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The People of the State of New York v. Bryan Medel Mendez, Defendant.
By way of an Omnibus Motion, dated August 30, 2026, Defendant moves for the following relief: (1) dismissal of both charges as facially insufficient; (2) preclusion of unnoticed statements; (3) a Sandoval/Ventimiglia/Molineux hearing; (4) Brady disclosures; and (5) a reservation of rights to file additional pretrial motions.
In rendering this Decision, the Court read and considered Defendant's Motion papers (notice of motion and Affirmation of David Arpino, Esq.), ADA Patrick Macarchuk's Affirmation in Opposition, dated September 16, 2026, and accompanying Memorandum of Law, and the accusatory instruments and supporting deposition of [A.G.G.]. Defendant did not submit a Reply.
I. Facial Insufficiency Claim
On May 26, 2026, Defendant was arraigned on one count of Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]), and one count of Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Penal Law § 260.10 [1]), based upon allegations that he intentionally caused physical injury to [A.G.G.] (hereinafter, [ ] or "complainant"), the mother of his child, on May 24, 2026, while in a vehicle with their three-month-old child ([G.M.G]) in the back seat.
The accusatory instruments (one for each charge) are each signed by Police Officer Rosario. They assert that on or about May 24, 2026, at approximately 12:30 am, at 67 Grant Avenue, White Plains, NY, during a verbal dispute inside of a vehicle, Defendant grabbed [A.G.G.] "by the left side of her hair, wrapped her hair around his fist, and pulled it forcefully while swinging her back and forth and slamming her toward the front passenger door." As this was happening, "the vehicle was still actively in motion, forcing the victim to hurriedly place the moving car into park." Thereafter, the defendant "grabbed" [A.G.G.] "by her left arm, and dragged her out of the vehicle, throwing her onto the ground." The third-degree assault accusatory instrument further alleges that defendant's actions caused [A.G.G.] "to suffer substantial pain and redness to her head and a physical injury in the form of a raised bump on the left side of her head." The Endangering the Welfare of a Child accusatory instrument alleges that defendant's actions "exposed the infant child to a substantial and immediate risk of physical and psychological harm."
The accusatory instruments are accompanied by [A.G.G.]'s sworn statement. In the statement, she attests that she and defendant (the father of her three-month-old daughter [G.M.G.]) were having a verbal disagreement, during which each was yelling, cursing, and insulting the other. Defendant called her a "b****" and stupid. At the time and place of the incident, they were in a car and pulling into the home driveway when the argument "escalated." Defendant "quickly raise[d] his right hand with his phone," and [A.G.G.] was frightened he "was going to hit" her. She "put up one hand to cover [her] face and hit him with the other hand." [A.G.G.] further alleges:
That [p***ed] Bryan off even more. Bryan grabbed the left side of my hair and began pulling it really hard. I'm pretty sure he wrapped my hair around his fist. When Bryan did this, I was in substantial pain and was telling him to let me go. He was telling me to "stop punching him," but I wasn't even trying to punch him at this time, Bryan was swinging me back and forth while he was gripping my hair and slamming me toward the front passenger door. During this, Bryan wasn't paying attention because of what he was doing to me, and the car was still moving. So, I tried to put the car in park, and eventually, I was able to. The car jumped when it parked and made a weird noise when I did that. [G.M.G.] was in the rear seat of the car during this entire altercation. During this entire altercation, I was scared and afraid. I was fearful for the safety of myself and my daughter. I felt like Bryan was going to hurt me really bad.
After that, I was able to open the front passenger-side door. I think he thought I was trying to go to the back to get [G.M.G.]. So, Bryan let go of my hair and got out of the car; I think he got out so he could get [G.M.G.] first. I didn't even get out of the car. Instead, I jumped to the driver's seat and locked the doors so Bryan couldn't come back in. However, Bryan still had his car keys on him, so he was able to unlock the door. Bryan came to the driver's seat, where I was sitting at the time. He had a big smile on his face and said something like, "You're so dumb. I still have the keys." That's when he opened the driver's door, grabbed my left arm, and dragged me out of the car. Bryan threw me on the floor and let go of me. While I was still on the floor, Bryan spit on my face. He was yelling at me, cursing at me, and insulting me. He was calling me insults in Spanish like "[p***]" and "pendeja," which translate into "[b****]" and "stupid."
[A.G.G.] Sworn Statement, dated May 24, 2026. [A.G.G.] further alleged that at the time of her statement, she had "a bump on [her] head, pain, and redness on the left side of [her] head, which is where [defendant] grabbed [her] by [her] hair." Id. She stated that she would seek medical treatment if she kept experiencing the pain. Id.
Defendant challenges the facial sufficiency of the third-degree assault charge and moves for its dismissal. He contends that the allegations in the accusatory instrument do not adequately establish the element of "physical injury" because they do not support the "impairment of any physical condition" and [A.G.G.]'s "mere invocation of the term substantial pain" is not supported by "objective facts" such as a description of the pain or a need for medical treatment (Arpino Aff., ¶¶ 22-29). Defendant argues that the charge for Endangering the Welfare of a Child is also facially insufficient because there are no factual allegations that the "infant perceived, reacted to, or was affected by the events" (id. at ¶ 31), or that there was a likelihood of physical harm. For the latter point, Defendant highlights that the accusatory instrument does not set forth the speed of the vehicle, whether the child was restrained in a car seat, if there was a "near-collision," or Defendant's knowledge of the likelihood of harm (id. at ¶ 32).
In response, the People argue that [A.G.G.]'s supporting deposition provides non-hearsay allegations establishing probable cause that Defendant committed each offense.
It is well-settled that the factual part of a misdemeanor information must allege " 'facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges' (CPL 100.15 [3]; see, CPL 100.40 [1] [a]); that the 'allegations of the factual part ... together with those of any supporting depositions ... provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged' (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]); and that the '[n]on-hearsay allegations [of the information and supporting depositions] establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof' (CPL 100.40 [1] [c]; see, CPL 100.15 [3])." People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000); see also People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 (1986). " 'Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense' exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it." CPL § 70.10 (2). Thus, the prima facie case standard for an accusatory instrument is less demanding than "the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial." People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680-681 (1999) (citations omitted). It is also lower than the legally sufficient evidence standard required to survive a motion to dismiss at trial. People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 (2009).
For this reason, the allegations in an information "should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey, 95 NY2d at 360 (citations omitted). The information need not "contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charge"; rather, it must only provide facts sufficient to "give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense . . . and prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense." People v McConnell, 11 Misc 3d 57, 60 (App Term, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2006); Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 (2010) ("The test is, simply, whether the accusatory instrument failed to supply defendant with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy."). Additionally, in analyzing the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, the People are entitled to rely on the fair inferences to be drawn from the facts contained therein. See Casey, 95 NY2d at 360.
The accusatory instruments here satisfy that standard. Assault in the Third Degree is committed when, "[w]ith the intent to cause physical injury to another person, a person causes such injury to such person or to a third person." Penal Law § 120.00 (1). Thus, the elements include (1) intent to cause physical injury to a person, and (2) actually causing physical injury to that person or another. Penal Law § 10.00 (9) defines the "physical injury" element as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain." "Substantial pain," in turn, is "a term which simply means 'more than slight or trivial pain.' " People v McIntyre, 61 Misc 3d 127(A), 2018 NY Slip Op 51347(U) (App Term, 1st Dept 2018) (citing People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 [2007]). Here, [A.G.G.]'s sworn statement provides non-hearsay allegations establishing those elements. She avers that while they were having an argument, Defendant grabbed her hair and "began pulling it really hard." Although she was telling him to let her go, he was "swinging [her] back and forth" by the hair, and "slamming [her] toward the front passenger door." [A.G.G.] averred that she was in "substantial pain" from these actions. She further asserted that Defendant pulled her out of the car by her arm and threw her on the ground. He spit on her face, and continued to yell at, curse, and insult [A.G.G.]. As a result of all of this, [A.G.G.] sustained a "bump" on her head, "pain," and "redness" on the left side of her head.
Accordingly, the allegation of physical injury is supported by more than just the invocation of the term "substantial pain," contrary to Defendant's argument. There are allegations of physical manifestations of the injury, including a bump on her head and redness to the side of her head. Further, there are allegations of the actions Defendant engaged in, during a heated argument, which are of the type that one would expect to produce more than slight or trivial pain. Based on the totality of facts alleged, there is reasonable cause for the Court to infer that Defendant caused [A.G.G.] to suffer "substantial pain." See Henderson, 92 NY2d at 681 (accusatory instrument "must be deemed sufficient to constitute 'physical injury' " where it contained "allegations of substantial pain, swelling and contusions following kicks").
That [A.G.G.] had not sought medical treatment at the time of the accusatory instrument's drafting does not undermine the Court's conclusion that physical injury was sufficiently alleged. Receiving medical treatment is a factor, not a prerequisite for a facially sufficient allegation of physical injury. See Chiddick, 8 NY3d at 447-448. Defendant's motion to dismiss the third-degree assault charge for facial insufficiency is DENIED.
The second accusatory instrument charges Defendant with one count of Endangering the Welfare of a Child. As relevant here, a person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when he "knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than seventeen years old." Penal Law § 260.10 (1). "A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists." Penal Law § 15.05 (2). In other words, "a defendant must simply be aware that the conduct may likely result in harm to a child." People v Johnson, 95 NY2d 368, 372 (2000) (emphasis in original). Actual harm to the child does not need to result before criminal liability may attach. People v Chang, 25 Misc 3d 1213(A), 2009 NY Slip Op 52047(U), *3 (Crim Ct, Queens Co 2009) (citing Johnson, 95 NY2d at 371). However, the harm alleged must be likely to occur, not merely possible. People v Hitchcock, 98 NY2d 586, 591 (2002). Finally, the relevant conduct need not be directed at the child who is likely to be harmed. Id., citing Johnson, 95 NY2d at 371-72.
Applying these principles, the Endangering the Welfare of a Child charge is facially sufficient. The age element is plainly satisfied: the accusatory instrument and supporting deposition allege that [G.M.G.] was three months old. As to the remaining elements, [A.G.G.]'s non-hearsay allegations, given the fair and not overly technical reading the law requires, establish the following. At approximately 12:30 a.m., Defendant, [A.G.G.], and their infant daughter were in a car pulling into the family's driveway, with the child seated in the rear. [A.G.G.] was in the front passenger seat, and it is a fair inference from her account—she was slammed "toward the front passenger door" and later "jumped to the driver's seat"—that Defendant was driving. While the car was "still moving," Defendant grabbed [A.G.G.] by the hair, wrapped it around his fist, and swung her back and forth, slamming her toward the passenger door. According to [A.G.G.], Defendant "wasn't paying attention because of what he was doing to [her], and the car was still moving," so she "tried to put the car in park, and eventually, [she] was able to." When she did so, "[t]he car jumped when it parked and made a weird noise." [G.M.G.] was in the rear seat "during this entire altercation." Thereafter, when [A.G.G.] moved to the driver's seat and locked the doors, Defendant used his keys to unlock the car, opened the driver's door, dragged her out by the arm, threw her to the ground, and spit on her face, all while yelling at, cursing, and insulting her.
These allegations, if true, establish that Defendant acted in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical welfare of the child. A driver who turns his attention and his hands away from a moving vehicle to grab, swing, and slam his front-seat passenger has, for that period, effectively relinquished control of the vehicle. The allegations that the car continued to move until [A.G.G.], from the passenger seat, was "eventually" able to force it into park (and that the car "jumped" when she did) support a reasonable inference that the vehicle was moving with no one in control of it, exposing the infant in the rear seat to the risk of a collision or of the very kind of abrupt, uncontrolled stop that in fact occurred. The violent struggle, moreover, took place within the same confined passenger compartment that the infant occupied. On these allegations, the risk of physical harm to the child was not remote or speculative; it was the likely consequence of the conduct alleged. See Hitchcock, 98 NY2d at 591.
The allegations also permit the inference that Defendant acted knowingly. Defendant is the child's father; he was driving the family home; and his three-month-old daughter was seated in the rear of the very vehicle he was operating. A person who knows that his infant child is a passenger in a moving car, and who nonetheless diverts his attention from driving to assault the child's mother, may fairly be found to have been aware "that the conduct may likely result in harm to a child." Johnson, 95 NY2d at 372. As with intent, a defendant's knowledge may be inferred from the conduct itself and the surrounding circumstances, cf. People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 (1977), and an accusatory instrument need not recite a defendant's admission of awareness in order to allege that element sufficiently.
Defendant's contention that the instrument is deficient because it does not specify the speed of the vehicle, whether the child was restrained in a car seat, or whether there was a "near-collision" (Arpino Aff., ¶ 32) misapprehends the pleading standard. An information is not required to anticipate and negate every circumstance that might have reduced the risk to the child; it must allege facts of an evidentiary character that, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, establish every element of the offense. Casey, 95 NY2d at 360. The vehicle's precise speed, whether and how the infant was secured, and how near the car came to striking anything are matters for trial, where Defendant will be free to argue that they diminished the danger. They are not facts the People must plead to give Defendant notice sufficient to prepare a defense and to protect him against being tried twice for the same offense. See id. Nor is a collision, or a "near-collision," an element of the offense: the statute requires that the conduct be likely to result in harm, not that harm, or a narrowly averted harm, actually occur. Johnson, 95 NY2d at 371. People v Cruz, 152 Misc 2d 436 (Crim Ct, NY Co 1991), is instructive. There, the court held facially sufficient an endangering charge alleging that the defendant drove while intoxicated with two small children as passengers, even though the complaint alleged no erratic driving or near-collision. The court reasoned that the statute "does not require that the potential of harm to which the child is subjected be actually realized," and that "[i]t takes little imagination" to recognize the likelihood of harm to child passengers of a driver who cannot properly control his vehicle. Id. at 439-440. The allegations here are more direct: [A.G.G.] avers that Defendant "wasn't paying attention" to the moving vehicle at all because he was assaulting her, so that she had to force the car into park herself.
Defendant's further argument—that the instrument fails to allege that the "infant perceived, reacted to, or was affected by the events" (Arpino Aff., ¶ 31)—fares no better. The mental state the statute requires is the defendant's, not the child's; it is Defendant's awareness of the likelihood of harm that must be alleged. See Johnson, 95 NY2d at 372. And because actual harm need not result, the People were not required to allege that the infant was in fact affected. Id. at 371. Further, because the allegations sufficiently establish a likelihood of injury to the child's physical welfare, the Court need not decide whether they would independently establish a likelihood of injury to her mental welfare, the theory to which Defendant's perception argument is principally directed.
Finally, Defendant argues that if keeping an unsecured handgun concealed in a home with children does not amount to endangering the welfare of a child, then "a low-speed arrival in the family driveway with an infant seated in the rear, motion ended . . . by the complainant shifting the transmission into park" cannot suffice either (Arpino Aff., ¶ 32). The argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, it rests on a misreading of Hitchcock, in which the Court of Appeals decided two appeals together. In the lead appeal, the Court affirmed an endangering conviction where the defendant kept numerous firearms, none of them locked, in a home where children lived, and two boys took one of the guns from an open tray in a doorless room. Hitchcock, 98 NY2d at 590-591. It was in the companion appeal, People v Duenas, that the Court found the evidence legally insufficient, because the defendant had "made a significant effort to conceal" the handgun inside a speaker in his bedroom closet, there was "no evidence that any other family member knew the gun was in the house," and the defendant "himself was not aware that his brother knew that the gun was in the apartment." Id. at 591-592. Hitchcock thus does not hold that an unsecured firearm in a home with children cannot support the charge. It holds that the outcome turns on the particular facts bearing on the likelihood of harm and the defendant's awareness of it.
Second, Hitchcock and Duenas were decided on review of the legal sufficiency of trial evidence—whether, viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the People, a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 590. This motion presents a different and considerably less demanding question: whether the non-hearsay allegations of the accusatory instrument, if true, establish every element of the offense and provide reasonable cause to believe that Defendant committed it. As noted above, that standard is lower than both the trial burden of proof and the legally sufficient evidence standard. Henderson, 92 NY2d at 680; Kalin, 12 NY3d at 230. A holding that a trial record failed to establish a likelihood of harm says little about whether an information adequately alleges one.
Third, the facts are materially different. In Duenas, any harm to a child depended on a chain of contingencies that the defendant had taken affirmative steps to prevent—that a child would discover a hidden weapon, retrieve it, and mishandle it—and the defendant was unaware that any child knew the weapon existed. The risk was latent, and the defendant's awareness of it was not shown. Here, by contrast, the risk alleged was immediate, was created by Defendant's own active conduct, and arose in the child's physical presence, with the child's location known to him: Defendant is alleged to have abandoned control of a moving vehicle in which his infant daughter was riding in order to assault her mother, leaving it to the mother to bring the car to a stop. Defendant's characterization of the episode as a "low-speed arrival" that ended when the complainant shifted into park is a view of the facts he may urge at trial. It is not, however, the reading the Court must give the accusatory instrument on this motion, where the allegations are taken as true and the People are entitled to the fair inferences they support. See Casey, 95 NY2d at 360. Indeed, the very allegation on which Defendant relies—that the car came to rest only because the complainant, while being assaulted, managed to force it into park—underscores that no one was in control of the vehicle while the infant was aboard. Cf. People v Villatoro, 44 Misc 3d 133(A), 2014 NY Slip Op 51157(U) (App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014) (evidence legally sufficient to sustain endangering conviction where defendant's attack on a mother caused the stroller holding her seven-month-old son to tip and, at one point, to be in the path of oncoming traffic).
Accordingly, the Endangering the Welfare of a Child accusatory instrument, together with [A.G.G.]'s supporting deposition, is facially sufficient. Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of Endangering the Welfare of a Child for facial insufficiency is DENIED.
II. Preclusion of Statements (CPL 710.30)
When the People intend to offer at trial evidence of a statement made by a defendant to a public servant, they must serve notice of that intention within fifteen days after arraignment (CPL 710.30 [1] [a], [2]). Absent timely notice, or a showing of good cause for late service, such evidence may not be received (CPL 710.30 [3]; People v O'Doherty, 70 NY2d 479 [1987]).
The People concede that they never served a CPL 710.30 statement notice in this case and that preclusion is warranted. Accordingly, this branch of the motion is GRANTED, and the People are precluded from offering on their direct case at trial any statement made by Defendant to a public servant within the meaning of CPL 710.30 (1) (a).
III. Sandoval, Ventimiglia, and Molineux
On the People's consent, this branch of the motion is GRANTED. The People shall disclose any prior criminal, vicious, or immoral conduct they intend to use at trial, whether to impeach Defendant's credibility or as substantive proof, no later than fifteen days before trial (CPL 245.10 [1] [b]; 245.20 [3]). A Sandoval hearing (People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) and, if the People give notice of an intention to offer such evidence on their direct case, a Molineux/Ventimiglia hearing (People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 [1901]; People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 [1981]), shall be held immediately before trial.
IV. Brady/Vilardi Disclosure
The People acknowledge their continuing obligation to disclose favorable evidence under Brady v Maryland (373 US 83 [1963]) and its progeny. The People are reminded that this obligation, and their statutory obligation under CPL 245.20 (1) (k), is not limited to material in the prosecutor's file. Under CPL 245.20 (2), all items and information in the possession of a New York State or local police or law enforcement agency are deemed to be in the People's possession (see also Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 437 [1995]).
This branch of the motion is GRANTED to the extent that the People are directed to comply fully and timely with their disclosure obligations under Brady, Giglio v United States (405 US 150 [1972]), People v Vilardi (76 NY2d 67 [1990]), People v Geaslen (54 NY2d 510 [1981]), CPL 245.20 (1) (k), and the continuing duty to disclose under CPL 245.60.
V. Reservation of Rights
Defendant's request to reserve the right to make additional motions is DENIED. Any further pretrial motion must comply with CPL 255.20, and the Court will entertain such a motion only upon a showing of good cause or as otherwise authorized by CPL 255.20 (3).
VI. Other Relief
To the extent not specifically addressed above, the remaining relief requested is DENIED.
DATED: October 27, 2026
White Plains, NY
ORDERED:
HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD
WHITE PLAINS CITY COURT JUDGE
Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.
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Docket No: Docket No. CR-04707-26
Decided: October 27, 2026
Court: City Court, New York,
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