The People of the State of New York, v. Marcos A. Martinez, Defendant. (2025)

The following papers were read and considered on the omnibus motion (Mot. Seq. No. 1) made by defendant MARCOS A. MARTINEZ (hereinafter defendant):

Papers:

1. Notice of Omnibus Motion; Counsel's Affirmation in Support; Memorandum of Law in Support,¹ Exhibits A-C

2. People's Affirmation in Response, Exhibits 1-6; Affidavit of Hon. Jessica Segal, J.C.C., Exhibit 1; Affidavit of Investigator Kevin Radovich, Exhibit 1  ²

3. Transcripts of the Grand Jury Minutes from January 10 and 17, 2025

Upon review of the foregoing papers, the Court finds, holds, and determines as follows:

On January 21, 2025, defendant — a retired detective with the City of Peekskill Police Department — was charged in a 10-count indictment with aggravated vehicular homicide (count one), vehicular manslaughter in the first degree (count two), manslaughter in the second degree (count three), vehicular manslaughter in the second degree (counts four and five), criminally negligent homicide (count six), aggravated driving while intoxicated (count seven), driving while intoxicated per se in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) (count eight), common-law driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) (count nine), and reckless driving (count ten).

The charges in this case arise from a fatal motor vehicle collision during the evening hours of November 11, 2023. The accident occurred when defendant, while allegedly intoxicated under the influence of alcohol and claiming to have fallen asleep behind the wheel, drove on Route 9 in the Town of Philipstown, crossed over a double-yellow line, collided head-on with an oncoming vehicle in the opposite lane, and killed one person.³ The victim was pronounced dead at the scene.

Defendant was arraigned on January 29, 2025, when he entered a not guilty plea. On July 31, 2025, he filed his omnibus motion requesting various associated relief.⁴ The People filed their response papers on September 5, 2025. Defendant's omnibus motion is thus fully submitted and ripe for determination. The Court will address each branch of his motion in turn and dispose of it as follows:

I. Defendant's Motion for Inspection & Release of the Grand Jury Minutes

Initially, defendant moves for inspecting the grand jury minutes. The People consent to have the Court review the grand jury minutes, in camera, for legal sufficiency purposes. Accordingly, this branch of defendant's motion is granted without opposition. The Court has inspected the minutes of the grand jury proceeding relative to this case (see CPL 210.30 [3]; CPL 245.20; see also People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d 389, 394-395 [1980]; People v Monserrate, 24 Misc 3d 1229[A], *1 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2009]).

Defense counsel also requests a full release and disclosure of the grand jury minutes to assess the sufficiency of the prosecutor's legal instructions to the grand jury and raise potential challenges as to defectiveness and the integrity of the grand jury proceedings. The People oppose release of the full grand jury minutes to defendant in each of those respects.

CPL 210.30 (3) provides, in pertinent part, that upon granting a motion to inspect the grand jury minutes, the Court "must then proceed to examine the minutes and to determine the motion to dismiss or reduce the indictment" (emphasis added). "If the court, after examining the minutes, finds that release of the minutes, or certain portions thereof, to the parties is necessary to assist the court in making its determination on the motion, it may release the minutes, or such portions thereof, to the parties. Provided, however, such release shall be limited to that grand jury testimony which is relevant to a determination of whether the evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient to support a charge or charges contained in such indictment" (id. [emphasis added]).

Here, the Court concludes that defense counsel has not demonstrated a compelling need for a complete release of the full minutes of the grand jury proceeding. The defense has already received a substantial portion of the relevant minutes through discovery. The Court is able to determine the motion through its own examination, including minutes of the testimonies of seven individuals (see CPL 210.30 [3]; People v Monserrate, 24 Misc 3d 1229[A] at *1).

Based on its independent inspection, the Court finds that a complete release of the grand jury minutes to defense counsel is unnecessary here. Hence, this branch of defendant's motion is denied (see CPL 210.30 [3]; People v Gonzalez, 228 Misc 3d 941, 945 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2010]; compare People v Carrington, 18 Misc 3d 1147[A], *1 [Co Ct, Westchester County 2008]).

II. The Grand Jury Proceeding

Next, defendant requests the Court to inspect the grand jury minutes for purposes of determining, inter alia, legal sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant claims that the indictment must be dismissed, or alternatively reduced, on the ground of legal insufficiency. Specifically, defendant presses that the charges of aggravated vehicular homicide, reckless driving, and manslaughter in the second degree must be dismissed due to legally insufficient evidence presented to the grand jury on those counts. Defendant also asks the Court to determine the integrity and potential defectiveness of the proceeding.

The People counter that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient in all respects to support charging defendant with the underlying offenses. The People maintain that the proceeding itself was not defective, the integrity of the proceeding is legally sound, and that it was not impaired by hearsay evidence or other perceived minor flaws and errors.

For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with the People in sustaining the indictment. Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment is denied in its entirety.

a. Legal Standard in Grand Jury Proceedings

It is well settled that on a motion to dismiss an indictment based on the alleged legal insufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury, the Court must determine whether there is "competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (CPL 70.10 [1]; see People v Jensen, 86 NY2d 248, 251-252 [1995]). "Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted — and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence — would warrant conviction" (People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; accord People v Wisey, 133 AD3d 799, 799-800 [2d Dept 2015]).

"In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference" (People v Wisey, 133 AD3d at 800 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976, 979 [1987]). "Inquiry into the adequacy of the proof to establish reasonable cause — the 'degree of certitude' the evidence provides — is exclusively the province of the Grand Jury" (People v Swamp, 84 NY2d 725, 730 [1995]; see CPL 190.65 [1] [b]).

Importantly, "[i]t is sufficient if the [prosecutor] provides the Grand Jury with enough information to enable it intelligently to decide whether a crime has been committed and to determine whether there exists legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of the crime. The People have wide discretion in presenting evidence to establish their case and do not have the obligation to present to the Grand Jury every piece of evidence which they possess against a suspect, nor must every matter which may have a tendency to reflect upon the credibility of a witness be revealed. The Grand Jury proceeding is not intended to be adversarial in nature or a minitrial of the individual suspected of committing a crime" (People v Shahzad, 71 AD3d 704, 705-706 [2d Dept 2010] [internal quotations marks and citations omitted] [emphasis added]; see People v Colucci, 32 AD3d 1044, 1045 [2d Dept 2006]; People v Suarez, 122 AD2d 861, 862 [2d Dept 1986], lv denied 68 NY2d 817 [1986]).

Moreover, the Court of Appeals has expressed that CPL 210.35 (5) establishes a "high test" to qualify for the "exceptional remedy" of dismissing an indictment: "[t]he statutory test is very precise and very high" (see People v Darby, 75 NY2d 449, 455 [1990]). "[M]ere flaw, error[,] or skewing" is not enough (id.). In other words, defendant bears a heavy burden in endeavoring to dismiss a grand jury's indictment.

"Generally, hearsay evidence is inadmissible before the Grand Jury" (People v Dunn, 248 AD2d 87, 94 [1st Dept 1998], appeal withdrawn 93 NY2d 1002 [1999]; see People v Huston, 88 NY2d at 406-407). However, "hearsay evidence may be admitted before the Grand Jury so long as the resulting indictment[ ] [is] not founded on hearsay which the Grand Jury 'may not have understood as such' " (People v Perry, 199 AD2d 889, 893 [3d Dept 1993], quoting People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97, 106 [1984]). Errors in admission of hearsay evidence must be of a significant magnitude to impair the integrity of grand jury proceedings (see People v Carey, 241 AD2d 748, 750-751 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 1010 [1997]). Even "isolated instances of hearsay testimony, which were accompanied by appropriate limiting instructions, do not warrant dismissal" of the indictment (People v Miller, 110 AD3d at 1150-1151) — so long as there is otherwise legally sufficient and admissible evidence to sustain the counts of the indictment.

1. Aggravated Vehicular Homicide & Reckless Driving

Defendant argues that the charge of aggravated vehicular homicide is legally insufficient inasmuch as the grand jury evidence is devoid of proof that he engaged in reckless driving. He contends that the evidence fails to establish any inculpatory driving behavior on his part other than him falling asleep behind the wheel and the only traffic violation he is alleged to have committed is failing to maintain his lane by crossing over the double-yellow line; thus, he could arguably, at most, only be found to have committed a traffic infraction and could not legally be found to have committed reckless driving. According to defendant, the counts charging him with aggravated vehicular homicide and reckless driving must both be dismissed because the "the element of reckless driving [was] not . . . established" by the evidence presented to the grand jury (see Penal Law § 125.14 [1]; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212).

The People, in opposition, disagree with defendant's claim in this regard. They advance that the grand jury relied not only on evidence that he committed a traffic infraction by crossing over the double-yellow line, which constitute as a traffic control device as "markings," when he failed to maintain his vehicle on the right half of the roadway (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 153; see id. §§ 1110 [a]; 1120 [a]; 1126 [a]); but also relied on evidence of defendant's intoxicated condition to support this count. The People further respond that defendant's reliance on People v Goldblatt (98 AD3d 817 [3d Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 932), is misplaced insomuch as that case stands for the proposition that while intoxication alone does not establish reckless driving, evidence of a person's intoxicated condition and how it may have affected the person's ability to operate a motor vehicle in allegedly committing other traffic infractions may be relevant to establish that such person recklessly drove a motor vehicle (see id. at 822). The Court agrees with the People's view.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, viewing the grand jury evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court holds that it was legally sufficient to establish that defendant operated a motor vehicle in a reckless manner while impaired by alcohol when he struck and fatally killed the victim, so as to sustain the counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and reckless driving (cf. People v Murphy, 218 AD3d 795 [2d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 1013 [2023]; People v Sharpe, 185 AD3d 965, 967 [2d Dept 2020], lv denied 931 [2020]).

Relevant here, a person commits the crime of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of Penal Law § 125.14 (1) if he or she causes the death of at least one person while recklessly driving a vehicle and having a blood alcohol content of .18% or higher. Specifically, that statute states that "[a] person is guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide when he or she engages in reckless driving as defined by [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212], and commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree as defined in [Penal Law § 125.12], and . . . commits such crimes while operating a motor vehicle while such person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in such person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine[,] or saliva made pursuant to the provisions of [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194]" (Penal Law § 125.14 [1]; see People v Aguilera, 78 Misc 3d 1216[A], *2 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2023]).

Also relevant here, a person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when he or she operates a motor vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), (3) or (4-a), thereby causing the death of another person "as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such motor vehicle" (Penal Law § 125.12 [1]; see People v O'Brien, 186 AD3d 1406, 1408 [2d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 930 [2020]; People v Hoffman, 130 AD3d 1152, 1154 [3d Dept 2015]).

"A person is guilty of reckless driving when a person operates a motor vehicle 'or any appliance or accessory thereof in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway' " (People v Cardona, 207 AD3d 737, 739 [2d Dept 2022], quoting Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212; see People v Frisbie, 114 AD2d 587, 588 [3d Dept 1985]). "More than mere negligence is required, and the term has been held to mean the running or operation of an automobile under such circumstances as to show a reckless disregard of the consequences" (People v Earley, 121 AD3d 1192, 1193 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1200 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "Determining whether conduct rises to the level of unreasonable interference or endangerment such that it constitutes the requisite recklessness involves the presence of additional aggravating acts or circumstances beyond a single violation of a rule of the road" (id. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).)

In this context, a defendant acts recklessly if he or she "is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that death will occur (Penal Law § 15.05 [3]; see People v Gaworecki, 37 NY3d 225, 230 [2021]). "The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto" (Penal Law § 15.05 [3] [emphasis added]). Hence, the defendant must "engage in some blameworthy conduct contributing to that risk" (People v Asaro, 21 NY3d 677, 684, [2013]; see People v Li, 34 NY3d 357, 364 [2019]; People v Boutin, 75 NY2d 692, 696 [1990]). "Thus, pursuant to that statute, a person who fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk by reason of their intoxication acts recklessly rather than with criminal negligence" (People v Smith, 224 AD3d 1278 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1054 [2024] [internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted]).

Applying the governing legal statutes here, the Court finds that there is legally sufficient evidence from which the grand jury could conclude that defendant committed reckless driving and aggravated vehicular homicide. Peter Maczkiewicz, an investigator with the New York State Police in the collision and reconstruction unit, gave expert testimony before the grand jury that he investigated the crash scene of the underlying motor vehicle accident in this case. He described the roadway on Route 9 in the Town of Philipstown where the accident occurred as a two-lane roadway, consisting of northbound and southbound lanes that are separated by a double-yellow line. Maczkiewicz testified that he, along with his partner Investigator Roy Keibit, used certain technology, which was explained to the grand jury, to reconstruct the crash at and around the scene of the accident. Among other things, Maczkiewicz detailed the methodology used to reconstruct the subject crash. He also described the procedures and protocols about the accuracies of the measurements they used to assess how the crash between defendant and the victim's vehicles occurred. Maczkiewicz further testified that they created a "scale diagram of the entire collision scene" using the collected data and measurements in the reconstruction software. Evidence was adduced to the grand jury including a diagram depicting the crash scene and a Google map aerial image depicting the location of the area of impact, as determined by Maczkiewicz's crash analysis.

Critically, Maczkiewicz testified that based on his professional training and experience as an accident and reconstruction investigator with the State Police, he opined that defendant's vehicle "was travelling northbound and crossed over the double[-]yellow line" and struck the victim's vehicle on the night in question. Maczkiewicz reiterated his conclusion to the grand jury that immediately before the collision, defendant's vehicle "left [the] lane of travel" and "at was some point in the southbound lane at the area of impact." Also, Maczkiewicz explained that the collision between the vehicles caused "gouges" in the pavement, thus showing that the point of impact between their vehicles was in the southbound lane which was the victim's lane of travel — thus indicating that defendant's vehicle was out of his proper lane of travel and had crossed over the double-yellow line. Maczkiewicz added that there was no evidence of braking in the proper lane of travel for defendant's vehicle because "there were no pre-impact tire marks."

Although Maczkiewicz was unable to determine the exact speeds of each vehicle at the moment of impact, Maczkiewicz stated that based on his experience in investigating motor vehicle collisions, "the damage was consistent with [their] vehicles traveling at a near highway speed." Maczkiewicz thus approximated that the vehicles were both travelling about 50 miles per hour (mph), with a "closing speed" of 100 mph between the two.

Upon examining the minutes, the grand jury was presented with evidence that defendant caused a fatal accident by driving while intoxicated when he allegedly drove over a double-yellow line on a two-lane roadway, directly collided with another vehicle that was travelling in the opposite direction, and killed the driver of the other vehicle as a result. Among other proof, evidence was adduced that defendant's blood alcohol concentration level (BAC) was allegedly .18% several hours after the accident. In this regard, defendant made an incriminating statement to police that he was drinking at a concert which he attended earlier that day at CitiField in the County of Queens and he fell asleep while driving back home from the concert. Maczkiewicz, a trained accident reconstructionist with the State Police, provided testimony as to where the impact between defendant and the victim's vehicles occurred, his estimates of the vehicle's speed, and arrived at certain measurements using the data collected in the reconstruction software. Testimony before the grand jury established that defendant crossed over the double-yellow line.

Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, the Court finds that it is legally sufficient to support the charge that defendant engaged in reckless driving insomuch as he operated his vehicle "in a manner which unreasonably interfere[d] with the free and proper use of the public highway, or unreasonably endanger[ed] users of the public highway" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212; see People v McGrantham, 12 NY3d 892, 894 [2009]; cf. People v Castro, 202 AD3d 815, 817 [2d Dept 2022]). The evidence presented by the People that defendant fell asleep while operating his vehicle, crossed over a double-yellow line, and failed to apply his brakes or maneuver his vehicle in a timely manner in order to avoid the collision with the victim's vehicle, is sufficient to demonstrate that he "unreasonably endanger[ed] users of the public highway" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212). The Court, therefore, holds that the evidence is also legally sufficient to support defendant's indictment for reckless driving.

The grand jury, of course, was free to credit or reject any evidence in order to rationally reach its conclusion. The Court accordingly holds that the grand jury was justified in concluding that defendant had the requisite mens rea of recklessness to support the counts of aggravated vehicular homicide (count one) and reckless driving (count ten) (see People v Vazquez, 211 AD3d 1592, 1593-1594 [4th Dept 2022], lvs denied 40 NY3d, 937 [2023]).

2. Manslaughter in the Second Degree

Defendant next claims that the charge of manslaughter in the second degree (count three) must be dismissed based on his alleged "actions" on the night in question because his conduct was not reckless when viewed in its totality. On this claim, defendant argues that his mere act of falling asleep while driving and crossing over the double-yellow line, coupled with his alleged alcohol intoxication at the time of collision, is not enough to sustain that count. The Court disagrees with defendant's premise.

As charged here under the Penal Law, a person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when they "recklessly cause[ ] the death of another person" (Penal Law § 125.15 [1]). Insofar as relevant here, "[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance . . . when [the person] is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" (id. § 15.05 [3]).

Applying these legal principles to the case at hand, the Court finds that the evidence presented to the grand jury, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, is legally sufficient to charge defendant with manslaughter in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 125.15 (1) (see id. § 15.05 [3]). The grand jury could have perceived the combined evidence to mean that defendant's conduct constituted a reckless act — since as a retired police officer, he engaged in a reckless act by drinking alcohol on the day in question, together with the knowledge that he had a long commute back home and had to drive over 65 miles from Queens County to Dutchess County during a November night when the days are shorter with less daylight,⁵ with an awareness that he may be drowsy and could fall asleep possibly, and potentially result in a motor vehicle accident since defendant's BAC level was nearly twice the legal limit (see Penal Law §§ 15.05 [3]; 125.15 [1]).

Adequate evidence was placed before the grand jury of defendant's reckless conduct to sustain the count of manslaughter in the second degree. Although the road was dry and clear at the time and traffic was light, defendant was driving at night when it was dark and there is less visibility on the road. He proceeded to fall asleep while operating his motor vehicle and was wholly unaware of what his vehicle collided with, despite extensive front-end damage to his car. There were no tire skid marks at the crash scene, thereby indicating that defendant failed to apply his vehicle's brakes to avoid striking or colliding with the victim's vehicle. Moreover, defendant admitted that he had consumed alcohol that day and had a .18% BAC level, which was well over the .08% reading indicating intoxication. The grand jury could have easily inferred that defendant may have been so intoxicated causing him to lose consciousness while driving; and consequently, he failed to make an attempt to warn of his approach or to slow or stop his vehicle to avoid or lessen the collision. Viewed most favorably to the People, the Court finds legally sufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury to sustain the charge of manslaughter in the second degree (see People v Kenny, 175 AD2d 404, 406-407 [3d Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 1012 [1991]).

3. Criminally Negligent Homicide

Similarly, the grand jury evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the charge of criminally negligent homicide (count six). "A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person" (Penal Law § 125.10). Penal Law § 15.05 (4) states, as relevant here, that "[a] person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result . . . when he [or she] fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists." "The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" (id.).

"While a traffic violation does not, in and of itself, constitute an act of criminal negligence, such a violation may nevertheless provide a basis from which it can be concluded, in light of additional relevant factors, that the culpable mental state existed" (People v McGrantham, 56 AD3d 685, 687 [2d Dept 2008], affd 12 NY3d 892 [2009]). Based on all of the circumstances laid out before the grand jury, the Court finds that defendant's conduct does rise to the level of "morally blameworthiness" so as to justify a charge of criminally negligent homicide (see Penal Law § 15.05 [4]; People v Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370, 378 [2008]; compare People v Boutin, 75 NY2d 692, 696-698 [1990]).

Here, criminal negligence could alternatively be found under these facts in finding that, although unaware of the risk, defendant failed to perceive the substantial or unjustifiable risk, which was a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed (see Penal Law § 15.05 [4]). The grand jury evidence demonstrates that defendant failed to see the victim's vehicle to prevent the collision because his drowsiness was induced by his intoxication.

The grand jury record evidence is not scattershot. The Court must give deference to members of the grand jury, who saw and heard the evidence and unanimously voted on all of the charged counts after weighing the collective evidence. The grand jury's decision to find legally sufficient evidence to indict defendant of the charged offenses is rational based on the fatal accident, what transpired, and the individuals involved, including various members of law enforcement who testified before them during the proceeding. What's more, several of the grand jurors asked questions of the testifying witnesses for clarification with respect to their testimonial statements.

All in all, the foregoing evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the People, constitutes legally sufficient evidence to establish all of the charged offenses. Upon examining the grand jury minutes and the totality of the proceeding, the Court concludes that the evidence presented to the grand jury is legally sufficient to sustain the indictment (see CPL 70.10 [1]; People v Mills, 1 NY3d 269, 274-275 [2003]; People v Wisey, 133 AD3d at 799-801).⁶

b. Integrity of the Grand Jury Proceeding

The Court further holds that there was no serious irregularity that impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding, so as to create the possibility of prejudice to defendant (see People v Lashua, 264 AD2d 951, 951-952 [3d Dept 1999]). All in all, defendant makes no meritorious argument that the grand jury proceeding was defective or that the integrity of the proceeding was somehow impaired.

To the extent that defendant asserts any purported claims of error in the prosecutor's presentation of the case to the grand jury, this Court's review of the grand jury minutes reveals no errors or conduct on the part of the prosecutor that impaired or infected the integrity of the proceeding, or that otherwise prejudiced him (see People v Huston, 88 NY2d at 409; People v Nelson, 156 AD3d 1112, 1116 n 1 [3d Dept 2017], lvs denied 31 NY3d 1145, 1151, 1152 [2018]). "There is no legal requirement that the prosecutor deliver any particular charge to the Grand Jury" (see People v McLaurin, 196 AD2d 511, 511 [2d Dept 1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 757 [1993]). In this regard, CPL 190.30 (7) states that "[w]herever it is provided in article [60] that a court presiding at a jury trial must instruct the jury with respect to the significance, legal effect[,] or evaluation of evidence, the district attorney, in an equivalent situation in a grand jury proceeding, may so instruct the grand jury" (emphasis added]).

Here, the prosecutor, among other actions, instructed the grand jury on the law, and provided legal definitions about the charged offenses and other specific instructions related thereto. Afterwards, the grand jury secretly deliberated and voted a true bill which was submitted with a quorum present. "A grand jury 'need not be instructed with the same degree of precision that is required when a petit jury is instructed on the law' " (People v Ruvalcaba, 187 AD3d 1553, 1554 [4th Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 1053 [2021] [internal brackets omitted], quoting People v Calbud, Inc., 49 NY2d at 394-395).

Also, the Court notes that the prosecutor's instructions to the grand jury comported with the charged offenses, since the prosecutor read the statutory text contained in the applicable statutes — which the grand jury apparently construed based on the text's most natural and obvious meaning. In addition, the prosecutor read certain definitions and instructions to the grand jury to help them better understand the process.

Furthermore, the prosecutor advised the grand jury about the burdens of proof and the primary function of that body. The Court finds that the legal instructions provided by the prosecutor to the grand jury adequately enabled it to make an informed and intelligent decision as to whether an indictment was authorized under circumstances of this case (see People v Hart, 25 AD3d 815, 816 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 834 [2006]). The grand jury was entitled to credit or reject all or some of the evidence presented as it determined. The evidence before the grand jury is legally sufficient to support the subject indictment. Thus, that branch of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, or reduce the charged count, is denied in its entirety (see CPL 190.65 [1]; People v Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 115 [1986]).

III. Defendant's Demand for a Bill of Particulars

Next, defendant moves for the People to furnish a court-ordered bill of particulars to the defense to further amplify the indictment (see CPL 200.95 [5]). Defendant claims that such is necessary to "specifically apprise[ ] him of the charges pending against him," inasmuch as he believes that the indictment itself does not provide him with specific information "of any particular element of the crimes charged."

The People, in response, oppose this branch of defendant's motion claiming that they have furnished a substantial amount of discovery to the defense. They assert that the indictment, coupled with the various notices and disclosures that were turned over as a part of discovery, provide defendant with all of the relevant information concerning the nature of the criminal charges. By doing so, the People contend that they have adequately informed defendant of the nature of the charges filed against him; and thus, he has the necessary information to prepare a viable defense. The Court agrees with the People in this respect.

"A [criminal] bill of particulars serves to clarify the pleading; it is not a discovery device" (People v Davis, 41 NY2d 678, 679-680 [1977]; see People v Ramlall, 99 AD3d 815, 816 [2d Dept 2012]; People v Elliot, 299 AD2d 731, 732 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 594 [2003]). "[W]here an indictment adequately apprises a defendant of the charges against him or her with sufficient specificity as to enable the defendant to develop and mount a defense, no bill of particulars is required" (People v Perillo, 144 AD3d 1399, 1403 [3d Dept 2016], lvs denied 29 NY3d 948, 951 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted]; see CPL 200.95 [1] [a]).

Here, the Court denies that branch of defendant's motion requesting a court-ordered bill of particulars. Initially, the Court points out that there is nothing in the record reflecting that defense counsel made a specific written demand requesting a bill of particulars from the People prior to doing so in this motion. Unless defendant files a written demand and the People either refuse to comply or fail to do so in a timely manner, this Court lacks authority to entertain defendant's motion for a court-ordered bill of particulars (see CPL 200.95 [5]; People v Hayes, 85 Misc 3d 1275[A], *1 [Crim Ct, New York County 2025]). Moreover, defendant fails to articulate in his motion what specific information he is requesting from the prosecution; hence, the Court is unable to discern whether "the items of factual information requested are authorized to be included in a bill of particulars, and that such information is necessary to enable the defendant adequately to prepare or conduct his defense" (CPL 200.95 [5]).

Even assuming, hypothetically, that defendant did file a prior written demand from the People for a bill of particulars, defendant's motion in this regard would be denied on the merits. As explained, "[t]he purpose of the bill of particulars is to more specifically disclose the crimes charged in the indictment and to amplify or clarify certain things in the accusatory instrument" (People v Gonzalez-Mendoza, 82 Misc 3d 508, 511 [Co Ct, Putnam County 2023]; see generally People v Zurita, 64 AD3d 800, 801, [2d Dept 2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 840 [2009]). Here, the various notices and disclosures already provided to defendant as a part of discovery "specify[ ] . . . items of factual information which are not recited in the indictment and which pertain to the offense[s] charged," and they include the substance of defendant's conduct encompassed by the alleged criminal offenses. Such furnishing of discovery by the People also indicates that they intend to prove that defendant acted as the principal in connection with the underlying indictment (see CPL 200.95 [1] [a]; see generally People v Bronx Auto Venture Corp., 35 AD3d 276, 277 [1st Dept 2006], lvs denied 8 NY3d 878, 879 [2007]).⁷ For these reasons, defendant's motion for a court-ordered bill of particulars is denied.

IV. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence and Controvert the Search Warrant

The court next turns to that branch of defendant's motion requesting to suppress all physical evidence that was obtained by police in this case, including, but not limited to, any cellphones, vehicle, credit cards, and any other tangible or testimonial fruits of a search and seizure. He moves to suppress such physical evidence on the ground that it was illegally searched and seized in violation of his constitutional rights. Among other relief sought, defendant also moves to controvert the search warrant and seizure order by claiming that they were issued without probable cause. In the alternative, he requests various hearings to explore those matters.

In urging that his arguments are without merit and do not entitle him to a suppression hearing, the People maintain that defendant's conclusory claims are devoid of sworn factual allegations. The People stress that the search warrant was validly supported by probable cause, predicated on reliable facts and circumstances, and supported by sufficient information.

A. The Search Warrant

1. Search of Defendant's Vehicle and Cellphone

Defendant argues that the search warrant application at issue is predicated on "deliberately false and misleading information." He argues that the prosecutor's documentary evidence establishes that Investigator Radovich deceived the town judge who reviewed the search warrant application by "deliberately withholding material facts."

Specifically, defendant claims that the search warrant for his car and cellphone must be controverted inasmuch as Investigator Radovich, as the affiant, made a statement that was knowingly false or made in reckless disregard of the truth. He avers that Radovich knew at the time of making the search warrant that no one, including him, who interacted with defendant at the accident scene or after he was transported to the hospital observed him to be intoxicated, under the influence of alcohol, or smelled an alcoholic odor emanating from him. Defendant posits that because none of the trained professionals consisting of police officers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians (EMTs) smelled an alcoholic odor from his person, such lends to the conclusion that he "was not in fact intoxicated." Based on the foregoing, defendant urges that Investigator Radovich — despite having knowledge to the contrary — fabricated information about his alcohol intoxication by falsely stating in his search warrant affidavit that Joseph Landow, a deputy with the Putnam County Sheriff's Office, smelled an alcoholic odor from defendant's person at the scene of the accident because it generated probable cause to support and bolster the search warrant application.

Additionally, defendant avers that Investigator Radovich purposefully withheld the fact that defendant consented to undergo the police administered blood test ordered by Judge Segal — thus hampering Judge Segal's ability to evaluate whether defendant refused to take the blood test. According to defendant, Investigator Radovich made "misleading omissions of material facts" in relation to the affidavit in support of the search warrant application. Defendant thus claims that Radovich engaged in dishonest conduct and his "intentional deception infected all [of] the evidence used to support a probable cause finding" because he purposefully withheld information that defendant affirmatively consented to the blood test. In other words, defendant avers that Radovich lied about the smell of an alcoholic odor coming from defendant's person since he knew it would negate or cast doubt on the existence of probable cause, given his oral statements that were captured on the bodycam recorder of Shawn Iarussi, a deputy with the Putnam County Sheriff's Office.

So, defendant maintains that he has made the requisite showing warranting a Franks/Alfinito hearing when considering Radovich's own statements, Ianussi's bodycam video footage, and Landow's sworn testimony. Defendant thus suggests that the Court dispense with the Franks/Alfinito hearing and controvert the search warrant in view of Radovich's alleged deceitful conduct and his reckless disregard for the truth.

The People dispute defendant's allegations that Investigator Radovich fabricated any part of his affidavit in support of the search warrant application. As to the search warrant pertaining to defendant's motor vehicle (a 2010 Range Rover) and iPhone, the People assert that Radovich imparted reliable information from Deputy Landow in the factual recitation of his affidavit in support given: (i) the police observations that defendant smelled of alcohol, had watery eyes, and slurred speech on the day in question — all common signs indicating that defendant was under the influence of alcohol; (ii) defendant's admission that he had consumed alcohol on the day in question; and (iii) Deputy Landow's ultimate conclusion, based on his professional training and experience, that defendant was impaired based on the results of three standardized field sobriety tests that he had personally administered upon defendant. Also, the People take exception to the fact that defendant's assertions center entirely on what was captured on the police bodycams, nothing more — which, according to the People, generates creates flaws in defendant's suppositions attacking Radovich's veracity.

Further, the People assert that the police had specific information about defendant's vehicle and they made plain view observations inside of his vehicle where they saw alcohol bottles; thus, the People claim that the search warrant for defendant's vehicle was properly issued and the items recovered were lawfully seized by police. Finally, the People claim that defendant did not meet his burden for the need of a Franks/Alfinito hearing to challenge the veracity of the statements contained in the search warrant application (see Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154, 155-156 [1978]; People v Alfinito, 16 NY2d 181, 186 [1965]).

Applying the governing legal principles to this case, the Court denies defendant's request for a Franks/Alfinito hearing to challenge the veracity of the statements contained in Investigator Radovich's search warrant application. "[A] defendant is entitled to [an Alfinito] hearing in which he may challenge the truthfulness of the allegations in the affidavit supporting a search warrant only where he attacks the veracity of the police officer affiant and not where . . . the credibility of the source of information is challenged" (People v Slaughter, 37 NY2d 596, 600 [1975]; see People v Alfinito, 16 NY2d at 186).

Prior precedent instructs that in order to be entitled to a Franks/Alfinito hearing, the defendant must "make the necessary substantial preliminary showing that the warrant is based upon affidavits containing false statements made knowingly or intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth" (People v Tordella, 37 AD3d 500, 500 [2d Dept 2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 991 [2007]; see Franks v Delaware, 438 US at 155-156; People v Alfinito, 16 NY2d at 186; People v Nunziata, 10 AD3d 695, 695 [2d Dept 2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 759 [2004]). A defendant may fulfill this burden by submitting "a written sworn statement alleging falsehoods in the search warrant affidavit sufficient to raise any doubt as to the probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant" (People v Woolnough, 180 AD2d 837, 839 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 1056 [1992]). Stated differently, the defendant must show that the affiant knew or should have known of the falsity (see id.).

Contrary to his claim, the Court finds that defendant failed to make a "substantial preliminary showing" that the search warrant application supported by Investigator Radovich's affidavit contains false statements that were made knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth (see Franks v Delaware, 438 US at 155-156). A review of that search warrant application negates defendant's claim. His contention that Radovich made a false statement about his intoxicated condition is without merit.

Critically, Investigator Radovich states in his affidavit in support of the search warrant application that the facts stated therein are based upon his "personal observations and training . . . and, where noted, information [relayed] to [him] by other law enforcement officers." Radovich details in his affidavit in support that he was present at the scene of the accident and that he personally observed in "plain view," among other things, "a bottle of white rum[ ] and multiple beer bottles in the rear passenger area" of defendant's vehicle. Those items were secured by police. Moreover, Radovich also explains in the same affidavit that he was "informed" by Deputy Landow, who spoke to defendant at the scene, that while speaking with defendant at the scene, Landow "detected the odor of alcohol coming from [defendant] and that [defendant] exhibited "watery eyes[ ] and slurred speech"; that defendant "made admissions to drinking" to Landow; and that Landow administered three different standardized field sobriety tests upon defendant that led to his conclusion of defendant's "intoxication," thus resulting in Landow placing defendant under arrest. Further, Radovich states in his affidavit that the police had probable cause to search defendant's vehicle, and seize the items found therein such as his cellphone, based on the personal observations of him and other police officers who were at the scene of the accident, the oral "statements" made by defendant, and a video recording of defendant's vehicle on November 11, 2023, at 9:39 p.m., where defendant's vehicle is seen "clearly traveling over the fog line."

The Court holds that defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that Radovich's statement about defendant's intoxication was "knowingly false or made in reckless disregard of the truth" (People v Tambe, 71 NY2d 492, 504 [1988]). Notably, defendant himself made an inculpatory admission to Landow that he was intoxicated. Defendant casts no such doubt on Radovich's statements, particularly with regard to the principal basis for the search warrant. Examining his moving papers, defendant does not create a factual dispute to warrant a hearing into whether there was unlawful police conduct or that police lacked probable cause. Thus, the Court finds that defendant is not entitled to a Franks/Alfinito hearing since the remaining statements in Radovich's affidavit in support were sufficient to establish probable cause, regardless of whether he met his burden as to Radovich's statement about his intoxication (see People v Tambe, 71 NY2d at 505; People v Franklin, 137 AD3d 550, 552-553 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1132 [2016]).

The Court also finds that Radovich's personal observations at the scene of the fatal motor vehicle accident, coupled with the information relayed to him by other police officers who were present at the scene including Landow, supplied the requisite probable cause for the search of defendant's vehicle. Defendant thus failed to make the necessary substantial preliminary showing that Landow's search warrant application was based upon an affidavit containing false statements that were made knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth (see id.; People v McGeachy, 74 AD3d 989, 990 [2d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 853 [2010]).

The Court further denies that branch of defendant's motion to controvert the search warrant. Inapposite to his belief, the Court concludes that the search warrant is supported by probable cause (see People v Gordon, 36 NY3d 420, 425 [2021]).

It is black-letter law that "a search warrant must be supported by evidence establishing probable cause to believe that an offense has been or is being committed, or that evidence of criminality may be found in a certain place" (People v Gaviria, 183 AD2d 913, 914 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 839 [1993] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Augustus, 163 AD3d 981, 982 [2d Dept 2018]). "Moreover, a search warrant may be validly based upon hearsay information found to be reliable" (People v Gaviria, 183 AD2d at 914 [internal quotation mark and citations omitted]). "The legal conclusion is to be made after considering all of the facts and circumstances together. Viewed singly, these may not be persuasive, yet when viewed together the puzzle may fit and probable cause found" (People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d at 423). "There is a strong judicial preference for search warrants" (People v Rivera, 210 AD3d 805, 806 [2d Dept 2022], lv denied 40 NY3d 930 [2023] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). "The search warrant application must provide the court with sufficient information to support a reasonable belief that evidence of illegal activity will be present at the specific time and place of the search" (People v Corr, 28 AD3d 574, 575 [2d Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 787 [2006]). Even "some relatively minor alleged discrepancies in the supporting affidavit[ ]" is not enough to controvert a search warrant (People v Watson, 163 AD3d 855, 858 [2d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1009 [2018]).

Thus, that branch of defendant's motion to controvert the search warrant for his automobile based on lack of probable cause is unavailing and denied. A hearing in that regard is not necessary (see People v Belizaire, 222 AD3d 875, 876 [2d Dept 2023]; People v Kelly, 151 AD3d 751, 752 [2d Dept 2017], lvs denied 30 NY3d 981 [2017], 39 NY3d 963 [2022]; People v Corr, 28 AD3d at 575).

B. The Seizure Order

The Court also finds that the seizure order issued out of the Justice Court of the Town of Carmel (Deniel M. Miller, J.), dated November 13, 2023, is valid. No further search warrant was required of defendant's cellphone in connection with the seizure application made by Deputy Landow on November 13, 2023. As the People correctly point out, no search warrant is required to inspect a criminal defendant's personal effects, where, as here, they " ''are immediately seized upon arrival at the jail, held under the defendant's name in the 'property room' of the jail, and at a later time searched and taken for use at the subsequent criminal trial' " (People v Natal, 75 NY2d 379, 383 [1990], quoting United States v Edwards, 415 US 800, 807 [1974]; see People v Brown, 52 AD3d 943, 946 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 735 [2008]).

Here, the cellphone was taken from defendant by jail personnel and stored with his other belongings at the county jail. A couple of days after defendant was taken into custody, the police seized his cellphone in connection with their investigation. Contrary to defendant's belief, the police did not have to obtain a search warrant authorizing the cellphone's seizure from the county jail. Because defendant was taken into custody by the police and placed under arrest, he can hardly claim that he had any legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated when the police seized the cellphone from the county jail. Therefore, a search warrant authorizing the seizure of his cellphone was not required (see People v Natal, 75 NY2d at 383-384; People v Woodard, 93 AD3d 944, 947 [3d Dept 2012], lv denied 24 NY3d 1048 [2014]; cf. People v Nordahl, 46 AD3d 579, 580 [2d Dept 2007], lvs denied 10 NY3d 842, 843 [2008]).

Based on defendant's arrest, detention at the county jail, and the serious nature of the criminal charges filed against him, the Court finds that police had established that the items in the seizure order, including defendant's cellphone, had an evidentiary value that was worth further investigating by law enforcement. Defendant's cellphone remained at the county jail as part of defendant's inventoried property; thus, police could lawfully seize it under those circumstances. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the seizure order is valid and the items taken pursuant to the seizure order were lawfully obtained by police (see People v Natal, 75 NY2d at 383-384; People v Woodard, 93 AD3d at 947).

C. Defendant's General Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence

A Mapp hearing is conducted for the purpose of determining, among other matters, the existence of probable cause to arrest a defendant, to test the constitutionality of physical evidence that was seized, usually being tangible items or the fruit(s) of a crime, and to determine the admissibility/suppression of physical evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure (see Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]). A Dunaway hearing is held to determine if statements attributed to defendant were the byproduct of an impermissible arrest (see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]).

A suppression motion "must contain sworn allegations of fact" by defendant which, if true, would warrant suppression (People v Bryant, 8 NY3d 530, 533 [2007]; see CPL 710.60 [1]; People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415, 422-429 [1993]). A court may summarily deny a motion to suppress if the defendant fails to allege a proper legal basis for suppression or if the "sworn allegations of fact do not[,] as a matter of law[,] support the ground alleged" CPL 710.60 [3] [b]). "The sufficiency of the factual allegations should be (1) evaluated by the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion and (3) evaluated by defendant's access to information" (People v Bryant, 8 NY3d at 533, quoting People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 426; see People v Lopez, 5 NY3d 753, 754 [2005]; People v Guzman, 153 AD3d 1273, 1276-1277 [2d Dept 2017]). Importantly however, even if the factual allegations asserted by defendant are deficient, summarily denying a motion to suppress is generally disfavored since the CPL permits discretionary, not mandatory, denial (see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 429 [the "CPL does not mandate summary denial of defendant's motion even if the factual allegations are deficient"]; People v Pavesi, 144 AD2d 392, 393 [2d Dept 1988], appeal denied 73 NY2d 981 [1989]).

"In ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the court 'is required to grant a hearing if the defendant 'raise[s] a factual dispute on a material point[,] which must be resolved before the court can decide the legal issue' of whether evidence was obtained in a constitutionally permissible manner" (People v Lambey, 176 AD3d 1232, 1234 [2d Dept 2019], quoting People v Burton, 6 NY3d 584, 587 [2006]; see People v Gruden, 42 NY2d 214, 215 [1977]). "If a court does not summarily grant or deny a motion to suppress, 'it must conduct a hearing and make findings of fact essential to the determination thereof' " (People v Harris, 192 AD3d 151, 155 [2d Dept 2020], quoting CPL 710.60 [4]).

Defendant claims that police lacked probable cause to arrest him on the night in question because he told police that he had simply fell asleep while he was driving and there was no odor of an alcoholic beverage detected on his breath immediately before his arrest. In this regard, defense counsel's affirmation asserts, among other things, that Deputy Landow's combined supporting deposition and DWI bill of particulars reflects that the smell of an odor of an alcoholic beverage from defendant's person did not supply the requisite probable cause to arrest him. Defense counsel's affirmation also points that when Deputy Landow was asked during the grand jury proceeding if he "smell[ed] anything" when interacting with defendant, he testified "no." Defendant thus believes that police had no reason to suspect he had committed a crime when they arrived at the scene of the accident.

Defendant further argues that the police bodycam recordings show that police illegally searched his person and then proceeded to seize his property without a warrant or his consent; and therefore, any search was illegal, any seizures of his property were unjustified, and police lacked probable cause. Defendant thus surmises that all of the items were obtained by unlawful police conduct and are fruits of the poisonous tree.

The People counter that probable cause existed to justify defendant's arrest. They also contend that defendant's suppression motion should be summarily denied inasmuch as his motion papers are devoid of sworn allegations of fact.

"As relevant here, the purpose of a hearing pursuant to [CPL 710.60 (4)] is to determine whether suppression should be granted because of an unlawful search and seizure. The CPL article 710 suppression procedure involves an adjudication based on mixed questions of law and fact" (People v Harris, 192 AD3d 151, 155-156 [internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted]).

Here, the Court finds there is an issue of fact including, but not solely limited to, whether Deputy Landow smelled an alcoholic odor emanating from defendant's person when he observed and interacted with him prior to arresting him. At minimum, defendant sufficiently claims, through counsel's affirmation, that contrary to the police officer's conclusion, he was not intoxicated and there was no alcoholic odor emanating from him. A fair interpretation of defense counsel's allegations in support of the motion to suppress are that defendant was not intoxicated when arrested, nor was he engaged in any sort of criminal activity at the time (see generally People v Veloce, 34 Misc 3d 152[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50304[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]).

Generally, a suppression hearing should be held where, as here, a material question of fact exists as to the legal justification to administer field sobriety tests when the police officer detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage on defendant's breath, and the existence of probable cause for the resultant arrest. In sum, the Court finds that defendant's moving papers raise some factual disputes on highly material issues in this case (see People v Clark, 153 AD3d 1093, 1093-1094 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 979 [2017]; People v Francois, 138 AD3d 1165, 1165-1166 [3d Dept 2016]).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the factual allegations set forth in defense counsel's affirmation and memorandum of law in support are sufficient to warrant a suppression hearing with respect to the circumstances surrounding the police-conducted field sobriety tests (see People v Moore, 186 AD2d 591, 591 [2d Dept 1992], lv denied 82 NY2d 807 [1993]). Contrary to the People's contention, defendant set forth enough factual allegations that ought to be further explored at a Mapp hearing (see People v Innis, 161 AD2d 730, 730 [2d Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 987 [1990]; compare People v Pavesi, 144 AD2d 392, 393-394 [2d Dept 1988], lv denied 73 NY2d 981 [1989]).

D. Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Blood Test Results

Defendant also moves to suppress the results of the police-conducted blood test performed upon on him on the ground that it was not obtained in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194. He claims that the application for the blood test "lacked sufficient cause," inasmuch as Investigator Radovich, who had no interaction with him, failed to properly identify the source of his knowledge or of individuals with direct knowledge of the events who were not sworn under oath by Judge Segal.

The Court rejects defendant's contention that the blood test conducted on him by police was administered in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194. Reviewing the blood seizure order, the Court denies that branch of defendant's motion to suppress the results of the court-ordered blood test.

As part of their response, the People submit an affidavit from Investigator Radovich, wherein he corroborates that he was "informed by Deputy Landow that defendant "smelled of alcohol" at the scene of the accident, that he failed three standardized field sobriety tests, and he was placed under arrest. Radovich states that "[a]ll the information contained in the application [for the court-ordered blood test] was provided" to him by Landow. Radovich also states that he contacted Judge Segal via telephone during the early morning hours of November 12, 2023 to hear the application for an order to compel defendant to submit to a chemical test, and he later submitted the completed application to Judge Segal via email. Radovich further states in his affidavit that he "was placed under oath by Judge Segal," that he the read the application aloud to her over the telephone "line by line" before she ultimately granted and signed the order. In his affidavit Radovich notes that there is "no recording of [that] telephone conversation" to his knowledge.

In addition, the People also proffer an affidavit from Judge Segal in connection with Radovich's application for a court-ordered blood test. In short, Judge Segal substantiates pretty much all of the statements set forth in Radovich's affidavit.

Contrary to defendant's claim, the Court concludes that the information provided by Investigator Radovich in support of his application of the blood-test order established that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant had operated a motor vehicle while he was intoxicated. Investigator Radovich, who applied for the court-ordered blood test, did advise Judge Segal that he relied on hearsay as is clearly reflected in his application in support thereof. Probable cause for defendant's arrest was provided by the objective signs of his intoxication that were observed by Deputy Landow, defendant's failures to pass any of the three standardized field sobriety tests conducted on him by Landow, and defendant's admission to Landow that he had been drinking alcohol on the day in question.

As the People correctly point out, the fact that Investigator Radovich's application relied on hearsay statements does not render it defective. "Although an application for a court-ordered blood test may contain hearsay and double hearsay statements that satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the application must disclose that it is supported by hearsay and identify the source or sources of the hearsay' " (People v Earley, 121 AD3d at 1192, quoting People v Freeman, 46 AD3d 1375, 1377 [4th Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 840 [2008]; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [3] [b]; see also People v Isaac, 224 AD2d 993, 993-994 [4th Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 937 [1996]; People v Whelan, 165 AD2d 313, 321-322 [2d Dept 1991], lv denied 78 NY2d 927 [1991]).

Here, the application in support of the blood-seizure order establishes that Investigator Radovich relied upon hearsay statements made by Deputy Landow in order to support his belief that the accident in question occurred "in the course of" defendant's operation of a motor vehicle (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [3] [b] [1]; see e.g. People v Freeman, 46 AD3d at 1377). The section of the application and order entitled "Basis of Knowledge of the Facts" on page three (3) reflects that Radovich's application was "based upon direct knowledge and information and belief" and identifies Deputy Landow as the primary source. As reflected therein, Radovich based the application on information supplied to him from Deputy Landow that defendant made oral admissions to police that he had "been drinking" and that "he fell asleep at the wheel and crashed." Also, the application provides that "[t]he other vehicle's driver was killed in the crash" and the victim's "7-year-old [son] is in critical condition at this time." Notably, that section refers to Deputy Landow a total of three times, describing Landow's interaction and observations of defendant in that he "smell[ed] an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from [defendant's] breath and watery[,] glassy eyes"; that the standardized field sobriety tests conducted by Landow "showed [an] indication of impairment" by defendant; and that when asked by Landow several times in a span of 45 minutes, defendant refused to take the preliminary breath test (PBT) a total of four times that were "offered" to him by police. Based on the foregoing, Radovich's application contains hearsay, not double hearsay.

The application for the blood test here contains specific allegations of fact sufficient to demonstrate that, "based upon the totality of circumstances, there [was] reasonable cause to believe" that defendant operated his vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [3] [b]). The Court thus concludes that the underlying application and the ensuing order for a compulsory blood test is sufficient, and accordingly, that the blood test results obtained as evidence obtained therefrom should not be suppressed.

The balance of defendant's arguments in connection with suppressing the results of the blood test have been examined and are without merit (see People v Smith, 18 NY3d 544, 552 [2012]). Accordingly, the Court denies that branch of his omnibus motion to suppress the blood test results (see People v Badia, 130 AD3d 744, 745 [2d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1085 [2015]; People v Bohacek, 95 AD3d 1592, 1593-1594 [3d Dept 2012]).

V. Defendant's Motion to Preclude his Oral Statement(s) to The Police

Next, defendant moves to preclude any of his noticed statements to police, which were recorded or could be used against him at trial. He moves to summarily suppress all oral statements that he allegedly made to law enforcement officials or police personnel in violation of his constitutional rights or, in the alternative, requests that a Huntley hearing be held. He claims that all of his oral statements to police were involuntarily made and law enforcement obtained them in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

The People oppose this branch of defendant's motion by advancing that defendant was lawfully arrested on the day in question. The People also argue that his motion papers fail to set forth any specific factual allegations to warrant suppression of his incriminating statements to police, or warrant conducting a Huntley hearing, since he makes boilerplate conclusory statements through defense counsel's papers. The People urge that defense counsel's affirmation in support is replete with blanket assertions that fail to satisfy the minimal standard under CPL 710.60 (1). In addition, the People request that if the Court elects to not summarily deny this branch of defendant's motion, then the Court conduct a hearing, pursuant to CPL 710.60 (4), in connection with defendant's oral statements to police.

A CPL 710.30 "notice must be served within [15] days after arraignment" (CPL 710.30 [2]). "[T]he purpose of CPL 710.30 is to inform a defendant that the People intend to offer evidence of a statement to a public officer at trial so that a timely motion to suppress the evidence may be made" (People v Rodney, 85 NY2d 289, 291-292 [1995]).⁸

To that end, the general purpose of a Huntley hearing is for the court to review evidence in determining whether statements made by defendant to law enforcement are admissible at trial (see People v Huntley 15 NY2d 72, 78 [1965]). A Huntley hearing is mandatory even if the statement is used solely for impeachment purposes (see People v Clemons, 166 AD2d 363, 365 [1st Dept 1990]; cf. People v Maerling, 64 NY2d 134, 142 [1984]); see also People v Ashley, 15 Misc 3d 80, 82 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 863 [2007] ["while oral statements which have been suppressed pursuant to CPL 710.30 may not be used as evidence-in-chief, they may be used for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of a defendant during cross-examination and on rebuttal"]).

Here, the People filed a CPL 710.30 notice on January 29, 2025, concerning several oral statements made by defendant to police on or about November 11 and 12, 2023 in connection with the underlying charges. The CPL 710.30 notice reflects that defendant made several allegedly incriminating statements to certain deputies of the Putnam County Sherrif's Department, including, among other remarks, that he is a cop/detective, that he "fell asleep," that he "didn't know what the f**k he hit," that he's "in a bad way right now," that "I ruined my whole f**king life," and that he couldn't properly do the walk-and turn field sobriety test because he was "fu**ked up." The CPL 710.30 notice reflects that defendant was provided a USB external drive which consists of video recordings of police bodycam footage, wherein defendant can be seen and heard making such oral statements.

Defendant seeks suppression of the various statements that he made to police on, among other grounds, involuntariness or, alternatively, he requests a Huntley hearing for a determination in this regard. "[A] motion to suppress a statement as involuntary need not be supported by sworn allegations of fact" (People v Riley, 303 AD2d 1045, 1045 [4th Dept 2003], lv denied 3 NY3d 741 [2004] [internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citation omitted]; see CPL 710.60 [1], [3]; see also CPL 60.45 [2] [b] [ii]). As explained above, this Court may — but is not required to — summarily deny that branch of defendant's motion seeking to suppress all statements made to police (see CPL 710.30 [3]; see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 429-430). While defendant's motion papers do not specifically refer to any particular oral statement which he made to law enforcement or indicate what statement, if any, were involuntarily obtained by police, the more prudent course here would be to grant a Huntley hearing for a definitive ruling to explore those issues (see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d at 430; cf. People v Wright, 256 AD2d 643, 645-646 [3d Dept 1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 880 [1999]).

Hence, the Court exercises its discretion here to conduct a Huntley hearing in this matter. Defendant's motion to suppress oral statements alleged to have been made by him, as contained in the 710.30 notice, is granted solely to the extent that a hearing on the motion will take place prior to trial (see CPL 710.60 [4]).

To the extent that defendant also seeks suppression of his statements pursuant to Dunaway, the Huntley hearing shall be inclusive of all suppression issues relative to any such statement(s) (see People v Williams, 192 AD3d 1461, 1461-1462 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 961 [2021]; see generally People v Harris, 97 AD3d 1111, 1112 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1026 [2012]). A combined Dunaway/Huntley hearing shall be held prior to trial.

VI. Defendant's Motion for a Sandoval Hearing & Molineux Material

Defendant also moves for a Sandoval hearing as to claimed or alleged vicious, criminal, or immoral acts, conduct, offenses, or convictions attributable to him insofar that such could be used to impeach his credibility if he elects to testify at trial (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 375 [1974]. He also requests a Molineux hearing as to any prior conviction or uncharged crime(s) which could be used adversely against him (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293 [1901]; People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350, 359-360 [1981]).

This branch of defendant's motion is granted based on the People's consent. The Court shall conduct a joint Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia hearing before the commencement of trial in order to balance the probative value and prejudicial nature of any such proof (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d at 375; People v Lee, 129 AD3d 1295, 1297-1298 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 27 NY3d 1001 [2016]). In the event the People wish to make a Molineux/Ventimiglia application regarding defendant's prior bad acts, it must be filed no later than 15 days before the trial date (cf. CPL 245.10 [b]; 245.20 [3]).

Within fifteen (15) days from the date of this decision and order, the People shall notify and provide to defendant, in compliance with CPL article 245, a copy of defendant's summary case history in the DCJS, and any other documents showing additional criminal convictions, if such has yet to be turned over. Additionally, the People shall notify defense counsel of all specific instances of defendant's alleged prior uncharged criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct of which the People have knowledge and intend to use at trial for purposes of impeaching defendant's credibility. Such notification shall be made in full compliance with CPL article 245.

VII. Discovery Requirements

As we well know, the discovery requirements set forth in CPL article 245 must be complied with in full. Generally, where the evidence is not in the exclusive control of the prosecution and may be readily accessible to the defendant, then the People do not have a duty to produce same to the defendant (see generally Giles v Maryland, 386 US 66, 80 [1967]). The People, however, have a continuing obligation to disclose and provide defendant with any material evidence already in their possession which is favorable to him, and if withheld, would deprive him of a fair trial — as is constitutionally mandated by Brady v Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]), its progeny, and CPL article 245.

Crucially, even a delay of providing discovery does not mean that defendant will never have access to the subject disclosure in preparing for trial, insomuch as he is still entitled to receive Rosario, Brady, and Giglio material; and, if need be, have a meaningful opportunity to use any exculpatory evidence (see People v Griggs, 180 AD3d 853, 855 [2d Dept 2020]; People v Hines, 132 AD3d 1385, 1386 [4th Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1109 [2016]). The People are directed to furnish same to the defense as soon as possible. To whatever extent material that is discoverable pursuant to CPL article 245 has not already been provided by the People, such discovery, including both Brady and Rosario material, shall be provided to defendant forthwith (see Brady v Maryland, 373 US at 88; People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286, 289-291 [1961]). Insofar he requests impeachment information to attack the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses, including law enforcement members, the People are obligated to promptly provide any such Brady and Rosario material to defendant.

Here, the record reflects that the People filed their certificate of compliance on March 12, 2025 and a supplemental certificate of compliance on October 27, 2025 (see CPL 245.50 [1]).⁹ The People, in response, acknowledge that they are aware of their duty to preserve and disclose exculpatory and impeachment information as well Rosario materials to the defense, adding that they will promptly disclose same. Anything outside the scope of the requisite discovery under CPL article 245 or not under the "direction or control" of the Putnam County District Attorney's Office need not be turned over by the People to the defense (CPL 245.20 [1]; see People v Gonzalez-Mendoza, 82 Misc 3d at 521-523).¹⁰

If necessary, defendant must also meet his disclosure obligations under CPL 245.20 (4) and 245.50 (2). The People are entitled to reciprocal discovery. Defendant is not exempt from providing the requisite disclosure to the prosecution. Like the People, defendant, too, has a continuing duty to disclose and file certificates of compliance as may be necessary (see CPL 245.60).

If a party has a particularized reason to believe that there remains any outstanding discovery which they have yet to receive, counsel for defendant shall promptly contact the prosecutor handling this case. If there are unresolved discovery issues, defense counsel shall contact the court to request a conference to address outstanding issues. Should a party have sufficient reason to believe, in good faith, that they have not received particular discovery to which they are entitled, they are so advised that they can later move for an order for applicable relief under CPL 245.80 (see generally CPL 245.35 ["Court ordered procedures to facilitate compliance"]).

As for the presentation of expert witnesses and disclosures related to expert opinion evidence, counsel are reminded, and defendant is so advised, that expert disclosure is automatic and must be made in compliance with CPL 245.20.

VIII. Defendant's Application Seeking Leave to File Additional Motions

Lastly, defendant seeks leave to file additional future motions should newly discovered facts or information come to light. The People oppose, asserting that he be prohibited from making any further motions absent a legally sufficient reason grounded in the law.

Given the substantial delays of this case on the part of defendant, the Court denies that branch of his motion for leave to file additional motions. In this regard, CPL 255.20 (3) specifically sets forth the circumstances under which motions may be renewed or filed notwithstanding provisions of time or inclusion in the initial omnibus motion. Mindful that this Court could exercise its discretion to "entertain and dispose of the motion on the merits . . . in the interest of justice[ ] and for good cause" (CPL 255.20 [3]), the Court sees no reason to do so based on the posture of this case since it has already been delayed (see People v Hughes, 22 NY3d 44, 49 [2013]; People v Davydov, 144 AD3d 1170, 1172 [2d Dept 2016]; People v Huang, 248 AD2d 73, 76 [1st Dept 1998]).

IX. The Trial

Any pretrial hearings in this matter shall be held sufficiently in advance of trial in order to allow ample time for transcription of the pretrial hearing minutes (see People v Sanders, 31 NY2d 463, 467 [1973] [defendant "shall . . . make his request for a transcript of the minutes of any pretrial hearing prior to its conclusion"]; see also People v Coleman, 81 NY2d 826, 927 [1993]).

The trial shall commence with jury selection on a date to be selected by the Court. It will continue day to day until completed. Counsel must be adequately prepared for the trial prior to its commencement.

The Clerk of the Court shall notify counsel of the date that the trial shall commence. Pursuant to the provisions of 22 NYCRR 125.1 (g), the trial date will not be adjourned (see People v Colasanto, 70 Misc 3d 133[A], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2020]). Counsel and defendant are further advised that this case may be subject to advancement if the Court's trial calendar so permits.

To the extent not specifically mentioned herein, the parties' remaining contentions have been evaluated and are without merit. Any other relief requested that is not squarely addressed herein is either rendered academic or denied based on this decision. Accordingly, it is hereby:

Ordered that the omnibus motion of defendant MARCOS A. MARTINEZ (Mot. Seq. No. 1), is granted in part and denied in part, as is more fully set forth herein; and it is further

Ordered that this Court shall conduct consolidated pretrial hearings in this matter — specifically, a combined Mapp/Dunaway/Huntley hearing — prior to trial; and it is further

Ordered that if the People endeavor to make a Molineux/Ventimiglia application, the People shall file an appropriate written application in this regard no later than fifteen (15) days before the trial date; and the Court shall conduct a combined Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia hearing prior to the commencement of trial; and it is further

Ordered that the defendant and the attorneys are directed to personally appear on Wednesday, November 12, 2025, at 9:30 a.m., for a conference and further proceedings.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of this Court.

Dated: October 31, 2025

Carmel, New York

E N T E R:

HON. ANTHONY R. MOLÉ

Judge of the County Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defense counsel neglected to insert page numbers for both his affirmation and memorandum of law in support.

2.   The affidavits of Judge Segal and Investigator Radovich are appended to the People's response papers as Exhibits 7 and 8, respectively.

3.   The victim's seven-year-old son was in the rear seat of the vehicle and fortunately survived, suffering non-life-threatening injuries.

4.   The Court notes it granted multiple extensions to defendant in filing his omnibus motion (see Uniform Civil Rules for the Supreme Court and the County Court [22 NYCRR] § 202.8 [c]). Defendant elected not to file reply papers by the final due date of September 15, 2025 (see generally CPLR 2214 [b]).

5.   In 2023, daylight saving time ended Sunday, November 5, 2023.

6.   The Court, at this time, expresses no view and makes no rulings on whether the DWI counts of which defendant is charged are also inclusory concurrent counts for some of the charges (see People v Conklin, 199 AD3d 1359, 1360 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1160 [2022]; People v Wager, 173 AD3d 1352, 1357-1358 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1020 [2019]).

7.   The Court, at this time, takes no view as whether the bill of particulars, as set forth in the People's response papers, is adequate (cf. People v Culver, 192 AD2d 10, 15 [3d Dept 1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 716 [1993]; People v Byrnes, 126 AD2d 735, 736 [2d Dept 1987]).

8.   CPL 710.30 (3) provides that "[i]n the absence of service of notice upon a defendant . . ., no evidence of a kind specified in [CPL 710.30 (1)] may be received against him [or her] upon trial unless he [or she] has, despite the lack of such notice, moved to suppress such evidence and such motion has been denied and the evidence thereby rendered admissible as prescribed in [CPL 710.70 [2]). "However, the notice requirement is excused when a defendant moves for suppression of such evidence" (People v Johnson, 280 AD2d 613, 614 [2d Dept 2001]; see People v Kirkland, 89 NY2d 903, 904 [1996]; People v Laws, 286 AD2d 991, 992 [4th Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 706 [2002]).

9.   "CPL 245.50 (1) creates a . . . compliance mechanism" (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 209 [2023]). "That provision directs the prosecution to 'serve upon the defendant and file with the court a certificate of compliance' when the prosecution, with several narrow exceptions, 'has provided the discovery required by [CPL 245.20 (1)]' " (People v Walker, 232 AD3d 1214, 1216 [4th Dept 2024], quoting CPL 245.50 [1]).

10.   CPL 245.20 (1) provides, in relevant part that the People must disclose all "material and information in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control." Further relating to the foregoing subdivision, CPL 245.20 (2) provides, in relevant part, that "[f]or purposes of [CPL 245.20 (1)], all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution."

Anthony R. Molé, J.