The People of the State of New York, v. Ralph Veal, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant has moved this Court pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 170.30 for an order dismissing the accusatory instrument due to an alleged violation of Defendant's speedy trial rights under CPL § 30.30. Defendant filed a pro se Notice of Motion and what appears to be an Affirmation in Support, dated February 17, 2026, and February 20, 2026, respectively. Defense Counsel adopted the motion on March 10, 2026. The People submitted an Affirmation in Opposition, dated March 31, 2026, and accompanying Memorandum of Law and Exhibits. Defendant did not submit a reply. The Court reviewed and considered all submissions.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Defendant is charged with one count of Petit Larceny (Penal Law § 155.25), a class "A" misdemeanor, which is an offense punishable by up to 364 days in jail. Accordingly, the People are obligated to announce their readiness for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the action, less any excludable time. CPL § 30.30(1)(b); People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 (1992). In a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, defendant bears the initial burden of alleging that the prosecution failed to declare their readiness for trial within the time required by CPL § 30.30. People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 (1995). The burden then shifts to the People to demonstrate whether any periods are to be excluded from the calculation, such that the allowable time has not elapsed. People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 (1986); see also People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 33, 349 (1980).

When a defendant is issued an appearance ticket, the criminal action is "deemed to have commenced on the date the defendant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket." CPL § 30.30(7)(b); see also People v Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434, 438-39 (1998); People v Parris, 79 NY2d 69, 71 (1992). In this matter, Defendant was issued a Desk Appearance Ticket ("DAT") on October 15, 2025, which directed him to appear in White Plains City Court for arraignment on October 30, 2025. He did not appear on that date, or on November 14, 2025, November 19, 2025, or December 12, 2025 (the subsequent dates this matter was on). Ultimately, the Court issued an arrest warrant for Defendant on December 12, 2025.

On or about January 16, 2026, the People learned that Defendant was in custody on another matter and obtained an order for his production in court on January 21, 2026.

On January 21, 2026, Defendant was produced in court, and thereby appeared for the first time in response to the DAT. The warrant was executed, and Defendant was arraigned on the instant matter. The People were not ready to proceed to trial, and the case was adjourned to February 11, 2026. Given the above facts, the instant prosecution is deemed to have commenced on January 21, 2026. CPL § 30.30(7)(b); Stirrup, 91 NY2d 438-39. It is irrelevant that Defendant was in custody during some portion of the period preceding his production for arraignment. CPL § 30.30(7)(b) "imposes no obligation on the People to determine the reason for defendant's absence or to take any action to secure his attendance in order to avoid having the action deemed commenced on the return date of the DAT." Parris, 79 NY2d at 71. This holds true even if the defendant failed to appear in court because he was incarcerated on a separate matter. Id. Accordingly, the People are only charged with the time from the commencement of the criminal prosecution on January 21, 2026 until February 11, 2026, which is twenty-one (21) days.

On February 21, 2026, once again the People were not ready for trial and requested an adjournment, this time until March 10, 2026. The People are charged with this adjournment (twenty-seven [27] days).

On March 10, 2026, in court, the People filed and served a Certificate of Compliance with their initial discovery obligations and statement of readiness for trial. Defense counsel indicated that he was adopting a pro se speedy trial motion filed by Defendant, and a motion schedule was set. The People were given until March 31, 2026, to file a response, and Defense Counsel was directed to file any reply by April 7. The matter was then adjourned to April 21, 2026, for decision. On or about April 16, 2026, the Court emailed the parties to determine whether Defense Counsel intended to submit a reply, but did not obtain a response until April 21, 2026, during the calendar call. Accordingly, the matter was adjourned to May 14, 2026, for decision. All of the time between March 10 and May 14, 2026, is excluded. Not only were the People ready for trial (which stops the clock), but the instant motion was filed and sub judice. See CPL § 30.30(4)(a) (excluding reasonable periods of delay attributable to motion practice, including the time the matter is under consideration by the court); People v. Brown, 99 NY2d 488, 491-92 (2003); People v Worley, 66 NY2d 523 (1984); People v Hicks, 235 AD3d 417 (1st Dept 2025); People v Torres, 205 AD3d 524, 525 (1st Dept 2022).

Since the People are only responsible for forty-eight (48) days of delay prior to stating ready for trial, the time permitted by CPL § 30.30(1)(b) has not elapsed. Defendant's motion to dismiss, therefore, is DENIED.

THIS DECISION CONSTITUTES THE ORDER OF THE COURT

Dated: May 12, 2026

White Plains, New York

ORDERED:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD

CITY COURT JUDGE

cc: Honorable Susan Cacace

District Attorney of Westchester County

Westchester County Courthouse

111 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Blvd.

White Plains, New York 10601

Attn: Erin G. Gisolfi, Esq.

Kenneth Bunting, Esq.

125 Dobbs Ferry Road

White Plains, New York 10607

Counsel for Defendant

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.