The People of the State of New York, v. Ralph Veal, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant has moved this Court pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 170.30 for an order dismissing the accusatory instrument due to an alleged violation of Defendant's speedy trial rights under CPL § 30.30. Defendant filed a pro se Notice of Motion and what appears to be an Affirmation in Support, dated February 17, 2026, and February 20, 2026, respectively. Defense Counsel adopted the motion on March 10, 2026. The People, through ADA Erin Gisolfi, submitted an Affirmation in Opposition, dated March 31, 2026, and accompanying Memorandum of Law and Exhibits. In addition, ADA Gisolfi provided additional factual information to the Court during the April 21, 2026 calendar call, which was also set forth in an email dated April 24, 2026 (Court Exhibit 1). The People also supplemented their response with transcripts from the calendar calls on April 4, 2025, June 9, 2025, July 1, 2025, November 10, 2025, and November 19, 2025. A transcript from the November 14, 2025 calendar call of Defendant's other pending matter (under docket CR-08567-25) was also submitted by the People. Defendant did not submit a reply. The Court reviewed and considered all submissions.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Defendant is charged with one count of Petit Larceny (Penal Law § 155.25), a class "A" misdemeanor, which is an offense punishable by up to 364 days in jail. Accordingly, the People are obligated to announce their readiness for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the action, less any excludable time. CPL § 30.30(1)(b); People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 (1992). In a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, defendant bears the initial burden of alleging that the prosecution failed to declare their readiness for trial within the time required by CPL § 30.30. People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 (1995). The burden then shifts to the People to demonstrate whether any periods are to be excluded from the calculation, such that the allowable time has not elapsed. People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986); see also People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 33, 349 (1980). Since the People have successful demonstrated that the time in which they are required to be ready for trial has not elapsed, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

On March 21, 2025, Defendant was arrested on the felony offense of Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree and given a Desk Appearance Ticket ("DAT") directing him to appear in White Plains City Court for arraignment on April 4, 2025.

On April 4, 2024, Defendant appeared for the first time in response to the DAT and was charged by felony complaint with one count of Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law § 155.30[1]). The accusatory instrument alleged that Defendant stole property by removing numerous items from the shelves at Nordstrom's Department Store in the Westchester Mall, placing them inside a Nordstrom shopping bag, and passing all points of sale without paying for the merchandise, which was valued in excess of $2000.

Subsequently, on March 10, 2026, the felony complaint was replaced by a Superseding Misdemeanor Information charging defendant with one count of Petit Larceny (Penal Law § 155.25), a class A misdemeanor.

In this scenario, the time in which the People must be ready for trial is determined by CPL § 30.30(7)(c), which states:

where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony complaint, and thereafter, in the course of the same criminal action the felony complaint is replaced with an information, the period [in which the People must be ready for trial] must be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in subdivision four, already elapsed from the date of the filing of the felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the charges in the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new accusatory instrument had not been filed.

CPL § 30.30(7)(c). In other words, as applicable here, so long as the People are not responsible for more than 93 days of delay between April 4, 2025 and March 10, 2026, then the People are permitted 90 days to declare their readiness for trial on the class A misdemeanor, measured from March 10, 2026—the date the Superseding Misdemeanor Information was filed.¹ As detailed below, this Court finds the People were responsible for only 88 days of delay before the filing of the new accusatory instrument. Accordingly, in this matter, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days of March 10, 2026. See CPL § 30.30(1)(b).

April 4, 2025 to April 22, 2025

Defendant appeared for the first time in response to the DAT on April 4, 2025, triggering the commencement date of the instant prosecution. CPL § 30.30(7)(b). On that day, he was arraigned and released on his own recognizance. The discussion then turned to Defendant's active arrest warrant for a separate matter in Yorktown. The Court informed Defendant that he would be held for authorities from Yorktown to pick him up, but if they did not come, he would be released and should return on the instant matter "when [defense counsel] says" (4/4/26 Tr., p. 4). The following colloquy then ensued:

[Defense Counsel]: Well, he's here on the 9th on another matter.

The Court: 9th of May?

[Defense Counsel]: No, April.

The Court: What's five days going to do for us? He's not being held on this case. And you can advance the case if you [find] out Mr. Veal is actually [being] held by Yorktown.

[Defense Counsel]: April 22nd.

The Court: Okay, Mr. Veal, your next court date here is April 22nd in this courtroom at 9:30.

Id. The People did not declare readiness for trial at arraignments and there was no clarification on the record as to why the matter was being adjourned.

The People argue that this pre-readiness adjournment is excluded time because the matter was adjourned at Defense Counsel's "request" to April 22, 2025. While adjournments at the request of or on the consent of defense counsel are not chargeable to the People under CPL § 30.30(4)(b), the request or consent must be "clearly expressed to relieve the People of the responsibility for that portion of the delay." People v Smith, 82 NY2d 676, 678 (1993); see also People v Barden, 27 NY3d 550, 556 (2016); People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 843 (1992). Further, it is the People's obligation to ensure that the reason for an adjournment is clearly placed on the record "so that on a subsequent CPL 30.30 motion the court can determine to whom the adjournment should be charged." Liotta, 79 NY2d at 843. In this case, at arraignment the People had not yet declared readiness for trial, therefore the matter had to be adjourned. Accordingly, Defense Counsel informed the Court that the Defendant was already expected to be back in the courthouse a few days later. The Court stated that date would be too soon, so Defense Counsel offered up another date. Notably, Defense Counsel did not expressly request, or consent to, the adjournment. Nor is this a scenario where Defense Counsel obtained an adjournment beyond that requested by the People to accommodate Defense Counsel's schedule. Instead, Defense Counsel provided dates that would be convenient for the adjournment necessitated by the People's pre-readiness status. Under the circumstances, the record does not demonstrate that Defense Counsel "clearly expressed" a "request" for an adjournment on April 4. Therefore, the People are responsible for this adjournment (18 days).

April 22, 2025 to May 14, 2025

On April 22, 2025, the People were not ready for trial and requested an adjournment to April 23, 2025. The next day, once again the People were not ready, and requested an adjournment to May 14, 2024. The People are responsible for these adjournments (21 days).

May 14, 2025 to June 9, 2025

On May 14, 2025, Defense Counsel requested an adjournment to June 9, 2025. This adjournment, therefore, is excluded. CPL § 30.30(4)(b); Barden, 27 NY3d at 556.

June 9, 2025 to July 1, 2025

On June 9, 2025, the People had not obtained an indictment on the felony charge and were not ready. Defense Counsel requested a felony hearing be held, and upon being asked how much time they needed, the People requested either July 1 or July 2, 2025 to conduct that hearing. The Court inquired of Defense Counsel which day she preferred, and she chose July 1, 2025. See 6/9/25 Tr., p. 2-3. The People argue that the adjournment to July 1, 2025 was at the "request" of Defense Counsel. However, the minutes from the calendar call demonstrate that Defense Counsel neither requested nor consented to the adjournment. Rather, Defense Counsel stated that a felony hearing should be conducted, and then the People offered two different dates after being asked by the Court "[h]ow much time do the [P]eople need." Indicating a date of availability is not the equivalent of clearly requesting or consenting to an adjournment. Barden, 27 NY3d at 556. Accordingly, the People are responsible for this adjournment (22 days).

July 1, 2025 to July 30, 2025

On July 1, 2025, the People's witnesses were present and the People were ready to proceed with the felony hearing. It could not happen, however, because Defendant failed to appear in court. Defense Counsel informed the Court that she did not know Defendant's whereabouts. The felony hearing was adjourned to July 30, 2025 for the Court to send Defendant a letter concerning the new date and warning him that if he did not appear, a bench warrant could be issued for him.

CPL § 30.30(4)(c)(i) excludes a "period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant." While that statute provides two examples of situations where a defendant "must be considered absent,"² the statute does not limit absence to only those situations. See People v Acosta, 76 Misc 3d 868, 874 (Sup Ct Bronx Co 2022). Here, Defendant's absence prevented the People from conducting a felony hearing—for which witnesses were present—and forced an adjournment. Moreover, his location was unknown. Thus, this Court relies on the common definition of the word "absent," meaning "not present," to conclude that this time is excluded under CPL § 30.30(4)(c)(i). Accordingly, this adjournment to issue a "warrant letter" after Defendant's failure to appear for the felony hearing does not count against the People. See generally People v Lopez, 56 Misc 3d 1206(A) (City Ct Mt Vernon 2017) (excluding time during a warrant letter adjournment).

July 30, 2025 to September 3, 2025

On July 30, 2025, once again, Defendant failed to appear in court for the felony hearing. The Court ordered a bench warrant but stayed it until August 27, 2025. When Defendant did not return to court by August 27, the stay was lifted. CPL § 30.30(4)(c)(ii) excludes the period of delay extending from the issuance of a bench warrant after a defendant has failed to appear in court after being released on bail or recognizance (so long as he is not in custody on another matter) to the day the defendant returns to court. This applies as well to the time period during which a bench warrant has been ordered and stayed. See People v Notholt, 242 AD2d 251, 254 (1st Dept 1997); People v Roberts, 84 Misc 3d 136(A) (App Term, 2d Dept, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024). Accordingly, this time is excluded.

September 3, 2025 to October 15, 2025

On September 3, 2025, Defendant was returned on the bench warrant. The matter was then adjourned to October 15, 2025, on Defense Counsel's request. This time is excluded for two reasons. First, the People are permitted a reasonable time to become ready after a defendant is returned on a warrant. People v Drummond, 215 AD2d 579, 581 (2d Dept 1995); People v Muhanimac, 181 AD2d 464, 465 (1st Dept 1992). In addition, adjournments at defense counsel's request are excluded under CPL § 30.30(4)(b). Thus, this time is not charged to the People.

October 15, 2025 to November 10, 2025

On October 15, 2025, Defense Counsel requested an adjournment to November 10, 2025. This time is excluded. CPL § 30.30(4)(b).

November 10, 2025 to November 19, 2025

On Monday, November 10, 2025, Defendant was not present in court because he had been arrested and arraigned in Mount Vernon on a separate matter over the weekend. Bail had been set on the new case, and Defendant was still in custody. 10/10/25 Tr. p. 2. Since Defendant was scheduled to appear on the Mount Vernon case on November 14, Defense Counsel requested an adjournment of the instant matter to November 19, 2025. When asked by the Court, Defense Counsel explicitly stated that the adjournment was at her request. Id., p. 3. Accordingly, this adjournment is excluded pursuant to CPL § 30.30(4)(b).³

November 19, 2025 to December 12, 2025

On November 19, 2025, although the People filed a bring back order to produce Defendant, he did not appear in court because he was no longer in custody.⁴ The matter was therefore adjourned so that Defense Counsel could contact her client and "get him here now that he's out." 10/19/25 Tr. p. 2. The record expressly states, without objection, that this adjournment was "defense time." Id., p. 3. This adjournment, therefore, is not chargeable to the People. CPL § 30.30(4)(b).

December 12, 2025 to January 21, 2026

On December 12, 2025, once again Defendant failed to appear in court. A bench warrant was ordered and stayed to December 16, 2025. When Defendant did not appear by December 16, the stay was lifted.

On January 15, 2026, Defendant was taken into custody on an open warrant in Yorktown. He was brought to Yorktown Town Court and sentenced to a period of incarceration on a separate matter prosecuted by the People. On January 16, 2026, the People contacted this Court to have the instant matter added to the Court's calendar on January 21, 2026, and obtain a bring back order for that date.

Since the People acted diligently upon Defendant's return to custody in the separate matter also being prosecuted by them, none of this time is chargeable to the People. CPL §§ 30.30(4)(c)(i) and (ii); Notholt, 242 AD2d at 254; Roberts, 84 Misc 3d 136(A).

January 21, 2026 to February 11, 2026

On January 21, 2026, Defendant was produced in court on the instant matter, a new defense counsel was assigned, and bail was set. The matter was adjourned to February 11, 2026 at the People's request. This time is not chargeable to the People because the People are permitted a reasonable time to become ready after a defendant is involuntarily returned on a warrant. Drummond, 215 AD2d at 581; Muhanimac, 181 AD2d at 465.

February 11, 2026 to March 10, 2026

On February 11, 2026, the matter was adjourned at the People's request to March 10, 2026. The People are responsible for this delay (27 days).

March 10, 2026 to May 14, 2026

On March 10, 2026, the felony complaint was replaced by a Superseding Misdemeanor Information charging Defendant with one count of Petit Larceny. The People also filed a certificate of compliance with their initial discovery obligations and stated ready for trial. In addition, the instant pro se motion, filed by Defendant, was adopted by Defense Counsel. A motion schedule was set, and the matter was adjourned to April 21, 2026 for decision. Prior to that date, the Court requested additional information concerning Defendant's time in custody and transcripts of various calendar calls. The matter was thereafter adjourned to May 14, 2026 for decision.

Since, prior to this date, the People were responsible for 88 days of delay, pursuant to CPL § 30.30(7)(c), the period of time in which the People must be ready for trial is the time period permitted for the new accusatory instrument measured from the date it replaced the felony complaint. On a class A misdemeanor, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days. CPL § 30.30(1)(b). Here, the People declared their readiness for trial on the same day that the Superseding Misdemeanor Information replaced the felony complaint. Furthermore, not only were the People ready, but the instant motion was filed and pending since March 10, 2026 as well. Accordingly, the People have utilized none of the 90 days permitted under CPL § 30.30(1)(b). See People v Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190-191 (2024); see also CPL § 30.30(4)(a) (excluding reasonable periods of delay attributable to motion practice, including the time the matter is under consideration by the court); People v. Brown, 99 NY2d 488, 491-92 (2003); People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523 (1984); People v Hicks, 235 AD3d 417 (1st Dept 2025); People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525 (1st Dept 2022).

Since the People are responsible for zero (0) days of delay prior to stating ready for trial, measured from March 10, 2026, the time permitted by CPL § 30.30(1)(b) has not elapsed. Defendant's motion to dismiss, therefore, is DENIED.

THIS DECISION CONSTITUTES THE ORDER OF THE

COURT

Dated: May 12, 2026

White Plains, New York

ORDERED:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD

CITY COURT JUDGE

cc: Honorable Susan Cacace

District Attorney of Westchester County

Westchester County Courthouse

111 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd.

White Plains, New York 10601

Attn: Erin G. Gisolfi, Esq.

Kenneth Bunting, Esq.

125 Dobbs Ferry Road

White Plains, New York 10607

Counsel for Defendant

FOOTNOTES

1.   When a defendant is issued an appearance ticket, the criminal action is "deemed to have commenced on the date the defendant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket." CPL § 30.30(7)(b); see also People v Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434, 438-39 (1998). In this matter, that date was April 4, 2025. Since the accusatory instrument filed that day was a felony complaint, the People would have been required to declare their readiness on the felony within six months of April 4, or 183 days.

2.   "A defendant must be considered absent whenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence." CPL§ 30.30(4)(c)(i).

3.   In their response, the People contend that on November 10, the matter was adjourned to November 14, so that a warrant letter could be issued. Further, they assert that on November 14, they were made aware that Defendant was in custody in "another jurisdiction," and that the matter was then adjourned on Defense Counsel's request to November 19, 2025. Subsequently, the People provided the transcript of the November 10, 2025 calendar call for the instant matter, which establishes that their earlier contention was mistaken. 10/10/25 Tr. p. 2-3. Further, the transcript from November 14, 2025, also establishes that the instant matter was not called on that date; only Defendant's other White Plains case (Docket CR-08567-25) was called on November 14.

4.   The People assert he was released from custody on his Mount Vernon case on November 14, 2025. See Court Exhibit 1.

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.