(2), an application for remission of forfeiture of a bail bond must be made within one year after the forfeiture is declared. As a local criminal court, Greenburgh Town Court, had ordered the forfeiture of the subject bail bond, Obligors' motion is properly made to this Court (see CPL § 540.30[1][b]). An application for remission should be granted “only under exceptional circumstances and to promote the ends of justice” (Matter of Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v People, 133 AD2d 345, 346 [2d Dept 1987]). “In making the application, the defendant or surety has the burden of proving that the defendant's failure to appear was not deliberate and willful, and that the failure did not prejudice the People or deprive them of any rights” (id. See also People v Scalise, 105 AD2d 869, 870 [3d Dept 1984]). Additionally, a court may consider whether the surety will suffer such extreme hardship as “will cause destitution to a family, deprive children of support and education, or creditors of their just debts” (Matter of Nationwide Bail Bonds/Intl. Fid. Ins. Co. v People, 244 AD2d 556, 556 [2d Dept 1997], quoting People v Fiannaca, 306 NY 513, 517 [1954]).

Obligors' application is denied for the reasons set forth at length on the record on May 12, 2026. Obligors simply have not met their burden. Although Obligors focus heavily on the fact that Mr. Perry eventually returned the defendant on the warrants issued by Greenburgh Town Court, this alone does not grant entitlement to remission (see People v Nicholas, 97 NY2d 24, 31 [2001] [“The damage defendants cause to the administration of justice when they fail to [appear at every court appearance] is not ameliorated merely because they are later apprehended and brought to court, nor is a surety automatically relieved of its obligation under the bond when a non-appearing defendant is eventually located”]).

Further, Obligors have failed to meet their burden in all other material respects. Notably, Obligors have offered no reasonable excuse for the defendant's multiple failures to appear in Greenburgh Town Court. Indeed, it appears to the Court that defendant's failures to appear were deliberate and willful. During oral argument, Obligors' counsel described Mr. Perry's efforts to locate the defendant, including engaging in a foot pursuit before the defendant was ultimately able to escape (see Transcript at pp. 4-5). Based upon the defendant's apparently intentional efforts to evade Mr. Perry, whom the defendant ostensibly knew to be a bail bondsman, the Court is hard-pressed to conclude that the defendant's absence from court was anything other than deliberate and willful (see Matter of Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 133 AD2d at 346). And the deliberate and willful failure to appear can constitute the basis for finding prejudice to the People (see People v Continental Cas. Co., 301 NY 79, 83-84 [1950] [“In determining whether there was any room here for the exercise of discretion in favor of the surety, we search the record to see whether there is any evidence to show that [defendant]'s failure to appear was other than deliberate and willful. If there be none, then the rights of the People of the State of New York were harmed and prejudiced”]).

Additionally, Obligors have failed to demonstrate the requisite level of extreme financial hardship to warrant remission. In the context of a bail bond, a surety has standing to seek remission under CPL § 540.30 (see Matter of Van Deusen v People, 97 AD2d 924, 925 [3d Dept 1983], citing Judiciary Law § 798). A surety is a person other than the defendant who executes a bail bond “and thereby assumes the undertaking described therein” (id.; CPL § 500.10[11], [12]). Though Mr. Perry acted as agent for Bankers Insurance Company, the evidence before the Court indicates that Bankers Insurance Company—the entity that issued the bail bond and assumed the obligation—is the surety (see Bail Bond, Ex. A to Affidavit of Yohance Perry [“Perry Aff.”]; Transcript at p. 22). The Court has not been presented with any evidence that Mr. Perry is personally liable to pay the $100,000, despite the Court's request for same (see Transcript at pp. 38-39). In fact, Obligors state in their supplemental papers that Mr. Perry “would not personally be writing a check for the $100,000” (Supplemental Memorandum at p. 5 [emphasis added]). Regardless, the Court has not been provided with sufficient information to support Mr. Perry's claim of extreme hardship. An application for remission should include specific details regarding the applicant's resources and how they would be impacted (see People v Fiannaca, 306 NY 513, 518 [1954]). Mr. Perry's affidavit reveals only that he is a homeowner with a mortgage, has three children, and is currently paying tuition for one child's school (see Perry Aff., ¶ 10). Further, Mr. Perry's speculative assertion that his business relationship with Bankers Insurance Company may be negatively affected by a forfeiture is insufficient to demonstrate extreme hardship (see Supplemental Memorandum at p. 5; Transcript at p. 27).

For all the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the above-named Obligors' motion for remission of forfeiture of bail is denied in its entirety.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At oral arguments, Obligors' counsel, Jeffrey Scaggs, Esq., explained that he represents only All-Pro Bail Agency and Mr. Perry, and that he had erroneously represented to the Court that he also represents Bankers Insurance Company. However, in his supplemental papers submitted after oral arguments, counsel clarified that “currently, and at all times since the original application, [counsel] represents all parties relevant captioned in this matter, and regrets confusion on this issue that occurred during the hearing” (Supplemental Memorandum, p. 2).

2.   This was in relation to Mr. Perry's request that the Court convert the application from one for remission of forfeiture of bail to one for vacatur of the forfeiture (see Transcript at pp. 33-35).

3.   At oral argument, the Court stated that it believed that an application for remission is premature in light of the fact that no moneys have been paid to date (see Transcript at p. 36). To the extent the Court's statement was taken to be a finding that such a motion is premature, the Court withdraws same.

Sheralyn Pulver, J.