People of the State of New York, v. III (2026)

Defendant is charged by three-count indictment with Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 220.18[1]), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 265.03[3]), and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 265.02[8]). Defendant moves to suppress statements and physical evidence arising from a police encounter on September 3, 2024. The Court conducted a suppression hearing on March 20 and April 10, 2026. The People presented testimony from Cayuga Heights Police Officer Adam Langlois, Officer Brandon Manheim, Sergeant James Manning, and Tompkins County Sheriff's Sergeant James Vann. Defendant William Hunter, III testified. The Court received body-worn-camera recordings and documentary exhibits, including a written consent to search the vehicle.

For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is DENIED.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court credits the testimony of the law-enforcement witnesses in all material respects relevant to the suppression issues before it. The body-worn-camera recordings provide substantial objective corroboration of the testimony and, where the recordings more precisely depict a disputed event, the Court relies upon the contemporaneous recording. On a suppression motion, the People bear the initial burden of going forward to establish the legality of the police conduct, while Defendant bears the ultimate burden of establishing a constitutional violation warranting suppression. People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 (1971).

At approximately 12:46 p.m. on September 3, 2024, Village of Cayuga Heights Police Officer Adam Langlois was conducting stationary patrol on North Triphammer Road when his license-plate-reader system alerted him that a black Nissan Murano had a suspended registration. Langlois confirmed the suspension through eJustice and entered traffic intending to stop the Murano for the suspected VTL § 512 misdemeanor. The Murano turned onto nearby Texas Lane before Langlois reached it. When Langlois subsequently located the Murano, it was already parked in the driveway of 125 Texas Lane. Langlois approached the parked vehicle and then activated his emergency lights and notified dispatch of his location. By the time Langlois arrived, Defendant, who had been the passenger, was already outside the Murano and walked away into the nearby roadway cul-de-sac, while the driver, later identified as Oluwatobi Osayi, was walking toward the residence. Langlois did not direct Defendant to return to the vehicle or remain in any particular location. Defendant walked freely about the cul-de-sac, much of the time while speaking on his phone. Langlois credibly testified that Defendant "was free to go" while Langlois investigated the suspected VTL § 512 offense and the reason the occupants were at the residence. Osayi told Langlois that he had come to the residence to perform work for a person named Serena. Langlois was unable to corroborate that explanation as no one with that name was connected to the residence. Osayi could not identify who had sent him or explain the proposed work. Langlois observed that Osayi was shaking, speaking rapidly, and eager to demonstrate that he possessed tools. When asked to identify his passenger, Osayi initially told Langlois to ask the passenger himself and ultimately stated that he knew him as "Biz." Langlois entered the nickname "Biz" into Spillman and it came back associated with Defendant William Hunter and displayed red-highlighted alerts stating, "guns on person" and "officer safety." Langlois testified that the information reported by Spillman caused him to request additional backup.

Officer Manheim thereafter arrived. At approximately 12:52:06 p.m., while Defendant was moving farther into the cul-de-sac, Manheim called, "Hey Boss, whatcha doing?" and made an arm gesture intended to bring Defendant back into conversational range. The recording shows that Manheim did not touch Defendant, display a weapon, block his path, tell him to stop, or state that he was detained. Defendant testified that he nevertheless believed he was no longer free to leave.

Sergeant Manning subsequently arrived and accompanied Langlois as he approached Defendant. At approximately 1:05:56 p.m., Langlois asked Defendant, "Do you have any weapons on you?" Defendant responded in the negative. Langlois then asked, "Do you mind if I pat you down?" The body-worn-camera footage depicts a request rather than a command. Langlois did not display a weapon, threaten Defendant, physically compel him, or state that the search was mandatory. Defendant positioned himself to permit the pat-down. Langlois and Manning both testified that Defendant permitted the search. The Court agrees with this characterization and finds that Defendant voluntarily consented to the limited weapons pat-down.

During the pat-down, a bulge was plainly visible in Defendant's shorts below the waistband. Langlois testified that he visually observed the bulge and did not feel it. Manning likewise testified that the bulge was visible and did not appear to be a weapon. The body-worn-camera recording is more precise on this point. It depicts a momentary contact with the exterior of Defendant's shorts by the back of Langlois's gloved hand. On this discrete point, the recording controls. The contact was fleeting—a quick tap or brush with the back of the gloved hand. Langlois did not squeeze, manipulate, probe, repeatedly pat, or otherwise explore the bulge by touch. He asked Defendant what it was. Defendant responded, "It's drugs, man." Only then, after that incriminating admission, was Defendant detained and handcuffed. Defendant thereafter removed multiple plastic bags containing a white substance, later alleged to constitute approximately 127.8 grams (4.5 ounces) of cocaine, from his shorts and provided them to law enforcement.

Osayi later gave repeated verbal consent to search the Murano and then signed a written consent-to-search form. Osayi was detained during the search and formally arrested at its conclusion. Police recovered additional evidence from the Murano, including a Stoeger 9 mm handgun and a large-capacity ammunition feeding device located inside a backpack. Osayi stated that the backpack belonged to Defendant. The Court treats that statement as Osayi's assertion, not as conclusive determination of exclusive ownership.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Police-citizen encounters in New York are governed by the graduated four-level framework established in People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210 (1976), and clarified in People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181 (1992). Each successive level permits a greater degree of police intrusion and correspondingly requires a greater quantum of suspicion. See People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 498-499 (2006).

At Level One, an officer may approach a person and request information when there exists an objective, credible reason for doing so, not necessarily indicative of criminality. De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; Hollman, 79 NY2d at 184-185. The questions ordinarily remain basic and non-threatening and do not communicate that the person is suspected of criminal conduct.

At Level Two, the common-law right of inquiry is activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; Hollman, 79 NY2d at 185. This permits more pointed questioning that would reasonably convey that the person has become the focus of the investigation. Founded suspicion is a lesser standard than the reasonable suspicion required for a forcible detention.

At Level Three, police may forcibly stop and detain an individual when they possess reasonable suspicion that the particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor. De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; Moore, 6 NY3d at 498-499. A Level Three encounter constitutes a seizure and permits restraints upon liberty not authorized at Levels One or Two. A frisk is not automatic at Level Three; it requires the additional predicate for a protective search for weapons.

At Level Four, police may arrest when they possess probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime. De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; Moore, 6 NY3d at 499.

The label placed upon an encounter by either party does not control. The Court must independently determine both the level of police intrusion that actually occurred and whether the facts known to the officers justified that degree of intrusion when it occurred. Both the People and Defendant devote substantial attention to whether the officers possessed reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Level Three detention of Defendant and whether a compelled protective frisk was authorized. That analysis assumes, however, that Defendant was forcibly detained before his admission concerning the drugs. The Court finds that he was not. The parties' characterization of the encounter is not controlling. The Court must evaluate the police conduct that actually occurred. Before Defendant stated, "It's drugs, man," the officers had not imposed a Level Three detention upon Defendant, which, as both the Defense and People note, would have required reasonable suspicion.

Defendant was outside the Murano when Langlois arrived, walked freely about the driveway and then into the cul-de-sac, was not handcuffed or physically restrained, and was not ordered to remain in any particular location. Langlois expressly testified that Defendant "was free to go." Defendant contends that Manheim's statement, "Hey Boss, whatcha doing?" together with his accompanying arm gesture, effectively communicated that Defendant was required to return and was no longer free to leave. The objective record does not support that conclusion. Manheim did not touch Defendant, display a weapon, block his path, order him to stop, or state that he was detained. Nearly fourteen additional minutes passed after Manheim's interaction before Langlois and Manning approached Defendant to inquire about weapons and request a pat-down. Throughout that entire period Defendant remained unhandcuffed and physically unrestricted. The objective inquiry is whether police conduct significantly interrupted Defendant's liberty of movement. People v Bora, 83 NY2d 531, 535 (1994); People v Ocasio, 85 NY2d 982, 984-985 (1995). On this record, the Court finds that it did not. Defendant voluntarily remained nearby during an ongoing investigation. Defendant was not subjected to a Level Three forcible detention.

Defendant separately argues that the police unlawfully prolonged the traffic investigation beyond the time reasonably necessary to address the suspended registration. See Rodriguez v United States, 575 US 348, 354-355 (2015); People v Thomas, 42 NY3d 236, 240-242 (2024); United States v Gomez, 877 F3d 76, 90-91 (2d Cir 2017). As this Court recently recognized, "a lawful traffic stop may not be prolonged beyond the time reasonably necessary to complete the mission of the stop absent additional justification." People v Brooks, 88 Misc 3d 1271(A), 2026 NY Slip Op 50754(U), *5 (County Ct, Tompkins County 2026), citing Rodriguez, 575 US at 350-351. The Court of Appeals has made clear that reasonable suspicion, rather than the lesser founded-suspicion standard applicable to a Level Two common-law inquiry, is required to justify the continued involuntary detention of an individual beyond the time reasonably necessary to complete a traffic stop. Thomas, 42 NY3d at 240-242. However, that principle does not require suppression here. Langlois personally observed the Murano operating upon a public highway, received a license-plate-reader alert that its registration was suspended, and independently confirmed the suspension through eJustice. Operation of a motor vehicle upon a public highway while its registration is suspended constitutes a misdemeanor. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 512. Langlois therefore had probable cause to believe that the driver had committed that crime and, because the registration of the Murano itself was suspended, the vehicle could not lawfully be returned to operation upon the public highway while that suspension remained in effect. More fundamentally, however, the Court need not determine the precise point at which the investigation of Osayi and the Murano reasonably should have concluded because Defendant was not subjected to a continuing traffic-stop seizure. Although an occupant of a vehicle ordinarily is seized when police effectuate a traffic stop, see Brendlin v California, 551 US 249, 257 (2007), that is not what occurred here. Langlois did not stop the Murano while Defendant occupied it. The Murano turned onto Texas Lane before Langlois reached it and was already parked in the driveway when Langlois subsequently located it. By the time Langlois arrived and activated his emergency lights, Defendant was already outside the Murano and thereafter walked freely about the nearby cul-de-sac. Langlois did not direct Defendant to return to the vehicle, remain at the scene, or stay in any particular location, and credibly testified that Defendant "was free to go." Neither Manheim's conversational effort to re-engage Defendant nor the officers' subsequent Level Two common-law inquiry about weapons objectively imposed a significant restraint upon Defendant's liberty before his admission concerning the drugs. Rodriguez and Thomas address the permissible duration of an involuntary traffic-stop seizure; they do not transform an otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure merely because police continue to investigate the driver and vehicle nearby. Regardless of how long the investigation of Osayi and the Murano continued, there was no traffic-stop seizure of Defendant to prolong. Gomez is distinguishable for the same reason. Defendant's contention that his subsequent statements and the physical evidence recovered thereafter were the product of an unlawfully prolonged traffic stop is therefore rejected.

Defendant testified that his experience as a Black man in Ithaca reinforced his belief that he was not free to leave. Defendant relies on Carter v United States, 341 A3d 1067, 1076 (DC 2025), cert denied sub nom United States v Carter, 608 US ___ (2026) (Alito, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari does not constitute a ruling on the merits, and Defendant did not identify, nor could this Court locate, any New York authority adopting Carter's formulation treating race as part of a constitutional seizure inquiry. This Court need not determine whether to credit Defendant's subjective belief because, under controlling New York law, the seizure inquiry is objective. Before this suppression Court, the question remains whether police conduct objectively imposed a significant restraint upon Defendant's liberty. Bora, 83 NY2d at 535; Ocasio, 85 NY2d at 984-985. The Court finds that it did not.

Although Defendant was not forcibly detained, the encounter had progressed beyond a Level One request for information. By the time Langlois approached Defendant inquiring about weapons, the officers possessed founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, thereby authorizing such Level Two common-law inquiry. As already described, the investigation began with the confirmed operation of a vehicle with a suspended registration, i.e., a traffic misdemeanor. Osayi then gave a suspicious explanation for the occupants' presence at 125 Texas Lane that Langlois could not corroborate. Osayi stated that he had come to perform work for a person named Serena, yet no person with that name could be connected to the residence. He could not satisfactorily identify who had sent him or explain the proposed work. Langlois further observed that Osayi was shaking, speaking rapidly, and unusually eager to demonstrate that he possessed tools. When Langlois asked Osayi to identify his passenger, Osayi initially would not and directed him to ask the passenger himself, but ultimately stated that he knew Defendant as "Biz." When Langlois entered the nickname "Biz" into Spillman, the inquiry returned an association with Defendant William Hunter and further alerts displayed noting "guns on person" and "officer safety." The constitutional inquiry considers the totality of the circumstances confronting the officers during the unfolding investigation. The Court finds that the circumstances confronting the officers provided founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

People v Darby, 234 AD3d 708, 709-710 (2d Dept 2025), is particularly instructive. There, the Second Department reiterated that, in circumstances justifying a Level Two encounter, an officer may request an individual's consent to conduct a search so long as the request is "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place," quoting People v Mercado, 120 AD3d 441, 443 (1st Dept 2014), affd 25 NY3d 936 (2015). Applying that principle here, Langlois's inquiry about weapons and his request for consent to conduct a limited weapons pat-down were reasonably related in scope to the totality of circumstances confronting the officers. Under Darby, the request therefore fell within the permissible bounds of a Level Two common-law inquiry. Under People v Garcia, 20 NY3d 317, 324 (2012), founded suspicion permits an officer to ask whether an individual possesses a weapon. Langlois therefore was permitted to ask Defendant, "Do you have any weapons on you?" Consistent with Darby, Langlois was likewise permitted to ask, "Do you mind if I pat you down?" Because that request was supported by founded suspicion and remained a request rather than a command, it did not transform the Level Two inquiry into a Level Three seizure. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not have understood Langlois's request as a significant limitation on his freedom of movement. Defendant remained free to decline the request and walk away. See People v Bora, 83 NY2d 531, 535-536 (1994); People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 586 (1980). Defendant was not restrained, and neither Langlois nor any other officer displayed a weapon. No orders were given and no threatening statements or gestures were made by any officer. Langlois requested permission to conduct the pat-down; he did not compel Defendant to submit to one. In response, Defendant cooperated and positioned himself to permit the pat-down. This crucial interaction is entirely corroborated by the body-worn-camera footage. Langlois's request for the limited pat-down was a permissible Level Two intrusion, not a Level Three compelled frisk. The People met their heavy burden of establishing, under the totality of the circumstances, that Defendant voluntarily consented to the limited weapons pat-down. People v Gonzalez, 39 NY2d 122, 128 (1976); People v Brinkley, 174 AD3d 1159, 1163 (3d Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 979 (2019); see People v Crispell, 223 AD3d 941, 943 (3d Dept 2024).

During the pat-down, the bulge in Defendant's shorts was visible. Although the officers recalled that the bulge was observed rather than patted, the recording depicts a fleeting tap or brush with the back of Langlois's gloved hand. That narrow discrepancy does not undermine the officers' overall credibility. On this discrete point, the recording controls. In People v Rosario, 245 AD2d 470, 471 (2d Dept 1997), the Second Department held that an officer who observed a bulge could make the minimal intrusion of touching it to determine whether it was a weapon. Conversely, once an object is determined not to be a weapon, police may not continue manipulating or exploring it in an effort to identify contraband. See People v Diaz, 81 NY2d 106, 109 (1993). Here, Langlois did not squeeze, manipulate, probe, repeatedly pat, or seize the bulge. That fleeting contact did not exceed the scope of the consensual weapons pat-down. Langlois then asked Defendant what the bulge was. Defendant responded, "It's drugs, man." The Level Two common-law inquiry permitted such pointed questioning because founded suspicion of criminality was present. Hollman, 79 NY2d at 185. Langlois's question was brief and reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the inquiry. Defendant's admission consequently supplied probable cause for his arrest and the ensuing recovery of the narcotics from his shorts.

Miranda warnings must precede custodial interrogation. Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444 (1966). The standard for custody is whether a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing would have believed that he or she was not free to leave. People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 129 (2005); People v Vieou, 107 AD3d 1052, 1053 (3d Dept 2013); People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 (1969), cert denied 400 US 851 (1970). Here, Defendant had not been handcuffed, arrested, placed in a patrol vehicle, or subjected to restraints comparable to formal arrest or custodial detention. Miranda warnings therefore were not required during this Level Two common-law inquiry and prior to Defendant making the admission that he was in possession of illegal narcotics. Under the Level Two common-law inquiry applicable here, Langlois was authorized to ask Defendant whether he possessed weapons, request permission to conduct a pat-down, and inquire about the unusual bulge. Because Defendant voluntarily consented to the pat-down and then admitted that the bulge was drugs, the narcotics were lawfully recovered. Defendant's motion to suppress his statements and the narcotics is therefore DENIED.

With respect to the firearm later discovered in a backpack located in the Murano, Osayi had repeatedly consented to a search of the Murano and had also signed a written consent-to-search form. While Osayi claimed, during the investigation, that the backpack inside the vehicle belonged to Defendant, the Court need not determine whether Osayi's consent to search the vehicle, standing alone, extended to that closed container because the backpack search was independently lawful under the automobile exception. Before the search of the backpack, Defendant had admitted possessing drugs and had produced multiple plastic bags containing approximately 127.8 grams of suspected cocaine. Considering the quantity and packaging of the suspected narcotics, Defendant's occupancy of the Murano less than 30 minutes earlier, and the suspicious circumstances surrounding the occupants' presence at 125 Texas Lane, the officers had probable cause to believe that additional controlled substances or related evidence would be found in the vehicle. Those circumstances established the required nexus between the probable cause and the Murano. The backpack was located inside the passenger compartment and was capable of containing such evidence. See People v Hall, 236 AD3d 1334, 1336 (4th Dept 2025); People v Blasich, 73 NY2d 673, 678-679 (1989); People v Langen, 60 NY2d 170, 180-181 (1983), cert denied 465 US 1028 (1984); People v Galak, 81 NY2d 463, 467 (1993); People v Thompson, 106 AD3d 1134, 1135 (3d Dept 2013).

Accordingly, the search of the backpack was permissible under the automobile exception and Defendant's motion to suppress the firearm evidence is DENIED.

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion to suppress statements and physical evidence is DENIED in its entirety. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER.

Dated: September 21, 2026

Ithaca, New York

Hon. Scott A. Miller

Tompkins County Court Judge

Scott A. Miller, J.