The People of the State of New York v. Luis Coitino, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant, pro se, filed a motion to vacate his judgment of conviction and set aside his sentence, pursuant to CPL §§ 440.10(1) and 440.20. Specifically, Defendant contends his conviction must be vacated because (1) the guilty plea was entered by defense counsel in violation of CPL § 340.20, and without an allocution on the record about the rights Defendant waived; and (2) Defendant did not authorize his counsel to enter a plea on his behalf. Defendant further argues that his sentence, which included restitution in the amount of $3,481.53, must be sent aside because (1) his conviction was invalid for the reasons stated above; and (2) he was not provided a copy of a second repair estimate in violation of People v Ranghelle. Defendant's motion is summarily DENIED. His claims are procedurally barred, meritless, and/or not cognizable under CPL § 440.20(1).¹

Procedural History

On October 23, 2024, Defendant was arraigned in White Plains City Court on the charge of Criminal Mischief in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law § 145.00[3]). The accusatory instrument alleged that Defendant recklessly caused damage to a motorcycle late in the evening of October 22, 2024, outside of the Blind Pig (a local bar), when he pushed another person into the motorcycle, causing it to fall and sustain damages.

The People certified their compliance with their discovery obligations on December 6, 2024. The matter was placed on the Court's pre-trial conference calendar on June 13, 2025, and then again on July 11, 2025. On July 11, 2025, the matter was adjourned to July 21, 2025, to commence a jury trial.

On the morning of July 21, 2025, prospective jurors were in the courthouse awaiting jury selection. Defense Counsel informed the Court that negotiations were still "on-going" with the prosecution (7/21/25 Tr. p.2), and the People placed the current offer on the record: If Defendant pled guilty to the violation of Disorderly Conduct on the instant matter, the promised sentence was restitution. Additionally, Defendant's second misdemeanor docket that was pending at the time (and was joined for purposes of trial with this docket) would be adjourned for six months in contemplation of dismissal. After Defense Counsel asserted that Defendant was not interested in the offer, the Court received confirmation from Defense Counsel that Defendant was aware that if he were convicted after trial, he could face imprisonment. Defense Counsel stated he had informed Defendant that the "maximum penalty for a misdemeanor conviction is up to a year in jail" (id., p.3). The Court clarified that would be "[o]n both, so it could be 364 plus 364" (id.). Later, when the Court asked Defendant if he would like to discuss his options with Defense Counsel, Defendant stated "In a minute, but I have one more question regarding that" (id., p. 29). The Court advised Defendant to ask his question of his attorney, and then proceedings broke for approximately 40 minutes. When court resumed, Defense Counsel stated that he was negotiating the level of restitution with the ADA, who needed to speak with the owner of the motorcycle, and asserted "based on that, we may have a disposition" (id., p. 30). The time was 12:20 pm, and the Court agreed to break for lunch until 2:00 pm but advised the parties that if a disposition was not reached that afternoon, then trial would commence the following morning at 9:30 am (id.).

When proceedings resumed that afternoon, negotiations continued and there were additional breaks. At 2:50 p.m., Defense Counsel informed the Court that he believed "we have a disposition" (id., p. 36). The People agreed to adjourn the other docket for one month (rather than six months) in contemplation of dismissal, and on the instant matter, if the parties could not agree on the amount of restitution by the sentencing date, then it would be determined through a restitution hearing (id., p.36-37). The following then occurred in the presence of Defendant:

THE COURT: On docket 8932 of 24, at this point in time, the People are reducing to the disorderly conduct?

[ADA]: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: 240.20, Sub(7).

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Jacobson, on behalf of Mr. Coitino, can you enter a plea to the disorderly conduct at this point in time?

[DEFENSE]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And that plea is?

[DEFENSE]: Your Honor I am informed by my client that he wishes to withdraw his not guilty plea and enter a plea of guilty to the criminal mischief.

THE COURT: So, he's withdrawing his not guilty plea ---

[DEFENSE]: I'm sorry —

THE COURT: So what happened was that the CM [Criminal Mischief], the [class] A [misdemeanor], was reduced to the violation of disorderly conduct, 240.20, Sub (7).

[DEFENSE]: Yes.

THE COURT: So, you would be entering a plea on his behalf to the 240.20, Sub(7).

[DEFENSE]: Right. So my client wishes to enter a guilty plea to the 240.20, disorderly conduct, which is a violation, not a crime.

THE COURT: Yes.

[DEFENSE]: In anticipation that it will be sealed upon —

THE COURT: Payment of Restitution.

[DEFENSE]: Yes.

(id., p. 37-38). The Court accepted the guilty plea (id., p. 42). After a date for the restitution hearing was set, and the other matter was adjourned in contemplation of dismissal, Defendant thanked the Court (id., 42-43).

In September 2025, Defendant asserted that trial counsel had been ineffective and sought to proceed with motion practice pro se, which was granted by the Court (9/16/25 Tr. p.7). Defendant was provided court-appointed stand-by counsel (id., p. 8).

In a pro se motion affirmed on September 27, 2025, Defendant sought to "Cancel/Vacate ACD Agreement" and, relying on CPL § 440.10, vacate his guilty plea in the instant matter. In that filing, Defendant averred: "I Cancel/(vacate) my acceptance of the Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal (ACD) that I agreed to on July 21, 2025, because I did not agree to it freely. I only accepted it because I felt forced and pressured by the court and by my attorney " and "I had no choice but to agree to crimes I did not commit" (p. 2). He further averred: "My decision to accept the ACD+DC was involuntary—it was made under duress and threat of incarceration numerous times through the Trial on 7/2/2025 (sic) between 11:08 AM and 2:50 PM" (p.3). Treating the filing as a motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty plea, the Court (Press, J.) denied it on October 15, 2026. The Court found that Defendant's guilty plea was not involuntary and that Defense Counsel had provided effective assistance.²

On December 4, 2025, the restitution hearing commenced. The People presented the motorcycle owner, Ms. Chanel Carter, who testified about the damage incurred as a result of the motorcycle falling over, along with photographs of the damage, and an estimate for the cost of repairs by Hudson Valley Motorcycles. As pertinent to the instant motion, on cross-examination she testified that she had obtained a second estimate for the cost of repairs from a Kawasaki repair shop in either White Plains or Scarsdale that she "sent to the DA" (12/4/25 Tr. p. 43). The ADA stated, "Your Honor, the People do not have a copy of that" (id.). Upon further questioning from Defendant, Ms. Carter stated that the second estimate was "[a]round the same amount" as the estimate that was placed into evidence at the hearing, and that she still had a copy of it (id.). The hearing was continued to January 20, 2026. On that date, the witness testified that she "believed" she had provided the second estimate to the People (1/4/26 Tr. p.8). Defendant did not seek a subpoena from the Court to require the witness to produce the second estimate prior to the continuation of the hearing.

Defendant was sentenced on February 3, 2026 to pay restitution in the amount of $3,481.53.

On or about February 4, 2026, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. Defendant's appellate brief is currently due to the Appellate Term for the Ninth and Tenth Judicial Districts on August 9, 2026.

Conclusions of Law

In the instant motion to vacate his conviction, Defendant contends that his guilty plea violated CPL § 340.20 because it was not entered by Defendant on the record. Rather, his Defense Counsel entered the plea, without obtaining written authorization from Defendant. Further, Defendant argues that since the Court did not ask him if he understood the Boykin rights that are waived by pleading guilty, the record does not establish that the guilty plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Defendant also asserts that he did not authorize his attorney to plead guilty on his behalf. Defendant argues that the Court, therefore, "must" grant his motion to vacate.

The People oppose Defendant's motion and assert that his claim is procedurally barred because it is record based and his appeal has not yet been perfected. As for the portion of his claim that is reliant upon his assertion that Defense Counsel entered a guilty plea without any authorization, the People argue that this Court retains the discretion to deny it under CPL § 440.10(3)(b) because it was raised and rejected in a prior claim to withdraw his guilty plea. The People further argue that the claim should be denied pursuant to CPL §§ 440.30(4)(c) and (d) because the record belies Defendant's assertion.

Pursuant to CPL § 440.10(2)(b), the Court "must deny" a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction when "[t]he judgment is, at the time of the motion, appealable or pending on appeal, and sufficient facts appear on the record with respect to the ground or issue raised upon the motion to permit adequate review thereof upon such an appeal unless the issue raised upon such motion is ineffective assistance of counsel." Accordingly, when a claim is record based and can still be raised on direct appeal, collateral review under CPL § 440.10 is procedurally barred. Simply put, a CPL § 440.10 motion is not "a substitute for direct appeal." People v Cooks, 67 NY2d 100, 103 (1986); see also People v Cuadrado, 9 NY3d 362 (1997).

Here, Defendant's claims that his guilty plea does not comply with CPL § 340.20 and the record is silent as to whether Defendant understood his Boykin rights are record-based. Indeed, Defendant repeatedly states that vacatur is required based on the face of the plea transcript. Since the transcript and record on appeal is all that would be required to litigate those claims, and Defendant's time to take an appeal has not yet expired, they must be raised on direct appeal. A motion by way of CPL § 440.10 is not the proper vehicle. Accordingly, this portion of Defendant's motion to vacate his conviction is procedurally barred and must be denied pursuant to CPL § 440.10(2)(b).

As for Defendant's claim dehors the record that he never authorized his attorney to enter a guilty plea on his behalf, that assertion is made only by Defendant, enjoys no support in the record, and is contradicted by Defendant's earlier averments in his September 27, 2025 affirmation in support of withdrawing his guilty plea. In that earlier affirmation, Defendant acknowledged that he "accepted" the disposition of a guilty plea to Disorderly Conduct and an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ("ACD") on his other pending docket, but that he did so because he felt pressured. He does not contend in that filing that he never consented to or authorized the guilty plea. Those allegations are raised for the first time in his current motion. Moreover, the record below does not support Defendant's new contention. Defendant was present in court when his Defense Counsel entered the guilty plea after stating he was doing so upon the "wishes" of his client. At no point did Defendant dispute that representation. Instead, when Defendant spoke up, it was to thank the Court after the plea had been entered and accepted. Notably, the guilty plea was entered after Defendant had several opportunities to discuss the offer with Defense Counsel during the lengthy proceeding. Accordingly, Defendant's claim that he did not give Defense Counsel permission to enter a guilty plea to Disorderly Conduct is summarily rejected pursuant to CPL § 440.30(4)(d). There is no reasonable possibility that Defendant's current allegations are true; they are made only by Defendant and are contradicted by his own prior allegations and Defense Counsel's statement on the record that he was "informed" by Defendant that Defendant "wishe[d]" to plead guilty to Disorderly Conduct. Defendant has not met his burden to provide allegations that are sufficient to warrant a hearing. People v. Session, 34 NY2d 254, 255-56 (1974).

Defendant also moves under CPL § 440.20 to set aside his sentence. He argues that the since the conviction was allegedly invalid, so is the sentence. In addition, Defendant asserts that the People's failure to produce the second damage estimate for the restitution hearing was a discovery violation under People v. Ranghelle, 65 NY2d 56 (1986), that requires the setting aside of his sentence. The People respond that Defendant's complaint about discovery is not a cognizable claim under CPL § 440.20, which is limited to situations in which a sentence is "unauthorized, illegally imposed or otherwise invalid as a matter of law." CPL § 440.20(1). Further, they assert that Defendant's claim, which is a Rosario claim, is meritless and should be denied because the record demonstrates that the document at issue was not in the People's possession, warranting denial under CPL § 440.30(4)(d). The People are correct.

The available claims for setting aside a sentence under CPL § 440.20(1) are much more limited than those available for a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction under CPL § 440.10(1). A motion to vacate a conviction can be brought under any of the twelve categories of claims set forth in CPL §§ 440.10(1)(a) through (k). In contrast, a court presiding over a CPL § 440.20(1) motion can only set aside a sentence when the sentence itself is "unauthorized, illegally imposed or otherwise invalid as a matter of law." CPL § 440.20(1). Notably, the Legislature expanded the claims that could be asserted to set aside a death penalty sentence to also include the claims set forth in CPL §§ 440.10(1)(b), (c), (f), (g) or (h), as applicable to the death penalty sentencing proceeding. CPL § 440.20(1). As relevant here, claims concerning missing discovery are typically raised under CPL § 440.10(1)(f) or (h). While the Legislature included those claims as a basis to set aside a death penalty sentence, it omitted them in connection with non-death penalty sentences. See McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 74 ("the failure of the Legislature to include a matter within the scope of an act may be construed as an indication that its exclusion was intended"]. This Court cannot expand the scope of CPL § 440.20(1) beyond that intended by the Legislature. Gonzalez v Northeast Parent & Child Society, 2026 WL 738987, at * 2, 2026 NY Slip Op 01443 (Ct of Appeals March 17, 2026). Accordingly, in this matter, Defendant's sentence can only be set aside if it was "unauthorized, illegally imposed or otherwise invalid as a matter of law." CPL § 440.20(1).

After a hearing, Defendant was sentenced to pay $3,481.53 in restitution. That sentence was authorized, legally imposed, and valid pursuant to Penal Law § 60.27. Since Defendant's complaint about allegedly missing discovery does not go to the authority to impose a sentence of restitution, the legality of the restitution sentence, or whether the sentence was "invalid as a matter of law," it is not cognizable under CPL § 440.20(1) and is denied. See People v O'Hanlon, 13 AD3d 718, 719 (3d Dept 2004); People v Pham, 287 AD2d 789, 790 (3d Dept 2001); People v Hargrove, 25 Misc 3d 313 (Sup Ct, Nassau Cnty 2009).

However, even if the claim were cognizable, Defendant has not set forth a meritorious claim or sufficient factual allegations to warrant a hearing. The rule under Ranghelle, upon which Defendant relies, is no longer controlling law. Instead, to warrant relief for a failure to disclose a witness's prior written statement, a defendant must establish: (1) a written statement of the witness about the subject matter of their testimony exists; (2) it was in the People's actual possession or control; (3) the People suppressed the statement; and (4) Defendant was prejudiced by the suppression. People v Machado, 90 NY2d 187 (1997); People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 (1961).

To begin, the item Defendant asserts should have been disclosed is not a written statement of the People's restitution hearing witness, Ms. Chanel Carter. It was an estimate of the cost to repair her motorcycle prepared by a Kawasaki Shop. Thus, the estimate was a written statement of the mechanic and/or repair shop, not of Ms. Carter. Next, while the witness originally testified that she sent a copy of the estimate to the People, she later downgraded that testimony to stating that she "believed" she had given it to them. Notably, the tepid testimony is not accompanied by any allegations as to when that occurred, how it was allegedly transferred, or who precisely it was tendered to. In contrast, the People immediately stated that they did not have a copy of the estimate when it was first mentioned during testimony on December 4, 2025. Additionally, the People represent that they searched their records and were never given a second estimate by Ms. Carter. Notably, despite the People's denial that the document was in their actual possession, and Ms. Carter's admission that she retained a copy, Defendant did not make any attempts to secure the estimate himself. Ms. Carter's continued testimony was adjourned more than six weeks until January 20, 2026, and during that time, Defendant did not seek a subpoena duces tecum to require her to produce the document in court. Since the People are not deemed to possess a document that is in the possession of a civilian witness, the failure to obtain and disclose it does not amount to suppression, especially where the defendant is equally capable of obtaining it via a subpoena. People v Kelly, 88 NY2d 248, 252 (1996); People v Bailey, 73 NY2d 812, 813 (1988); People v Reedy, 70 NY2d 826, 827 (1987); People v Vail, 167 AD2d 567 (3d Dept 1990).

Finally, Defendant has also failed to sufficiently allege that any failure to disclose the second estimate caused him prejudice in the restitution hearing. According to Ms. Carter, the second estimate was for "[a]round the same amount" as the estimate that was placed in evidence during the restitution hearing. There is no reason to infer, therefore, that the second estimate would have mitigated Defendant's sentence of restitution. In sum, Defendant's allegations do not satisfy any of the elements needed to establish a Rosario violation, nor do they demonstrate that Defendant was denied due process in the restitution hearing. There is no basis to set aside his sentence. His motion pursuant to CPL § 440.20 is therefore also denied on the merits. CPL §§ 440.30(4)(b) and (d).

Conclusion

Defendant's motion to vacate his judgment of conviction and set aside his sentence is DENIED it its entirety.

THIS DECISION CONSTITUTES THE ORDER OF THE COURT

Dated: July 24, 2026

White Plains, NY

ORDERED:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD

CITY COURT JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

1.   In rendering this Decision, the Court read and reviewed Defendant's Notice of Motion, dated April 24, 2026, with the accompanying (unsigned) affirmation and exhibits; Affirmation of ADA Alexandra Krueger in Opposition, dated May 27, 2026, with accompanying memorandum of law; Defendant's Reply, dated May 28, 2026; ADA Krueger's letter in response, dated May 29, 2026; Defendant's letter reply, dated May 29, 2026; and the Court's file.

2.   In a Decision dated January 14, 2026, the Court denied Defendant's pro se motion to reargue and renew.

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.