The People of the State of New York, v. Santos P. Vasquez-Ramirez, Defendant. (2026)

The following papers were read and considered on the omnibus motion (Mot. Seq. No. 1) made by defendant SANTOS P. VASQUEZ-RAMIREZ (hereinafter defendant):

Papers:

1. Notice of Omnibus Motion; Defense Counsel's Affirmation in Support; Defense Counsel's Memorandum of Law in Support

2. People's Affirmation in Response; Exhibits A-B

3. Transcripts of the Grand Jury Minutes from January 16 and 23, 2026

Upon review of the foregoing papers, the Court finds, holds, and determines as follows:

On January 23, 2026, defendant was charged in an eight-count indictment with two counts of murder in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 125.25 (1) and (3) (counts one and two); manslaughter in the first degree in violation of Penal Law § 125.20 (1) (count three); robbery in the first degree in violation of Penal Law § 160.15 (1) (count four); two counts of grand larceny in the fourth degree in violation of Penal Law § 155.30 (4) and (8) (counts five and six); concealment of a human corpse in violation of Penal Law § 195.02 (count seven); and tampering with physical evidence in violation of Penal Law § 215.40 (2) (count eight).

These serious charges stem from disturbing allegations that defendant fatally strangled the victim (a cab driver who resided in Connecticut) to death in the Village of Brewster over a fare dispute and then disposed of the victim's body, which was later discovered in the Croton Falls Reservoir on or about December 7, 2025.

Defendant was arraigned on the indictment on January 28, 2026, when he entered a not guilty plea. He has been remanded to the county jail since.

On March 27, 2026, the defendant, through counsel, filed an omnibus motion requesting various relief. The People filed their response papers on April 8, 2026. Defendant did not file reply papers and rests on his initial moving papers. The omnibus motion is thus fully submitted and ripe for determination. The Court will address each branch of his motion, in turn, and dispose of it as follows:

I. Defendant's Motion for Inspection & Release of the Grand Jury Minutes

Initially, defendant moves for this Court to inspect the grand jury minutes. The People consent to have the Court review the grand jury minutes, in camera, for legal sufficiency purposes. Accordingly, this branch of defendant's motion is granted without opposition. The Court has inspected the minutes of the grand jury proceeding relative to this case (see CPL 210.30 [3]; CPL 245.20; see also People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d 389, 394-395 [1980]; People v Monserrate, 24 Misc 3d 1229[A], *1 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2009]).

II. The Grand Jury Proceeding

Next, defendant requests the Court to inspect the grand jury minutes for purposes of determining, inter alia, legal sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant claims that the indictment must be dismissed, or alternatively reduced, on the ground of legal insufficiency. Defendant also asks the Court to determine the integrity and potential defects in the proceeding, which hinge on the arguable impartiality of some of the grand jurors.

The People counter that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient in all respects to support charging defendant with the offenses. The People maintain that the proceeding itself was not defective and the integrity of the proceeding is legally sound. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with the People in sustaining the indictment based on the minutes and the vast evidence presented to the grand jury in support of the charges.

a. Legal Standard

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss an indictment based on the alleged legal insufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, the Court must determine whether there is "competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (CPL 70.10 [1]; see People v Jensen, 86 NY2d 248, 251-252 [1995]). "Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction" (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord People v Wisey, 133 AD3d 799, 799-800 [2d Dept 2015]).

"In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference" (People v Wisey, 133 AD3d at 800 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976, 979 [1987]). "Inquiry into the adequacy of the proof to establish reasonable cause — the 'degree of certitude' the evidence provides — is exclusively the province of the Grand Jury" (People v Swamp, 84 NY2d 725, 730 [1995]; see CPL 190.65 [1] [b]).

Importantly, "[i]t is sufficient if the [prosecutor] provides the Grand Jury with enough information to enable it intelligently to decide whether a crime has been committed and to determine whether there exists legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of the crime. The People have wide discretion in presenting evidence to establish their case and do not have the obligation to present to the Grand Jury every piece of evidence which they possess against a suspect, nor must every matter which may have a tendency to reflect upon the credibility of a witness be revealed. The Grand Jury proceeding is not intended to be adversarial in nature or a minitrial of the individual suspected of committing a crime" (People v Shahzad, 71 AD3d 704, 705-706 [2d Dept 2010] [internal quotations marks and citations omitted] [emphasis added]; see People v Colucci, 32 AD3d 1044, 1045 [2d Dept 2006]; People v Suarez, 122 AD2d 861, 862 [2d Dept 1986], lv denied 68 NY2d 817 [1986]).

Moreover, the Court of Appeals has expressed that CPL 210.35 (5) establishes a "high test" to qualify for the "exceptional remedy" of dismissing an indictment: "[t]he statutory test is very precise and very high" (see People v Darby, 75 NY2d 449, 455 [1990]). "[M]ere flaw, error[,] or skewing" is not enough (id.). In other words, a defendant thus bears a heavy burden in endeavoring to dismiss a grand jury's indictment.

"Generally, hearsay evidence is inadmissible before the Grand Jury" (People v Dunn, 248 AD2d 87, 94 [1st Dept 1998], appeal withdrawn 93 NY2d 1002 [1999]; see People v Huston, 88 NY2d at 406-407). However, "hearsay evidence may be admitted before the Grand Jury so long as the resulting indictment[ ] [is] not founded on hearsay which the Grand Jury 'may not have understood as such' " (People v Perry, 199 AD2d 889, 893 [3d Dept 1993], quoting People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97, 106 [1984]). Errors in admission of hearsay evidence must be of a significant magnitude to impair the integrity of grand jury proceedings (see People v Carey, 241 AD2d 748, 750-751 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 1010 [1997]). Even "isolated instances of hearsay testimony, which were accompanied by appropriate limiting instructions, do not warrant dismissal" of the indictment (People v Miller, 110 AD3d at 1150-1151) — so long as there is otherwise legally sufficient and admissible evidence to sustain the counts of the indictment.

b. The Grand Jury Proceeding

Applying these legal principles to the case at hand, the Court finds that the evidence presented to the grand jury, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, is legally sufficient to indict defendant with the charged crimes (see CPL 70.10 [1]; People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003]; People v Wisey, 133 AD3d at 799-801). Defendant's claim that the indictment is grounded upon legally insufficient evidence is without merit (see People v Williams, 150 AD3d 1273, 1279 [2d Dept 2017], lv denied 29 NY3d 1135 [2017]). Notably, defendant himself does not raise any specific argument(s) or contention(s) concerning the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury.¹

The Court initially points out that the minutes reflect that a quorum of grand jurors was present at the beginning of the proceeding and before the grand jury voted to deliberate on the counts presented (see People v Huston, 88 NY2d at 409; People v Robinson, 156 AD3d 1123, 1128 n 8 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1119 [2018]). The entire proceeding lasted two days. Defendant's due process rights were not violated during the process. Nor does the Court find that the proceeding itself was infected or impaired by the prosecutors' presentation and conduct.

The collective evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the People, constitutes legally sufficient evidence to establish the offenses that were charged, which included, among other things, DNA evidence matching the defendant's profile and defendant's inculpatory statements to police. The grand jury was free to accept all of the evidence and reach a conclusive determination. Upon examining the grand jury minutes and the totality of the proceeding, the Court concludes that the evidence presented to the grand jury is legally sufficient to sustain the subject indictment (see id.; CPL 70.10 [1]; People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003]; People v Wisey, 133 AD3d at 799-801).

1. The Quorum & Vote

Defendant's claim that the grand jury proceeding was defective since there was not a quorum present is off the mark. In this regard, he argues that there is a fundamental issue with respect to the quorum requirement, inasmuch as the law requires between 16 to 23 grand jurors to be physically present to constitute a quorum, and that the grand jury minutes reflect that the prosecutor stated "let the record reflect that at least twelve of the Grand Juror present heard all of the evidence . . . in this case." The People challenge defendant's supposition about the quorum and voting requirements. Despite the aforesaid statement made by the prosector, defendant misconstrues the legal requirement of what constitutes a quorum and exactly how many members of a grand jury panel are required to cast a vote on an official action such as voting on an indictment.

In this regard, CPL 190.25 (1) is instructive, stating that "[p]roceedings of a grand jury are not valid unless at least [16] of its members are present" (emphasis added). That statute continues, in relevant part, that "[t]he finding of an indictment . . . requires the concurrence of at least twelve members thereof" (id. [emphasis added]; accord People v Infante, 124 AD2d 86, 89 [2d Dept 1987]).

In view of the foregoing statutory language, and contrary to defendant's postulation, it is clear that in order to indict or dismiss, "there must be a formal vote of the grand jury and 12 of its members must concur in that result" (People v Aarons, 2 NY3d 547, 549 [2004]; see People v Foster, 279 AD2d 317, 321 [1st Dept 2001]). Here, the grand jury minutes clearly reflect that when the prosecutor asked the grand jury foreperson "to again take a quorum count and read the voting requirements" to the grand jurors, the foreperson did so, and then stated "[l]et the record reflect that a quorum is present." The minutes, more importantly, reflect that the foreperson explained to the other grand jurors about the legal requirement to vote on the indictment by stating the following without any interruptions or interjections:

"The panel is reminded that only those Grand Jurors who have heard all of the evidence presented in this case may vote, and an affirmative action or decision requires the concurrence of at least twelve Grand Jurors thereto. Therefore, in order for you to return an indictment, at least twelve of you must vote to do so. Additionally, in order for you to dismiss any charges, twelve of you must vote to do so. In the event that you cannot agree upon the decision, you must inform the [prosecutor(s)] of this outcome. Please raise your hand if you have heard all of the evidence. Let the record reflect that at least twelve of the Grand Jurors present heard all of the evidence given in the case" (emphasis added).

The grand jury minutes reflect that three of the grand jurors were instructed not to participate in the deliberations and voting. The minutes evince that some of the grand jurors had questions for the prosecutor about the voting process, sought clarification about dismissal, not voting, and a true bill, which the prosecutor answered and explained with some level of clarity. That prompted the foreperson, at one point, to express on the record that "we need twelve" grand jurors to vote and return a true bill on the indictment.

The minutes further show that the prosecutors and stenographer then exited the room to allow deliberations to begin and went "outside of the presence" of the grand jury, whereupon a secret vote was taken. When the prosecution was notified that a final vote was cast by the grand jury, the prosecutors returned to the deliberation room and asked the foreperson if "there [is] a quorum present," to which the foreperson responded "[l]et the record reflect that a quorum is present." The foreperson confirmed that the grand jury voted a "true bill on all charges" when asked by the lead prosecutor.

The People annexed to their response papers an attendance sheet and a voting sheet for the grand jury proceedings. The former document represents which grand jurors were present and which were absent on each of the two days that this case was presented to the panel. And the latter document reflects how many members of the grand jury voted a true bill on each of the eight counts charged. In reviewing those sheets, those documents refute defendant's claim predicated on grand jury defectiveness as it relates to the presence of a quorum and the number of grand jurors who concurred to vote on the indictment, which was more than 12 members (see CPL 190.25 [1]).

In other words, what is quite clear from the grand jury minutes is that there was a quorum of at least 16 grand jurors present on January 23, 2026 and at least 12 grand jurors heard the evidence and voted to indict defendant on all of the charges (see id.). The grand jury's ultimate decision to indict the defendant by a concurrence of 12 grand jurors was a proper legal action taken by that charging body on January 23, 2026. It, therefore, follows that there was no defect in the makeup of the grand jury because a quorum of more than 16 grand jurors were present on that day and more than 12 of them voted and agreed to charge defendant vis-à-vis the indictment (see id.; People v Aarons, 2 NY3d at 549; People v Foster, 279 AD2d at 321).

2. Grand Juror Nos. 2, 14, 18, and 22

Next, defendant urges that the grand jury proceeding was defective and is "fatally flawed" with procedural irregularities because certain members of the panel were not excused. In advancing this argument, defendant believes that the prosecutor failed to ensure that Grand Jurors No. 2, 14, 18, and 22 could be fair and impartial. Upon review of the minutes, the Court rejects the arguments made by defendant in this respect.

Specifically, defendant claims that Grand Juror No. 2 should have been excused based on his/her friendship with a deputy sheriff from the Putnam County Sherriff's Office who would be testifying during the proceeding. Also, defendant contends that the indictment is rendered invalid and ought to be dismissed because Grand Juror No. 14 had a "personal and business relationship" with one of the prosecutors who presented part of the case during the proceedings.

Defendant's challenges regarding Grand Jurors No. 2, 14, 18, and 22 are equally without merit. Generally, "potential prejudice may result from a close relationship between a grand juror and a witness" (People v Wilkinson, 166 AD3d 1396, 1397 [3d Dept], lv denied 32 NY3d 1179 [2019]). "Unlike the statutory provisions that apply to petit jurors (see CPL 270.20 [1] [c]) . . ., the provisions governing a grand jury do not provide for a challenge to a grand juror based on his or her relationship to a witness" (People v Revette, 48 AD3d 886, 887 [3d Dept 2008]; see CPL 190.20 [2] [b]; Judiciary Law § 510). "Moreover, remote familial relationships or speculative assertions of possible bias are insufficient to require dismissal of an indictment. Nevertheless, a close relationship between a grand juror and a witness raises the real risk of potential prejudice. Armed with knowledge of such a relationship, the prosecutor, who wields substantial control over the grand jury and has a duty of fair dealing should ensure fairness and, if there is any doubt with regard thereto, bring the potential bias to the attention of the court or otherwise excuse the grand juror. The likelihood of prejudice turns on the particular facts of each case and a defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice" (People v Revette, 48 AD3d at 887 [internal brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted]; see CPL 190.20 [2] [b] [a grand juror should not serve if "incapable of performing his (or her) duties because of bias or prejudice"]).

Here, the minutes of the grand jury presentation reflect three instances where a grand juror acknowledged that he/she knew a witness (specifically Grand Juror Nos. 2, 18, and 22), and one instance where Grand Juror No. 14 disclosed that he/she knew one of the prosecutors. As defendant concedes in his papers and the minutes so reflect, the prosecutor directed Grand Juror Nos. 14, 18 and 22 to abstain from deliberating or voting and not to meaningfully participate in the proceeding. The minutes demonstrate as follows based on a question from Grand Juror No. 14:

"Grand Juror No. 14: I'm dismissed from voting, so what is my role[?]

Ms. Smith: You can, if you need to take a break. You can leave and not participate in deliberating.

Grand Juror No. 14: I can still be in the room but I can't say anything[?]

Ms. Smith: That is grand jurors number 14, 22, and 18. Those three Grand Jurors we spoke to last week. They do not participate in the deliberation or in the vote for these charges. Thank you for reminding me."

The People thus maintain that Grand Juror Nos. 14, 18, and 22 were excused and instructed not to deliberate or vote. In doing so, the People rely on the attendance and voting sheets which evince that a total of 22 grand jurors were present on January 23, 2026, but that only 19 out of the 22 members participated in the voting. That leads the Court to naturally deduce that Grand Juror Nos. 14, 18, and 22 abstained from voting on the charges. Even more, the minutes from January 23, 2026 reflect that before the grand jury retired to deliberate, Grand Juror Nos. 14, 18, and 22 did not ask any questions about the evidence or about the legal charges and instructions from the prosecutor. Furthermore, as stated below, Grand Juror No. 2 was absent on that day. The foregoing, together with the attendance and voting sheets, "are sufficient to overcome defendant's speculative claim of bias" (People v Perkins, 166 AD3d 1285, 1286 [3d Dept 2018], lvs denied 33 NY3d 980 [2019], 38 NY3d 1035 [2022]).

Secondly, the prosecution's attendance sheet reflects that Grand Juror No. 2 was absent on the particular day (being January 23, 2026), when the grand jury voted a true bill on the indictment. In light of Grand Juror No. 2's absence, it means he/she did not participate in the grand jury deliberations, nor did he/she cast a vote on the indictment.

Notwithstanding, defendant's challenge as to Grand Juror No. 2's arguable bias must fail. The record reflects that on January 16, 2026 — when Grand Juror No. 2 was present — the prosecutor inquired whether there was anything about his/her knowledge about the deputy sheriff who was a witness, which could lead Grand Juror No. 2 to believe that he/she could not be fair and impartial. Grand Juror No. 2 unequivocally answered in the negative. The prosector queried Grand Juror No. 2 as to the precise nature and approximate duration of his/her relationship with the deputy sheriff. A portion of the colloquy between the prosector and Grand Juror No. 2 reflects the following:

"Ms. Smith: Based on that past closeness, and based on your past relationship, now less frequent you're seeing each other, you would not put more credibility on [the witness] then you would on anybody else[?]

Grand Juror No. 2: No.

Ms. Smith: You can be fair and impartial[?]

Grand Juror No. 2: Yes."

In light of the foregoing colloquy, the Court is satisfied that the impartiality of Grand Juror No. 2 was not compromised based upon his/her unequivocal response that he/she can remain fair and impartial. The record sufficiently demonstrates that the prosecutor sufficiently inquired with Grand Juror No. 2 as to whether he/she could be fair and impartial, and he/she answered unequivocally that he or she could do so (see People v Demas, 242 AD3d 1434, 1436-1437 [3d Dept 2025]; People v Malloy, 166 AD3d 1302, 1303-1304 [3d Dept 2018], affd 3 NY3d 1078 [2019]; People v Simpson, 231 AD3d 1525, 1527 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 947 [2025]). The Court finds no articulable likelihood of, or potential for, prejudice stemming from Grand Juror No. 2's prior knowledge of the witnesses in question and his absence and non-participation when the vote was cast renders defendant's argument moot. All things considered, the grand jury evaluated the evidence by judging defendant's case fairly and impartially. In view of the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the exceptional remedy of dismissal is not warranted here (see People v Demas, 242 AD3d at 1436-1437; People v Malloy, 166 AD3d at 1304; People v Perkins, 166 AD3d at 1286; compare People v Revette, 48 AD3d at 888).

c. Integrity of the Grand Jury Proceeding

The Court further holds that there was no serious irregularity that impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding, so as to create the possibility of prejudice to defendant (see People v Lashua, 264 AD2d 951, 951-952 [3d Dept 1999]). In dispensing with the particular claims raised in his motion, defendant makes no meritorious argument that the grand jury proceeding was defective or that the integrity of the proceeding was somehow impaired.

To the extent that defendant asserts any purported claims of error in the prosecutors' presentation of the case to the grand jury, this Court's review of the minutes reveals no errors or conduct on the part of the prosecutors that impaired or infected the integrity of the proceeding, or that otherwise prejudiced him (see People v Huston, 88 NY2d at 409; People v Nelson, 156 AD3d 1112, 1116 n 1 [3d Dept 2017], lvs denied 31 NY3d 1145, 1151, 1152 [2018]). "There is no legal requirement that the prosecutor deliver any particular charge to the Grand Jury" (see People v McLaurin, 196 AD2d 511, 511 [2d Dept 1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 757 [1993]). In this regard, CPL 190.30 (7) states that "[w]herever it is provided in article [60] that a court presiding at a jury trial must instruct the jury with respect to the significance, legal effect[,] or evaluation of evidence, the district attorney, in an equivalent situation in a grand jury proceeding, may so instruct the grand jury" (emphasis added]). Here, the prosecution instructed the grand jury on the law, providing legal definitions about each of the charges, and other specific instructions related thereto. Afterwards, the grand jury secretly deliberated and voted a true bill with a quorum present. "A grand jury 'need not be instructed with the same degree of precision that is required when a petit jury is instructed on the law' " (People v Ruvalcaba, 187 AD3d 1553, 1554 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 1053 [2021] [internal brackets omitted], quoting People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d at 394-395). Also, the Court notes that the prosecutor's instructions to the grand jury comported with the charged offenses, since the prosecutor read the statutory text contained in the applicable statute(s) — which the grand jury apparently construed based on the text's most natural and obvious meaning. In addition, the prosecutor read certain definitions and instructions to the grand jury to help them better understand the process.

Furthermore, the prosecutor advised the grand jury about burdens of proof and the primary function of that body. The Court finds that the legal instructions provided by the prosecutor to the grand jury adequately enabled it to make an informed and intelligent decision as to whether an indictment was authorized under circumstances of this case (see People v Hart, 25 AD3d 815, 816 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 834 [2006]). The grand jury was entitled to credit or reject all or some of the evidence presented as it determined. The evidence before the grand jury is legally sufficient to support the subject indictment. Thus, that branch of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, or reduce the charged counts therein, is denied in its entirety (see CPL 190.65 [1]; People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 115 [1986]).

III. Defendant's Motion to Suppress his Alleged Oral Statement(s) to The Police and Application for a Huntley/Dunaway Hearing

Next, defendant moves to suppress any of his noticed statements to police, which were recorded or could be used against him at trial. He claims that his oral statement(s) to police were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution. Defendant further claims that his alleged oral statements were involuntarily made. In addition, defendant contends that police had no probable cause to arrest him and therefore his arrest was unconstitutional.

Defendant, alternatively, requests a Huntley hearing in connection with his oral statements to police. In response to this branch of defendant's motion to suppress his statement(s) to police, the People state that they "deny all factual allegations contained within the defendant's motion," and that they "consent to a hearing on such matters."

A CPL 730.10 "notice must be served within [15] days after arraignment" (CPL 710.30 [2]). "[T]he purpose of CPL 710.30 is to inform a defendant that the People intend to offer evidence of a statement to a public officer at trial so that a timely motion to suppress the evidence may be made" (People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 291-292 [1995]). "The CPL 710.30 notice requirements serve to 'facilitate a defendant's opportunity to challenge before trial the voluntariness of statements made by a defendant,' and, in furtherance of that end, the People are required to serve notice of their intent to offer such evidence within 15 days of arraignment and before trial' " (People v McCray, 53 Misc 3d 19, 23 [App Term, 2d Dept, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1125 [2016] [internal brackets omitted], quoting People v Lopez, 84 NY2d 425, 428 [1994]). "The 15-day rule may be waived for good cause shown,' and the notice requirement is excused if the defendant has, in fact, moved for suppression" (People v McCray, 53 Misc 3d at 23 [internal brackets omitted], quoting CPL 710.30 [2]; see CPL 710.30 [3]).

Here, the record presently reflects that the People have not formally, nor officially, filed the original CPL 710.30 notice with the Court. With that said, the defense has received a copy of that notice. At arraignment, the People served a copy of the CPL 710.30 notice upon defense counsel, who acknowledged receipt thereof in open court. However, the People neglected to file the original notice with this Court as part of the official record of this case. Though not error, the People are directed to file the original notice, for purposes of the record and case file, with all convenient speed and no later than five (5) calendar days.

In the absence of the People's CPL 710.30 notice identifying the alleged statement(s) that they intend to use against defendant at trial (compare e.g. People v Martinez, 87 Misc 3d 1231[A], *17-18 [Co Ct, Putnam County 2025]; People v Washington, 2025 NY Slip Op 25265, *10-14 [Co Ct, Putnam County 2025]), the Court cannot make any legal determinations as to this branch of defendant's motion to suppress his oral statements. The Court thus declines to reach those legal issues and expresses no view at this time on the merits of this branch of defendant's motion. Notwithstanding, the Court grants so much of defendant's motion requesting a Huntley hearing.

The general purpose of a Huntley hearing is for the court to review evidence in determining whether statements made by defendant to law enforcement are admissible at trial (see People v Huntley 15 NY2d 72, 78 [1965]). A Huntley hearing is mandatory even if the statement is used solely for impeachment purposes (see People v Clemons, 166 AD2d 363, 365 [1st Dept 1990]; cf. People v Maerling, 64 NY2d 134, 142 [1984]); see also People v Ashley, 15 Misc 3d 80, 82 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 863 [2007] ["while oral statements which have been suppressed pursuant to CPL 710.30 may not be used as evidence-in-chief, they may be used for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of a defendant during cross-examination and on rebuttal"]).

"[A] motion to suppress a statement as involuntary need not be supported by sworn allegations of fact" (People v Riley, 303 AD2d 1045, 1045 [4th Dept 2003], lv denied 3 NY3d 741 [2004] [internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citation omitted]; see CPL 710.60 [1], [3]; see also CPL 60.45 [2] [b] [ii]). As explained above, this Court may — but is not required to — summarily deny that branch of defendant's motion seeking to suppress all statements made to police (see CPL 710.30 [3]; see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 429-430). While defendant's motion papers do not specifically refer to any particular oral statement(s) which he allegedly made to law enforcement or indicate what statement, if any, were involuntarily obtained by police, the more prudent course here would be to grant a Huntley hearing for a definitive ruling to explore those issues (see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 430; cf. People v Wright, 256 AD2d 643, 645-646 [3d Dept 1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 880 [1999]).

Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion here to conduct a Huntley hearing since the People served the requisite notice to defense counsel at arraignment. Defendant's motion to suppress oral statements alleged to have been made by him is granted solely to the extent that a hearing on the motion will take place prior to trial (see CPL 710.60 [4]). To the extent that defendant also seeks suppression of any of his statements pursuant to Dunaway,² the Huntley hearing shall be inclusive of all suppression issues relative to any such statement(s) (see People v Williams, 192 AD3d 1461, 1461-1462 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 961 [2021]; see generally People v Harris, 97 AD3d 1111, 1112 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1026 [2012]). In sum, a combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing shall be held prior to trial.

IV. Defendant's Motion for a Sandoval Hearing & Molineux Material

Next, defendant moves for a Sandoval hearing as to any claimed or alleged vicious, criminal, or immoral acts, conduct, offenses, or convictions attributable to him insofar that such could be used to impeach his credibility if he elects to testify at trial (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 375 [1974]. He also requests a Molineux hearing as to any prior conviction or uncharged crime(s) which could be used adversely against him (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293 [1901]; People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350, 359-360 [1981]). This branch of defendant's motion is granted based on the People's consent. The Court shall conduct a joint Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia hearing before the commencement of trial in order to balance the probative value and prejudicial nature of any such proof (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 375; People v Lee, 129 AD3d 1295, 1297-1298 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1001 [2016]). In the event the People wish to make a Molineux/Ventimiglia application regarding defendant's prior bad acts, it must be filed no later than 30 days before the trial date (cf. CPL 245.10 [b]; 245.20 [3]).

Within thirty (30) days from the date of this decision and order, the People shall notify and provide to defendant, in compliance with CPL article 245, a copy of defendant's summary case history in the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), and any other documents showing additional criminal convictions, if such has yet to be turned over. Additionally, the People shall notify defense counsel of all specific instances of defendant's alleged prior uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct of which the People have knowledge and intend to use at trial for purposes of impeaching defendant's credibility. Such notification shall be made in full compliance with CPL article 245.

V. Discovery Requirements

The discovery requirements set forth in CPL article 245 must be complied with in full. Generally, where the evidence is not in the exclusive control of the prosecution and may be readily accessible to the defendant, then the People do not have a duty to produce same to the defendant (see generally Giles v Maryland, 386 US 66, 80 [1967]). The People have a continuing obligation to disclose and provide defendant with any material evidence already in their possession which is favorable to him, and if withheld, would deprive him of a fair trial — as is constitutionally mandated by Brady v Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]), its progeny, and CPL article 245.

Crucially, even a delay of providing discovery does not mean that defendant will never have access to the subject disclosure in preparing for trial, insomuch as he is still entitled to receive Rosario, Brady, and Giglio material; and, if need be, have a meaningful opportunity to use any exculpatory evidence (see People v Griggs, 180 AD3d 853, 855 [2d Dept 2020]; People v Hines, 132 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1109 [2016]). The People are directed to furnish same to the defense as soon as possible. To whatever extent material that is discoverable pursuant to CPL article 245 has not already been provided by the People, such discovery, including both Brady and Rosario material, shall be provided to defendant forthwith (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US at 88; People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286, 289-291 [1961]). In regard to any potential impeachment information to attack the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, including law enforcement members, the People are obligated to promptly provide any such Brady and Rosario material to defendant. Here, the record reflects that the People have yet to file their certificate of compliance in connection with this case. They are so advised to do so at the earliest possible juncture. If necessary, defendant must also meet his disclosure obligations under CPL 245.20 (4) and 245.50 (2). The People are entitled to reciprocal discovery. Defendant is not exempt from providing the requisite disclosure to the prosecution. Like the People, defendant, too, has a continuing duty to disclose and file certificates of compliance as may be necessary (see CPL 245.60).

If a party has a particularized reason to believe that there remains any outstanding discovery which they have yet to receive, counsel for defendant shall promptly contact the prosecutor handling this case and exercise good faith in addressing any discovery issues. If there are unresolved discovery issues, defense counsel shall contact the court to request a conference to address any outstanding discovery issues. Should a party have sufficient reason to believe, in good faith, that they have not received particular discovery to which they are entitled, they are so advised that they can later move for an order for applicable relief under CPL 245.80 (see generally CPL 245.35 ["Court ordered procedures to facilitate compliance"]).

As for the presentation of expert witnesses and disclosures related to expert opinion evidence, counsel are reminded, and defendant is so advised, that expert disclosure is automatic and must be made in compliance with CPL 245.20.

VI. Defendant's Application Seeking Leave to File Additional Motions

Lastly, the defendant requests leave to file additional motions in the future, should newly discovered facts or information come to light. The People apparently do not oppose this request. The Court grants, in part, this branch of defendant's motion for leave to file additional motions as may be absolutely necessary. Any future discovery and disclosures coming from the People could lead to further motion practice.

CPL 255.20 (3) specifically sets forth the circumstances under which motions may be renewed or filed notwithstanding provisions of time or inclusion in the initial omnibus motion. Indeed, this Court could exercise its discretion to "entertain and dispose of the motion on the merits . . . in the interest of justice[ ] and for good cause" (CPL 255.20 [3]; see People v Hughes, 22 NY3d 44, 49 [2013]; People v Davydov, 144 AD3d 1170, 1172 [2d Dept 2016]; People v Huang, 248 AD2d 73, 76 [1st Dept 1998]). Notwithstanding, while defendant wishes to reserve his right to file another motion in the future, he is cautioned that such a prospective motion must not be based upon grounds that he could have easily raised here — which may well result in summary denial. Further, any such motion shall be promptly filed by defendant as soon as practicable without undue delay.

VII. The Trial

Finally, defendant requests that any pretrial hearings in this matter be held sufficiently in advance of trial in order to allow ample time for transcription of the pretrial hearing minutes (see People v Sanders, 31 NY2d 463, 467 [1973] [defendant "shall . . . make his request for a transcript of the minutes of any pretrial hearing prior to its conclusion"]; see also People v Coleman, 81 NY2d 826, 927 [1993]). The People do not address this application to any extent in their responsive papers. Accordingly, the foregoing branch of defendant's motion is granted without opposition.

The trial shall commence with jury selection on a date to be selected by the Court. It will continue day to day until completed. Counsel must be adequately prepared for the trial prior to its commencement. Pursuant to the provisions of 22 NYCRR 125.1 (g), the trial date will not be adjourned (see People v Colasanto, 70 Misc 3d 133[A], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2020]). Counsel and defendant are further advised that this case may be subject to advancement if the Court's trial calendar permits.

To the extent not specifically mentioned herein, the parties' remaining contentions have been examined and are without merit. Any other relief being requested that is not squarely addressed herein is either rendered academic or denied based on this decision. Accordingly, it is hereby:

Ordered that the omnibus motion of defendant SANTOS P. VASQUEZ-RAMIREZ (Mot. Seq. No. 1), is granted in part and denied in part, as is more fully set forth herein; and it is further

Ordered that the People are directed to file the original CPL 710.30 notice with the Court within five (5) calendar days; and is further

Ordered that in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Law, the People shall file a valid certificate of compliance in this case as soon as practicable without undue delay; and it is further

Ordered that this Court shall conduct a Huntley/Dunaway hearing before commencement of trial; and it is further

Ordered that if the People endeavor to make a Molineux/Ventimiglia application, the People shall file an appropriate written application in this regard no later than thirty (30) days before the trial date; and the Court shall conduct a combined Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia hearing prior to the commencement of trial; and it is further

Ordered that the defendant and the attorneys are directed to personally appear on Wednesday, June 17, 2026, at 9:30 a.m., for a conference and further proceedings thereon.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of this Court.

Dated: June 9, 2026

Carmel, New York

E N T E R:

Hon. Anthony R. Molé

Judge of the County Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court declines to assume the role of an advocate by raising arguments on behalf of a party (see generally People v Martinez, 2026 NY Slip Op 50773[U], *4 [Co Ct, Putnam County 2026]).

2.   A Dunaway hearing is held to determine if statements attributed to defendant were the byproduct of an impermissible arrest (see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]).

Anthony R. Molé, J.