OCP LLC v. QUISQUEYA ROSARIO 1303 10601 (2026)

The following papers were read on respondents' motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 3211 and RPAPL 741 (4), and on petitioner's cross-motion for leave to amend the petition:

Notice of Motion; Affirmation of Christine A. Ruscigno, Esq., dated August 24, 2026; Affirmation of Ray Quinones, dated August 23, 2026; Affirmation of Quisqueya Rosario, dated August 23, 2026; Exhibits A—H 1—4

Notice of Cross-Motion; Affirmation of Andrew K. Brotmann, Esq., in Opposition to Motion and in Support of Cross-Motion, dated September 16, 2026; Exhibits A—B 5—6

Reply Affirmation of Christine A. Ruscigno, Esq., dated September 23, 2026; Exhibit I 7

Upon the foregoing papers, and for the reasons that follow, respondents' motion is granted to the extent that the petition is dismissed without prejudice, and petitioner's cross-motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner OCP Holdings LLC ("petitioner") owns the residential building at One City Place in White Plains. Respondents Ray Quinones and Quisqueya Rosario ("respondents") have occupied Apartment 1303 (the "premises") with their two minor children since in or about 2019 (Quinones Aff. ¶ 2; Rosario Aff. ¶ 2). Petitioner's own ledger reflects charges to the account beginning in 2019. Their most recent lease, dated December 31, 2024, ran from February 7, 2025 through February 28, 2026, at a monthly rent of $3,260.00 (Petition ¶¶ 3—4).¹

In May 2025, petitioner served a fourteen-day notice to cure for unpaid May 2025 rent of $3,645.29. Petitioner's ledger reflects payment of that full sum on May 30, 2025. Petitioner nonetheless commenced a nonpayment proceeding in June 2025, which it discontinued at the first appearance. Following that proceeding, the ledger reflects two "Legal Fee Charge — Brotmann Law" entries, of $236.00 on June 1, 2025 and $1,052.00 on July 14, 2025. The resulting $1,288.00 balance was carried forward each month thereafter. Apart from that balance, the ledger shows that the rent for each month through February 2026 was paid.

By Local Law No. 2 of 2025, adopted June 10, 2025, the Common Council of the City of White Plains added Chapter 9-8 to the White Plains Municipal Code, entitled "Prohibition on Eviction Without Good Cause." The local law adopts Article 6-A of the Real Property Law, commonly known as the Good Cause Eviction Law ("GCEL") (see RPL § 213; White Plains Mun. Code § 9-8-1). Petitioner does not dispute that the premises are covered by the GCEL; its own GCEL notice so states.

By letter dated December 9, 2025, addressed to "Quisqueya Herrera, Ray Quinones & Janet Herrera," petitioner's counsel advised that the lease was "set to expire on February 6, 2025" and that "the Landlord has elected NOT to renew your Lease" (the "December Letter"). The December Letter stated no reason for the nonrenewal and appended no notice under RPL § 231-c. Respondents attest that no one named Quisqueya Herrera exists, and that Janet Herrera, Mr. Quinones's sister, has never resided at the premises (Quinones Aff. ¶¶ 5—7; Rosario Aff. ¶¶ 5—7).

Respondents tendered a check for March 2026 in the amount of $3,751.36. The check was returned with a handwritten notation that it had been received on March 2 and "returned to Resident" on March 9, 2026. Petitioner thereafter declined further payments. Respondents attest that their tenders were refused (Quinones Aff. ¶¶ 19—21; Rosario Aff. ¶¶ 19—21). Petitioner asserts that it was willing to accept payments designated as use and occupancy but not as rent (Brotmann Aff. ¶¶ 48—50).

By letter dated March 19, 2026, captioned "Re: Notice to Vacate," petitioner's counsel wrote to "Janet Herrera & Quisqueya Rosario" at the premises, under the salutation "Dear Ms. Rumph." The letter stated that the lease had expired on February 28, 2026 and directed the recipients to vacate by June 20, 2026 (the "March Letter").² Enclosed with the March Letter were two documents. The first was a "Written Notice to Terminate (Move Out)." It identified the "Tenants" as "Janet Herrera & Quisqueya Rosario," but listed "Janet Herrera," "Quisqueya Rosario," and "Ray Quinones" as the persons in possession. It checked the box stating that the lease expired on February 28, 2026, and directed all of them to vacate by June 20, 2026. The second was the Unified Court System's form UCS-LTH2, "Notice to Tenant of Applicability or Inapplicability of the New York State Good Cause Eviction Law" (the "GCEL Notice").

The GCEL Notice states that the premises are subject to Article 6-A. In response to the question "what is the good cause for not renewing the lease?" it checks three boxes. Box E states that the tenant "has failed to pay rent due and owing" (see RPL § 216 [1] [a]). Box F states that the tenant "is violating a substantial obligation of their tenancy or breaching any of the landlord's rules and regulations" and "has failed to cure the violation after written notice that the violation must cease within 10 days" (see RPL § 216 [1] [b]). Box G states that the tenant is "either (a) committing or permitting a nuisance . . . ; (b) maliciously or grossly negligently causing substantial damage . . . ; [or] (c) interfering with the . . . comfort and safety" of the landlord or other occupants (see RPL § 216 [1] [c]). Neither the GCEL Notice, the March Letter, nor the Written Notice to Terminate states any fact in support of any of the three grounds. Respondents attest that they never received any further information about the allegations and were never served with a notice to cure (Quinones Aff. ¶ 14; Rosario Aff. ¶ 14).

Petitioner commenced this holdover proceeding by notice of petition and petition dated July 6, 2026. The petition alleges that the lease expired on February 28, 2026, that respondents "failed to vacate the premises at the end of the lease term," that the March Letter, the Written Notice to Terminate, and the GCEL Notice were served, and that respondents have failed to vacate and to pay use and occupancy (Petition ¶¶ 4—9). It seeks possession and a money judgment of not less than $21,470.79, comprising $19,600.79 in use and occupancy and $1,500.00 in legal fees, together with costs (id. ¶¶ 10, 14). The petition alleges that the premises are "not subject to rent control" (id. ¶ 11). Annexed to the petition, and part of it, are the March Letter, the Written Notice to Terminate and the GCEL Notice (id. ¶¶ 6—7; see CPLR 3014). Neither the petition nor the annexed notices alleges any fact in support of the grounds checked on the GCEL Notice.

Respondents, represented by Legal Services of the Hudson Valley, moved to dismiss. They argue, among other things, that (i) the predicate notices fail to state any facts supporting the asserted grounds for nonrenewal, as the GCEL requires, and (ii) the notices misidentify the tenants. Petitioner opposed and cross-moved for leave to amend the petition and/or to "serve a corrected predicate notice to the extent permitted by law" (Brotmann Aff. ¶ 61).³ In its opposition, petitioner states that it decided not to renew because respondents "failed to pay their rent in a timely manner for three successive months," namely May, June and July 2025 (id. ¶¶ 9—14, 28). Respondents replied.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of Petitioner's Opposition and Cross-Motion

Respondents ask the Court to disregard petitioner's papers, which were due on September 16, 2026 under the briefing schedule but were received via email on September 18, 2026. Via that email to the Court, Counsel attributed the delay to difficulty filing through NYSCEF (undoubtedly because this matter had not been converted to e-filing). Although one of the emails sent by Counsel referenced that he was "following up" on an email sent on September 16, 2026 ("Wednesday"), the Court was unable to locate any such email. Nonetheless, the delay was two days, respondents have suffered no discernible prejudice, and respondents submitted a full reply addressing the merits. In the exercise of its discretion, the Court will consider petitioner's papers (see CPLR 2004). Counsel is reminded that any filing difficulties are to be raised with the Court and opposing counsel before a deadline passes, not afterward.

B. The Applicable Standards

On a motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are accepted as true, and the pleader is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87—88 [1994]). Where evidentiary material is considered, the question becomes whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not merely whether one has been stated (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]). Dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is warranted where documentary evidence utterly refutes the factual allegations and conclusively establishes a defense as a matter of law (Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of NY, 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]). The predicate notices here are annexed to the petition itself, and their contents are not in dispute.

A summary proceeding is a statutory creature, and service of a proper predicate notice is a condition precedent to its maintenance. A predicate notice that is defective cannot be cured by amendment. The remedy is dismissal, without prejudice to a new proceeding on a proper notice (Chinatown Apts. v Chu Cho Lam, 51 NY2d 786 [1980]; 1646 Union, LLC v Simpson, 62 Misc 3d 142[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50089[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2019]). Whether a notice is sufficient is measured by a standard of reasonableness. Where termination is predicated on a specific cause, the notice must identify the legal basis for the termination and the supporting facts with a level of particularity that is "reasonable[ ] in view of all attendant circumstances" (Hughes v Lenox Hill Hosp., 226 AD2d 4, 17 [1st Dept 1996], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 90 NY2d 829 [1997]; see Oxford Towers Co., LLC v Leites, 41 AD3d 144 [1st Dept 2007]; Brooklyn Home for Aged People Hous. Dev. Fund Co. v Selby, 32 Misc 3d 130[A] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). The purpose of the requirement is to permit the tenant to frame a defense.⁴

C. The Good Cause Eviction Law

The GCEL changed the legal landscape for covered tenancies outside the rent-regulatory system. Before its adoption, a landlord could recover possession from a market-rate tenant at the end of a lease term simply by declining to renew and serving a timely notice under RPL § 226-c. That option no longer exists for a covered unit. RPL § 215 provides:

No landlord shall, by action to evict or to recover possession, by exclusion from possession, by failure to renew any lease, or otherwise, remove any tenant from housing accommodations covered by section two hundred fourteen of this article except for good cause as defined in section two hundred sixteen of this article.

RPL § 216 (1) then enumerates the grounds that constitute good cause. As relevant here, they include the tenant's failure "to pay rent due and owing" (RPL § 216 [1] [a]); the tenant's violation of a substantial obligation of the tenancy, coupled with a failure to cure after written notice that the violation cease within ten days (RPL § 216 [1] [b]); and the tenant's commission or permission of a nuisance, malicious or grossly negligent damage to the premises, or interference with the comfort and safety of the landlord or other occupants (RPL § 216 [1] [c]).

Two notice provisions implement these substantive rules. RPL § 226-c (1) (a) requires a landlord that does not intend to renew a tenancy to give written notice within the time prescribed by subdivision two. Where, as here, the tenant has occupied the unit for more than two years, that period is at least ninety days (RPL § 226-c [2] [c]). The notice must also "append or contain the notice required pursuant to section two hundred thirty-one-c," which in turn must state, "if the landlord is not renewing the lease for a unit subject to article six-A . . . , the lawful basis for such non-renewal" (RPL § 226-c [1] [a]). If the landlord fails to give timely notice, the tenancy continues on its existing terms until the notice is given and the notice period expires (id.). RPL § 231-c prescribes the content of the GCEL notice, which the Unified Court System has implemented as form UCS-LTH2.

D. The Operative Predicate Notice

The petition does not rely on the December Letter. It pleads the March Letter, the Written Notice to Terminate, and the GCEL Notice as the predicate for this proceeding (Petition ¶¶ 6—7). The March notice was served more than ninety days before the June 20, 2026 vacate date, and under RPL § 226-c (1) (a) the tenancy continued until that period ran. The March notice is therefore the operative predicate, and its sufficiency is dispositive.⁵ Because the three March documents were served together and are pleaded together, the Court reads them together in assessing whether they gave respondents reasonable notice of the grounds for nonrenewal.

E. The March Notice Does Not State the Grounds for Nonrenewal with Reasonable Particularity

1. The Governing Rule

No appellate court has yet decided whether, or to what extent, a GCEL nonrenewal notice must set out facts supporting the ground asserted. The trial courts that have considered the question have divided.

The leading decision is RP Wimbledon Owner, LLC v Chisholm (86 Misc 3d 1075 [Civ Ct, NY Co 2025]). There, a landlord served a ninety-day notice of nonrenewal for a GCEL-covered unit. The notice cited RPL § 216 (1) (a) and stated that the tenant had "failed to pay rent due and owing," but gave no months or amounts. The court reasoned that because RPL § 215 "requires good cause for the act of non-renewal itself, § 226-c notices for units covered under GCEL must include factual allegations sufficient to satisfy the Hughes reasonableness standard" (id.). It held the notice insufficient and dismissed the proceeding. Other courts have followed Chisholm. In Wagab LLC v Medina (88 Misc 3d 1258[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 50578[U] [Civ Ct, Queens Co 2026]), the court held that "detailed allegations beyond an unelaborated assertion of 'nonpayment' or 'failure to pay' are required in order for the notice of termination to be sufficient," and dismissed a petition predicated on a GCEL notice that, like the one here, gave no facts. Similarly, University Riverview Assoc. v Chisholm (88 Misc 3d 1249[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 50479[U] [Civ Ct, Bronx Co 2026]) and Plaza Gardens Real Estate Corp. v Pitts (2026 NY Slip Op 32108[U] [Civ Ct, Queens Co 2026]) dismissed petitions that pleaded no facts supporting the GCEL ground asserted.

In Bedrock Equities LLC v Husain (90 Misc 3d 221 [Civ Ct, Kings Co 2026]), the court declined to follow Chisholm. It held that a GCEL termination notice premised on nonpayment need not specify the amount or period of the arrears. The court reasoned that Chisholm had borrowed the rent-demand standard from commercial holdover cases, whereas the proceeding before it was "neither a commercial holdover proceeding nor a residential nonpayment proceeding" (id. at 230). Notably, however, the notice in Bedrock informed the tenant that she was "behind on [her] rental obligation," and the petition there pleaded the arrears claimed (id. at 222).

This Court finds the reasoning of Chisholm and the decisions following it persuasive, at least to the following extent. Under the GCEL, a covered tenancy can no longer be ended merely because its term has run. Good cause is now the substantive predicate of the nonrenewal itself (RPL § 215). A GCEL nonrenewal notice is therefore, by definition, a notice of termination "predicated upon some specific cause." The settled rule of Hughes has long applied to such notices: the notice must state the ground and the facts supporting it with reasonable particularity, so that the tenant can understand the claim and prepare a defense (Hughes, 226 AD2d at 17). Nothing in the GCEL suggests that the Legislature intended its new class of cause-based terminations to be exempt from that rule. Nor does the statutory direction that the notice state "the lawful basis for such non-renewal" (RPL § 226-c [1] [a]) displace it. The "lawful basis" requirement fixes the minimum content of the notice. It does not convert the rule of reasonable particularity into a formality satisfied by checking a box.

The Court need not, and does not, decide whether a GCEL notice premised on nonpayment must always recite specific months and amounts, the precise point on which Bedrock parted company with Chisholm. The reasonableness standard is flexible, and what suffices depends on the ground asserted and the attendant circumstances. But at a minimum, the notice must contain some case-specific factual content that tells the tenant what conduct is claimed to constitute good cause. A notice that merely recites the statutory language of one or more grounds, with no facts at all, is generic boilerplate. It is not reasonable notice under Hughes, and no decision cited by the parties or located by the Court holds otherwise.

2. Application

Measured against that standard, the March notice is insufficient. Read as a whole, the three documents contain no fact supporting any ground for nonrenewal. The March Letter and the Written Notice to Terminate speak only of the expiration of the lease. The GCEL Notice checks three distinct statutory grounds and says nothing more about any of them.⁶

As to box E, the notice does not identify any rent claimed to be "due and owing," whether by month, amount or otherwise. As to box F, the notice does not identify the obligation, rule or regulation respondents supposedly violated. More fundamentally, RPL § 216 (1) (b) makes the tenant's failure to cure after written notice directing that the violation cease within ten days an element of that ground. Respondents attest without contradiction that no such notice was ever served, and petitioner identifies none. As to box G, the notice does not disclose which of the three disjunctive categories of misconduct (nuisance, substantial damage, or interference with others' comfort and safety) is claimed, much less what conduct is alleged. By checking three separate grounds without a single supporting fact, petitioner left respondents to guess which theory, if any, it would pursue at trial and on what facts. Respondents' affidavits confirm that they could not tell (Quinones Aff. ¶ 14; Rosario Aff. ¶ 14; Reply Aff. ¶ 17).

Petitioner's own papers confirm the insufficiency of the notice. Petitioner now asserts that it declined to renew because respondents paid the rent late in May, June and July 2025 (Brotmann Aff. ¶¶ 9—14, 28). That theory appears nowhere in the March notice. It is also not the ground the GCEL Notice asserts. Box E concerns a failure "to pay rent due and owing," not untimely payment of rent that was in fact paid. Petitioner's ledger reflects that the rent for each of those months was paid in full within the month. When petitioner decided not to renew in December 2025, the only balance carried on its ledger was the $1,288.00 in legal fee charges assessed after the discontinued 2025 nonpayment proceeding.⁷ The arrears petitioner now claims accrued after the lease expired, as use and occupancy, during a period in which petitioner refused respondents' tenders. Use and occupancy is distinct from rent (see University Riverview Assoc., 2026 NY Slip Op 50479[U], at *7 [citing Eighteen Assocs., LLC v Nanjim Leasing Corp., 257 AD2d 559 (2d Dept 1999)]). In any event, post-expiration charges could not have been the basis for a nonrenewal decision made months earlier. A tenant reading the GCEL Notice could not have discerned from it the claim petitioner now advances.

Petitioner advances several arguments in response, none of which is persuasive. Its principal contention is that, by checking boxes E, F and G of the GCEL Notice, it identified the statutory grounds on which it declined to renew, so that respondents "cannot plausibly argue that the Good Cause notice failed to identify any statutory basis for the proposed nonrenewal" (Brotmann Aff. ¶¶ 27—29). Petitioner adds that the Court must distinguish between whether a notice identifies the statutory basis for termination, which is a question of notice, and whether petitioner will ultimately be able to prove that basis, which is a question for the merits (id. ¶ 31).

The Court accepts much of the premise. The GCEL Notice does identify the legal bases on which petitioner relies, and in that respect it satisfies the statutory direction that a nonrenewal notice state "the lawful basis for such non-renewal" (RPL § 226-c [1] [a]; see RPL § 231-c). The Court also agrees that the sufficiency of the notice is distinct from the merits of the claimed good cause. But the conclusion petitioner draws does not follow. A notice of termination predicated upon a specific cause must state not only the legal basis for the termination but also the supporting facts, with reasonable particularity (Hughes, 226 AD2d at 17). Identifying the legal basis is necessary, but it is not sufficient. The question presented is therefore not whether petitioner can prove good cause, but whether its notice told respondents what facts petitioner contends constitute good cause. For the same reason, petitioner's contention that respondents' affidavits raise factual disputes about rent that cannot be resolved on a CPLR 3211 motion (Brotmann Aff. ¶¶ 17, 24—26, 51—54) misses the mark. The motion turns on the content of the notice, which is not in dispute.

Petitioner next asserts that its notices "provide sufficient specificity" to allow respondents to understand the basis for nonrenewal, and that, unlike the landlord in Chisholm, petitioner "identified the factual circumstances and basis underlying it's [sic] statutory grounds" (Brotmann Aff. ¶¶ 37, 39). The record does not bear that out. Petitioner does not point to any statement of fact in the March Letter, the Written Notice to Terminate or the GCEL Notice, and the Court has found none. The only factual circumstances petitioner has identified—respondents' late payment of the rent for May, June and July 2025—appear for the first time in its opposition papers (id. ¶¶ 9—14, 28). Facts set out in an attorney's affirmation submitted in litigation cannot supply what the predicate notice omitted (see Chinatown Apts., 51 NY2d at 788).

Nor is Chisholm distinguishable on the ground petitioner suggests. Petitioner characterizes Chisholm as a nonpayment case, in contrast to this proceeding, which it describes as resting on respondents' holding over after the expiration of their lease (Brotmann Aff. ¶¶ 34—36). But Chisholm was not a nonpayment proceeding. It was a holdover proceeding predicated on a ninety-day notice of nonrenewal of a GCEL-covered tenancy, the same posture presented here, and the notice there, like box E here, recited the statutory nonpayment ground without supporting facts (86 Misc 3d 1075). If anything, the notice here is less informative than the one found wanting in Chisholm, because it asserts three distinct grounds without facts for any of them. Petitioner also argues that the predicate notices must be read in their totality (Brotmann Aff. ¶ 40). The Court has done so. Read together, the three documents contain no facts supporting any of the grounds asserted.

Finally, petitioner argues that respondents' own papers demonstrate that they understood the grounds on which petitioner relies (Brotmann Aff. ¶¶ 18, 45—46, 60). Respondents' papers show the opposite. They address the 2025 legal fees, the 2025 late payments and the 2026 refused tenders precisely because respondents could not tell which, if any, petitioner meant. In any event, the sufficiency of a predicate notice is measured by its contents when served, not by what the tenant may later piece together in the course of litigation (see Chinatown Apts., 51 NY2d at 788).

Because the March notice failed to state the grounds for nonrenewal with the particularity that Hughes requires, petitioner has not satisfied a condition precedent to this proceeding, and the petition must be dismissed.

F. The Petition, Read with Its Annexed Notices, Fails to State the Facts upon Which the Proceeding Is Based

The same deficiency independently defeats the petition as a pleading. RPAPL 741 (4) requires a petition to "[s]tate the facts upon which the special proceeding is based." For a covered unit, expiration of the lease term is no longer, by itself, a basis for recovering possession (RPL § 215). The facts upon which the proceeding is based therefore necessarily include facts establishing the good cause asserted.

The petition does not rest on the expiration of the lease alone. It annexes the March Letter, the Written Notice to Terminate and the GCEL Notice (Petition ¶¶ 6—7), and those documents are part of the petition for all purposes (CPLR 3014). Read with its annexed notices, the petition identifies the three statutory grounds on which petitioner relies. But it alleges no facts in support of any of them. The body of the petition alleges the lease, its expiration, service of the notices, respondents' continued occupancy, and the use and occupancy claimed (Petition ¶¶ 3—14). The annexed notices, as discussed above, contain no facts at all.

This pleading defect is distinct from the insufficiency of the predicate notice, and it would require dismissal even under the narrower view of the notice requirement taken in Bedrock. There, the court declined to require that a GCEL notice premised on nonpayment specify the arrears, but the petition before it pleaded the amount claimed. Courts that have addressed the question have held that a petition seeking to recover a GCEL-covered unit must plead facts supporting the good cause asserted, and that annexing a GCEL notice that identifies the statutory ground does not by itself satisfy RPAPL 741 (4) (see Plaza Gardens Real Estate Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op 32108[U]; University Riverview Assoc., 88 Misc 3d 1249[A]; RP Wimbledon Owner, LLC, 86 Misc 3d 1075). The petition's claim for use and occupancy does not fill the gap. Use and occupancy accruing after the lease expired is not rent (see Eighteen Assocs., LLC, 257 AD2d 559), and its nonpayment is not a ground for nonrenewal under RPL § 216 (see University Riverview Assoc., 88 Misc 3d 1249[A]). The petition therefore fails to state a cause of action (RPAPL 741 [4]; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]).

Petitioner contends that, to the extent additional factual particulars are required, the appropriate remedy is not dismissal but amendment or clarification (Brotmann Aff. ¶¶ 32, 61). Standing alone, a petition's failure to plead sufficient facts under RPAPL 741 (4) may in an appropriate case be cured by amendment, absent prejudice (see CPLR 3025 [b]; University Riverview Assoc., 88 Misc 3d 1249[A] [in case commenced after effective date of GCEL, but before the GCEL predicate notice requirements were effective, granting leave to amend petition to include GCEL allegations]; cf. RP Wimbledon Owner, LLC, 86 Misc 3d 1075 [noting that petitioner had not moved to amend]). Here, however, the pleading defect cannot be separated from the insufficiency of the predicate notice. Any facts petitioner might now plead would have to support grounds that its notice failed to particularize, and amending the petition cannot cure a deficient predicate notice. For these reasons, and for the additional reasons set forth in Point II(H), below, amendment is not an available remedy here.

G. The Naming Discrepancies Do Not Independently Warrant Dismissal

Respondents also contend that the notices are fatally defective because they misidentify the tenants. The Court does not agree that the naming errors, standing alone, would require dismissal.

As noted, the December Letter is not the predicate for this proceeding. As to the March notice, the question is again one of reasonableness: whether, viewed in light of all attendant circumstances, the notice fairly apprised respondents that their tenancy of the premises was being terminated and when they were required to vacate (see Hughes, 226 AD2d at 17; Oxford Towers Co., LLC, 41 AD3d 144). Errors that could not have misled the tenant have been treated as de minimis (see 47-05 Ctr. SPE, LLC v Hack, 89 Misc 3d 132[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 51314[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2026] [incorrect vacate date in ninety-day nonrenewal notice did not render notice defective where notice otherwise correctly stated lease expiration and proceeding was commenced more than ninety days after service]). The March Letter was addressed to respondent Rosario, a named tenant, at the premises, and she received it. The Written Notice to Terminate lists respondent Quinones by name among the persons in possession who were directed to vacate. The March notice correctly identified the premises, the lease expiration date and the vacate date. Neither respondent claims to have been confused about whose tenancy was being terminated or what they were being told to do. The inclusion of Janet Herrera, a person who on respondents' account does not reside at the premises, does not render the notice misleading as to respondents. Petitioner's inconsistent records (see n 1, supra) explain, though they do not excuse, the error.

The decision on which respondents principally rely, 1759 Monroe Ct. LLC v Brown (81 Misc 3d 1244[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50143[U] [Civ Ct, Bronx Co 2024]), is not to the contrary. There, the court declined to enter a default judgment where the petitioner had identified the respondents only by first initial under CPLR 1024, despite knowing or being able to learn their names. That case concerned the identification of parties in a petition and a resulting warrant, not a predicate notice that named the tenant and was received by her.

The Court does not condone the evident carelessness with which the March notice was prepared. A notice addressed to one person, opening "Dear Ms. Rumph," and listing a non-occupant as a "tenant" falls well short of the care that a termination notice warrants. In a closer case, errors of this kind could well contribute to a finding that a notice was unreasonable. Here, however, the naming discrepancies do not supply an independent basis for dismissal, and the Court rests its decision on the grounds set forth in Points II(E) and II(F).

H. Petitioner's Cross-Motion

Petitioner's cross-motion seeks, first, an order "dismissing Respondents' motion." That is simply opposition to the motion, which the Court has considered and rejected.

Petitioner seeks, in the alternative, leave to amend the petition. Leave to amend is ordinarily to be freely given absent prejudice or surprise, but not where the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or clearly devoid of merit (CPLR 3025 [b]; Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 222 [2d Dept 2008]). The application here fails for three reasons. First, CPLR 3025 (b) requires that a motion to amend "be accompanied by the proposed amended or supplemental pleading clearly showing the changes or additions to be made to the pleading." Petitioner submitted no proposed amended petition. Second, any amendment would be futile. The petition rests on a predicate notice that failed to state the grounds for nonrenewal. Amending the petition cannot cure a deficient predicate notice (Chinatown Apts., 51 NY2d at 788). Third, the only theory of good cause petitioner has articulated, repeated late payment in mid-2025, is not the ground stated in the GCEL Notice. Pleading it now would not conform the petition to the notice; it would substitute a new ground for the one on which the tenancy was purportedly terminated.

Finally, to the extent petitioner seeks leave to "serve a corrected predicate notice," a predicate notice cannot be corrected nunc pro tunc to sustain a pending proceeding (id.). Nothing in this decision precludes petitioner from serving a new notice that complies with RPL §§ 216, 226-c and 231-c and, if warranted, commencing a new proceeding. Petitioner needs no leave of Court to do so. The cross-motion is denied in its entirety.

I. Respondents' Requests for Affirmative Relief

Respondents' affirmations and reply also ask the Court to direct petitioner to offer a renewal lease, to remove the legal fee charges from their ledger, to restore their garage access, and to award attorney's fees. As a threshold matter, none of that relief is demanded in the notice of motion. The notice seeks only dismissal and, in the alternative, leave to answer (see CPLR 2214 [a]). But even had the relief been properly demanded, the Court could not grant most of it.

This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. In this proceeding, its jurisdiction derives from UCCA 204, which confers jurisdiction over summary proceedings to recover possession of real property within the City, and from the provisions governing counterclaims (see UCCA 208; RPAPL 743). UCCA 212 gives the Court the powers that the Supreme Court would have "[i]n the exercise of its jurisdiction." That provision supplies the means of exercising jurisdiction the Court otherwise has; it does not enlarge that jurisdiction. Three of respondents' requests fall outside it.

An order directing petitioner to offer respondents a renewal lease would be a mandatory injunction, or a decree of specific performance. An order directing petitioner to restore respondents' garage access would be an injunction. An order directing petitioner to strike charges from its ledger would be either an injunction or a declaration of the parties' rights under the lease and RPL § 234-a. UCCA 209 (b) provides that "[n]o injunction or restraining order" shall issue out of this Court except in enumerated circumstances, none of which is presented here. Respondents' entitlement to a renewal lease under the GCEL, the propriety of the legal fee charges, and their claimed right to garage access are matters they may raise defensively in any future proceeding petitioner may bring, or affirmatively in a court of competent jurisdiction. They are not matters on which this Court may grant affirmative equitable or declaratory relief.

Further, the request for attorney's fees is premature in any event. Any claim by a tenant to fees under RPL § 234 depends on the tenant being the prevailing party in a controversy that has reached an "ultimate outcome" (Matter of J.P. & Assoc. Props. Corp. v Krautter, 128 AD3d 963 [2d Dept 2015], citing Elkins v Cinera Realty, 61 AD2d 828 [2d Dept 1978]). The dismissal of a holdover petition without prejudice on the ground of a deficient predicate notice resolves no claim on the merits and leaves petitioner free to serve a new notice and commence a new proceeding. The Court therefore need not, and does not, reach whether RPAPL 702, as amended by the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019, forecloses an award of attorney's fees in a residential summary proceeding.⁸

Accordingly, the requests for a renewal lease, removal of the legal fee charges and restoration of garage access are denied for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to their assertion in a court of competent jurisdiction or, defensively, in any future proceeding. The request for attorney's fees is denied without prejudice as premature. Nothing in this decision adjudicates the parties' respective rights under the GCEL, the lease, or RPL § 234-a. Respondents' alternative request for leave to serve an answer is denied as academic.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that respondents' motion to dismiss is GRANTED to the extent that the petition is dismissed, without prejudice, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (a) (7) and RPAPL 741 (4); and it is further

ORDERED that the branches of respondents' motion predicated on CPLR 3211 (a) (2) and (a) (8) are DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that respondents' requests for an order directing petitioner to offer a renewal lease, to remove legal fee charges from their ledger, and to restore garage access are DENIED for lack of jurisdiction (UCCA 209 [b]; 212-a), without prejudice to their assertion in a court of competent jurisdiction or, defensively, in any future proceeding; and it is further

ORDERED that respondents' request for attorney's fees is DENIED, without prejudice, as premature; and it is further

ORDERED that respondents' alternative request for leave to serve an answer is DENIED as academic; and it is further

ORDERED that petitioner's cross-motion is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing the petition without prejudice.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: October 14, 2026

White Plains, New York

E N T E R:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD

TO:

THE BROTMANN LAW GROUP

Andrew K. Brotmann, Esq.

Attorneys for Petitioner

4 West Red Oak Lane, Suite 118

White Plains, New York 10604

LEGAL SERVICES OF THE HUDSON VALLEY

Christine A. Ruscigno, Esq., of counsel

Attorneys for Respondents

90 Maple Avenue

White Plains, New York 10601

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record contains two different versions of the December 31, 2024 lease. The version annexed to the petition (Blue Moon Document ID 480903214, on a December 2024 form) identifies the tenants as "Janet Herrera, Quisqueya Rosario" and bears a single tenant signature. The version submitted by respondents (Document ID 513234785, on a form bearing an April 2025 revision date) identifies the tenants as "Quisqueya Rosario, Ray Quinones" and bears both respondents' signatures. The petition itself alleges that respondents Rosario and Quinones are the tenants under the December 31, 2024 lease (Petition ¶ 3). Petitioner's rent ledger, in turn, carries the account in the names "Quisqueya Herrera & Ray Quinones." The Court need not reconcile these documents to decide the motion; it notes them because they bear on the naming arguments discussed in Point II(F), below.

2.   Respondents' reply characterizes the March 2026 notice as having been sent "in March 2025" (Reply Aff. ¶ 10). The documents themselves are dated March 19, 2026, and the Court so treats them.

3.   Petitioner's affirmation describes its application as a cross-motion "for summary judgment and/or leave to amend" (Brotmann Aff. ¶ 2), but the notice of cross-motion seeks only an order "dismissing Respondents' motion or, in the alternative, for leave to amend." Relief not demanded in the notice of motion is not properly before the Court (see CPLR 2214 [a]), and the Court does not treat the cross-motion as one for summary judgment.

4.   Respondents' notice of motion also invokes CPLR 3211 (a) (2) and (a) (8). Respondents advance no argument concerning service of process, and the branch of the motion predicated on CPLR 3211 (a) (8) is denied. Nor does the sufficiency of a predicate notice implicate this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, which extends to summary proceedings to recover possession of real property located within the City (see UCCA 204). A deficient predicate notice is instead the failure of a condition precedent that defeats the petitioner's cause of action, and the Court analyzes it as such under CPLR 3211 (a) (7). The label does not affect the outcome.

5.   The December 9, 2025 letter is defective in any event. It appended no notice under RPL § 231-c, as RPL § 226-c (1) (a) requires for a unit covered by Article 6-A, and it misstated the expiration of the tenancy as "February 6, 2025," a date that is wrong as to both day and year. Because the petition does not rely on it, however, the Court need not decide whether those defects would independently require dismissal.

6.   Respondents overstate the point in reply when they assert that the predicate notices did not include even the phrase "failed to pay rent due and owing" (Reply Aff. ¶ 15). Box E of the GCEL Notice, which accompanied the notice, recites the statutory language of RPL § 216 (1) (a). The notice in this case is therefore materially indistinguishable from the one found insufficient in Chisholm, which likewise recited the statutory nonpayment ground and nothing more.

7.   The Court expresses no view on the merits of respondents' contention that the legal fee charges reflected on the ledger are barred by RPL § 234-a, which prohibits a residential landlord from assessing "any fee, surcharge or other charges for legal services" absent a court order. The point is noted only to underscore that, on this record, there is no apparent "rent due and owing" to which box E of the GCEL Notice could have referred when petitioner decided not to renew.

8.   RPAPL 702 now provides that, in a proceeding relating to a residential dwelling, "rent" means the monthly or weekly amount charged for use and occupancy, and that no fees, charges or penalties other than rent may be sought in a summary proceeding, notwithstanding any contrary language in the lease or rental agreement. The Court notes that the petition demands $1,500.00 in legal fees in addition to use and occupancy (Petition ¶ 14). Should petitioner commence a new proceeding, it is cautioned that a demand of that kind is not cognizable in a residential summary proceeding (RPAPL 702), and that RPL § 234-a bars a residential landlord from assessing fees for legal services against a tenant absent a court order.

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.