PEOPLE v. L.M., Defendant. (2026)

This is an Indictment charging a 15 year old girl with two counts of second degree murder, both intentional and depraved indifference, (PL § 125.25[1] and PL § 125.25[2]) and first degree arson (PL § 150.20). The Court ordered a Clayton hearing sua sponte prior to accepting a plea. People v. L.M., 87 Misc 3d 451 (Columbia Co. Ct. 2025).

In a decision and order dated October 27, 2025, the Court denied the defendant's supplemental motion to dismiss based on impairment of the integrity of the proceedings before the Grand Jury, citing People v. Douglas, 226 AD3d 1162 (3d Dep't 2024).

The Clayton hearing took place over three days on January 16, 2026, February 11, 2026 and February 19, 2026. Summations were provided to the Court on April 24, 2026.

Three days after summing up on the Clayton hearing, the People moved to recuse this Court from presiding over this case in a motion dated April 27, 2026. The defense answered this motion on May 14, 2026. A decision was rendered on June 5, 2026 denying the People's application. People v. L.M., 89 Misc 3d 1208(A) (Columbia Co. Ct. 2026).

On July 17, 2026, based upon the information disclosed at the Clayton hearing, the Court requested briefing to re-visit the investigator's lack of candor in her testimony at the Grand Jury. The Court also asked counsel to brief the interplay between depraved indifference murder and intentional murder.

Letter-briefs were submitted on August 21, 2026 addressing both of these issues.

This Court has the ability to take judicial notice of all proceedings in this case and all aspects of all exhibits that have been admitted into evidence, and I so do.

The evidence presented and testimony adduced at the Clayton hearing made it clear that the defendant, L. M., aged 15 years and 4 months at the time of the offense, was subjected to years of abuse and neglect by her father, E. M., including slaps, punches, yelling, name calling, and involvement in criminal activities.¹ Records of the Columbia County Department of Social Services Investigations are particularly credible, as they were created at or close in time to the investigation, and contain no editorializing or hyperbole. If anything, the DSS records downplay and minimize the abuse described therein. The testimony from the school counselor was also very credible, and provided a neutral professional's assessment of the attitude and behaviors of the child that she observed in school.

The evidence at the Clayton hearing reflects L.’s fear of her father; she attempted to run away from her home on at least two documented occasions, expressing a preference to be in foster care or “juvie.”²

L. presents as particularly vulnerable, in light of the fact that she suffers from global intellectual deficits, with poor ability to abstract and generalize, and a poor memory for the recent past and remote occurrences.³

People with intellectual disabilities possess diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others․ These traits render people with intellectual disabilities uniquely vulnerable to injustice within criminal proceedings. People v. Oldorff, 253 N.Y.S.3d 818, 821 (3d Dep't 2026).

L. was apparently not able to adequately describe her alleged sexual assault at the hands of her uncle to Investigator Sanzi at a CAC interview. Investigator Sanzi determined that such touching took place outside the statute of limitations, and told L. there was nothing to be done.⁴ There was no evidence of counseling being offered to L. L. exhibited hyper sexualized behavior at school, including public masturbation and boundary issues with older boys.⁵ Such behavior is corroborative of having been abused. In re Ashley M., 235 AD2d 858, 859 (3d Dep't 1997).

Particularly disturbing to the Court is the fact that this child cried out for help to trusted adults and authority figures multiple times, only to be rebuffed and returned to her father's residence. The same cries for help that were recorded by the police, the Department of Social Services, and Four Winds Psychiatric Facility are now put before this Court as evidence of murderous intent. L. did have at least one adult that believed her, the school counselor who, as a mandated reporter, reported child abuse or neglect to the appropriate authorities multiple times.

It is also dismaying to the Court to consider that if these threats and allegations had been brought to the Court in a PINS petition, a juvenile delinquency petition, or even a family offense petition, the Court could have acted to separate L. and her father, and perhaps save his life.

The New York State Legislature provides the option for children 16 and 17 years old, “adolescent offenders” to remove matters to Family Court. A 16 year old child charged with felony murder (Penal Law § 125.25[3]) as a result of gang involvement had her case removed to Family Court and was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. Matter of D.S., 80 Misc 3d 721, 723 (Kings Co. Family Ct. 2023). That homicide was “presumptively removable to Family Court” under Criminal Procedure Law § 722.23. D.S., 80 Misc 3d at 722. The sixteen year old in that case is somehow allowed more leniency and constitutional protections than the fifteen year old before this Court.

Criminal Procedure Law Article 722 requires the People to move the court to retain adolescent offender's offenses in criminal court, but requires the defendant to move the court to remove the matter to Family Court in the case of juvenile offenders. It is unclear why the New York State Legislature shifted the burden in such an inequitable way in the cases of juvenile offender defendants who are younger and hence more vulnerable.

At least one court found that Criminal Procedure Law Article 722 is unconstitutional as applied to a juvenile offender based upon this inequity, finding an equal protection violation in the application of CPL 722.22(1)(b), which requires the consent of the prosecution to remove a similarly situated juvenile offender to Family Court. People v. K.S., 84 Misc 3d 319, 330 (Richmond Co. Sup. Ct. 2024). (“[T]he court cannot envision any conceivable State interest nor any legitimate purpose for the defendant, charged as a juvenile offender, to face greater constraints seeking removal than those imposed upon an older adolescent offender facing that precise same charge.”) I concur with the analysis of the Richmond County Supreme Court.

Where does this Court turn for guidance when faced with a violation of constitutional equal protection rights under Article I, § 11 of the New York State Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?⁶ It is often said that the job of a judge is to be a neutral umpire in court proceedings, ie. “call balls and strikes.”⁷ However, the consensus in the scientific and legal communities is that children accused of crimes have bigger strike zones. They are less culpable and more vulnerable than an adult accused of the same crime. The legislative history of the Raise the Age reform law has been cited by the Third Department in their interpretation of CPL Article 722, to determine the intent of the New York State Legislature.

Assembly Member Joseph Lentol, one of the drafters speaking in favor of the bill, described that the presumption was that the “overwhelming bulk of the cases” would be removed to Family Court, that those cases retained in criminal court would be “one in 1,000” and reserved to “extremely rare and exceptional cases” (NY Assembly Debate on 2017 NY Assembly Bill A3009C, Apr. 8, 2017 at 37-38, 102). He further characterized that only those cases which present “highly unusual and heinous facts” demonstrating “that the young person is not amenable or would not benefit in any way from the heightened services in the family court” should not be removed (NY Assembly Debate on 2017 NY Assembly Bill A3009C, Apr. 8, 2017 at 39). Though opining that providing examples of what may constitute extraordinary circumstances is difficult and that the court must “look at all the circumstances of the case,” Lentol described that such may be satisfied where the defendant has committed “a series of serious crimes ․ over the course of many days,” where the “defendant act[ed] in a cruel and heinous manner” or where “the defendant [was] a ringleader who threatened and coerced reluctant youths to participate in the crimes” (NY Assembly Debate on 2017 NY Assembly Bill A3009C, Apr. 8, 2017 at 39-40). Taken collectively, these statements illustrate the Legislature's intent to create a sweeping presumption in favor of removing these cases to Family Court and that the People's burden is exceedingly high on a motion to prevent removal. In sum, we agree with the Second Department's conclusion that the Legislature intended for adolescent offenders to be prosecuted in criminal court “only in the most exceptional cases.” People v. Aaron VV., 246 AD3d 131, 135-36 (3d Dep't 2025), citing People v. Lloyd F., 245 AD3d 69 (2d Dep't 2025).

Using the intent of the lawmakers as guidance, the Court will fashion a remedy for this case. With the intent and the spirit of the Raise the Age reform law in mind, the Court addresses the Clayton factors in turn here.

 CPL § 210.40(1)(a) The Seriousness and Circumstances of the Offense

At the preliminary hearing, prosecution witness Gregory Amyot testified that he worked for New York State Division of Homeland Security Emergency Services Office of Fire Prevention and Control.⁸ Amyot opined that the couch in the living room was the seat of the fire, and that the fire had been set with gasoline from the gallon container on the floor next to the couch.⁹ Amyot claimed that the couch was consumed more on one side than the other, and claimed to see a “protected area” where the couch was less consumed than the other.¹⁰ This uneven consumption of the couch is not evident in the pictures. Amyot posited that the decedent was sitting on the couch when the fire started, and got up off the couch, traveled toward the bedroom in an attempt to get out of the window, and collapsed on the threshold of the bedroom and the living room.¹¹

At the Clayton hearing, prosecution witness Andrew Pohl also testified that the couch was set on fire.¹² Pohl testified that he could not tell whether the decedent's external burns came from being on fire or from the excessive heat in the house.¹³

Notwithstanding the fire investigators’ testimony, the decedent was discovered in the rear bedroom of the structure, according to testimony from Trooper Daniel Stang.¹⁴ There was one exit in the house, which was through the kitchen.¹⁵

There was no testimony concerning the existence of smoke detectors or any fire suppression equipment.

Brett Smith, an off-duty volunteer fire fighter, was one of the first on the scene of the fire, having been summoned by the decedent's land lady.¹⁶ The homeowner told Mr. Smith that she thought a man and his daughter were in the burning building.¹⁷ Mr. Smith attempted to use the garden hose to put water on the flames, but no water came out of the spigot.¹⁸ Mr. Smith broke a window to try and get a trapped person out, but the window was blocked by a pile of clothes.¹⁹ Mr. Smith entered the residence with another fire fighter, and told the other fire fighter to go find the person in the building.²⁰ Mr. Smith said the entrance was through a kitchen area, and “we put out the fire to the right.”²¹ Within three minutes the other fire fighter found someone in the building.²² A stretcher was secured, and the body was pulled out of the window.²³ Mr. Smith said “He did not look burnt. He — you could tell it was a, still a male person. You could see his facial features. He did not look like it was near any type of fire or heat source, the body did not. It's not the first body I pulled out of a fire, and I would say the body was in a good condition enough that you could tell it was a person and it was a male, and you could recognize who he was at that time.”²⁴

 CPL § 210.40(1)(b) The Extent of Harm Caused by the Offense.

The decedent lost his life in a fire, overcome by the heat and smoke, which resulted in his airway swelling shut, and subsequent suffocation.²⁵ The decedent's family remains devastated and heartbroken over the loss, discussed in detail, infra.

Decedent's landlords were compelled to rebuild their little rental house as a garage, giving up the rental income. The structure was rebuilt within six months of the fatal fire.²⁶

 CPL § 210.40(1)(c) The Evidence of Guilt, Whether Admissable or Inadmissable at Trial

L. was admitted as an unaccompanied minor to Four Winds Katonah on May 16, 2024.²⁷ Upon admission, she informed her interviewer that “I wanted to kill my own father.”²⁸ She also told the interviewer that she “tried to fight off the cops, it's what I do ask them.”²⁹ Upon intake, she told the interviewer that she wanted to kill her father for hurting her and “it's time for him to get what's coming.”³⁰ In her psychosocial assessment, L. stated she wants to “burn her father to hell with the demons.”³¹

L. did not try to “fight off the cops” when she was taken into custody following the fatal fire on June 7, 2024. When Investigator Kyle Godfroy sat with L at the Livingston Trooper Barracks, waiting for the child's mother to appear so she could be interrogated  ³² , he recorded the following statements:

“So where am I going, juvie or Four Winds again?”

“He deserved it after what he did to me.”

“Why don't you put me in juvie for attempted murder. That's what you're going to do anyways.”

“How big was the fire?”

“Stupid old gallon of gas did not work. Should have put it in his bedroom.”

“At least I can jump over fire, almost got burned”

“Gasoline makes a great big fire.”

“So, I will have this on my record, attempted murder. It was lousy, I should have done better at it but.”

“He probably should have known that was coming, but I need my lizard.”

“How long will you go to jail for attempted murder.”

“How long will I go to juvie anyway for attempted murder?”

“I mean who wouldn't.”33

Investigator Godfroy stated that these statements were not in response to anything he or anyone else said to L.³⁴

R. M. testified that L confessed to her while incarcerated.³⁵ She stated that L. told her she was planning on running away, that she set the fire and escaped through the kitchen, and she had to jump over the fire to get out.³⁶

 CPL § 210.40(d) The History, Character and Condition of Defendant

The Court has reviewed the child protective investigation reports, admitted as defendant's exhibit B, and found them credible. The records were created at or close in time to the investigation, and contain no editorializing or hyperbole. If anything, the records minimize or downplay the abuse described therein. The Columbia County Department of Social Services declined to take steps to assist L. or intervene in her life, in spite of multiple interviews conducted by the police and caseworkers.

The Court heard testimony from the school social worker who testified credibly about the steps she took to protect L. and assist her.

The Court heard testimony from forensic psychologist Jacqueline Bashkoff, PhD. Dr. Bashkoff conducted a forensic interview of L., reviewed hospital records and interviewed collateral sources. Her testimony, and her forensic evaluation report, introduced into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit E. Dr. Jacqueline Bashkoff's expert testimony was completely credible, and helpful to the Court in evaluating the extent of L.’s limitations and maturity.

The Court reviewed records from Four Winds Katonah, which detailed L's treatment and diagnosis at that facility. The Court determines that the records were created close in time, as a part of a professional obligation on the part of the writers to document the care and treatment afforded to L. as a part of her psychiatric hospitalization. The records, admitted into evidence by both defense and prosecution as Defendant's Exhibit A and People's Exhibit 1, give an accurate picture of treatment rendered to the child at the hospital.

The Court heard testimony from the decedent's landlord who accused L. of killing mice and a pet tortoise at unspecified times and dates during her father's tenancy.³⁷ The Court finds this testimony incredible, as the prosecution elicited no dates and times of these alleged bad acts.

The Court heard testimony from the decedent's sister, L's Aunt R.M. The Court finds that most of the testimony offered by R. M. was not based on personal knowledge of the child's day-to-day life with her father.

The Court also heard testimony from L. L's testimony was sincere; she appeared younger than her chronological age. The Court observed the self harm marks on L. during this case, and watched her cry on the stand during questioning. The testimony given by L. tracks and is consistent with the testimony of the school counselor, and Investigator Sanzi. L.’s testimony was consistent with the records kept by the Department of Social Services during their investigation, and the medical records from her hospitalizations.

When L. was born on X, X, 2009, she and her nineteen year old mother tested positive for cocaine. Her father was forty-three years old when L was born, housed as homeless by the Columbia County Department of Social Services, and also a cocaine user, who apparently shoplifted to get money for drugs, and recruited L's mother to do the same.³⁸ L's father had non-lethal levels of cocaine and cocaine metabolites, as well as THC and alcohol in his system at the time of his autopsy.  ³⁹

After her birth, L. was removed from her parents’ care and placed in foster care as an infant. The decedent, E. M., and L's mother, J. K. admitted neglect, and consented to orders of supervision.⁴⁰ It is L's belief that she stayed with her grandmother for a long time.⁴¹

J. K. testified that she attended treatment and successfully completed it.⁴² She testified she had L. with her until L. was five. Ms. K. testified due to living circumstances and the fact that “she ran out of power,” she had to give the five year old to the decedent.  ⁴³ L.’s father went to Family Court while Ms. K. was out of state, and obtained residential custody of L.⁴⁴ Ms. K. went on to raise two more children, of whom she has custody.⁴⁵

The decedent's sister, R., stated that she let L. come to her house on weekends after her grandmother died.⁴⁶ Before that, she testified, L. was at her aunt's house every night until 8PM or 9PM at night.⁴⁷ She stated that L. did not tell her that her brother was physically abusive, and stated she did not see bruises on the child.⁴⁸

R. testified that after L.’s grandmother died, she witnessed the decedent yell at the child to do the dishes at her own birthday party.⁴⁹

R. testified that at an unspecified time and place, L. told her that she drowned a hamster at an unspecified time in milk after it bit her in the finger.⁵⁰

On or around October 12, 2023, a child protective report was called in, alleging that L. was being made to shoplift by her father, who then sold the stolen merchandise in front of her. The report also stated that L. had not been appropriately supported with respect to her schooling, and likely needed to be provided with special education. The report stated that L.’s father refused to sign paperwork to allow her to be evaluated for special education. The report noted that L., then 14 years old, had been “semi-mute” up until the past year.⁵¹

During an October 13, 2023 interview at school with a caseworker concerning the October 12, 2023 child protective report, L. disclosed that recently, her father smacked her across the face, and picked up her fish tank and threatened to throw it. She disclosed that he had anger problems and slept most of the time. L. stated that it was “not safe” when her father was mad.⁵²

During the October 13, 2023 interview at the school, L. stated that her father shoplifted, using her as an accomplice. L. also told the interviewer that her father sold his prescription painkillers.⁵³

During the October 13, 2023 interview at the school, L. asked the caseworker if she could get her mother involved.⁵⁴

In the evening of October 13, 2023, a caseworker went to the home with law enforcement, and met with L and her father. In contrast to previous statements, in the presence of her father, L. said she did not care to see her mother.⁵⁵

On October 16, 2023, a caseworker contacted L.’s mother by phone who stated that the father does not let her see or speak to the child, although she had given him her contact information. L.’s mother told the interviewer that when she was in a relationship with L.’s father, she used to get arrested for petit larceny.⁵⁶

During another school interview on October 23, 2023, L. also disclosed to the caseworker that her father played “monkey bubble” with her, a game wherein he would dig his knuckle into her forearm giving her constant pain. When the caseworker asked whether she told her father that “monkey bubble” hurts her, she stated “he does not care.” L. reiterated in this interview that she wanted to get in touch with her mother, but her father would not allow it, and that if she asked her father to see her mother, “her father would kill her.”⁵⁷

During an October 24, 2023 interview with Investigator Oakes, L.’s father told investigators that he was taking 4 to 6 hydrocodone pills per day for his surgeries and disability.⁵⁸ He denied that he was selling his painkillers. He told the caseworker that he did not believe L. needed to be evaluated for special education, although he opined that her mother “has some issues.” He also told the interviewers that he wrestles with his daughter and demonstrated by assuming a fighting stance with his hands in a fist.⁵⁹

In November of 2023, school guidance counselor Donna Coons tried to assist L. in adjusting to school by having her join a table top gaming club.⁶⁰ The integration into the club was unsuccessful, as L. had issues with boundaries, attempting to hug high school boys, getting into their personal space, and seeing the boys as “more than just potential friends.”⁶¹ L. exhibited a concerning hyper-sexualized behavior in school: publicly masturbating.⁶²

On April 22, 2024, a child protective report was called in, regarding L.’s father's treatment of her. The report alleged “inadequate guardianship” and “lacerations, bruises, welts.” The report stated “caretaker is violent and appears out of control” and “Caretaker views/describes/acts negatively toward child and/or has extremely unrealistic expectations of child.” The report alleges that L.’s father uses L. to shoplift, and that they were caught in the summer of 2023. The report further alleges that L.’s father struck her in the left side of her head near her ear, and grabbed her by her arm, and pulled her hair. The report further alleges that L. was afraid to go home with her father, and would rather live with her mother.  ⁶³

School social worker D.C. testified that L came to school on April 22, 2024 with multiple bags, highly agitated.⁶⁴ She stated to Ms. C. “I'm not going back there, I'm not going home,” reiterating this throughout the day.⁶⁵ She told Ms. C. “You can send me anywhere, send me to juvenile hall, send me to foster care.”⁶⁶ L. also told Ms. C. that she and her father had an “altercation.”⁶⁷ Ms. C. testified that L. told her “the prior night she an her father had an argument, and that he hit her on the left side of her head in the car, pulled her hair and grabbed her arm. She stated that he was angry because she did not go to her after-school determination and that she would not participate in his shoplifting.”  ⁶⁸ Ms. C. observed a bruise on L's arm.⁶⁹

In an interview with the child protective caseworker on April 22, 2024, at which a school social worker, Mr. G., and a sheriff's department investigator were present, L. told the caseworker that her father hits and yells at her every day, and that he made her help him steal meats and produce from a grocery store in Catskill. She reiterated the allegation that her father punched her in her head, and grabbed her arm. The bruise on L.’s arm was evident at this time.⁷⁰

The CPS investigators told her she had to go home.⁷¹ However, L. did not get on the bus to go home.⁷² Ms. C. found her at the high school, where she stated “If they make me go home, I'll pour gasoline on him and set him on fire.”⁷³ Child Protective Services declined to assist, which “terrified” Ms. C..  ⁷⁴

Ms. C. notified the school safety officer, who advised her to call Hudson Police.⁷⁵ The police arrived, and spoke with L. while they waited for her father to appear.  ⁷⁶

When L.’s father appeared, L. saw him through the window, and ran out of the room down the hallway in a panicked state.⁷⁷

Ms. C. stated that L. was not violent in school, the closest thing to violence being once hitting a teacher in the face with a piece of paper.⁷⁸ Ms. C. testified that L. wanted help in getting in touch with her mother, and alternatively, requested to go to “juvie” or foster care.⁷⁹

The case report indicates, and Ms. C. testified, that the police brought L. to the hospital after she refused to go home from school on April 22, 2024.⁸⁰ The case report further states that L. “threatened to kill herself, the father, and burn the home down.” In the report, L. reported her uncle touching her buttocks in a sexual manner, and a law enforcement referral was initiated by the Department of Social Services caseworker.⁸¹

On Monday, April 22, 2024, Sheriff's Department Investigator Oakes interviewed L.’s father at his residence. L.’s father was asked multiple times by the investigator whether he got into an argument with L. and whether they went to the store in Catskill yesterday or over the past weekend. L.’s father answered variously and unconvincingly:

“I don't recall going to the store, I don't recall getting into any arguments.”

***

While driving in the car driving to his sister's “he grabbed one of [L's] ponytails ‘to get her attention’ because [L] had been ignoring him” “he had grabbed [L's hair] and twisted so she would turn to look at him.”

***

“[L's father] stated that he and [L] had not gone anywhere because he does not have any money for gas, and he has had to pay for car repairs.”

***

“I don't hit my kid.”

***

“I don't recall going to the store”

***

“[H]e might have gone to ShopRite to return bottles and cans on Friday or Saturday.”

***

“[H]e might have gone across the river yesterday.”

***

“[H]e had gone to the store yesterday across the river he had bought Pepsi or toilet paper.”

***

“INV asked why [L's father] had gone across the river. [L's father] stated, “I don't recall.”

***

“INV asked if [L] had been in the vehicle when [L's father] had gone across the river. [L's father] stated that he did not remember. [L's father] stated that [L] had a hat on. INV asked if [L's father] had hit [L]. [L's father] stated ‘I don't recall hitting her’.”

During that interview, the Department of Social Services caseworker also interviewed L's father. She learned that L.’s father has a prescription for hydrocodone, which he kept in the bathroom, but was told “[L] does not go there.”⁸²

At the hospital, on Tuesday, April 23, 2024, a Department of Social Services Caseworker interviewed L. L. told the caseworker that she did not want to go home “no matter what,” and that “she would run away if she had to go home.” L. told the caseworker that the house is small, it used to be a bait shop.⁸³

At the April 23, 2024 interview with the caseworker, L. further disclosed “I'm just not happy with my father, he's a thief and steals stuff.” L told the caseworker that her father stole stuff at Lowes, Price Chopper, Shop Rite and used her as a look out. She added that he sells the stolen goods to family and friends.

During the April 23, 2024 interview at the hospital, L. showed the caseworker her bruise, and pointed out where she said her father hit her in the head. She told the caseworker that “after my grandma died, my dad got this attitude and is angry it starts off as yelling, sometimes he hits me.” The caseworker asked multiple times “what happens before” her father slaps or punches her, and L. told her each time she does not want to talk about it.⁸⁴

L. told the caseworker that her father is a racist and uses slurs all the time, making her uncomfortable. She also told the caseworker that her father “doesn't listen to me.”⁸⁵

L.’s father spoke to the caseworker over the phone on April 23, 2024, to say he was taking L. home. He told the caseworker that this was about a vape he found in her bookbag, that she had gotten in trouble at school over the same thing. He also told the caseworker that “there has never been a problem with [L.] until this vape issue,” and also that “she's been cutting classes” and “I've received 20 referrals from the school.” L's father stated that “she's supposed to have after school detention, but never arrived.”⁸⁶

During this conversation, L.’s father stated that he did not have any family resources where L could stay while they were having “disagreements.”⁸⁷

On April 23, 2024, the caseworker advised a New York State Police Investigator he did not need to investigate the shoplifting allegations, as the Columbia County Sheriff's Department was investigating. The Columbia County Sheriff's Department transferred investigation of the shoplifting allegations to the Greene County Sheriff's Department.⁸⁸ The Columbia County Sheriff's Department was not made aware of the child sexual abuse allegations, until shortly before or after they divested the shoplifting allegations to the Greene County Sheriff's Department.⁸⁹

New York State Police Investigator Sanzi made arrangements to interview L. at the Child Advocacy Center in the presence of her father, and an Assistant District Attorney regarding the child sexual abuse allegations. See Infra, under header CPL § 210.40(1)(e). No attempt was made to address or investigate the alleged physical abuse of L., her threats to harm her father, her threats to burn down the house, or her threats to run away.⁹⁰

During the CAC interview, the caseworker spoke to L.’s father. He stated that L. had been suspended from school and that she would be tutored.⁹¹

On May 14, 2024, another child protective report was called in. L. had gone to school and stated, among other things, she did not feel safe with her father, and she wanted to go to foster care and never return home. When her father was called, he claimed to notice that morning that he was missing wine, but also stated he does not drink. L. again stated that she wants to burn her father and she hopes he gets into an accident and dies.⁹²

The case report found all the allegations made by L. unsubstantiated after verbal denials by her father. The investigation into the shoplifting allegations was discontinued by police after L.’s father died.⁹³

L. was hospitalized by the police on May 14, 2024, after being discovered with alcohol at school, and was accused of using alcohol and drugs at school. However, she tested negative for all substances at Columbia Memorial Hospital.⁹⁴ Upon her arrival at the hospital, L. was “agitated and crying,” and reported abuse at home.⁹⁵ L. told the nursing assessor that “she will not return to her father's home under any circumstances.”⁹⁶

L. declined to disclose anything with the caseworker and Investigator Sanzi when they visited her in her hospital room on May 15, 2024.⁹⁷ On May 15, 2024, Investigator Sanzi spoke to L.’s father, who confirmed that her uncle John is a jokester and “asked if he like booted her in the bottom.”⁹⁸

L.’s father signed a paper on May 15, 2024 indicating L. was on Adderall.⁹⁹ On November 10, 2023, the Department of Social Services noted a concern from L.’s physician that she had not been to her last two appointments for her medication check, concerning her Vyvanse prescription, and the doctor's office did not know if she was taking her medication. L.’s father also told a Department caseworker on November 17, 2023 that he had taken her off the medicine. The drug did not appear in a blood test upon her initial hospitalization, and she was noted as medication noncompliant.¹⁰⁰ Adderall was discontinued after L was hospitalized by Four Winds.  ¹⁰¹

On or around May 17, 2024, L.’s father told the Four Winds interviewer that L.’s behavior changed after her grandmother died.¹⁰² In a phone interview, L's father denied that she was cruel to animals or played with fire.¹⁰³ Her father reported that she had to repeat “6th or 7th grade.”¹⁰⁴

L. is recorded as having a poor memory for the recent past (2-3 days), and remote occurrences (months-years).¹⁰⁵ Her ability to abstract and generalize was listed as “poor,” and her intellectual functioning was listed as “below average” at intake for Four Winds.¹⁰⁶ She presented upon intake with symptoms of “anxiety and/or panic.”¹⁰⁷ At Four Winds, she was medicated with Benadryl, Thorazine and Depakote.¹⁰⁸ On May 17, 2024, L. refused to sign a master treatment plan that stated she would go home to her father.¹⁰⁹ She reported trouble managing her anger.¹¹⁰ L. had no “significant aggressive behavior on the unit” while hospitalized at Four Winds.¹¹¹

L. told the interviewer at Katona that she thought her father had an order of protection against her mother and that she was unable to see or speak to her mother.¹¹² However, a review of the Columbia County Family Court file reveals that is not true.¹¹³

On May 24, 2024, L. reported in an individual psychotherapy session at Four Winds that she harbored homicidal ideation towards her father. The interviewer at Four Winds charted that clinical and discharge updates would be provided to her father.  ¹¹⁴

On May 31, 2024, L. reported that she has always been safe at home, and she would go home and stay in bed for the rest of her life.¹¹⁵

On June 3, 2024, a family session was held at Four Winds, wherein L.’s father and half-sister K. were present.¹¹⁶ L. reported felling “angry and stressed” during this family session.¹¹⁷ She stated that she was “triggered” or went into “crisis” by, among other things, physical fighting and arguments with dad.¹¹⁸ K. testified about this meeting at the Clayton hearing. K testified that in May of 2024,¹¹⁹ she drove her father, with his friend Barry, to Four Winds while L was hospitalized there.¹²⁰ When they got there, L. told K. that she wanted to go home with her instead of her father.¹²¹ L. did not seem like she was planning to go home, instead contemplating staying the hospital for a long time.¹²² K. testified that the focus of the session was on L's conduct, and that she should calm herself down if she was anxious or angry, and that firearms should be “put up high enough” so L. couldn't reach them.¹²³

R.M., the decedent's sister, testified that the decedent always kept a gallon of gas in his van in case he ran out.¹²⁴

On June 4, 2024, L. told her interviewer that she was “a little nervous about discharge. Patient reported that she has had fun while in the hospital and wants to stay longer as she does not want to lose control of her anger again.”¹²⁵

In a progress note dated June 5, 2024, staff noted that continued inpatient treatment is “indicated.”¹²⁶

On June 6, 2024, L. was discharged from Four Winds home to her father.  ¹²⁷

  CPL § 210.40(1)(e) Any Exceptionally Serious Misconduct by Law Enforcement.

The Grand Jury presentation of this case was problematic, and all of the relevant evidence was not presented to the Grand Jury. It is axiomatic that the prosecutor has dual roles advocate and public officer. “In his position as a public officer he owes a duty of fair dealing to the accused and candor to the courts, a duty which he violates when he obtains a conviction based upon evidence he knows to be false.” People v. Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97, 105 (1984).

Upon the seating of a Grand Jury, the jurors are instructed that “grand jurors may request that factual questions be asked of any witness appearing before them. The prosecutor will review and such proposed question and will ask those questions that he or she finds relevant and legally proper.” See CJI2d Grand Jury Instructions. It follows that the grand jurors are entitled to have their questions answered truthfully and completely. This did not happen in this case.

At the Grand Jury proceedings on June 28, 2024, a New York State Police investigator testified in this manner in response to questions from a Grand Juror.

Grand Juror 5: Number 5. I'm not sure it's relevant to — does it — how many times was she admitted to Four Winds? Does anybody know, or isn't that pertinent?

By Ms. Botts:

Q: Are you, do you have any direct knowledge of how many times she would have been admitted?

A: I do not have direct knowledge.

Grand Juror 5: Another question —

Ms. Botts: Certainly ma'am, Did you say your number? I apologize.

Grand Juror 5: 5.

Ms. Botts: Thank you.

Grand Juror 5: Sorry. Does anybody know if there's any suggestive evidence of abuse from the father and the daughter? Does that

By Ms. Botts:

Q: Investigator?

A: If there is any evidence of abuse from the father, there is no evidence of abuse from the father.

Grand Juror 5: Ever, or you probably don't know.

Ms. Botts: I would just instruct you that certainly that would be a very broad question, obviously, that might not necessarily be relevant at this point to the investigation.

By Ms. Botts:

Q: When you interacted with L. M. on the 7th, did you observe any injuries to her or anything to effect?

A: No.

Ms. Botts: I'm just trying to elicit her direct observations which might not be hearsay, so just trying to answer your questions. Yes ma'am, number 4.

Grand Juror 4: Number 4. You indicated you knew who Mr. M. and L. — you were aware of them prior to that day. Can you, can you explain how knew them?

Ms. Botts: So I'll instruct you that she's only allowed to talk about stuff that's relevant to this particular investigation.

By Ms. Botts: If it's related to another investigation that may or may not be relevant, I'll instruct you that you can't answer. So if you can, you can. If it's related to another investigation, then you can let them know that.

A: It was related to another investigation.128

Contrast the testimony at the Grand Jury with the testimony at the preliminary hearing on June 10, 2024.

By Mr Galvin:

Q: Investigator Sanzi, you said you were familiar with 2879 Cold Spring Road and its occupants by an earlier event?

A: The is correct.

Q: Could you describe that for me?

A: So it is an unrelated case that I received a law enforcement referral for—

Ms. Botts: I would object to the relevance for the purposes of this hearing.

The Court: Understood. It could be relevant in how she knew that. So I'm going to allow the question and I don't know what that area is, but I'll pay attention and stop if it's inappropriate.

Investigator Sanzi, you may answer that question.

The Witness: So I had received a law enforcement referral with L. M. as a possible victim of a crime that I was investigating. And I had interviewed L. at the Child Advocacy Center. Her and I spoke, and she declined to have anything further done. It was a very sensitive topic. One that I think she might tell you that she would not want me to disclose the details about, but it was an investigation that I was handling. And as a part of that investigation, I went to her house to interview her father while she was not present.

Q: And prior to going to that house in Livingston, you met with L. at the Child Advocacy Center?

A: Yes, I did.129

At the Clayton hearing on January 16, 2026, the New York State Police investigator testified again. In this sworn testimony, the investigator admitted that she met with L. on May 3, 2024 at the Child Advocacy Center after a referral on April 23, 2024, slightly over a month before the fatal fire.¹³⁰ The decedent, L.’s father, accompanied her to this interview.¹³¹

During the interview, L. told the investigator that her father had punched her in the jaw,¹³² that her father would take her shoplifting,¹³³ that her father “beat her ass” because of eggshells in the sink,¹³⁴ and that her father hit her while she was showering resulting in a bloody nose.¹³⁵ The police investigator testified further that L. said she would rather be in foster care or in her mother's care rather than live with her father.¹³⁶

At this interview, L. asked the investigator “multiple times” “[w]hat do I need to say to get removed from my father's home.”¹³⁷ Investigator Sanzi apparently discounted L.’s complaints as normal parental discipline.¹³⁸

L. also told Investigator Sanzi that her uncle touched her butt, but the uncle went unnamed, and Investigator Sanzi determined that such touching took place outside the statute of limitations, so there was nothing to be done.¹³⁹

The Grand Jury is an arm of the Court, not a tool of the prosecution. CPL § 190.05. The questions asked by the Grand Jurors were not ambiguous; they were asking broad questions about L.’s mental health treatment and her relationship with her father. On these facts, the prosecution's restriction on the information presented to the Grand Jury was improper.

An argument could be made that Investigator Sanzi's prior interviews with the decedent and the defendant in this case are hearsay. The Third Department has found that “hearsay evidence and opinion proof did not adversely affect the integrity of the grand jury proceeding so as to warrant the exceptional remedy of dismissal of the indictment” where the “remaining evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the indictment.” People v. Ruple, 239 AD3d 1040, 1042 (3d Dep't 2025).

Investigator Sanzi had personal knowledge of L.’s hospitalization, and personally conducted an investigation into sexual abuse allegations. For the prosecution to limit her testimony in front of the Grand Jury in the name of restricting hearsay testimony is disingenuous.

Less serious than the misleading testimony adduced by the prosecution before the Grand Jury, but also disturbing, are the prosecutor's tactics during this case. During the Clayton hearing, the prosecution objected to testimony from the school counselor, who was privy to the child-defendant's behavior at school, arguing that the school counselor's description of her attempts to counsel the child-defendant were “hearsay.”¹⁴⁰ This went on to the point of the counselor being confused and unable to answer the prosecution's questions, because they called for a hearsay response.¹⁴¹ Later, at the same hearing, the prosecution argued that hearsay was admissible at the hearing for their own witness, the child-defendant's aunt, sister of the decedent.¹⁴²

 CPL § 210.40(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for this offense.

The Court heard Dr. Jaqueline Bashkoff's testimony as an expert forensic evaluator. The Court in an abundance of candor, advised the prosecution that “I consider her as a friend, and I consider her to be someone that I relied upon for advice and counsel at times.”

Dr. Bashkoff opined within a reasonable degree of professional psychological certainty that without therapeutic treatment, incarceration of L would inevitably lead to recidivism, and new criminal convictions. Dr. Bashkoff said L should be confined in a therapeutic environment.¹⁴³

 CPL § 210.40(g) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system.

This Court believes that the prosecution of children should take into consideration their tender age and developing brain. This position is based upon science which is more fully explicated in a previous decision in this matter. People v. L.M., 232 N.Y.S3d 347 (Columbia Co. Ct. 2025). The Court is aware that there are different schools of thought concerning the prosecution of children. Public perception of the prosecution of children in general is changing, as evidenced by the Raise the Age reform. The shift in attitude towards the incarceration of children is outlined in the dissent of Presiding Justice Elizabeth Garry in a recent decision.

Slowly but surely, in the 21st century,

“[s]ociety began to more widely recognize that, as compared to adults, juveniles are far more impetuous, lacking in both maturity and a sense of responsibility, that they are more susceptible to negative influences, and that their characters are not as well formed (see Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 569 [2005]). Those “salient characteristics” (Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 68 [2010]) of youth have been found to make it “difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” (Roper v Simmons, 543 US at 573). Thus, courts began to hold that “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders” deserving of the “most severe punishment[s]” (id. at 568, 569 [concerning the death penalty]; see Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465 [2012] [concerning mandatory life imprisonment schemes]; Graham v Florida, 560 US at 68 [concerning life imprisonment without parole for nonhomicide crimes]). These hallmark characteristics of youth not only weaken typical penological justifications for harsh punishment, they amplify capacity for reform (see Miller v Alabama, 567 US at 471-473).

The wisdom “that youth matters in sentencing” does not suddenly lose force upon a person's 18th birthday (Jones v Mississippi, 593 US 98, 105 [2021]; see Roper v Simmons, 543 US at 574). Indeed, in more recent years, neuroscience, criminology and our standards of decency — all captured by sentencing policy — have markedly evolved. Subsequent research shows that development of the regions of the brain responsible for impulse control, executive functioning, emotional regulation and risk assessment continues well into an individual's twenties, irrespective of any rigid legal boundary we have, up until now, generally agreed to as a society (see e.g. Francis X. Shen et al., Justice for Emerging Adults After Jones: The Rapidly Developing Use of Neuroscience to Extend Eighth Amendment Miller Protections to Defendants Ages 18 and Older, 97 NYU L Rev Online 101, 104-107 [May 2022]; Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 Fordham L Rev 641, 645-656 [Nov. 2016]; Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 Temp L Rev 769, 785-787 [2016]; Vincent Schiraldi et al., Community-Based Responses to Justice-Involved Young Adults, New Thinking in Community Corrections, US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice at 3-8 [Sept. 2015], available at https://nij.ojp.gov/library/publications/community-based-responses-justice-involved-young-adults [last accessed June 2, 2026]). Interestingly, some research suggests that individuals up to the age of 24 or 25 engage in even greater risk-taking behavior compared to those under the age of 18 — an occurrence occasioned by comparable neurological underdevelopment paired with more complicated social expectations and greater independence (see Scott at 649-650; Cohen at 785-787; Schiraldi at 4). These developments have increasingly informed sentencing policy nationwide (see The Sentencing Project, Left to Die in Prison: Emerging Adults 25 and Younger Sentenced to Life without Parole at 10-12[June 2023], available at https://www.sentencingproject.org/app/uploads/2023/09/Left-to-Die-in-Prison-Emerging-Adults-25-and-Younger-Sentenced.pdf [last accessed June 2, 2026]), and some courts have already begun to take a more protective stance toward new classes of “emerging adult” or “young adult” offenders (see e.g. Commonwealth v Mattis, 493 Mass 216, 217-218, 225-229, 224 N.E.3d 410 [2024] [extending the state's prohibition against life imprisonment without parole for offenders under the age of 18 years old to those who were 20 years of age or younger when they committed their crime(s)]).

In New York, similar concerns have been reflected in repeated legislative proposals to provide courts with the opportunity to take a “second look” at lengthy prison sentences (see e.g. 2025 NY Senate Bill S158, 2025 NY Assembly Bill A1283; 2023 NY Senate Bill S321, 2023 NY Assembly Bill A531; 2021 NY Senate Bill S7872, 2021 NY Assembly Bill A8894). Although varying somewhat by session, these proposals generally would permit resentencing after an individual has served a substantial period of their term of incarceration and demonstrated rehabilitation, while continuing to afford victims, prosecutors and the court an opportunity to be heard regarding public safety and the interests of justice. The most recent proposal, presently active before the Legislature, authorizes reductions that may well be below the applicable statutory minimum and would create certain rebuttable presumptions in favor of resentencing, including where an otherwise qualified applicant was 25 years of age or younger on the date of his or her incarcerating offense (see 2025 NY Senate Bill S158, 2025 NY Assembly Bill A1283). No offenses, or sentences, would be excluded (see 2025 NY Senate Bill S158, 2025 NY Assembly Bill A1283). Although such legislation has not yet been enacted, its repeated introduction reflects a growing recognition that the propriety of continued incarceration may be informed not only by the facts known at sentencing, but also “new laws, scientific research, and norms” and “the profound rehabilitative work in which many individuals engage while incarcerated” (Senate Introducer's Mem in Support of 2025 NY Senate Bill S158; see generally New York State Justice Task Force, Recommendations on Second Look Sentencing Reform, available at https://www.nyjusticetaskforce.org/pdfs/Recommendations-on-Second-Look-Sentencing-Reform.pdf [last accessed June 2, 2026]) People v. Hoffler, 250 AD3d 1444, 1453-55 (3d Dep't 2026). (Garry, P.J., in dissent).

Some may complain that this Court is “off base” on this issue, but many legal minds point to a new way of thinking about juvenile justice. The reader is invited to follow this Court's analysis. The emerging law and the science of juvenile justice point to only one reasonable, equitable and human outcome.

 CPL § 210.40(h) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community.

The Court did not hear any testimony concerning L.’s posing a safety risk to the community. If L. is allowed to mature in a safe, therapeutic environment, as proposed by Doctor Bashkoff, there is a good chance that she can live and remain at liberty without violating the law. See Amanda NeMoyer , Elizabeth Gale-Bentz, Naomi E. S. Goldstein & Lisa Pema Harvey, Factors Associated with Successful Completion of a Community-Based, Postarrest.

Juvenile Diversion Program and Subsequent Rearrest, 66 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 603 (May 2020); Elizabeth Scott, Natasha Duell & Laurence Steinberg, Brain Development, Social Context, and Justice Policy, 57 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'y 13 (2018).

 CPL § 210.40(1)(i) Where the Court deems it appropriate, the Attitude of the Complainant or Victim with Respect to the Motion

At the Clayton hearing, the prosecution called the decedent's ex wife to the stand, which was very difficult for her.¹⁴⁴ She tearfully opined that L. “should be put away forever. I think that what she did — just forever. I don't think she should be in society at all.”¹⁴⁵ Decedent's ex-wife testified that the decedent's daughter, was forever scarred by the pictures of her father lying charred and burned.¹⁴⁶ Decedent's ex-wife also testified that she most regretted not being able to share with her ex-husband milestones concerning her daughters, including buying a house, trying for a baby, and getting married.¹⁴⁷

Decedent's daughter K. testified that her father never hit her.¹⁴⁸ He worked nights and was sleepy most of the time, and his discipline mostly consisted of yelling.¹⁴⁹ K.’s parents divorced when she was 7 years old, and she spent weekends with her father during the summer.¹⁵⁰

K. testified that she would call the decedent weekly, and talk about the problems he was having as a single parent to L.¹⁵¹ She opined that he tried to be the best father he could be.¹⁵² K. testified that she saw L. monthly or every other month, without her father present.¹⁵³

K. testified that her life changed when her father died, and stated she had to plan his funeral.¹⁵⁴ K. testified that she was shown the pictures of her deceased father at the preliminary hearing, which were horribly affecting.¹⁵⁵

K. denied that L. complained of physical abuse by her father when she saw her semi-monthly.¹⁵⁶

K. testified that she did not spend Thanksgiving or Christmas in 2023 or 2024 with her father or L.¹⁵⁷

The decedent's sister, R. testified that her brother was helpful to her on many ways, as a mechanic, working in the yard, and painting.¹⁵⁸ She testified that she and her family miss the decedent very much, and that her brothers, the brothers of the decedent, presumably L.’s uncles, cannot come into the courtroom to face what has happened.¹⁵⁹ R..opined that the decedent did not abuse his daughter.¹⁶⁰ R. described her brother's relationship with his daughter thusly “They were friends unless she didn't get her way, then she acted out, but I still kept her under my wing because I knew she had nobody.”¹⁶¹

 CPL § 210.40(1)(j) Any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would serve no useful purpose.

The Court has concerns that because this 15 year old child was indicted with both intentional murder and depraved indifference murder, the mens rea for her acts has not been clearly alleged or pleaded. The People, in their August 21, 2026 filing state that “the potential inconsistency of the counts is not an appropriate consideration for an interest of justice analysis.” The Court disagrees.

The Court of Appeals instructs that depraved indifference murder is most aptly applied to “cases reflect[ing] wanton cruelty, brutality or callousness directed against a particularly vulnerable victim, combined with utter indifference to the life or safety of the helpless target of the perpetrator's inexcusable acts.” People v. Suarez, 6 NY3d 202, 212 (2005). Also,

“[w]hen depraved indifference murder is properly understood, “twin-count” indictments -- charging both homicide and depraved indifference murder — should be rare. Twin count submissions to a jury, even rarer. For by the time the proof has been presented, it should be obvious in most cases whether or not the evidence establishes ‘an intentional killing or no other.’ Thus, where twin-count indictments are lodged, trial courts should presume ‘that the defendant's conduct falls within only one category of murder and, unless compelling evidence is presented to the contrary, dismiss the count that is least appropriate.” Suarez, 6 NY3d at 215, quoting People v. Wall, 29 NY2d 863, 864 (1971), and Abramovsky and Edelstein 55 Syracuse L. Rev. at 491.

Even after a plenary hearing in this matter, the prosecutor does not “pick a lane.” The prosecution's case was aired at the Grand Jury, the preliminary hearing, and at the Clayton hearing. The prosecution still will not hint about which mens rea could apply to this teenaged girl. Did she intend to kill her father, or not? The Court is left with no definitive answers.

Prior to the fire that took her father's life, L.’s homicidal statements were recorded by caseworkers, medical professionals and the police, and neither she, nor her father were provided with assistance or follow-up. Now, the prosecutor points to them as proof of intent. L.’s callous statements recorded by the New York State Police after her arrest seem to indicate that she did not think the fire was big enough to kill her father, and that she was ready to be confined to a facility for “attempted murder.” Those statements, as read into the record by the Investigator who took them, suggest indifference to whether her father was alive or dead.

The prosecution's position appears to be that L.’s statements are proof both of intent and depraved indifference. Yet, her statements regarding her feelings about her relationship with her father are completely discounted as lies by the prosecution.

The child made multiple statements before, during and after the fire. Parsing the statements of a troubled, learning disabled teenager to determine her criminal intent seems to the Court to be a futile endeavor, especially where the prosecution declines to give any direction.

The Court instead looks to the recorded behaviors of the child to determine her mens rea. Unfortunately, evidence of her L.’s behaviors at school was sharply curtailed by the prosecution's successful objections to hearsay evidence being presented. There is evidence of the child sneaking vapes, and acting out in school. There is evidence that she packed her bags, set a fire and ran away. There is evidence of self-harming behaviors that manifested in L. during her hospitalizations and confinement. It seems clear that the child's intent was to run away from home, and to get away from her father. In the end, it does not matter whether L.’4s reasons for running away are valid, because she telegraphed this intent to every adult she spoke with.

 Conclusion

The Court is persuaded by the reasoning in People v. K.S., 84 Misc 3d 319 (Richmond Co. Sup. Ct. 2024). It defies the spirit of the Raise the Age reform to require the consent of the District Attorney to remove a juvenile offender to Family Court, where the same consent is not required for a similarly situated adolescent offender who is older and less vulnerable. Thus, the consent requirement in Criminal Procedure Law 722.22(1)(b), is stricken as unconstitutionally applied to this juvenile offender.

The Court has previously noted that the interest of justice factors under CPL § 210.40 are the same as the factors for removal of a juvenile offender to Family Court under CPL § 722.22(2). People v. L.M., 87 Misc 3d 451, 458 (Columbia Co. Ct. 2025). An examination of the facts applicable to each factor has been set forth, supra.

The Court acknowledges that it did not indicate to the prosecution not the defense that I was considering moving this matter to Family Court. However, the Court deems all of the prior submissions of the parties and their respective positions on this issue fully submitted. The People, specifically oppose the same and do not consent. Nevertheless the Court fashions a remedy and here applies the factors to be considered for the transfer of an adolescent offender to Family Court in considering this juvenile offender.

The Court here finds, based on a careful consideration of the record before it, that there are significant mitigating factors concerning the condition of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense. CPL § 722.22(1)(b)(i). This is a fifteen year old child, with mental health challenges and cognitive limitations.

It is therefore hereby

ORDERED: This case will be removed to Family Court in the interest of justice.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Columbia County Family Court file number Certified medical records from Four Winds Katonah, in evidence January 16, 2026 People's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Exhibit A; Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B [N.B.: Investigative Progress Notes from April 23, 2024 have been obviously and inexplicably redacted]; Forensic Evaluation Report dated August 4, 2024, in evidence February 11, 2026 as Defendant's Exhibit E; January 16, 2026 testimony from Hudson City School District Counselor Donna Coons; January 16, 2026 testimony from NYSP Investigator Alyson Sanzi; February 19, 2026 testimony from L M.. “He verbally abused her, called her such things as a whore, a slut, a cunt, he physically abused her she said almost every other day.” February 11, 2026 testimony of Dr. Jacqueline Bashkoff page 47 lines 20-25.

2.   January 16, 2026 page 32 line 13-14, January 16, 2026 page 43 lines 2-9; Certified medical records from Four Winds Katonah, in evidence January 16, 2026 People's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Exhibit A.

3.   Certified medical records from Four Winds Katonah, in evidence January 16, 2026 People's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Exhibit A.

4.   January 16, 2026 transcript at page 52 line 17-18, page 73 line 22, page 74 lines 4-5, Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B.

5.   January 16, 2026 page 29 lines 12-13, page 30 lines 2-5. February 11, 2026 page 32 lines 5-11.

6.   “Never let us forget that the law is never settled until it is settled right, it is never right until it is just, and it is never just until it serves society to the fullest.” Harry Philo.

7.   “I will decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of law, without fear or favor, to the best of my ability, and I will remember that it's my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat” (Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States, Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, 109th Cong, 1st Sess, Serial No. J-109-37 at 56 [Sept. 12-15, 2005]). People v. McCarter, 77 Misc 3d 825, 838-39 (NY Co. Sup. Ct. 2022).

8.   June 10, 2024 page 45 lines 9-15.

9.   June 10, 2024 page 48, lines 16-25, page 49 lines 1-4, page 50 lines 18-25, page 59 lines 18-20, People's Exhibit 4.

10.   June 10, 2024 page 53 lines 24-25, page 54 lines 1-5, People's Exhibit 4.

11.   June 10, 2024 page 54, lines 5-13, page 57 page 18-22.

12.   February 19, 2026 page 139 lines 12-25, People's Exhibit 17.

13.   February 19, 2026 page 153 lines 9-22.

14.   June 10, 2024 page 24 lines 19-25, page 31 lines 5-8.

15.   February 19, 2026 page 154 lines 8-10.

16.   June 28, 2024, page 21 lines 1-10.

17.   June 28, 2024 page 22 line 1.

18.   June 28, 2024 page 24 line 11-18.

19.   June 28, 2024 page 26 line 15-19.

20.   June 28, 2024 page 28 line 8-14.

21.   June 28, 2024 page 28 line 16-24.

22.   June 28, 2024 page 29 line 25, page 30 line 1.

23.   June 28, 2024 page 29 lines 7-10.

24.   June 28, 2024 page 29 lines 16-23.

25.   February 19, 2026, death certificate admitted as People's Exhibit 28.

26.   February 19, 2026, page 59 lines 14-24.

27.   January 16, 2026 Certified medical records admitted as People's Exhibit 1

28.    Id.

29.    Id.

30.    Id.

31.    Id.

32.   June 10, 2024 page 62 lines 7-13

33.   February 19, 2026 page 162 lines 6-25, page 163 line 1.

34.   February 19, 2026 page 158 lines 21-23, June 10, 2024 page 63 lines 6-11.

35.   February 19, 2026 page 101 lines 15-16.

36.   February 19, 2026 page 101 lines 18-25, page 102 lines 1-6.

37.   February 19, 2026 page 63 lines 18-25, page 64 lines 1-25.

38.   Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B, Forensic Evaluation Report dated August 4, 2024, in evidence February 11, 2026 as Defendant's Exhibit E.

39.   Autopsy Report dated June 10, 2024, admitted into evidence as People's Exhibit 27 on February 19, 2026.

40.    Id.

41.   Certified medical records from Four Winds Katonah, in evidence January 16, 2026 People's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Exhibit A.

42.   January 16, 2026 page 81, lines 13-18.

43.   January 16, 2026 page 82 lines 15-21.

44.   January 16, 2026 page 82 line 18-21.

45.   January 16, 2025 page 83 lines 16-20.

46.   February 19, 2026 page 91 lines 24-25.

47.   February 19, 2026 page 91 lines 20-22.

48.   February 19, 2026 page 92 lines 18-25, page 93 lines 1-3.

49.   February 19, 2026 page 96 lines 23-25, page 105 lines 16-25, page 106 lines 1-4.

50.   February 19, 2026 page 98 lines 7-11.

51.   Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B. N.B.: Investigative Progress Notes from April 23, 2024 have been obviously and inexplicably redacted.

52.   Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B. N.B.: Investigative Progress Notes from April 23, 2024 have been obviously and inexplicably redacted.

53.    Id.

54.    Id.

55.    Id.

56.    Id.

57.   Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B. N.B.: Investigative Progress Notes from April 23, 2024 have been obviously and inexplicably redacted.

58.   The Autopsy Report dated June 10, 2024, admitted into evidence as People's Exhibit 27 on February 19, 2026 reveals that the decedent had no opiates in his system.

59.    Id.

60.   January 16, 2026 page 28 lines 12-20.

61.   January 16, 2026 page 29 lines 12-13, page 30 lines 2-5.

62.   February 11, 2026 page 32 lines 5-11.

63.   Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B. N.B.: Investigative Progress Notes from April 23, 2024 have been obviously and inexplicably redacted.

64.   January 16, 2026 page 30 line 25, page 31 lines 1-5.

65.   January 16, 2026 page 31 lines 4-5, page 35 lines 21-22.

66.   January 16, 2026 page 32 line 13-14.

67.   January 16, 2026 page 32 lines 15-16.

68.   January 16, 2026 page 33 lines 8-14.

69.   January 16, 2026 page 34 line 15.

70.   January 16, 2026 page 34 line 15.

71.   January 16, 2026 page 36 line 1-2.

72.   January 16, 2026 page 37 lines 20-25.

73.   January 16, 2026 page 38 lines 8-18.

74.   January 16, 2026 page 40 lines 12-19, page 41 lines 9-11.

75.   January 16, 2026 page 42 lines 14.

76.   January 16, 2026 page 42 lines 16-24.

77.   January 16, 2026 page 43 lines 2-9.

78.   January 16, 2026 page 46 lines 18-21.

79.   January 16, 2026 page 48 lines 21-24, page 49 lines 6-8.

80.   January 16, 2026 page 43 lines 2-9.; Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B. N.B.: Investigative Progress Notes from April 23, 2024 have been obviously and inexplicably redacted.

81.   Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B. N.B.: Investigative Progress Notes from April 23, 2024 have been obviously and inexplicably redacted.

82.    Id.

83.    Id.

84.    Id.

85.    Id.

86.    Id.

87.    Id.

88.    Id.

89.    Id.

90.    Id.

91.    Id.

92.    Id.

93.    Id.

94.   Certified medical records from Four Winds Katonah, in evidence January 16, 2026 People's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Exhibit A.

95.    Id.

96.    Id.

97.   Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B.

98.    Id.

99.   Certified medical records from Four Winds Katonah, in evidence January 16, 2026 People's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Exhibit A.

100.   Certified medical records from Four Winds Katonah, in evidence January 16, 2026 People's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Exhibit A.

101.    Id.

102.    Id.

103.    Id.

104.    Id.

105.    Id.

106.    Id.

107.    Id.

108.    Id.

109.    Id.

110.    Id.

111.    Id.

112.    Id.

113.   The Court takes judicial notice of the orders in the family file concerning this family unit.

114.    Id.

115.    Id.

116.    Id.

117.    Id.

118.    Id.

119.   Presumably Ms. M. was mistaken about the date of this meeting, as the medical records indicate that it took place on June 3, 2024.

120.   February 19, 2026 page 82 lines 13-16.

121.   February 19, 2026 page 83, lines 4-16.

122.   February 19, 2026 page 84 lines 1-4.

123.   February 19, 2026 page 89 lines 7-14.

124.   February 19, 2026 page 102 lines 3-6.

125.   Certified medical records from Four Winds Katonah, in evidence January 16, 2026 People's Exhibit 1, Defendant's Exhibit A.

126.    Id.

127.    Id.

128.   June 28, 2024 at page 102 line 9, through page 104 Line 5.

129.   June 10, 2024 at page 37 line 1 through page 38 line 4.

130.   January 16, 2026 at page 52 lines 10-21.

131.   January 16, 2026 at page 54 lines 13.

132.   January 16, 2026 transcript at page 70, lines 17-19.

133.   January 16, 2026 transcript at pages 70, lines 20-25 and page 71 lines 3-4.

134.   January 16, 2026 transcript at lines 9-13.

135.   January 16 transcript at lines 14-16.

136.   January 16, 2026 transcript at page 71, lines 17-19.

137.   January 16, 2026 transcript at page 75, lines 16-21.

138.   January 16, 2026 transcript at page 74, line 18.

139.   January 16, 2026 transcript at page 52 line 17-18, page 73 line 22, page 74 lines 4-5, Certified records from Columbia County Department of Social Services, in evidence January 16, 2026, Defendant's Exhibit B.

140.   January 16, 2026 page 15 line 3-4, page 17 line 21-22, page 20 lines 3-4, page 27 lines 2-9, page 31 lines 6-7, page 32 lines 17-18, page 33 lines 15-22, page 35 lines 6-11, page 36 lines 17-19, page 37 lines 9-11, page 38 line 23-25, page 39 lines 10-17, page 40 line 20-25, page 41 line 12-25.

141.   January 16, 2026 page 46 lines 17-19.

142.   February 19, 2026 page 95 lines 20-25, page 96 lines 1-7.

143.   February 11, 2026 page 51 lines 5-25, page 52 lines 1-10.

144.   February 19, 2026 page 72 lines 23-25, page 73 lines 1-2.

145.   February 19, 2026 page 73 lines 19-21.

146.   February 19, 2026 page 72 lines 11-15.

147.   February 19, 2026 page 73 lines 6-15.

148.   February 19, 2026 page 79 line 2-3.

149.   February 19, 2026 page 79 line 11-15.

150.   February 19, 2026 page 87 lines 12-18.

151.   February 19, 2026 page 79 lines 18-25, page 80 lines 1-5.

152.   February 19, 2026 page 80, line 14-20.

153.   February 19, 2026 page 81 lines 2-16.

154.   February 19, 2026 page 85 lines 18-19, page 86 lines 7-22.

155.   February 19, 2026 page 86 lines 3-6.

156.   February 19, 2026 page 82 lines 1-7.

157.   February 19, 2026 page 88 lines 8-18.

158.   February 19, 2026 page 91 lines 7-10.

159.   February 19, 2026 page 103, lines 17-21.

160.   February 19, 2026 page 102 line 14.

161.   February 19, 2026 page 102 lines 15-18.

Michael C. Howard, J.