The People of the State of New York v. Akintunde Akinleye, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant moves, pro se, to dismiss the instant prosecution. He argues that it is unconstitutional for a state to require a license to drive because he asserts it violates the right to travel. Defendant also contends that the case should be dismissed "for failure to state a claim in which relief can be granted," which the People have interpreted and addressed as a motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency under CPL 170.30(1)(a). The People oppose, arguing that regulations requiring a license to operate a motor vehicle are constitutionally sound and do not violate the right to travel, and that the accusatory instruments filed in the instant matter sufficiently allege facts supporting every element of every charge.¹ Defendant's motion is granted in part only to the extent that the Court finds the accusatory instrument charging VTL 1198(9)(d) facially insufficient. That count is dismissed without prejudice. The remainder of Defendant's motion is denied.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Constitutional Right to Travel Claim

Defendant contends that the instant prosecution should be dismissed because he believes it violates his constitutional right to travel. According to Defendant, he "should be able to [travel] freely and unencumbered." Def's Notice of Motion, unnumbered p. 1. Defendant further argues that "the right to travel cannot be converted in to [sic] a privilege nor can the state issue a license and a fee for it." Id. The People respond that the right to travel does not include a "right" to operate a motor vehicle. The latter is a privilege, and restrictions on the privilege to drive do not violate the Constitution.

Defendant cites cases that discuss the constitutional right to interstate travel, but none of them hold that a state cannot enact laws that make it illegal to operate a motor vehicle without first obtaining a valid license. That is because the United States Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that states "may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles,--those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. And to this end [states] may require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers." Hendrick v State of Maryland, 235 US 610, 622 (1915); see also Reitz v Mealey, 314 US 33, 36 (1941) ("The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the reasonableness and necessity of regulation apparent. The universal practice is to register ownership of automobiles and to license their drivers. Any appropriate means adopted by the states to insure competence and care on the part of its licensees and to protect others using the highway is consonant with due process."); Gaebel v New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 43 Misc 3d 185 (Sup Ct Sulivan Co. 2013) (the state may regulate the ability to operate a motor vehicle and the possession of a license in furtherance of highway safety and to protect against potential injury to the public; so long as licenses are "issued or revoked with procedural due process safeguards, there is no violation of any 'Constitutional right' ").

Defendant's argument misconstrues the right to travel. "The word 'travel' is not found in the text of the Constitution. Yet the 'constitutional right to travel from one State to another' is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence." Saenz v Roe, 526 US 489, 498 (1999). The United States Supreme Court has stated that its jurisprudence on the right to travel contemplates three different components: "It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State." Id. at 500. It does not create a right to drive or operate a motor vehicle. Miller v Reed, 176 F3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir 1999) (there is no "fundamental right to drive;" denial of a driver's license does not unconstitutionally impede the right to interstate travel); Allen v New York State Dept of Motor Vehicles, 45 Misc 3d 475, 503 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2014) (the Constitution recognizes a right to travel, not a right to drive); see also Berberian v Petit 118 RI 448, 374 A2d 791, 794 (1977) (characterizing as "frivolous" a claim that there is a right to operate a motor vehicle that extends from the right to travel). Simply put, the requirement that a person possess a license before they can legally operate a motor vehicle does not unreasonably burden their right to travel. That person can walk, take public transportation, board an airplane, or ride in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license. The ability to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege, not a Constitutional right.

Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the claim that his prosecution for Aggravated Unlicensed Operation in the Second Degree (VTL 511[2][a][2]) is an unconstitutional restriction on his right to travel is DENIED.

Facial Sufficiency Claim

An information must contain two sections: an accusatory part and a factual part. CPL 100.15(1). The accusatory part "must designate the offense or offenses charged." CPL 100.15(2). It is well-settled that the factual part of a misdemeanor information must allege " 'facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges' (CPL 100.15 [3]; see, CPL 100.40 [1] [a]); that the 'allegations of the factual part ... together with those of any supporting depositions ... provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged' (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]); and that the '[n]on-hearsay allegations [of the information and supporting depositions] establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof' (CPL 100.40 [1] [c]; see, CPL 100.15 [3])." People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000); see also People v Dumas, 83 NY2d 729, 731 (1986). The "non-hearsay requirement is met so long as the allegation would be admissible under some hearsay rule exception." Casey, 95 NY2d at 361. " 'Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense' exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it." CPL 70.10(2). Thus, the prima facie case standard for an accusatory instrument is not as high as "as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial." People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680-681 (1999) (citations omitted). It is also lower than the legally sufficient evidence standard required to survive a motion to dismiss an indictment (People v Suber, 19 NY3d 247 [2012]) or to dismiss at trial. People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 (2009).

For this reason, the allegations in an information "should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey, 95 NY2d at 360 (citations omitted). The information need not "contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charge"; rather, it must only provide facts sufficient to "give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense . . . and prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense." People v McConnell, 11 Misc 3d 57, 60 (App Term, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2006); Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 103 ("The test is, simply whether the accusatory instrument failed to supply the defendant with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy."). Additionally, in analyzing the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, the People are entitled to rely on fair inferences to be drawn from the facts contained therein. See Casey, 95 NY2d at 360.

Notably, a facial sufficiency evaluation is just that—it relies entirely on the "face" of the instrument. The Court is not permitted to consider any information outside of the "four corners" of the document and its supporting depositions. People v Slade, 37 NY3d 127, 140-41 (2025); People v Thomas, 4 NY3d 143, 146 (2005); Casey, 95 NY2d at 361.

The Court finds that the accusatory instruments, together with the supporting depositions of Police Officer Maya, sufficiently allege all elements of the offenses of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation in the Second Degree (VTL 511[2][a][2]) and the failure to yield to a pedestrian in a crosswalk (VTL 1151[a]). However, there are insufficient factual allegations to establish every element of the offense of Circumvention of an Interlock Device (VTL 1198[9][d]).

A facially sufficient accusatory instrument charging Circumvention of an Interlock Device must set forth non-hearsay allegations providing reasonable cause to believe that Defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device and (2) did so while he was subject to a court ordered ignition interlock device. VTL 1198(9)(d); see also CJI2d VTL § 1198(9)(d), https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/3-VTL/VTL_1198/VTL%201198%289%29%28b%29.pdf [last visited 4/30/26].

In the Uniform Traffic Ticket charging a violation of VTL 1198(9)(d), Officer Maya identifies Defendant and the vehicle, and sets forth the date, time and location of the offense. Officer Maya's supporting depositions provide additional relevant factual allegations concerning the offense. Specifically, in one deposition (which is sub-titled "Simplified Traffic Information"), Officer Maya alleges that Defendant "did operate a white 2017 Jeep on Martine Av at Mamaroneck Av a public highway in the City of White Plains, State of New York without an interlock device installed on said vehicle violating his interlock device restriction." In a second Supporting Deposition (which is sub-titled "CPL 710.30 Notice to Support Simplified Traffic Information"), Officer Maya alleges once again that Defendant was operating the vehicle in that location, and further states, as relevant here, that "an NCIC check of license indicated status was revoked 15 on 7 dates and also has an interlock restriction." Both supporting depositions are dated December 22, 2025.

The supporting deposition that is sub-titled as a Simplified Traffic Information also includes an accusatory part that identifies VTL 1198(9)(d) as the offense charged and provides the statutory language for that offense ("No person subject to a court ordered ignition interlock device shall operate a motor vehicle without such device.").

However, none of the accusatory instruments or supporting depositions provide any factual allegations regarding whether Defendant was "subject to a court ordered ignition interlock device" at the time he operated the motor vehicle. Instead, they only allege that there was an "interlock device restriction," without any factual allegations explaining the basis of that "restriction." To conclude that the "restriction" was a valid court order would require speculation. Further, the reference to a "restriction" is simply too vague to give Defendant notice sufficient to prepare a defense. Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 103.

Since the accusatory instrument and supporting depositions do not contain factual allegations sufficient to support one of the required elements, CPL 100.15(3) and CPL 100.40(1)(b) have not been satisfied. Accordingly, the offense of Circumvention of an Interlock Device under VTL 1198(9)(d) is DISMISSED as facially insufficient pursuant to CPL 170.30(1)(a). The dismissal is without prejudice, and does not prevent the People from filing a facially sufficient accusatory instrument for that charge, if they are capable of doing so, within the time permitted by CPL 30.30(1)(b).

THIS DECISION CONSTITUTES THE ORDER OF THE COURT

Dated: April 30, 2026

White Plains, NY

ORDERED:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD

CITY COURT JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

1.   In determining this motion, the Court read and considered the following: (1) Defendant's unsigned Notice to Dismiss, dated December 23, 2025; (2) ADA Zaria Graham's Affirmation in Opposition, dated March 27, 2026, and accompanying Memorandum of Law and Exhibits; and (3) Defendant's unsigned "Judicial Notice," dated April 2, 2026.The Court notes that neither Defendant's nor the People's submissions qualify as an "affirmation" or sworn submissions under CPLR 2106. In particular, they are missing the language mandated by CPLR 2106. The submissions also do not portend to be or meet the requirements for an affidavit. In any event, the parties' arguments are essentially legal and not factual, therefore, the Court will consider the non-factual assertions.

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.