People of the State of New York, v. Omar J. Punter, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant Omar J. Punter moves to suppress physical evidence recovered from a green backpack and a statement he made while the bag was being searched. The Court conducted evidentiary hearings on September 22 and September 30, 2026, and continued the hearing on October 6. At the October 6 continuation, defense counsel rested without calling another witness. Counsel for the People and defendant then presented oral arguments, and the matter was deemed fully submitted.

Officer Sean Detota, Sergeant James Vann, Ithaca Police Sergeant Jacob Allard, and New York State Parole Officer Todd Richards testified. The Court admitted and reviewed the body-worn-camera (BWC) recordings from Officers Detota and Sgt. Vann repeatedly. Defendant's written conditions of parole were also received. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the traffic stop was lawful and was not unlawfully prolonged. The parole search was rationally and reasonably related to parole supervision. Defendant's statement was spontaneous. The motion to suppress is DENIED.

PROCEDURAL STATUS

Defendant is charged under a two-count indictment, dated March 19, 2026, with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law § 220.09[2]) and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 220.16[7]). He pleaded not guilty on March 31, 2026. On June 15, 2026, defendant filed an omnibus motion seeking suppression of evidence derived from the vehicle stop, detention, search, and questioning. The motion alleged, among other things, that police contacted parole to search defendant, that the driver refused a vehicle search, and that the stop lasted approximately 25 minutes before parole arrived. The People opposed suppression, relying on the window-tint violation, the body-worn-camera chronology showing parole arrived about 10 minutes after the stop began, Vann's ongoing VTL citation work, and Defendant's written parole conditions and curfew violation.

By Amended Decision and Order dated July 2, 2026, the Court denied defendant's challenges to the indictment and summarily denied the then-pending motion to suppress physical evidence, finding no hearing-worthy factual dispute on the submissions and BWC recordings then before it. The Court granted a Huntley hearing on defendant's statement. After receiving defense counsel's July 6 supplemental submission and the People's July 7 response, the Court's July 10, 2026 Supplemental Decision and Order adhered to its determination that the initial VTL tint traffic stop was supported by probable cause, but permitted the supplemental submission and ordered a limited combined Huntley and Rodriguez hearing.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court credits the testimony of Officer Detota, Sgt. Vann, Sgt. Allard, and Parole Officer Richards in all material respects relevant to the issues before it. Their testimony is corroborated by the objective record, including the BWC recordings admitted into evidence. Where the recordings more precisely depict a disputed event, the Court relies on that contemporaneous recording.

On the evening of February 26, 2026, Tompkins County Sheriff Sgt. Vann and Ithaca Police Officer Detota were participating in a GIVE (Gun Involved Violence Elimination) detail in the City of Ithaca. Detota attended the GIVE briefing, where law-enforcement personnel reviewed PowerPoint materials prepared by the department's crime analyst. He testified that Punter was not mentioned. Sgt. Allard, the GIVE supervisor on that evening, likewise testified Punter was not in the February 26 presentation. Sgt. Vann did not attend that briefing and testified Punter was not a designated target and had not been mentioned to him as someone to stop that day. Detota testified he had not previously met or known Punter.

Shortly before 10:00 PM, while traveling northbound near Yazzy's Market, Vann and Detota observed a maroon Chevrolet Malibu whose tint prevented them from seeing the driver or any passengers. After the vehicle proceeded through a parking lot and onto West State Street, the officers observed it again as it entered the Dandy Mart lot. Vann activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle based on the readily apparent tint violation. VTL § 375(12-a)(b). At that point, neither officer knew who was inside.

At 9:59:15 PM (21:59:15), Detota approached the passenger side at which point the windows were lowered, allowing him to see inside. Punter was seated in the front passenger seat. Detota greeted him and asked who he was and whether he had a New York driver's license. Punter handed over his license, then asked, "What are you running me for?" Detota ran the license through dispatch to check its validity and for wants or suspensions. The BWC depicts a green backpack between Punter's legs. Detota testified that Punter repeatedly touched it while they spoke. The BWC recording shows Punter handling it during the stop. (Sept. 22 Tr. 14—18, 29—35.)

Meanwhile, Vann spoke with the driver, Destynie Wilkinson, who said she did not have her physical license but provided pedigree information. She also claimed she was attempting to obtain a tint exemption from DMV. Vann recorded her information, returned to his patrol vehicle, and began the administrative tasks associated with the traffic stop, including a DMV inquiry. Having overheard Punter's name, Vann also ran Punter's information through eJustice and at that time learned he was on parole. Between approximately 10:02 and 10:03 PM (22:02—22:03), Vann began entering the driver's information in TraCS (Traffic and Criminal Software) in preparation for the tint citation. At 10:06:20 PM (22:06:20), he handed the tint meter to Detota, who obtained a 4% reading at 10:06:37 PM (22:06:37). At 10:08:05 PM (22:08:05), the recording still shows Vann entering stop-related information in TraCS.

After learning of Punter's parole status, Vann contacted GIVE supervisor Allard over Zello and at approximately 10:02:50 PM (22:02:50), Vann told Allard, "We have Omar Punter stopped," and asked whether parole was still working that evening. Vann described this as routine notification, not a request that parole take any particular action. Allard testified that he then called Parole Officer Harmer, reported the stop involving Punter, and asked what parole wished to do. Harmer informed Allard that parole would come over to the traffic stop. Allard confirmed there was a standing request to notify parole when police encountered a parolee. Vann testified that although the Zello app was set not to retain messages, the BWC recorded his transmissions. (Sept. 22 Tr. 54, 58—61, 87—88.)

Parole officers arrived at approximately 10:09:30 p.m. (22:09:30). The BWC shows Vann remained inside his patrol vehicle, lowered his window, and directed the parole officers to Punter, identifying him as the "front passenger" with a "nice bag." (Vann BWC at 10:09:30—10:09:37.) Vann then resumed processing the tint violation in TraCS. At approximately 10:09:50 p.m. (22:09:50), Detota's BWC captures him asking Punter whether he was on parole. Although Richards testified that Harmer asked Punter to exit the vehicle, Detota's BWC did not capture that request as Detota was too far away from Harmer. Detota's BWC does show Punter opening the passenger door and exiting as a parole vehicle pulled alongside. The Court finds that Punter exited without a command upon notice parole officers pull alongside. In any event, because the hearing record establishes that Punter was violating his parole curfew, Harmer was authorized to direct him to exit the vehicle in connection with parole supervision. Punter left the backpack inside, walked to the rear of the Malibu, and spoke with the parole officers with his hands open. Detota informed the parole officers that the backpack belonged to Punter. (Detota BWC; Sept. 22 Tr. at 62—64; Sept. 30 Tr. at 5—6, 12.)

At approximately 10:11:10 p.m. (22:11:10), while speaking with Richards, the driver objected to a search of her car. The BWC captures her clarifying, in substance, "Yes, you can take the bag," and pushing the backpack to Richards. (Sept. 30 Tr. at 13—15; Detota BWC.) Richards searched the backpack under the search condition in Punter's signed conditions of release, which authorized a parole officer to search and inspect Punter's person, residence, and property. (Defendant's Ex. A.) Richards also testified that the parole curfew ran from 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. and that a parolee's presence in public at approximately 10:00 p.m. violated that curfew. The Court finds that Punter was in violation of his parole curfew. As Richards inspected a grinder found in the backpack, Punter stated, "That's my grinder—I use it for my marijuana." Richards had not questioned or prompted him. Richards continued the search and found a digital scale, baggies, and suspected narcotics. (Sept. 30 Tr. at 5—7, 9—16.)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A defendant must demonstrate a personal, legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or item searched. The inquiry asks whether defendant manifested an expectation of privacy and whether society recognizes it as reasonable. As the Court of Appeals explained, "A legitimate expectation of privacy exists where defendant has manifested an expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable." People v Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d 99, 108 (1996). Possession alone does not decide the issue; the Court considers the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's relationship to the property, control, and steps taken to preserve privacy. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 NY2d at 108; People v Whitfield, 81 NY2d 904, 906 (1993). A defendant need not testify in order to establish standing. Evidence introduced during the People's case may support it. In Gonzalez, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was "not required to testify at the suppression hearing to sustain his burden of proving standing," and that the People's proof concerning a bag between defendant and the driver sufficed. People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 950, 951 (1986).

Here, the BWC recording places the backpack between Punter's legs in the passenger compartment, and Detota testified Punter repeatedly touched it. Detota told the parole officers the backpack belonged to Punter, and the driver's later identification and handoff corroborated that information. Defendant's statement while Richards was inspecting the grinder further confirms his relationship to the bag's contents. These facts establish defendant's control of the backpack and a manifested expectation of privacy in it. There is no evidence he disclaimed the backpack or relinquished his privacy interest before the search. On the People's proof and the full hearing record, the Court finds defendant has standing to challenge the backpack search.

At a suppression hearing, the People bear the burden of going forward to show the legality of police conduct and then the defendant bears the ultimate burden of establishing illegality. People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 (1971).

An automobile stop is lawful when supported by probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred. "Automobile stops are lawful only when based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation." People v Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427, 430 (2020), quoting People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349—350 (2001). Here, the officers observed tint so dark they could not see silhouettes or occupants. That observation supplied an objective basis to stop the Malibu. The later 4% measurement confirmed the violation. "Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis," Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 813 (1996), and New York likewise applies an objective standard grounded in the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Robinson, 97 NY2d at 349-350. The stop was supported by probable cause. VTL § 375(12-a)(b). Defendant's assertions and arguments that the officers possessed some subjective pretextual motive are without merit, unsupported by the record, and irrelevant under the objective probable cause analysis. The stop was lawful.

When police stop a vehicle, the stop seizes its driver and any passengers. Brendlin v California, 551 US 249, 257—258 (2007). Punter was therefore seized when Vann stopped the Malibu. The issue is not whether Detota's approach created a seizure; it is whether his request for Punter's license and the ensuing dispatch check unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. Detota asked whether Punter had a New York driver's license, Punter handed it to him, and Detota ran it through dispatch to check its validity and for wants or suspensions. The BWC shows that this was a brief inquiry during the ongoing traffic stop. During a lawful traffic stop, an officer may request identification from a passenger without converting the stop into an unlawful detention as such requests for identification are "uniform precautionary procedures" and any "de minimis" intrusion is reasonable and outweighed by the governmental interest in police officer safety. People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317, 322-324 (2012). Detota's request for Punter's identification is precisely the type of inquiry authorized during a legitimate traffic stop as it "involve[d] basic, nonthreatening questions regarding, for instance, identity." People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 185 (1992).

A traffic stop may not last any longer than reasonably necessary to complete its traffic-related mission. "authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are — or reasonably should have been — completed." Rodriguez v United States, 575 US 348, 354 (2015). A stop is not unlawfully prolonged when an unrelated inquiry "does not measurably extend the duration of the stop." Id. at 355. The Supreme Court further noted, "the government's officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself. Traffic stops are 'especially fraught with danger to police officers,' Johnson, 555 US at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted), so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely." Rodriguez, 575 US at 356 (emphasis added). Detota's request for Punter's identification was a legitimate traffic stop officer safety inquiry and did not delay the mission of the stop.

At 10:08:05 p.m. (22:08:05), the BWC video shows Vann continuing TraCS data entry. When parole arrived at approximately 10:09:30 p.m. (22:09:30), Vann was still processing the tint violation. The BWC shows Vann remained inside the patrol car when parole arrived. He lowered his window as parole officers approached his vehicle and he verbally directed parole to Punter, then resumed the VTL tint citation work. Once parole discovered narcotics, Vann stopped his work on the VTL tint violation and began to assist in the now criminal investigation. The fact that the officers ultimately did not issue a tint violation traffic summons does not, standing alone, invalidate an otherwise lawful stop. The governing inquiry is whether the officers possessed probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. Robinson, 97 NY2d at 349—350. The failure to issue a traffic ticket may bear upon the credibility of the officer's testimony concerning the alleged violation, but does not itself render the stop unlawful. People v Beaupre, 170 AD3d 1031, 1032 (2d Dept 2019). Here, the proof was uncontroverted that the Chevy Malibu's windows were obviously and visibly unlawfully tinted. The Court finds that the tint summons was ultimately not issued because the ongoing traffic-stop mission escalated into a criminal investigation supported by at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity once parole officers searched defendant's green backpack and, as Vann testified, "it was apparent that narcotics were inside." (Sept. 22 Tr. at 62—63.)

It should be noted and bears emphasis that parole arrived at about 10:09:30 pm, a mere 10 minutes and 15 seconds after Vann had initiated his conversation with the driver. Thus, the stop was not measurably prolonged. Rodriguez, 575 US at 354-356. See People v Banks, 148 AD3d 1359, 1361-1362 (3d Dept 2017) (upholding further detention after a tint stop where parole-related circumstances and defendant's conduct supported founded suspicion; also noting that an average traffic stop lasted 15 to 20 minutes); People v Blanche, 183 AD3d 1196, 1198-1199 (3d Dept 2020) (upholding a 44-minute detention after a tint stop based on facts that developed during the encounter). In short, this traffic stop was not measurably prolonged. Rodriguez, 575 US at 354—356.

A parole officer's search must be "rationally and reasonably related to the performance of his duty." People v Huntley, 43 NY2d 175, 179-181 (1977). Here, Richards testified that the parole curfew ran from 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. and that Punter's presence in public at 10:00 p.m. during the traffic stop violated that curfew. The Court finds that the hearing record established Punter was in violation of his parole curfew. That curfew violation, standing alone, supplied a rational basis for Richards to investigate further. Moreover, Punter's signed parole conditions state that he will permit a parole officer to search and inspect his person and property. The backpack was reliably linked to Punter. It was between his legs, he handled it during the stop, Detota identified it as his, the driver identified it and pushed it toward Richards, and Punter's spontaneous statement confirmed his relationship to its contents. Vann's brief remark through the open window that Punter was the front passenger and had a "nice bag" served only to identify the individual and the item; it did not direct the search or convert Richards into a police agent. Richards was a parole officer participating in the parole detail and Richards credibly testified (as corroborated by Detota's BWC) that the driver identified the bag as Punter's as she pushed it towards him. Furthermore, Detota's BWC clearly depicts Detota explaining to parole officers that the green backpack was in Punter's possession. Considering Richards's testimony concerning Punter's curfew violation, the signed parole search conditions (Ex. A), and the reliable evidence linking the backpack to Punter, the Court finds that Richards's search of the backpack was within the scope of the parole supervision operation. The Court finds that Parole Officer Richards' search of Punter's green backpack was "rationally and reasonably related to the performance of his [parole] dut[ies]." Huntley, 43 NY2d at 179-181.

Miranda warnings are required before custodial interrogation. Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444 (1966). Here Richards credibly testified that Punter spontaneously made the statement about the grinder belonging to him and the comment was not the product of any interrogation. See People v Ero, 139 AD3d 1248, 1249 (3d Dept 2016) (spontaneous statements made which are not the product of questioning are admissible regardless of whether Miranda warnings were given).

The July 2, 2026 Amended Decision and Order found the People had complied with their then-existing disclosure obligations under CPL article 245. Defendant's omnibus motion also sought a broad inquiry and production of GIVE directives and communications on government and personal devices and messaging platforms. The People opposed the demand as speculative and overly broad, representing that Article 245 disclosure had been provided and acknowledging their continuing Brady obligations. At the October 6 hearing, defense counsel renewed objections concerning communications and Zello retention. Having considered the parties' positions, the hearing record, and their oral arguments, the Court finds no basis on this record to conclude that any further discoverable communications exist or were withheld.

Thus, the traffic stop was supported by probable cause and was not measurably prolonged beyond the time reasonably needed to complete the "mission of the stop." Rodriguez, 575 US at 354-357. Parole arrived while the tint violation was still being processed. Richards searched personal property reasonably attributed to the defendant, who was in violation of his curfew, under conditions that were rationally and reasonably related to parole supervision. Defendant's inculpatory statement was spontaneous. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence and his statement is DENIED.

This matter is ready for jury trial. The parties shall appear on October 27, 2026, at 11:30 a.m. for a trial-scheduling conference.

Ithaca, New York

October 19, 2026

Hon. Scott A. Miller

Tompkins County Court

cc.:

Matthew Van Houten, Esq., Tompkins County District Attorney

Edward E. Kopko, Esq., Attorney for Defendant Punter

Scott A. Miller, J.