The People of the State of New York, v. Christopher Phifer, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant has moved this Court pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 170.30(1)(e) for an order dismissing the accusatory instrument due to a violation of defendant's speedy trial rights under CPL 30.30.¹ Defendant filed a Notice of Motion and Affirmation in Support, both dated November 19, 2025. The People submitted an Affirmation in Opposition. dated November 21, 2025, and subsequently provided the Court with the transcript from August 5, 2025. Defendant did not submit a reply. The Court reviewed and considered all submissions.

Defendant is charged with one count of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600(2), an unclassified misdemeanor, treated as a class "A" misdemeanor — an offense punishable by up to 364 days in jail. Accordingly, the People are obligated to announce their readiness for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the action, less any excludable time. CPL 30.30(1)(b); People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 (1992). In a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, defendant bears the initial burden of alleging that the prosecution failed to declare their readiness for trial within the time required by CPL 30.30. People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 (1995). The burden then shifts to the People to demonstrate whether any periods are to be excluded from the calculation, such that the allowable time has not elapsed. People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986); see also People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 33, 349 (1980).

When a defendant is issued an appearance ticket, the criminal action is deemed to commence when the defendant first appears in local criminal court in response to the ticket. CPL 30.30(7)(b). In this matter, defendant was arrested on January 8, 2025, and was issued a Uniform Traffic Ticket informing him to appear in this Court on January 23, 2025, which he did. Accordingly, this criminal action commenced on January 23, 2025. The defense alleges that 300 days are chargeable to the People because the People have not yet declared readiness for trial. The People counter that various exclusions under CPL 30.30(4) apply, and only 83 days have elapsed.

Upon reading the foregoing papers and the court file, the Court finds and decides as follows:

January 23, 2025 — February 20, 2025

On January 23, 2025, defendant appeared in court for the first time in response to the Uniform Traffic Ticket. He was without counsel as his retained attorney was engaged on trial in another court and had previously requested an adjournment to February 20, 2025, via email. This adjournment is excluded from the CPL 30.30 calculations because defense counsel specifically requested the adjournment and because defendant was "without counsel through no fault of the court." See CPL 30.30(4)(b) and (f); People v Galante, 78 Misc 3d 31, 33 (App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2023); People v Huger, 167 AD3d 1042, 1043 (2d Dept 2018); People v Trinidad, 8 AD3d 106, 106 (1st Dept 2004). Accordingly, this adjournment is excluded time.

February 20, 2025 — March 11, 2025

On February 20, 2025, defendant appeared in court with defense counsel and was arraigned on the accusatory instrument. The People requested an adjournment to March 6, 2025. Defense counsel specifically requested an adjournment past March 6, 2025, to March 11, 2025, which the Court granted. Accordingly, the People are charged with 14 days. CPL 30.30(4)(b); People v Barden, 27 NY3d 550, 555 (2016); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33.

March 11, 2025 — April 7, 2025

On March 11, 2025, defendant was present in court with counsel. The People concede that they requested an adjournment to March 27, 2025. Defense counsel, however, specifically requested an adjournment past that date, to April 7, 2025. Accordingly, the People are charged with 16 days. CPL 30.30(4)(b); Barden, 27 NY3d at 555; Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33.

April 7, 2025 — April 21, 2025

On April 7, 2025, defendant was present in court with counsel. The People requested an adjournment to April 21, 2025, which was granted. Accordingly, the People are charged with the full adjournment of 14 days.

On April 21, 2025 — April 28, 2025

On April 21, 2025, defendant failed to appear in court. Defense counsel requested an adjournment to April 28, 2025, to give defendant another opportunity to appear. Accordingly, this adjournment is excluded time. CPL 30.30(4)(b); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33.

April 28, 2025 — May 12, 2025

On April 28, 2025, defendant was present in court with counsel. Defense counsel requested an adjournment to May 12, 2025. Accordingly, this adjournment is excluded time. CPL 30.30(4)(b); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33.

May 12, 2025 — May 28, 2025

Defense counsel was engaged on trial with another matter and did not appear in court with defendant on May 12, 2025. The matter was adjourned to May 28, 2025. Since defendant was "without counsel through no fault of the court," this adjournment is excluded time. CPL 30.30(4)(f); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33; Huger, 167 AD3d at 1043.

May 28, 2025 — June 25, 2025

On May 27, 2025, defense counsel sent a letter to the court indicating he could not appear on this matter on May 28, 2025 (but his client would) and requesting an adjournment. On May 28, 2025, defendant failed to appear in court. The matter was adjourned to June 25, 2025 (the earliest date requested by defense counsel in his letter). Since defendant was "without counsel through no fault of the court," this adjournment is excluded time. CPL 30.30(4)(f); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33; Huger, 167 AD3d at 1043. It is also excluded as an adjournment at defendant's request. CPL 30.30(4)(b); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33.

June 25, 2025 — July 10, 2025

On June 25, 2025, defendant failed to appear in court once again. The matter was adjourned for a "warrant letter" to July 10, 2025, to give defendant another opportunity to appear in court before a bench warrant would issue. CPL 30.30(4)(c)(i) excludes a "period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant." On June 25, 2025, defendant was absent from court, and instead of a bench warrant being issued on his successive failure to appear (which was also his third failure to appear in five months), the matter was adjourned for his benefit. This Court relies on the common definition of the word "absent," meaning "not present," to conclude that this time is excluded under CPL 30.30(4)(c)(i). While that statute provides two examples of situations where a defendant "must be considered absent,"² the statute does not limit absence to only those situations. See People v Acosta, 76 Misc 3d 868, 874 (Sup Ct Bronx Co 2022). Accordingly, this adjournment to issue a "warrant letter" after defendant's successive absence from court does not count against the People. See generally People v Lopez, 56 Misc 3d 1206(A) (City Ct Mt Vernon 2017) (excluding time during a warrant letter adjournment).

July 10, 2025 — July 22, 2025

On July 10, 2025, defendant appeared in court without counsel. The matter was adjourned to July 22, 2025, for defendant's attorney to appear. Because defendant appeared in court "without counsel through no fault of the court," this time-period is excluded from CPL 30.30 calculations. See CPL 30.30(4)(f); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33; Huger, 167 AD3d at 1043.

July 22, 2025 — August 5, 2025

On July 22, 2025, both defendant and defense counsel failed to appear in court. A warrant letter was issued, and the matter was adjourned to August 5, 2025, for defendant and defense counsel to appear.This period is excluded because defense counsel's absence rendered defendant "without counsel through no fault of the court." See CPL 30.30(4)(f); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33; Huger, 167 AD3d at 1043. It is also excluded because defendant was "absent" from court. CPL 30.30(4)(c)(i); Acosta, 76 Misc 3d at 874.

August 5, 2025 — September 4, 2025

On August 5, 2025, defendant appeared in court with counsel. The matter was adjourned, on defense counsel's consent, to September 4, 2025. Accordingly, this adjournment is excluded time. CPL 30.30(4)(b); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33.

September 4, 2025 — September 29, 2025

On September 4, 2025, defendant appeared in court without defense counsel. Because defendant appeared in court "without counsel through no fault of the court", this time-period is excluded from CPL 30.30 calculations. See CPL 30.30(4)(f); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33; Huger, 167 AD3d at 1043.

September 29, 2025 — October 9, 2025

On September 29, 2025, defendant was present with counsel in court. The People were not ready, and the matter was adjourned to October 9, 2025, for trial. Accordingly, the People are charged with the full adjournment of 10 days.³

October 9, 2025 — November 6, 2025

On October 9, 2025, defendant was present in court with a stand-in defense counsel. The People were not ready to proceed to trial and requested an adjournment to November 6, 2025.Accordingly, the People are charged with the full adjournment of 28 days.

November 6, 2025 — November 13, 2025

On November 6, 2025, neither defendant nor defense counsel appeared in Court for trial. A message was relayed to the Court that defense counsel was out of state and requesting an adjournment to the following week. The matter was adjourned to November 13, 2025. Since defendant was "without counsel through no fault of the court," and defense counsel requested the adjournment, this time-period is excluded from CPL 30.30 calculations. See CPL 30.30(4)(b) and (f); Galante, 78 Misc 3d at 33; Huger, 167 AD3d at 1043. It is also excluded because defendant was "absent" from court. CPL 30.30(4)(c)(i); Acosta, 76 Misc 3d at 874.

November 13, 2025 — January 26, 2026

On November 13, 2025, defendant was present in court with defense counsel, who requested a motion schedule for the instant motion to dismiss. The matter was adjourned to January 26, 2026, for decision. Accordingly, this entire period is excluded as a reasonable period of delay attributable to motion practice. See CPL 30.30(4)(a); People v. Brown, 99 NY2d 488, 491-92 (2003); People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523 (1984); People v Hicks, 235 AD3d 417 (1st Dept 2025); People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525 (1st Dept 2022).

The Court finds that 82 days of includable time has elapsed, which does not exceed the statutory limit of 90 days for this accusatory instrument. Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss based on a violation of CPL 30.30(1)(b) is DENIED.

THIS DECISION CONSTITUTES THE ORDER OF THE COURT

Dated: January 29, 2026

White Plains, New York

ORDERED:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD

CITY COURT JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant also invoked CPL 30.20 but made no arguments concerning constitutional speedy trial time.

2.   "A defendant must be considered absent whenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence." CPL 30.30(4)(c)(i).

3.   The People mistakenly calculated 11 days for this time-period, however, the proper number is ten.

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.