YWCA LLC v. Stacey Murray, Respondent-Tenant. (2026)

The instant matter is a summary holdover proceeding. Petitioner-Landlord, YWCA Residence LLC ("Petitioner"), seeks to recover possession of Room [REDACTED] at 69 North Broadway, White Plains, New York (the "Premises") from Respondent-Tenant, Stacey Murray ("Respondent"), on the ground that Respondent repeatedly violated the terms of her residential lease, the Resident Agreement, and the Tenant Handbook. Respondent opposes and argues that (1) the evidence did not establish good cause for eviction, and (2) the proceeding is retaliatory under Real Property Law ("RPL") § 223-b. In the alternative, Respondent seeks a post-judgment cure period under RPAPL 753(4). Petitioner also seeks an award of use and occupancy.

A trial was conducted before this Court on May 20, 2026, June 15, 2026 and July 14, 2026. The parties presented oral argument on July 14, 2026, and additional argument on August 21, 2026. In rendering this decision, the Court considered all of the foregoing, as well as the following written submissions:

Respondent's Post-Trial Memorandum, dated July 14, 2026, (hereinafter "Respondent's Post-Trial Mem.");

Petitioner's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Respondent's Post-Trial Motion to Dismiss, dated July 28, 2026 (hereinafter "Petitioner's Mem.");

Affirmation of Maria C. Corrao, Esq., dated August 31, 2026, and accompanying exhibits;

Post-Trial Affirmation of Claudia Sutherland, Esq., dated September 11, 2026 (hereinafter "Sutherland Post-Trial Aff."), and accompanying exhibits;

Sur-Reply Affirmation of Maria C. Corrao, Esq., dated September 21, 2026 (hereinafter, "Corrao Sur-Reply Aff.), and accompanying exhibits;

Tenant Ledger, Copy of Money Orders, and October 2, 2026 email from Maria C. Corrao, Esq.; and

Email from Claudia Sutherland, Esq., dated October 2, 2026.

Prior to the commencement of trial, the petition was amended, without objection, to add incidents that occurred on February 20, 2026, March 13, 2026, and March 28, 2026, all of which post-dated the October 22, 2025 Notice of Termination (Tr. of May 20, 2026, at 2-3). For the reasons that follow, Petitioner is awarded a final judgment of possession.

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. The Tenancy and the Notice of Termination

The evidence at trial established that Respondent was a month-to-month tenant at the YWCA Residence,¹ located at 69 North Broadway in White Plains. She has lived there for three years. The most recent lease commenced on June 9, 2024 for room [REDACTED]. When it expired in June 2025, she was not offered a renewal.

Under the terms of the lease, Respondent could not engage in "serious or repeated interference with the rights and quiet enjoyment of other tenants," and was required to abide by the Resident Agreement and Tenant Handbook, both of which prohibit "verbal or physical aggression, threats, assault, bullying or stalking toward residents or staff" (Petitioner's Exhibit 1 [Lease], ¶¶ 9, 11, 15B, and 23; Petitioner's Exhibit 2 [Resident Agreement], ¶ 13; Petitioner's Exhibit 3 [Tenant Handbook], at 12). Pursuant to the lease, a violation of these terms constitutes good cause to commence eviction proceedings.

On October 22, 2025, Respondent was personally served with a 90-Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy (the "Notice") (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). The Notice terminated the tenancy as of midnight on January 20, 2026, and asserted that Respondent had violated paragraphs 9, 11, 15B and 23 of the Lease, paragraph 13 of the Resident Agreement, and the terms of the Tenant Handbook. It annexed incident reports setting forth the alleged violations.

B. Incidents Preceding the Notice

At trial, Petitioner presented evidence of five incidents that pre-dated the Notice.

July 9, 2025

On July 9, 2025, Respondent attended an Activities of Daily Living Workshop at the Residence. While there, she made "loud remarks" that the elderly and those with mental disabilities "stink." Respondent also complained that the workshop was a waste of time because the people who needed it were not in attendance. Respondent was asked to leave, and she did. This incident was witnessed by Michelle King, Petitioner's Property Manager.

Management sent Respondent a memorandum advising her that her comments during the workshop were "inappropriate, made others feel uncomfortable, and will not be tolerated within the residence" (Petitioner's Exhibit 5). Respondent did not recall this incident.

July 11, 2025

On July 11, 2025, Ms. King and Toni Tweedy, Respondent's caseworker, were in the lobby of the Residence for a donation distribution. They observed Respondent cutting the line and taking donations when it was not her turn. Another resident made a comment to Respondent, and Respondent replied, using a profanity, that the resident should mind her own business. A heated argument ensued. Respondent, who was "hyped up," threw her belongings to the floor, got into the other resident's face, and asked her to "go outside," a phrase Ms. Tweedy recognized as an invitation to a physical altercation. Both Ms. King and Ms. Tweedy had to intervene to separate Respondent from the other resident. An incident report documented this incident (Petitioner's Exhibit 5).

Respondent did not offer any testimony about this particular incident. She testified generally that she had never been "physical" with any tenants or staff.

September 3, 2025

On September 3, 2025, Respondent entered the office of Agnes Huertas, the Awakenings Clinical Case Manager at the Residence. Respondent threatened to "beat up" another resident and said Ms. Huertas would be "in trouble" if Ms. Huertas and the resident did not stop "talking about" Respondent. Ms. Huertas prepared an incident report documenting the interaction (Petitioner's Exhibit 9).

September 10, 2025

On September 10, 2025, Ms. Huertas noticed alcohol bottles on the patio. As she was discussing the issue with a security guard, Respondent interjected and stated in a "loud aggressive manner," in sum and substance: "Awakenings girls are the ones in the patio relapsing. Half of your girls are relapsing. Focus on them." Ms. Huertas completed an incident report (Petitioner's Exhibit 9), not because of what Respondent said, but because of the bottles on the patio.

September 17, 2025

On September 17, 2025, Respondent confronted Ms. Huertas at the Residence's front desk. She demanded to know "what type of empowerment are you doing?" and why a member of the Awakenings group had to leave the facility. Ms. Huertas told Respondent that Respondent did not know all of the facts and that it was not her business. During the interaction Respondent was aggressive, hostile, and screaming. Ms. Huertas had to retreat to her office to de-escalate the situation. She wrote an incident report (Petitioner's Exhibit 5), and Respondent was thereafter served with a 10-day notice to cure (Petitioner's Exhibit 6).

Respondent admitted that she confronted Ms. Huertas and asked, "what kind of empowerment are you running?" She testified that at the time she did not know the other woman had been terminated from the program, and she was concerned that the woman had been evicted without court process. Respondent explained that she was worried that if it could happen to that person, it could happen to anyone. To the extent that Respondent testified that she was not upset during her conversation with Ms. Huertas and was not yelling, the Court does not credit that testimony.

C. Incidents Following the Notice

After Respondent was served with the Notice on October 22, 2025, additional incidents occurred.

February 20, 2026

On February 20, 2026, Hester Mitchell was present for a donation distribution at the Sisters Village in the Residence. Respondent was assisting Ms. Mitchell with the distribution by handing out tickets to residents. An argument ensued between Respondent and Christine, another resident. Ms. Mitchell did not hear how it began, but she saw Respondent walk toward Christine in an "aggressive manner," tell Christine to "shut the f--- up," and threaten to "break [Christine's] neck." Ms. Mitchell had to separate the two. Christine left and called the police. Ms. Mitchell prepared an incident report documenting the situation (Petitioner's Exhibit 10).

Respondent testified that she had been helping Ms. Mitchell with the donation distribution when Christine, with whom she had a "prior situation," used profanity. To the extent Respondent testified that she responded to Christine in the same manner in which she spoke in court while testifying, and that she had not been separated from Christine, the Court does not credit that testimony.

March 13, 2026

On March 13, 2026, Respondent arrived late to a donation distribution. Ms. Mitchell testified that during a donation distribution, also called a workshop, donations from various sources, such as Target, are distributed to residents on a first-come, first-served basis. Residents take a ticket before the workshop begins, and when it is their turn to select from the donations, their number is called. If someone is not present when called, or arrives after the workshop begins, she is placed on a stand-by list. Individuals on stand-by are not given tickets. Ms. Mitchell told Respondent she was on stand-by and asked her to go to the side of the room and sit down. Respondent refused. When Ms. Mitchell told Respondent she did not need a ticket for stand-by, Respondent began to yell at her and forcefully demanded to be given a ticket or to be placed on a list. Respondent behaved in this manner within five feet of Ms. Mitchell. Ms. Mitchell removed herself from Respondent's vicinity and reported the incident to management. An incident report documented the altercation (Petitioner's Exhibit 11).

When Respondent testified about this incident, she explained that the stand-by policy was new, and that the change bothered her because she felt management was not being consistent in how donations were distributed to residents.

March 28, 2026

On Saturday, March 28, 2026,² Paul DellaDonna, who performs maintenance for the Residence, was called in for an emergency. A clogged sewer main had backed up and caused flooding in some of the apartments. He encountered Respondent in the hall, walking toward him while "screaming" and "yelling" about a smoke detector sounding upstairs. Mr. DellaDonna told her he was dealing with the flood, but that someone else would come by later to address the smoke detector. Respondent continued to yell at Mr. DellaDonna for approximately ten minutes, complaining that he was there and not doing anything. She followed him to the front desk and continued to yell while he was attempting to speak with security personnel. During this "aggressive" interaction, Respondent berated Mr. DellaDonna, claiming he did not do any work around the Residence.

Respondent called the Fire Department. The smoke detector was malfunctioning, not alerting to a fire. Mr. DellaDonna's assistant, who had arrived by that time, went with the Fire Department to remove the chirping device, which was replaced the following day. Mr. DellaDonna continued to address the flooding. As he explained, emergencies such as flooding take precedence over a malfunctioning smoke detector. The incident was documented in a report (Petitioner's Exhibit 8), and Respondent was given a notice to cure (Petitioner's Exhibit 7).

Respondent testified that she did not know about the flood. When she saw Mr. DellaDonna, she asked him to fix a chirping smoke detector in the room next to hers. He told her he was not there for that, and she called him a "rude ass." At the front desk, Mr. DellaDonna asked security whether Respondent had put in a work order. Respondent testified that it was not her room that needed the work, and that she called the Fire Department. Respondent acknowledged that she was upset and raised her voice during this altercation. She stated that there are frequently delays in getting things fixed because residents must submit work orders and cannot contact Mr. DellaDonna directly.

The incident was partially witnessed by Vanessa Ellis, a resident who testified for Respondent. Ms. Ellis works long hours during the week and frequently runs errands on weekends. On this day, while walking by at a distance, she heard Respondent and others being "loud" at the front desk. Ms. Ellis characterized it as "raised voices," not screaming. She could not make out what was being said because the participants were on the other side of a window, but she described one of the Residence workers as being a "smart ass" or "sarcastic" based on the way he was holding his body. She witnessed only a brief moment of the incident. Ms. Ellis stated that Respondent speaks up when she thinks something is wrong, but that others may not like how Respondent expresses herself.

D. Evidence Concerning Retaliation and Habitability

Respondent testified that she believed the Notice was retaliation for her complaints to staff and her involvement in the Sisters Advisory Committee, a tenant advocacy group that formerly existed at the Residence, which was started by the individual that is currently Petitioner's Chief Operating Officer. Respondent was a member for approximately six to twelve months before the group disbanded sometime after its final monthly meeting in January 2026, due to lack of resident involvement. She attended approximately three or four meetings.

To establish her involvement in the group, Respondent presented a February 2026 email between herself and Cheryl Hewitt, the group's last president, in which Ms. Hewitt shared a draft communication addressed to all residents concerning issues discussed at the group's January 29, 2026 meeting (Respondent's Exhibit A). Respondent stated that she did not submit any work orders requesting repairs in connection with any of the issues covered in the email.

Respondent also testified that she was one of the members of the group who met with the Chief Operating Officer of the Residence on May 8, 2025 to discuss concerns regarding mental health issues, residents not feeling safe, and cameras in the hallways. That meeting followed a letter from an attorney retained by members of the group to the YWCA's Chief Executive Officer. Respondent said the meeting did not bring about any changes.

Respondent testified that she also complained about conditions at the Residence to a government agency. She first said it was the Department of Social Services that she called sometime in 2025 to register an oral complaint about mold, staff only "half cleaning" the facility, rent increases, and the decision to stop providing complimentary soap, toilet paper and paper towels in the common bathrooms. She specifically denied raising her complaint with a building inspector. When she resumed the stand on another day, Respondent adjusted her testimony and asserted that it was actually the White Plains Department of Buildings that she called, and that she never heard back. Respondent acknowledged that the lease did not provide for complimentary bathroom supplies, but she did not think it was right for the Residence to stop providing them.

Respondent testified that there were rodents in the facility, but she did not provide details concerning where, when, and how frequently she encountered them (other than describing it as "regularly"), whether she notified staff, or what response, if any, staff provided. Mr. DellaDonna testified that an exterminator treats the property every Friday.

Respondent introduced a photograph she took of a hallway vent in the winter of 2025 depicting a black substance she believed to be mold (Respondent's Exhibit B). She did not submit a work order concerning that vent. Respondent testified that her room also had mold and that she complained to staff. In response, sometime in 2025 Mr. DellaDonna and Angela (the Director) took a sample from Respondent's window, and about a week later took a second sample for testing. The area was cleaned. Mr. DellaDonna did not recall the results of the tests; Respondent testified that Angela told her the tests showed it "wasn't mold" or was just "common mold." She asserted that it must have been mold because her own doctor had determined that she is allergic to mold. Respondent did not present any test results or medical records.

Respondent testified that the refrigerator in her "cluster" kitchen has been broken since June 2024, and submitted a photograph depicting a small tear along a portion of the door seal (Respondent's Exhibit C). She did not identify whether the defect affected the refrigerator's ability to maintain its temperature. She never submitted a work order but told her caseworker about it sometime in 2025.

Finally, Respondent presented a photograph of the kitchen island in her cluster showing the countertop resting on the island on a diagonal, exposing the drawers beneath (Respondent's Exhibit D). Respondent initially testified that the countertop had been in that condition "for quite some time" despite numerous work orders. On questioning, she clarified that the countertop had been loose for approximately six months but had not been sitting diagonally during that time; that she moved it into that position to take the photograph in November 2025, which she shared with staff along with a work order; that her November 2025 work order was the first she had submitted; and that she had no first-hand knowledge of whether other members of her cluster had previously requested a repair. The countertop was repaired within two days of her request.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Governing Good-Cause Standard

The Premises is operated as a Low-Income Housing Tax Credit ("LIHTC") residence subject to a regulatory agreement with the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (Petitioner's Exhibit 1 [Lease]; Petitioner's Mem. at 3; Respondent's Post-Trial Mem. at 2). As a condition of the credit, the owner of a LIHTC project must enter into an extended low-income housing commitment that prohibits "the eviction or the termination of tenancy (other than for good cause) of an existing tenant of any low-income unit" (26 USC § 42[h][6][E][ii][I]). Paragraph 23 of the Lease likewise conditions termination on good cause.

Both parties measure good cause by reference to 24 CFR 247.3 (Petitioner's Mem. at 3; Respondent's Post-Trial Mem. at 2), and the Court does the same.³ That regulation permits termination for "[m]aterial noncompliance with the rental agreement" (24 CFR 247.3[a][1]), which "includes":

(1) One or more substantial violations of the rental agreement; [or] (2) Repeated minor violations of the rental agreement that: (i) Disrupt the livability of the project, (ii) Adversely affect the health or safety of any person or the right of any tenant to the quiet enjoyment of the leased premises and related project facilities, (iii) Interfere with the management of the project, or (iv) Have an adverse financial effect on the project.

24 CFR 247.3(c)(1), (2).

The "rental agreement" includes "valid rules and regulations adopted by the landlord pursuant to a written agreement" (24 CFR 247.2). The Resident Agreement and the Tenant Handbook, which the Lease requires Respondent to follow, are therefore part of the rental agreement for purposes of this analysis. Petitioner bears the burden of establishing good cause by a preponderance of the credible evidence.

B. The Scope of the Conduct the Court May Consider

Before reaching the merits, the Court must determine what conduct Petitioner may rely upon. Respondent concedes that she consented to the amendment of the petition to add the three 2026 incidents (Sutherland Post-Trial Aff. ¶ 3) but argues that the sufficiency of Petitioner's claim must be measured by the conduct set forth in the Notice, and that the 2026 incidents may be considered only if the noticed conduct independently suffices (id. ¶¶ 5, 9, 12-13). Petitioner responds that Respondent's consent places the 2026 incidents properly before the Court, that post-termination conduct is relevant to prove a pattern, and that Respondent waived any challenge to the Notice by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense (Corrao Sur-Reply Aff. ¶¶ 5-14). Neither position is entirely correct.

1. 24 CFR 247.6(b)

The federal regulation on which the parties rely addresses the question directly. Under the heading "Limitations on allegations of new grounds," it provides:

In any judicial action instituted to evict the tenant, the landlord must rely on grounds which were set forth in the termination notice served on the tenant under this subpart. The landlord shall not, however, be precluded from relying on grounds about which he or she had no knowledge at the time the termination notice was sent.

24 CFR 247.6(b).

Two features of this text are significant. First, the regulation limits the grounds on which a landlord may rely — the basis on which the tenancy was terminated — not the evidence by which a noticed ground may be proven. The ground set forth in the Notice is material noncompliance with specified provisions of the Lease, the Resident Agreement, and the Tenant Handbook, established through a course of aggressive and threatening conduct. Evidence that the same course of conduct continued is proof of that ground, not a new one.

Second, the savings clause for grounds of which the landlord "had no knowledge at the time the termination notice was sent" does not permit the 2026 incidents to serve as independent grounds here. The clause is most naturally read to reach pre-notice conduct that the landlord later discovers. Whatever its outer reach, conduct that had not yet occurred cannot have been a ground for a termination that had already taken effect. The Notice terminated Respondent's tenancy as of midnight on January 20, 2026. Each of the 2026 incidents occurred after that date, and after the petition dated February 13, 2026 was filed. Those incidents therefore cannot supply the cause for ending a tenancy that had ended before they occurred.

Moreover, the regulation expressly preserves any state-law procedural protections that are "in addition to those provided by this subpart" (24 CFR 247.6[c]). New York supplies such a protection. A proper predicate notice is a condition precedent to a summary proceeding, and a deficient termination notice may not be cured retroactively by amendment (Chinatown Apts. v Chu Cho Lam, 51 NY2d 786, 788 [1980]). Thus, even if the federal savings clause could be read to permit reliance on grounds arising after the notice, section 247.6(c) leaves Respondent the benefit of New York's more protective rule.

2. New York Law on Post-Notice Conduct

New York law draws the same line between grounds and evidence. The Court of Appeals has held that a termination notice must be adequate on its face, and that later submissions may serve as "an elaboration of incidents" and "evidence of ongoing nuisance," but not as "an attempt to cure a defect in the notice" (Domen Holding Co. v Aranovich, 1 NY3d 117, 124 [2003]). Applying Domen, the court in Goodhue Residential Co. v Lazansky (1 Misc 3d 907[A], at *4-5, 2003 NY Slip Op 51559[U] [Civ Ct NY Co 2003]) explained that "post-notice acts can expand only an already-adequate notice," while recognizing that evidence of post-notice conduct may be admitted to prove, among other things, intent, lack of mistake or accident, and that "a tenant engaged in a pattern of objectionable conduct." Petitioner itself relies on Domen and Goodhue for that proposition (Corrao Sur-Reply Aff. ¶ 7).

3. The Effect of Respondent's Consent

Respondent consented to the amendment of the petition on May 20, 2026 to add three additional incidents. Respondent received the three incident reports and the names of the witnesses on April 15, 2026, stated on the record that she was aware of them, and consented to their addition (Tr. of May 20, 2026, at 2-3; Corrao Aff. Exs. B, C, D). She therefore cannot claim surprise or lack of notice as to those incidents, and she has no basis to object to their admission. But the consent was to the amendment of the petition; it did not, and could not, amend the Notice, and it did not convert conduct occurring after the termination date into a predicate ground for that termination (see Chinatown Apts., 51 NY2d at 788).

For the same reason, Petitioner's waiver argument is beside the point. Respondent does not contend that the Notice is facially defective; she contends that the conduct set forth in the Notice, as proven at trial, is insufficient to constitute good cause. That is a challenge to the sufficiency of the proof, which Respondent preserved by denying the material allegations of the petition and asserting her defenses.

Accordingly, the Court holds as follows. Petitioner must establish material noncompliance on the basis of the conduct set forth in the Notice. If it does, the Court may consider the 2026 incidents as evidence of the continuity and recurrence of that conduct, of the likelihood that it will continue, and of whether it is capable of cure. If it does not, the 2026 incidents cannot rescue the proceeding.

C. The Noticed Conduct Establishes Material Noncompliance

1. Substantial Violations — 24 CFR 247.3(c)(1)

The Resident Agreement and the Tenant Handbook expressly prohibit "verbal or physical aggression, threats, assault, bullying or stalking toward residents or staff." Two of the noticed incidents fall squarely within that prohibition and are, in the Court's view, substantial violations of the rental agreement.

On July 11, 2025, in the lobby, during a donation distribution attended by other residents, Respondent threw her belongings to the floor, got into another resident's face, and invited her to "go outside." The Court credits Ms. Tweedy's testimony that the phrase was an invitation to a physical fight and finds that it was so intended and so understood. Two staff members had to physically intervene to separate Respondent from the other resident. Respondent offered no testimony about this incident beyond a general denial that she had ever been "physical" with anyone.

On September 3, 2025, Respondent entered the office of the Awakenings Clinical Case Manager, threatened to "beat up" another resident, and told Ms. Huertas that she would be "in trouble" if the talk about Respondent did not stop. That was an explicit threat of physical violence against a fellow resident, coupled with an implied threat against a staff member.

Neither incident involved a complaint about building conditions, an expression of opinion about management, or any other form of tenant advocacy. Each was a threat of violence directed at a fellow resident in a congregate residence in which residents share kitchens, common rooms, and programming, and in which some residents participate in a clinical program for women re-entering the community. Conduct of that kind strikes at the core of what the Resident Agreement's safety provisions are designed to prevent. The Court finds that each incident constitutes a substantial violation of the rental agreement within the meaning of 24 CFR 247.3(c)(1).

2. Repeated Violations — 24 CFR 247.3(c)(2)

Together, the noticed incidents constitute repeated violations within the meaning of 24 CFR 247.3(c)(2). Between July 9 and September 17, 2025 — a span of roughly ten weeks — Respondent engaged in at least four documented episodes of aggressive or hostile conduct toward residents or staff: the disparaging remarks that led to her removal from the July 9 workshop; the July 11 confrontation in the lobby; the September 3 threat; and the September 17 confrontation in which she screamed at Ms. Huertas until the case manager retreated to her office. Even treating the July 9 remarks as a minor violation, they are part of a recurring pattern, which persisted after management warned Respondent in writing that such conduct "will not be tolerated within the residence" (Petitioner's Exhibit 5) and culminated in a 10-day notice to cure (Petitioner's Exhibit 6).

That pattern satisfies subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of section 247.3(c)(2). It "[a]dversely affect[ed] the health or safety of any person or the right of any tenant to the quiet enjoyment of the leased premises and related project facilities": the July 11 and September 3 incidents placed other residents at risk of physical harm, and the July 9 and July 11 incidents occurred in shared program spaces during events held for the residents' benefit. And it "[i]nterfere[d] with the management of the project": Respondent's conduct disrupted a life-skills workshop, a donation distribution, and the work of the clinical case manager, who was twice confronted in her professional capacity and on one occasion forced to withdraw to de-escalate. Although this proceeding is not framed as a nuisance holdover, the conduct also reflects "a pattern of continuity or recurrence of objectionable conduct" of the kind the Court of Appeals has described (Domen Holding Co., 1 NY3d at 124).

3. Respondent's Remaining Arguments

Respondent argues that Petitioner's case fails because no tenant testified that Respondent interfered with her quiet enjoyment (Respondent's Post-Trial Mem. at 3-5). The Court disagrees. Section 247.3(c)(1) contains no such requirement. Section 247.3(c)(2)(ii) speaks of the health or safety of "any person," not only tenants, and section 247.3(c)(2)(iii) concerns interference with the management of the project, a matter on which staff are the most competent witnesses. The threats at issue were witnessed first-hand by the staff members who testified, and the Court credits their testimony.⁴

Respondent also contends that some of the incident reports contain redacted names and hearsay statements of unidentified declarants (Respondent's Post-Trial Mem. at 7). The Court's findings rest on the first-hand testimony of the witnesses who observed each incident, which the incident reports corroborate. The Court has not relied for their truth on statements in the reports attributed to persons who did not testify, such as the statements attributed to other residents in Petitioner's Exhibits 10 and 11.

Nor does Matter of Smith v Tuckahoe Hous. Auth. (111 AD3d 642 [2d Dept 2013]) warrant a different result. Smith was a CPLR article 78 proceeding in which the Appellate Division, having confirmed the housing authority's finding that the tenants violated their lease, reviewed only whether the penalty of termination was so disproportionate as to shock the judicial conscience. The tenant there had lived in the development for more than 25 years without complaint, none of the incidents involved violence, and the tenant had acknowledged his anger issues and engaged in anger management treatment (id. at 643-644). The Second Department has since distinguished that category of case from one in which a tenant's belligerence involves threats of violence See Matter of Washington v Shuldiner, 150 AD3d 745, 747 (2d Dept 2017) (remitting for consideration of a penalty less severe than lease termination where tenant's belligerence did not involve violence or threats of violence). Here, the Court sits as the trier of fact rather than as a reviewing court; Respondent's tenancy began in 2023; and the conduct at issue includes explicit threats of physical violence against other residents.

Finally, Respondent characterizes the incidents as the product of her advocacy for better conditions and fair treatment of residents. The Court recognizes that some of the incidents touched on matters of legitimate concern to residents — the departure of a resident from the Awakenings program on September 17, 2025, for example — and nothing in this decision should be read to suggest that a tenant may be evicted for raising such concerns. But the violations found here lie in the manner in which Respondent acted, not in the subjects she raised. A tenant's interest in how a building is managed does not license threats, screaming, or physical intimidation. And the two incidents the Court has found to be substantial violations — July 11 and September 3, 2025 — had no advocacy component at all.

Petitioner has therefore established, on the basis of the conduct set forth in the Notice alone, material noncompliance with the rental agreement under both 24 CFR 247.3(c)(1) and (c)(2), and thus good cause to terminate Respondent's tenancy.

D. The Post-Notice Incidents Confirm a Continuing Pattern

Because the noticed conduct independently establishes good cause, the Court may consider the 2026 incidents as evidence of the continuity and recurrence of that conduct (Domen Holding Co., 1 NY3d at 124; Goodhue Residential Co., 2003 NY Slip Op 51559[U]). They confirm it. On February 20, 2026, Respondent walked toward another resident in an aggressive manner, told her to "shut the f--- up," and threatened to "break [her] neck," requiring Ms. Mitchell to separate them. On March 13, 2026, Respondent refused a staff member's direction and yelled at her from within five feet until the staff member removed herself. On March 28, 2026, Respondent yelled at a maintenance worker for approximately ten minutes while he was responding to an emergency flood, followed him to the front desk, and, by her own admission, called him a "rude ass."

These incidents occurred after the September 2025 notice to cure, after service of the Notice, after the termination date, and after this proceeding was commenced. They demonstrate that the conduct established by the noticed incidents was not isolated, has not abated despite repeated written warnings, and is likely to recur. To the extent Respondent's authorities require a showing that the objectionable conduct is continuing or likely to recur (see Respondent's Post-Trial Mem. at 4), that showing has been made.

E. Respondent Has Not Established Retaliation

RPL § 223-b(1) prohibits a landlord from serving a notice to quit or commencing a summary proceeding in retaliation for (a) a good faith complaint, by or on behalf of the tenant, to the landlord, the landlord's agent, or a governmental authority, of the landlord's alleged violation of any health or safety law, the warranty of habitability, or related laws; (b) good faith actions to secure or enforce rights under the lease or such laws; or (c) "[t]he tenant's participation in the activities of a tenant's organization." Judgment must be entered for the tenant if the court finds that the landlord is acting in retaliation for any such action (RPL § 223-b[4]).

The statute creates a rebuttable presumption of retaliation if the tenant establishes that the landlord served a notice to quit or commenced a proceeding within one year after a good faith complaint to the landlord, its agent, or a governmental authority of the landlord's violation of such laws; after the tenant in good faith took action to secure or enforce such rights; or after a prior judgment, inspection, or order resulting from such a complaint or action (RPL § 223-b[5][a]-[c]). "The effect of the presumption shall be to require the landlord to establish a non-retaliatory motive for his acts by a preponderance of the evidence" (RPL § 223-b[5]). Notably, participation in a tenant organization, although protected by subdivision (1)(c), is not among the triggering events enumerated in subdivision (5). As to that theory, Respondent bears the burden of proving retaliation without the benefit of the presumption.

1. The Presumption Arises

The Notice was served on October 22, 2025. The relevant look-back period therefore runs from October 22, 2024. Within that period, the record reflects that (i) on May 8, 2025, Respondent participated in a meeting with Petitioner's Chief Operating Officer concerning residents' safety and hallway cameras; (ii) the meeting was a result of a letter written to the YWCA's Chief Executive Officer by an attorney retained by the Sisters Advisory Committee; and (iii) at some point in 2025, Respondent complained to staff about mold in her room, which prompted two rounds of testing by Mr. DellaDonna.

The Court does not credit Respondent's claimed complaint to a governmental agency, given her shifting testimony as to which agency she contacted and the absence of any corroboration. But the statute, as amended in 2019, reaches good faith complaints made "to the landlord [or] the landlord's agent" (RPL § 223-b[5][a]). Petitioner argues that no violation of the warranty of habitability was proven (Petitioner's Mem. at 5-6), but the question under subdivision (5)(a) is whether the complaint was made in good faith, not whether the tenant ultimately proves a violation. The Court finds that Respondent's complaint about mold in her room was made in good faith, regardless of the test results, and that it was made within one year before the Notice was served. The presumption therefore arises. As for the May 8, 2025 meeting where Respondent raised residents' concerns with the Petitioner's Chief Operating Officer, the Court assumes, without deciding, that the concerns discussed at the meeting also trigger the presumption.

2. Petitioner Has Rebutted the Presumption

The Court finds that Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, a non-retaliatory motive for serving the Notice and commencing this proceeding.

First, the Notice rests on documented conduct — threats of violence toward other residents and hostile confrontations with staff — recorded contemporaneously in incident reports prepared by several different staff members and confirmed by their credible testimony. None of that conduct concerned building conditions. The two most serious incidents arose from Respondent's disputes with other residents.

Second, the chronology is inconsistent with a retaliatory motive. Petitioner took no adverse action in response to the May 2025 meeting with its Chief Operating Officer. The steps Petitioner did take followed Respondent's conduct in measured sequence: a written warning after the July 2025 workshop incident; a 10-day notice to cure after the September 17, 2025 confrontation; and the Notice some five weeks later. The timing of Petitioner's actions tracks Respondent's conduct, not her complaints.

Third, Petitioner's response to the complaints that were brought to its attention was to address them, not to suppress them. It tested Respondent's window twice for mold; it repaired the kitchen countertop within two days of Respondent's first work order; it has an exterminator treat the building weekly; and, as Respondent testified, it not only permitted the Sisters Advisory group to meet and organize, it helped to establish the group, and its Chief Operating Officer met with the group's members.

Fourth, to the extent certain incidents — September 17, 2025 and March 28, 2026 — involved subjects on which a tenant might legitimately complain, the record establishes that Petitioner's concern was the manner of Respondent's conduct, not the substance of her complaints. RPL § 223-b protects good faith complaints; it does not immunize threats or intimidation merely because they are delivered in connection with a grievance.

For the same reasons, Respondent has not established that the Notice was served in retaliation for her participation in the Sisters Advisory group. Respondent attended three or four meetings of a group that met with management's acquiescence, and there is no evidence connecting her membership to the Notice. The Court finds that Petitioner would have served the Notice and commenced this proceeding regardless of any protected activity, and Respondent's First Affirmative Defense is dismissed.⁵

F. RPAPL 753

Respondent requests, in the alternative, a 30-day post-judgment period to cure under RPAPL 753(4). That provision applies where a proceeding "is based upon a claim that the tenant or lessee has breached a provision of the lease," and it affords the tenant a stay "during which time the respondent may correct such breach" (RPAPL 753[4]). As Respondent's own authorities recognize, the provision presupposes a breach that is capable of being corrected within the stay period (Respondent's Post-Trial Mem. at 7). The breach found here is not a discrete condition that can be remedied, such as an unauthorized alteration or occupant, but a pattern of threatening and aggressive conduct toward residents and staff. That conduct persisted after a written warning, after a 10-day notice to cure, after service of the Notice, and after this proceeding was commenced. On this record, there is no act by which Respondent could "correct" the breach within 30 days, and her application under RPAPL 753(4) is denied.

G. Use and Occupancy

A landlord may recover reasonable compensation for a tenant's use and occupancy of premises after the termination of the tenancy (RPL § 220). Respondent argues that a monetary award may be made in a summary proceeding only together with an award of possession (Sutherland Post-Trial Aff. ¶¶ 14-16; October 2, 2026 Sutherland email). Because Petitioner has been awarded possession, that condition is satisfied. The parties agree that use and occupancy should be fixed at $534 per month, the rent reserved in the Lease (Sutherland Post-Trial Aff. ¶ 18; Corrao Sur-Reply Aff. ¶ 22).⁶

The tenancy terminated at midnight on January 20, 2026. Petitioner is therefore awarded use and occupancy at the rate of $534 per month for the eight months of February 2026 through September 2026, totaling $4,272.00, and use and occupancy commencing October 1, 2026 until Respondent vacates the subject premises, at a rate of $17.23 per day ($534 31).

Attorney for Petitioner presented a ledger and copies of money orders submitted by Respondent during the holdover period. On February 13, 2026, Petitioner received a money order for $534 that included the date "1/2026" and the earmark of "Rent for January." On March 22, 2026, Petitioner received a money order for $534 that included the earmark of "rent for February." On April 7, 2026, Petitioner received a money order for $534 that included the earmark "For the month of March." Finally, on August 12, 2026, Respondent was charged $10 for parking, and she tendered payment the same day.

Respondent argues that any use and occupancy award should be reduced by the three payments of $534, thereby reducing the award by $1,602, to a total of $2,670 ($4,272- $1,602). Respondent's argument, however, disregards the rule that a landlord must honor a tenant's earmarking of payments by applying it to the time period intended. See Snide v Larrow, 62 NY2d 633, 634 (1984); EOM 106-15 217th Corp v Severine, 62 Misc 3d 141(A), 2019 NY Slip Op 50068(U) (App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019); Greenbriar Garden Apts v Eustache, 50 Misc 3d 142 (A), 2016 NY Slip Op 50210(U) (App term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2016); Anderson A-G LLC v Tavarez, 84 Misc 3d 1209(A), 2024 NY Slip Op 51399(U) (Civ Ct Bronx Co 2024). Accordingly, the February payment designated for January 2026 is properly applied to arrears for that month, and the other two payments of $534 are properly applied to use and occupancy for February and March 2026. The use and occupancy award of $4,272 is therefore reduced to $3,204 to credit those two payments.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Petitioner is awarded a final judgment of possession of the Premises, Room [REDACTED], 69 North Broadway, White Plains, New York 10603, against Respondent Stacey Murray; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent's First Affirmative Defense (retaliation under RPL § 223-b) and Third Affirmative Defense (RPL § 230 and the First Amendment) are dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent's application for a post-judgment cure period under RPAPL 753(4) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the warrant of eviction may issue forthwith, but execution thereof is stayed for the statutory 14-day period from service; and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioner is awarded a money judgment against Respondent for use and occupancy for the period of February 1, 2026 through September 30, 2026 in the sum of $3,204; and it is further

ORDERED that Respondent pay use and occupancy from October 1, 2026 until Respondent vacates the subject premises, prorated at $17.23 per day.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.

Dated: October 6, 2026

White Plains, New York

ENTER:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD, J.C.C.

To:

Keane & Beane, P.C. (Maria C. Corrao, Esq.)

Attorneys for Petitioner

445 Hamilton Avenue, 15th Floor, White Plains, New York 10601

Legal Services of the Hudson Valley (Claudia Sutherland, Esq., of counsel)

Attorneys for Respondent

90 Maple Avenue, White Plains, New York 10601

FOOTNOTES

1.   The YWCA Residence is a Low-Income Housing Credit Project, subject to regulation by the New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal ("DHCR"), the United States Internal Revenue Service and a Low-Income Housing Credit Regulatory Agreement (Petitioner's Exhibit 1 [Lease]).

2.   Petitioner's Verified Bill of Particulars and its counsel's affirmations refer to this incident as having occurred on March 30, 2026. The incident report itself (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) and counsel's application to amend on the record on May 20, 2026 identify the date as March 28, 2026, which is consistent with the trial testimony.

3.   Part 247 applies by its terms to "subsidized project[s]" as defined in 24 CFR 247.2 — principally projects assisted under sections 221(d)(3) and (5) and 236 of the National Housing Act, section 202 direct loans, rent supplement payments, and certain project-based Section 8 assistance. Neither party contends that the Premises receives any of those forms of assistance. The Court therefore does not hold that Part 247 applies of its own force; it applies the definitions of 24 CFR 247.3(c) as the measure of good cause because both parties have argued the case under that standard and because it gives content to the good-cause requirement that governs this LIHTC tenancy.

4.   Respondent also relies on authorities from other jurisdictions (e.g., Housing Auth. of City of Newark v Jones, 204 NJ Super 600 [1985]; ABC Mgt. Co. v El, 1988 Ohio App LEXIS 1592 [Apr. 29, 1988]) and on unreported trial-level rulings from Minnesota and Iowa. None is binding on this Court. As Respondent herself describes it, Newark recognized that violent behavior, unlike noise, may be established without the testimony of other tenants because its seriousness does not depend on the sensibilities of neighbors (Respondent's Post-Trial Mem. at 4). The threats found here fall within that category.

5.   Respondent's Third Affirmative Defense invokes Real Property Law § 230 and the First Amendment. The findings set forth in this Point — that the Notice was motivated by Respondent's conduct and not by her participation in the Sisters Advisory group or her complaints — are equally dispositive of the section 230 claim. As to the First Amendment, Respondent has not demonstrated that Petitioner, a private limited liability company, engaged in state action in serving the Notice, and in any event the Court has found that the proceeding was not motivated by protected activity.

6.   Petitioner's August 31, 2026 affirmation sought use and occupancy at $555 per month based on a July 1, 2025 rent increase (Corrao Aff. ¶¶ 19-20). In its Sur-Reply, Petitioner expressly agreed that use and occupancy should be set at $534 per month, the rent reserved in the Lease (Corrao Sur-Reply Aff. ¶ 22). The Court accepts that concession.

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.