Concerning D.C., Appellant. v. << (2023)

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

¶ 1 D.C. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating the parent-child legal relationships with her children. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services filed a petition in dependency or neglect regarding then-newborn Z.J.F., then-one-year-old L.F., and then-three-year-old A.F. (the children). The Department alleged that mother had admitted to using methamphetamine while pregnant with Z.J.F. and that the family had been involved in a dependency and neglect action before A.F. was born. The children were kept in mother's custody under a safety plan that required the children and mother to continue living with paternal grandmother, who would supervise any contact between mother and the children.

¶ 3 About six months after the filing of the petition, the Department received a referral about concerns that A.F. was wandering unsupervised at father's apartment building, asking neighbors for food. After a hearing, the court found mother and father had violated the safety plan and granted temporary custody of the children to the Department for placement in foster care.

¶ 4 Mother entered a deferred adjudication with a “phase one” treatment plan that required her to comply with court orders, cooperate with the Department, and attend parenting time. A full “phase two” treatment plan was not adopted until six months later when her deferred adjudication was extended. This treatment plan required mother to maintain contact with the Department, provide a safe and stable environment, demonstrate protective parenting, address substance abuse, and participate in parenting time. An element requiring mother to participate in a domestic violence evaluation was held in abeyance — it is unclear from the record if or when this element went into effect.

¶ 5 Midway through the extended deferred period, the Department moved to revoke the deferred adjudication because mother had not complied with her treatment plan. After mother admitted noncompliance, the court adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.

¶ 6 The Department later moved to terminate mother's parental rights. Two years after the filing of the petition and following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion.

II. Termination of Parental Rights

A. Standard of Review and General Law

¶ 7 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent's conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2023; People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 10.

¶ 8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile court's findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. We review de novo the juvenile court's legal conclusions, including whether the Department engaged in reasonable efforts. See id.; People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8.

¶ 9 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and to assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). Accordingly, we set aside a trial court's factual findings only when they are “so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record.” Id. at 250 (citing People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo. 1982)).

B. Reasonable Efforts

1. Legal Framework

¶ 10 The state must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and reunite families following the out-of-home placement of abused or neglected children. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2023. “Reasonable efforts” means “the exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 11 To that end, services that are provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2023, are deemed to satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). The services which “must be available and provided” as determined by individual case planning include, among others, screening, assessment, home-based family and crisis counseling, information and referral services to assistance resources, visitation, and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Additional services must be made available based on funding, and include, among others, transportation, child care, diagnostic and mental health services, drug and alcohol treatment services, and family support services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶ 12 To evaluate whether a department made reasonable efforts, the court should consider whether the provided services were appropriate to support the parent's treatment plan. People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). But a department has “discretion to prioritize certain services or resources to address a family's most pressing needs in a way that will assist the family's overall completion of the treatment plan.” People in Interest of My.K.M., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. So, whether a department made reasonable efforts “must be measured holistically rather than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan objectives.” Id. at ¶ 35.

¶ 13 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the provided services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the treatment plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011). The court may therefore consider a parent's unwillingness to participate in treatment when determining whether a department made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

2. Analysis

¶ 14 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that the Department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation because (1) frequent changes in the caseworker assigned to the family prevented her from receiving adequate support from the Department and (2) frequent changes and delays in visitation services interfered with her ability to develop a meaningful parent-child bond with her children. We discern no error.

¶ 15 During the case, between five and nine caseworkers were assigned to mother. The caseworker who testified at the termination hearing had been assigned just four months before the hearing.

¶ 16 The juvenile court acknowledged that there “have been a lot of caseworkers” but determined that the Department had nonetheless provided reasonable efforts and resources. In doing so, the court found that the Department held family engagement meetings and staffings, reached out to mother, discussed the case with other professionals, gave mother a phone and bus passes, and provided referrals to life skills services, substance abuse evaluations, and a domestic violence evaluation.

¶ 17 The record supports these findings. The current caseworker testified the Department had held family engagement meetings, which mother had attended, and that she communicated with mother at least twice a month since taking over the case. The caseworker had spoken with the prior Department supervisor, the domestic violence evaluator, and the visitation supervisor assigned at the time of the hearing. The caseworker met mother to give her bus passes two weeks before the termination hearing. Referring to notes from prior caseworkers, the caseworker testified that (1) mother had been given a phone at the beginning of the case; (2) referrals for life skills services and a substance abuse evaluation had been made within the first month; and (3) a second referral for a substance abuse evaluation and a referral for a domestic violence evaluation were made about nine months after the case opened.

¶ 18 The juvenile court found that mother attended parenting time and that she had many visitation providers, but she was discharged due to her own “lack of engagement or communication.”

¶ 19 The record supports this finding. The caseworker, reviewing notes from prior caseworkers, testified that the family received ongoing visitation services from four different visitation centers: The Family Visitation Center, Kids Crossing, Palome, and New Horizon. The caseworker testified that her notes indicated mother missed three visits in a row, which terminated her services at the Family Visitation Center. Mother's visitation supervisor at Kids Crossing quit and the newly assigned supervisor was unable to make contact with mother, causing her to miss three visits in a row and lose services with that agency. Palome cancelled its services after five months for lack of attendance. Mother had been at New Horizon since the most recent caseworker had been assigned. Mother had previously lost services for lack of engagement; but, at the time of the termination hearing, she was attending visits twice per week for two hours at a time and was in good standing with New Horizon. In addition to those four visitation centers, the Department made referrals to four other visitation providers who declined the referrals or who never set up visitation, in large part because they could not accommodate the family's schedule.

¶ 20 Mother argues that the Department's failure to notify her about new caseworkers assigned to her, respond to her inquiries about the children, or meet with her outside of court to develop a relationship hindered her from establishing a relationship with the Department. Mother points to the Department's internal negligence in transferring cases among caseworkers as causing long lapses in referrals and support that she needed to be successful.

¶ 21 Mother testified regarding the impact that changing caseworkers and confusion around visitation centers had on her and her ability to work with the Department. She felt that she tried to communicate with the Department about her services and her children's needs but did not hear back. She testified that fewer caseworkers “would have helped a lot” because they might have communicated better or taken the time “to get to know what's really going on with us.” Mother testified that she did not understand why they had moved to so many visitation centers, and that each move required more paperwork and delay in seeing her children.

¶ 22 We acknowledge that the changes in caseworkers and visitation providers were disruptive for mother and the children. In fact, the juvenile court acknowledged the impacts of the changes in visitation providers and the Department's lack of communication. Nonetheless, the court determined that the efforts provided by the Department were reasonable, and that those efforts had been “tempered by [mother's] unwillingness or inability to engage.”

¶ 23 Specifically, the domestic violence evaluator testified that it took mother four attempted appointments to complete a partial evaluation. Mother never completed a substance abuse evaluation despite multiple referrals. The life skills referral closed for lack of engagement by mother. Mother testified that she completed a mental health evaluation and participated in therapeutic services for three or four months. However, the caseworker testified that mother's treatment provider reported that only an intake had been completed and mother never engaged in treatment.

¶ 24 Given this record support, we will not disturb the juvenile court's factual findings. And based on those findings — in particular, regarding mother's failure to consistently engage in the myriad of services the Department offered that were unrelated to visitation — we agree with the trial court that the Department satisfied its obligation to provide reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify the family.

III. Disposition

¶ 25 We affirm the judgment.

Opinion by JUDGE TOW

Furman and Johnson, JJ., concur JUDGE FURMAN and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.