The People of the State of New York, v. Ramal B. Abdullah, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant Ramal B. Abdullah, proceeding pro se, moves pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(h) to vacate the judgment of conviction entered following a jury trial in Tompkins County Court. The People oppose the motion. Defendant principally contends that his constitutional rights were violated because stand-by counsel allegedly failed to adequately assist him in preparing a proposed defense witness, Andrea Isacks, a substance abuse counselor whom Defendant hoped would provide testimony supporting his claim that the narcotics recovered from his person were possessed for personal use rather than for sale. The Court has considered Defendant's Notice of Motion pursuant to CPL § 440.10(1)(h), Defendant's supporting affidavit and exhibits, Defendant's amended supporting affidavit, the People's affirmation in opposition, Defendant's reply affirmation, and the entire record of the proceedings herein. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is DENIED without a hearing.

I. Procedural Background

On May 6, 2025, following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree (PL § 220.16[7]), Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree (PL § 220.16[1]), Unlawful Fleeing of a Police Officer in a Motor Vehicle in the Third Degree (PL § 270.25), and Reckless Driving (VTL § 1212). After the guilty verdict, Defendant moved pursuant to CPL § 330.30 to set aside the verdict. Among other arguments, Defendant asserted that he had been deprived of a fair trial because the Court precluded testimony from a proposed substance abuse counselor witness. By written Decision & Order dated June 30, 2025, this Court rejected that claim and specifically held that the Court's rulings concerning the proposed witness were legally sound and that Defendant could pursue any preserved challenge on direct appeal. People v. Abdullah, 87 Misc 3d 1242 (Tompkins Cty. 2025). On July 1, 2025, Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate determinate term of 12 years, followed by three years of post-release supervision for the two counts of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree (and local time for the misdemeanors). The present CPL Article 440 motion largely repackages Defendant's CPL Article 330 claims under a constitutional label.

II. Defendant's Claims Are Record-Based and Must Be Raised on Direct Appeal

The Court concludes that Defendant's motion is procedurally barred. At its core, Defendant's motion concerns the proposed testimony of Andrea Isacks, the role and conduct of stand-by counsel, the Court's handling of the proposed witness, and the Court's ultimate determination that the proposed testimony would not be admitted before the jury. Each of those matters was extensively litigated on the record before and during trial. Defendant's motion repeatedly cites transcript excerpts, courtroom colloquies, pretrial proceedings, and rulings made in open court. The allegations derive almost entirely from the existing record rather than newly discovered evidence outside the record.

CPL Article 440 was not designed to provide a substitute for appellate review of recordbased claims. The purpose of CPL Article 440 is to bring before the Court matters not appearing on the record and therefore not reviewable on direct appeal. The Third Department, in People v. Spradlin, 188 AD3d 1454, 1460 (3rd Dept. 2020) explained:

"[T]he purpose of a CPL article 440 motion is to inform a court of facts not reflected in the record and unknown at the time of the judgment. By its very nature, the procedure cannot be used as a vehicle for an additional appeal" (People v. Saunders, 301 AD2d 869, 870 [2003] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citations omitted], lv denied 100 NY2d 542 [2003]; see People v. Taylor, 156 AD3d 86, 89 [2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1120 [2018] ). Such a motion must be denied when "[t]he judgment is, at the time of the motion, appealable or pending on appeal, and sufficient facts appear on the record with respect to the ground[s] or issue[s] raised upon the motion to permit adequate review thereof upon such an appeal" (CPL 440.10[2][b]; see People v. Grays, 162 AD3d 1224, 1228 [2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1111 [2018] ).

Indeed, this Court previously addressed Defendant's challenge concerning the preclusion of the proposed substance abuse counselor and expressly noted that Defendant remained free to pursue that preserved claim on direct appeal. Rather than perfecting a direct appeal, Defendant now seeks collateral review of the same record-based issue. Because the factual basis for Defendant's claims appears fully on the record and because those claims are reviewable on direct appeal, collateral review is inappropriate. Defendant's direct appeal has not yet been perfected. The present motion therefore represents an impermissible attempt to obtain collateral review of record-based claims before appellate review has occurred. The motion may therefore be denied on that ground alone.

III. Defendant Improperly Seeks Reconsideration of an Evidentiary Ruling Previously Made by the Court

Defendant's present motion rests upon the mistaken assumption that Andrea Isacks would have testified before the jury but for alleged shortcomings by stand-by counsel. The record establishes otherwise. The Court advised Defendant that the admissibility of Ms. Isacks' proposed testimony would be determined through an evidentiary inquiry outside the hearing of the jury. The Court thereafter conducted proceedings specifically directed toward evaluating the relevance and admissibility of the proposed testimony. Following that inquiry, the Court ruled that the proposed testimony would not be admitted before the jury. The Court's ruling excluding the proposed testimony was subsequently challenged by Defendant in his CPL § 330.30 motion and rejected again by written Decision & Order dated June 30, 2025.

The Court did not preclude Ms. Isacks because Defendant failed to meet with her. The Court precluded the testimony because, after conducting the required evidentiary inquiry, the Court determined that the proposed testimony was inadmissible. Whether that evidentiary determination was correct or incorrect is a matter for appellate review. CPL Article 440 does not authorize a collateral attack simply because Defendant disagrees with an evidentiary ruling already made on the record. The Court therefore declines Defendant's invitation to revisit an evidentiary determination that was fully litigated, decided on the record, challenged in Defendant's CPL § 330.30 motion, and remains reviewable on direct appeal. People v. Abdullah, 87 Misc 3d 1242 (Tompkins Cty. 2025).

IV. Defendant Fails to Establish a Cognizable Constitutional Violation

Even assuming Defendant's claims were properly before the Court, they fail on the merits. The record reflects that Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and elected to proceed pro se following a Faretta inquiry. It is well settled that once a defendant validly elects self-representation, there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of hybrid, or stand-by counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); People v. Rodriguez, 95 NY2d 497 (2000).

Defendant attempts to avoid this principle by reframing his claim as one involving compulsory process and the right to present a defense. The distinction is unpersuasive. The Court approved Defendant's request for expert-witness funding and afforded Defendant the opportunity to litigate the admissibility of the proposed testimony. Defendant was not prevented from locating witnesses, presenting witnesses, or advancing a defense. Rather, Defendant now complains that stand-by counsel allegedly did not provide the level of assistance Defendant desired. Thus, the record does not support Defendant's contention that the Court interfered with his ability to investigate, prepare, or present the proposed witness. Such allegations do not establish a constitutional violation warranting vacatur of a judgment of conviction.

V. Defendant Fails to Demonstrate Prejudice

Defendant's motion also fails because he has not established prejudice. Most notably, Defendant submits no affidavit from Andrea Isacks stating that she would have diagnosed Defendant with a substance use disorder, that she would have concluded the narcotics were possessed for personal use, that she would have disagreed with the People's theory of intent to sell, or that she would have provided admissible testimony favorable to Defendant. Instead, Defendant relies upon his own speculation concerning what Isacks might have concluded had additional meetings, assessments, or consultations occurred. Moreover, the actual trial record and Defendant's own submissions substantially undermine his claim. During the proffer examination relied upon by Defendant, Isacks was presented by the People with a hypothetical closely tracking the facts of this case, including forty-eight individually packaged narcotics in varying weights. Andrea Isacks acknowledged, "I would imagine that person was trying to move thatthose products, yes." (Exhibit C, Tr. at 6). Thus, Defendant's own submissions demonstrate that Isacks could not offer testimony exculpating Defendant or rebutting the People's theory that the narcotics were possessed with intent to sell. To the contrary, Isacks' testimony, had it been allowed, would have further undermined rather than supported Defendant's claims.

As this Court previously observed in its CPL § 330.30 Decision & Order, Defendant possessed forty-eight separately packaged quantities of methamphetamine and heroin/fentanyl in varying pre-measured amounts. Defendant also possessed two cellular telephones, over $2,600 in cash, much of it concealed on his person, and no personal-use drug paraphernalia. Defendant further fled from law enforcement during a high-speed pursuit through the City of Ithaca. The proof supporting the jury's finding that Defendant possessed the narcotics with intent to sell was overwhelming.

VI. No Hearing Required

Finally, the Court concludes that no hearing is required. Even if every factual allegation contained in Defendant's affidavits were accepted as true, Defendant would still not be entitled to vacatur of the judgment. The motion is procedurally barred, fails to establish a cognizable constitutional violation, fails to demonstrate prejudice, and consists largely of Defendant's conclusory assertions concerning what the precluded substance abuse counselor (Isacks) would have testified to at trial, which assertions are wholly contradicted by the witness's under-oath proffer examination conducted during the Court's evidentiary inquiry outside the presence of the jury. Summary denial is appropriate pursuant to CPL § 440.30(4)(a), (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, Defendant's motion pursuant to CPL § 440.10 is DENIED in its entirety without a hearing. This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Ithaca, New York

Dated: June 15, 2026

Hon. Scott A. Miller

Tompkins County Court Judge

Scott A. Miller, J.