The People of the State of New York v. M.P., Defendant. (2026)

The following papers were read and considered on this Motion, filed by the Defendant, seeking

1) Withdrawal of the Defendant's guilty plea pursuant to CPL § 220.60(3):

2) Removal and/or reopening of this matter from to the Family Court of Orange County pursuant to CPL § 722.21(4), 722.23, 725.05

Notice of Motion and Affirmation dated May 15, 2026;

People's Affirmation in Response dated June 5, 2026;

Reply Affirmation dated June 18, 2026.

Background

Defendant M.P. was arrested on March 13, 2024, charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second-Degree and Criminal Possession of a Firearm for allegedly possessing a loaded and operable firearm. At that time, M.P., having been born XX/XX/2006, was 17 years old, making him an Adolescent Offender (A.O.). as defined in section 722 of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), and as such this matter was brought in Youth Part.

On March 14, 2024, the Defendant was arraigned and on March 20, 2024, pursuant to CPL § 722.23 (2), the Court conducted a six-day hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court determined that the People had met their burden of establishing by a preponderance of evidence that the Defendant had displayed a firearm. As such, the action remained in the Youth Part of Criminal Court. On August 14, 2024, the Defendant pled guilty to Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, a class C felony and Criminal Possession of a Firearm, a class E felony.

The Defendant was placed on interim probation, with the understanding that if successful, Defendant would be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea to the class C felony and would be sentenced on the class E felony. On March 18, 2025, the Probation Department wrote a letter to the Court regarding certain alleged violations by the Defendant of his interim probation conditions. Thereafter, the Court afforded the Defendant the full opportunity to be heard and conducted the requisite inquiry into the alleged violations. The Court determined that the Defendant had violated the conditions of his interim probation and did not permit Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.

Thereafter, Defendant's attorney, John Peter Demaio was suspended from the practice of law, and by Order of this Court dated August 13, 2025, Eli D. Siems, Esq. was appointed to represent the Defendant. On August 15, 2025, the Defendant appeared in Court and the Court placed the Defendant on release under the supervision of the Department of Probation. On February 11, 2026, the Court set bail on the Defendant, who was thereupon confined to the Orange County Jail. On March 18, 2026, the Court's securing order was modified. Defendant remains confined at Orange County Jail. On May 6, 2026, the Court granted the Defendant's request for leave to file a motion. Before this Court is the instant motion dated May 15, 2026, filed by Defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and for removal of the action to Family Court or, in the alternative, a reopening of the 6-day hearing. The People filed an Affirmation in Response dated June 5, 2026, opposing the motion and Defendant filed a Reply Affirmation dated June 18, 2026.

Legal Analysis

Defendant moves pursuant to CPL § 220.60(3) to withdraw his previously entered guilty plea. Defendant further seeks to reopen the CPL § 722.23 removal hearing and remove this matter to the Family Court pursuant to CPL §§ 722.21, 722.23, and 725.05. Finally, defendant contends that his waiver of indictment was constitutionally defective because the record does not adequately establish that it was executed in open court.

Defendant principally argues that prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the CPL § 722.23 removal hearing by failing to introduce available evidence demonstrating that defendant did not display a firearm during the commission of the alleged offenses. Defendant maintains that competent representation would likely have resulted in removal of the matter to the Family Court and that, because the subsequent plea negotiations occurred only after the matter remained in the Youth Part, counsel's deficient performance undermined the voluntariness of the plea itself.

The People oppose the motion, arguing that counsel did, in fact, argue that defendant had not displayed a firearm, that the summary nature of a six-day removal hearing does not require presentation of every available piece of evidence, and that defendant's sworn plea allocution establishes that his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.

The Court recognizes that defendant's motion presents thoughtful and substantial questions concerning the relationship between the Raise the Age statutory framework, the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the voluntariness of a subsequent guilty plea. Defendant's submissions required careful consideration and raised issues for which there is limited appellate guidance. Nevertheless, after careful review of the record, the applicable statutes, and the governing precedent, the Court concludes that defendant has failed to establish a basis for the relief requested.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding including before deciding whether to plead guilty. People v Moran, 244 AD3d 1250 [2d Dept 2025]; People v Tindley, 202 AD3d 838 [2d Dept 2022]; People v Flinn, 188 AD3d 1093 [2d Dept 2020]. Under the Federal Constitution, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance," 'the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' " and " 'that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense' ". People v Ramroop, 236 AD3d 931, 931 [2d Dept 2025] quoting People v Alexander, 208 AD3d 1247, 1248, [3d Dept 2022], quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-688 [1984]. Under the New York standard, the Court must examine the totality of counsel's representation, the evidence, the law, and the circumstances to determine whether defendant received meaningful representation. People v Moran, 244 AD3d 1250 [2d Dept 2025]; People v Montgomery, 235 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2d Dept 2025]; see also People v Tindley, 202 AD3d 838 at 839 [2d Dept 2022].

Defendant raises legitimate concerns regarding prior counsel's handling of the CPL § 722.23 removal hearing. Specifically, Defendant argues that counsel failed to introduce evidence already in his possession bearing directly upon the issue of whether Defendant displayed a firearm. The Court recognizes that the omitted evidence may have been relevant to the issue before the Court and that successor counsel has articulated a well-reasoned argument as to why its omission warrants scrutiny. However, claims of ineffective assistance are not evaluated by examining isolated omissions in hindsight, but rather by reviewing counsel's representation as a whole under the totality of the circumstances.

Here, the record reflects that counsel expressly argued during the removal hearing that Defendant did not display a firearm. The Court acknowledges that the constitutional inquiry is not whether counsel simply uttered the correct legal position, but whether counsel meaningfully advocated that position under the totality of the circumstances. While the Court cannot agree that counsel's failure to introduce available evidence bearing directly upon the dispositive factual issue constituted a reasonable strategic decision, the Court also cannot conclude on the present record that Defendant has established constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. The nature of a summary proceeding such as the removal hearing does not require the use of every available piece of evidence, counsel did in fact expressly articulate the circumstances on the record, and, thereafter, counsel successfully negotiated a highly favorable disposition on Defendant's behalf, one which this Court views as among the most advantageous negotiated resolutions it has encountered in comparable Adolescent Offender proceedings. Additionally, before sentence was imposed, Defendant obtained successor counsel, who thoroughly reviewed the proceedings and promptly raised the concerns now before the Court.

Additionally, as the matter has not yet concluded, the issue of any prejudice to Defendant resulting from the alleged ineffective conduct has yet to be determined and the question of whether counsel's conduct rises to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel is premature. "Since the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be resolved without reference to matter outside the record, a CPL 440.10 proceeding is the appropriate forum for reviewing the claim in its entirety." People v Bennett, 115 AD3d 973, 974 [2d Dept 2014]. Under the totality of these circumstances, the Court acknowledges there may have been some deficiency in counsel's representation but cannot conclusively discern whether Defendant has endured the necessary prejudice to sustain the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or whether the deficiency amounts to harmless error at this juncture. To the extent defendant's claim depends upon matters dehors the record— including counsel's strategic reasoning, the significance of the omitted evidence within the overall defense strategy, and whether any alleged deficiency resulted in legally cognizable prejudice—the claim is more appropriately addressed in a proceeding pursuant to CPL 440.10 following the entry of judgment. Accordingly, the Court declines to make a constitutional determination regarding counsel's effectiveness on the present motion.

II. Withdrawal of the Guilty Plea

The decision to withdraw a guilty plea rests largely in the in the Court's discretion. People v Vicente, 167 AD3d 951 [2d Dept 2018]; People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113 [2010]; People v Bennett, 115 AD3d 973 [2d Dept 2014]. A guilty plea must be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently to be valid and enforceable. People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113 [2010]; People v Keller, 168 AD3d 1098 [2d Dept 2019]. A plea that is knowing, intelligent and voluntary is based upon factors such as the nature and terms of the agreement, the reasonableness of the bargain, and the age and experience of the accused. People v Moran, 244 AD3d 1250 [2d Dept 2025]; People v Gaity, 216 AD3d 667 [2d Dept 2023]; People v Garcia, 92 NY2d 869 [1998].

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, there must be a reasonable probability that Defendant would not have plead guilty, or that the outcome would have been different, absent counsel's performance. People v Moran, 244 AD3d 1250 [2d Dept 2025]; People v Flinn, 188 AD3d 1093 [2d Dept 2020]; People v Parson, 27 NY3d 1107 [2016]. While the Courts have acknowledged that a defendant's claim of ineffectiveness of counsel may affect the voluntariness of his plea (People v Shorter, 106 AD3d 1115 [2d Dept 2013]), such claims are typically overcome by admissions of guilt "in a thorough and complete allocution" (People v Vega, 256 AD2d 367, 368 [2d Dept 1998]) and when the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not directly involve the plea-bargaining process (People. v Scalercio, 10 AD3d 697 [2d Dept 2004]; People v Petgen, 55 NY2d 529 [1982]).

Defendant's principal challenge to the voluntariness of his plea rests entirely upon his claim that prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the earlier removal proceedings and makes no claims of ineffective assistance directly in connection with the plea proceedings. The Court recognizes that the enactment of Raise the Age reflects the Legislature's determination that prosecution in Youth Part and adjudication in Family Court are materially different in purpose and consequence (see People v Torres, 45 NY2d 751, 754 [1978]), and it therefore follows that the forum in which an adolescent offender is prosecuted is reasonably capable of influencing the decision whether to exercise the constitutional right to trial or instead resolve the matter by negotiated plea. Regardless, because the Court cannot conclude, on the present record, that Defendant has established ineffective assistance of counsel at either stage, Defendant likewise has not demonstrated that the plea was rendered constitutionally infirm on that basis.

Additionally, were the only factor before the Court whether Defendant could sufficiently establish counsel's ineffective assistance to render the guilty plea unknowing or involuntary, the Court might have to give the force of Defendant's argument further consideration in deciding whether to exercise its discretion and permit the withdrawal. Here, however, it is worth noting that the favorable, negotiated decision contemplated a different course. As a material term of the plea agreement, Defendant would have been afforded the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea upon his successful completion of interim probation. Thus, the parties bargained for a mechanism by which Defendant could avoid the consequences of his plea, but that opportunity was expressly conditioned upon his compliance with the terms of interim probation and Defendant thereafter failed to satisfy that condition. It is well settled that when a Defendant is found to have violated his interim probation, he forfeits the benefit of the bargain that would have permitted withdrawal of his plea for having failed to fulfill a material condition precedent to that relief. See People v Avery, 85 NY2d 503, 508 [1995]; People v Wheeler, 242 AD3d 1630, 1631 [4th Dept 2025]; People v Mays, 181 AD3d 874, 874 [2d Dept 2020]; People v Portillo, 208 AD3d 522 [2d Dept 2022]. Now, the Court having done the requisite inquiry and Defendant having been found to have violated the terms of his probation and Defendant having failed to fulfill a material condition precedent to the requested relief, Defendant cannot now cunningly obtain the same result through a collateral challenge to the voluntariness of said plea.

Moreover, the record of the plea proceeding itself supports the validity of the plea as, except in very rare circumstances, a proper allocution forecloses subsequent claims that the plea was the product of ineffective counsel and establishes a strong presumption that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Defendant confirmed under oath that he had sufficient time to consult with counsel, that he was satisfied with counsel's representation, that he understood the rights he was waiving, and that he was entering the plea voluntarily. Such solemn declarations in open court carry significant weight. While those statements do not invariably foreclose a subsequent claim of ineffective assistance, they do weigh heavily against Defendant's present contention, particularly where the constitutional claim itself has not been established on this record.

Defendant further contends the plea was invalid because his waiver of indictment was not signed in open court. The Court finds this contention without merit. The record, viewed in its entirety and with due regard for the presumption of regularity that attaches to judicial proceedings (see, People v Washington, 246 AD2d 676, 677 [2d Dept 1998]; People v McGee,220 AD2d 799, 801 [3d Dept 1995]), demonstrates that the Defendant was represented by counsel, fully allocated regarding the waiver, and that the Court executed an Order Approving Waiver of Indictment reflecting that the waiver was executed in open court. As Defendant has failed to rebut the presumption of regularity attaching to the waiver proceedings, this branch of the motion is likewise denied.

Accordingly, the Court finds no basis to exercise its discretion to permit withdrawal of defendant's guilty plea.

III. Reopening the Removal Hearing

Defendant also seeks an order reopening the previously conducted CPL § 722.23 removal hearing and directing removal of this matter to the Family Court.

The Court declines to grant that relief. A removal hearing conducted pursuant to CPL § 722.23 is a summary proceeding intended to provide an expedited threshold determination at the outset of an Adolescent Offender prosecution. Summary proceedings, by their very nature, are used to resolve a single legal issue with speed and finality rather than be a comprehensive inquiry into all of the available evidence. The Legislature imposed strict time limitations and a streamlined procedure reflecting its intent that the removal determination be made promptly so that the criminal proceeding may thereafter advance without unnecessary delay.

The issue presently before the Court is a pre-sentence motion pursuant to CPL § 220.60(3), which authorizes the Court to determine whether a guilty plea should stand and the relief authorized by CPL § 220.60(3) does not explicitly extend to vacating the prior removal determination or conducting a new removal hearing. Defendant's request to revisit the prior removal determination presents a new procedural question. Nothing in CPL § 722 authorizes the reopening of a completed removal hearing months later based upon a change in counsel, a reassessment of litigation strategy, or a subsequent challenge to counsel's performance. Neither party has identified, nor has this Court's independent research revealed, any authority recognizing such a procedural mechanism. To recognize one judicially would substantially undermine the legislative purpose underlying the statutory framework. If completed removal hearings could routinely be reopened whenever successor counsel identified additional evidence, advanced a different litigation strategy, or challenged prior counsel's tactical decisions, the expedited nature of the six-day hearing would be fundamentally eroded. Such a rule would invite piecemeal litigation, delay criminal proceedings, diminish the finality of removal determinations, and create uncertainty in an area where the Legislature plainly intended prompt resolution.

Neither the statutory language nor the existing appellate authority expressly authorizes the reopening of such a hearing under the circumstances presented here. While the Court is not persuaded by the People's contention that the preliminary nature of the 6-day hearing entirely excuses counsel's omission of material evidence, and the Court emphasizes that this determination should not be construed as an endorsement of every aspect of the prior proceedings. Rather, it reflects the limited procedural posture of the present motion. The fact that counsel did affirmatively argue that the weapon was not displayed, considered in conjunction with the other circumstances of the case at bar, is sufficient for the subsequent determination to stand.

This is not to suggest that Defendant's arguments lack force. To the contrary, successor counsel has identified issues that warranted careful consideration by the Court. The question, however, is not whether Defendant has presented a thoughtful argument, but whether the Criminal Procedure Law authorizes the relief requested. On the present record, and under the current statutory framework, the Court concludes that it does not.

Accordingly, defendant's request to reopen the CPL § 722.23 removal hearing and remove the action to the Family Court is denied.

NOW, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED, Defendant's motion is denied in its entirety.

Dated: Goshen, New York

E N T E R

July 17, 2026

HON. VICTORIA B. CAMPBELL

Victoria B. Campbell, J.