The People of the State of New York v. Clarence Simmons, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant moves pursuant to CPL 170.30 for an order dismissing the charges of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree on the grounds that the accusatory instruments are facially insufficient under CPL 170.35 and 100.40. Defendant also challenges the People's Certificate of Compliance with discovery and their statement of readiness, seeking dismissal for a CPL 30.30 speedy trial violation. Finally, Defendant seeks a Dunaway hearing to suppress any tainted fruit of an unlawful detention or arrest. The People oppose. They contend that they diligently obtained and provided all required discovery in their possession, that the accusatory instruments are facially sufficient as to both charges, and they validly declared their readiness for trial. Because each charge in the accusatory instruments lacks factual allegations sufficient to support every element of the offense, Defendant's motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency is GRANTED.

In determining this motion, the Court read and considered the following:

Defendant's Notice of Motion, dated January 23, 2026, with the accompanying Affirmation of Dennis W. Light, Esq., and Exhibits;

ADA Erin G. Gisolfi's Affirmation in Opposition, dated March 2, 2026, and accompanying Memorandum of Law and Exhibits; and

Reply Affirmation of Dennis W. Light, Esq., dated March 5, 2026.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Facial Sufficiency

It is well-settled that the factual part of a misdemeanor information must allege " 'facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges' (CPL 100.15 [3]; see, CPL 100.40 [1] [a]); that the 'allegations of the factual part ... together with those of any supporting depositions ... provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged' (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]); and that the '[n]on-hearsay allegations [of the information and supporting depositions] establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof' (CPL 100.40 [1] [c]; see, CPL 100.15 [3])." People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000); see also People v Dumas, 83 NY2d 729, 731 (1986). The "non-hearsay requirement is met so long as the allegation would be admissible under some hearsay rule exception." Casey, 95 NY2d at 361. " 'Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense' exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it." CPL 70.10(2). Thus, the prima facie case standard for an accusatory instrument is not as high as "as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial." People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680-681 (1999) (citations omitted). It is also lower than the legally sufficient evidence standard required to survive a motion to dismiss an indictment (People v Suber, 19 NY3d 247 [2012]) or to dismiss at trial. People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 (2009).

For this reason, the allegations in an information "should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey, 95 NY2d at 360 (citations omitted). The information need not "contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charge"; rather, it must only provide facts sufficient to "give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense . . . and prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense." People v McConnell, 11 Misc 3d 57, 60 (App Term, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2006); Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 103 ("The test is, simply whether the accusatory instrument failed to supply the defendant with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy."). Additionally, in analyzing the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, the People are entitled to rely on the fair inferences to be drawn from the facts contained therein. See Casey, 95 NY2d at 360.

Notably, a facial sufficiency evaluation is just that—it relies entirely on the "face" of the instrument. The Court is not permitted to consider any information outside of the "four corners" of the document and its supporting depositions. People v Slade, 37 NY3d 127, 140-41 (2025); People v Thomas, 4 NY3d 143, 146 (2005); Casey, 95 NY2d at 361. This rule also applies when determining whether an allegation in an accusatory instrument is hearsay. Slade, 37 NY3d at 137 ("[w]hether the allegation of an element of an offense is hearsay, rendering the information defective, is to be determined on a facial reading of the accusatory instrument") (quoting Casey, 95 NY2d at 361).

A facially sufficient accusatory instrument charging Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree must set forth non-hearsay allegations providing reasonable cause to believe that defendant "with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another, he utters or possesses a forged instrument." Penal Law 170.20. Accordingly, there are three elements that must be plead in the accusatory instrument: (1) defendant uttered or possessed a forged instrument; (2) defendant did so with knowledge that it was forged; and (3) defendant did so with the intent to defraud, deceive or injure another. A "forged instrument" is a "written instrument which has been falsely made, completed or altered." Penal Law 170.00(7). A "written instrument" includes "any instrument or article, containing written or printed matter constituting a symbol or evidence of value, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person." Penal Law 170.00(1). Money (and purported money) qualifies as a "written instrument."

In the accusatory instrument charging third-degree Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument, it is alleged that on September 6, 2025, at approximately 5:58 p.m., at 125 Westchester Avenue in White Plains, in the Sephora Store, Defendant "use[d] the counterfeit $100 bill" to "make a purchase." The accusatory instrument, which is signed by Officer Omorugn, further states that the bill "did not contain the correct security features of a true $100 bill of United States currency." Specifically, it indicates "[t]here were issues with ink alignment and the faint watermark security feature of Benjamin Franklin's portrait was not visible on the bill." Officer Omorugn indicates that the accusatory instrument is based on "direct knowledge and upon information and belief" with the sources thereof being "police investigation and the attached supporting deposition of Alicia Burey." Within the document itself, Officer Omorugn does not indicate which factual allegations are based on direct knowledge and which are based on information and belief.

In her supporting deposition, Ms. Burey, who is an Asset Protection Partner at Sephora, alleges that Defendant used two $100 bills and one $50 bill to buy a product. She avers that the cashier used a currency detector pen to mark the bills, and the mark turned yellow. However, Ms. Burey alleges that one of the $100 bills "displayed some inconsistencies through visual inspection." A manager came over and marked the bills again and allowed all of them to be accepted "due to company policy that states if the suspected bills pass the pen test, we must accept it." During the transaction, Defendant also stated, in sum and substance, "if the mark doesn't turn to black, you have to accept it." According to Ms. Burey, after the transaction was completed, she also utilized the counterfeit currency detector pen on the bills and once again the mark turned yellow. However, based on her "prior training and numerous cash handling trainings," she alleged that one of the $100 bills appeared to be "counterfeit," in that it "appeared very bright in color as if the bill was washed. Furthermore, there were inconsistencies to the ink printed at the top front left corner of the bill and there were ink alignment issues along the top of the back of the bill. The texture of the bill was a bit deteriorated as well."

As noted above, a necessary element of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree is that defendant must know that the written instrument is forged. Mere negotiation or utterance of a forged instrument does not lead to the presumption that a defendant knows the instrument is forged. People v Johnson, 65 NY2d 556, 561 (1985); People v Rodriguez, 214 AD3d 908, 909 (2d Dept 2023); People v Thorne, 50 Misc 3d 775, 779-80 (Crim Ct Bronx Co 2015). Thus, to sufficiently plead knowledge of the forgery in the accusatory instrument, the People must include facts from which it can be inferred that the forgery would be obvious (for example, the forgery purported to be a three-dollar bill), or facts that would otherwise support the inference that defendant knew the forged nature even if it wasn't obvious to a layperson. Thorne, at 780; People v. Hellwig, 18 Misc 3d 1143(A), *1 (Crim Ct NY Co 2008) ("when the difference between a forged instrument and a genuine instrument is not readily apparent to a layperson, it is impermissible to infer guilty knowledge unless the People allege additional facts"); People v Roa, 8 Mic 3d 333, 336 (Crim Ct NY Co 2005). "Guilty knowledge of forgery may be shown circumstantially by conduct and events." Johnson, 6 NY2d at 561.

In this matter, the People did not sufficiently allege facts from which it can be inferred that Defendant knew the $100 bill was forged. To begin, the accusatory instrument asserts that the bill repeatedly passed the counterfeit detection test. It turned yellow, not black, for each of the three marks. Moreover, several factors relied upon by Ms. Burey (who had "prior training") to support her belief the bill was counterfeit are not obvious to the layperson, such as her assertion that there were "inconsistencies to the ink" printed on the top front left corner and "ink alignment issues" on the top back of the bill. The additional factor alleged by Officer Omorugn is also not obvious: a missing "faint watermark security feature of Benjamin Franklin's portrait." The average person is not necessarily aware of each security feature on the many different series of $100 bills, nor is the average person likely to closely examine each bill in search of security watermarks. The other factors noted by Ms. Burey also would not lead a layperson to conclude the bill was counterfeit: that the texture of the bill was "a bit deteriorated" and the bill "appeared very bright in color as if the bill was washed." Older money that has passed through many hands can feel "a bit deteriorated" and it is not uncommon for money left in pockets to go through a washing machine spin cycle.

Since the forged nature of the bill would not have been obvious to a layperson, the People needed to plead some additional fact to support the inference that Defendant knew the bill was forged. The only additional fact offered is that Defendant said, "if the mark doesn't turn to black, you have to take it." As set forth in the accusatory instrument, the statement is true. It does not provide a basis to believe Defendant knew that a bill that passed multiple counterfeit detection tests was anything other than genuine. Since the People did not allege a basis to infer Defendant passed the $100 bill with the knowledge that it was forged, they also have not sufficiently alleged that Defendant passed the bill with the "intent to deceive, defraud or injure another." Accordingly, the charge of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree is DISMISSED for facial insufficiency. Rodriguez, 214 AD3d at 909.

A facially sufficient accusatory instrument charging Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree must set forth non-hearsay allegations providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant "intentionally obstruct[ed], impair[ed] or pervert[ed] the administration of law or other governmental function or prevent[ed] a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act " PL 195.05(1). An essential element of the crime of obstruction of governmental administration is an act of either (1) intimidation, (2) physical force or interference, or (3) an independently unlawful act. If the People's theory of the case is interference, "then it must be physical interference, as 'physical' modifies 'interference' in the statute." People v Case, 42 NY2d 98, 101 (1977). The Court of Appeals has held that purely verbal interference does not satisfy the "physical" component under PL 195.05(1). Case, 42 NY2d 98 (1977). Thus, to "trigger criminal liability" for Obstructing Governmental Administration, "the interference would have to be in part at least, physical in nature." See In re Davan L., 91 NY2d 88, 91 (1997) (quoting Case, NY2d at 102). Moreover, the pleading must be specific enough to give defendant "notice of the official function with which he was charged with interfering." People v Wheeler, 34 NY3d 1134, 1135-36 (2020) (accusatory instrument alleging "in a conclusory fashion that defendant's actions were intentionally taken to prevent the police officers from 'effecting a proper vehicle stop' " was facially insufficient and jurisdictionally defective because defendant "lacked sufficient notice to prepare his defense"); People v Cacsere, 185 Misc 2d 9 (App Term, 2d Dept 2000).

As pertinent here, the accusatory instrument charging Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (Penal Law 195.05), which is signed by Detective Ramirez, alleged that on September 6, 2025, at approximately 5:58 p.m., at 125 Westchester Avenue in White Plains, Defendant:

did intentionally obstruct, impair, and pervert the administration of law and attempted to prevent a public servant from performing an official function by means of intimidation, physical force, or interference when the defendant did intentionally flee from your deponent and attempted to physical (sic) pull himself away while I was attempting to investigate the passing of a forged instrument — counterfeit $100.00 bills. The defendant did physically interfere with my official function and the administration of law by attempting to flee and physically pull himself away from your deponent, a uniformed police officer. The actions of the defendant did intentionally interfere with the administration of law.

Affirmation of Detective Ramirez, dated September 6, 2025.

The Court finds that the accusatory instrument is jurisdictionally defective because it does not provide sufficient factual allegations to identify the "official function" the officer was conducting, how it was interfered with, or that Defendant engaged in either an "independently unlawful act" or "physical interference." To begin, much like the situation in Wheeler, the accusatory instrument here is conclusory and doesn't explain what official function the police officer was engaged in to permit defendant to prepare a defense. All that is alleged is that the police officer "was attempting to investigate the passing of a forged instrument — counterfeit $100.00 bill" and that Defendant intentionally interfered "with the administration of law." From those facts, it is unclear what the police officer was doing that constituted his "investigation." Concomitantly, it is unclear how "attempting to flee and physically pull himself away" from the officer interfered with or impeded that investigation. To the extent the People have provided additional facts within their motion response concerning the officer's actions at the time, those facts are dehors the accusatory instrument and cannot be considered by this Court in its facial sufficiency analysis. Slade, 37 NY3d at 140-41; Thomas, 4 NY3d at 146; Casey, 95 NY2d at 361.

Moreover, there are insufficient facts to support the inference that Defendant engaged in an independently unlawful act or physical interference. "It is well established that a person has no obligation to cooperate with police efforts to investigate suspected criminal activity." People v Brown, 46 Misc 3d 1212(A), *3 (Rochester City Ct 2015). A defendant can refuse to answer questions and walk or even run away. See People v Howard, 50 NY22d 583, 591-92 (1980). "Because a person has no obligation to cooperate with the police, it stands to reason that a person's failure to cooperate with a police investigation, including a person's flight from the police, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime." Brown, 46 Misc 3d 1212(A), at *3; see also People v Perez, 47 AD3d 1192 (4th Dept 2008) (exercising the "right 'to be let alone' and to refuse to respond to police inquiry" is not obstructing governmental administration). Indeed, numerous cases have held that mere flight from the police does not constitute Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree. See People v Williams, 73 Misc 3d 1226(A) (Mt Vernon City Ct 2021); Brown, 46 Misc 3d 1212(A), at *3 (collecting cases); People v Tillman, 184 Misc 2d 20, 22 (Auburn City Ct 2000). "Running from a police officer is not a crime, although such activity may create rights and duties for police, such as to proceed to obtain a warrant or assuming probable cause to arrest without a warrant, chase and apprehend the defendant." Tillman, 184 Misc 2d at 22.

The allegations in the accusatory instrument do not provide reasonable cause to believe that Defendant did something other than try to get away from the police that would amount to "physical interference." The allegations consist only of the following: that Defendant "did intentionally flee from your deponent and attempted to physical (sic) pull himself away," and that he interfered with the investigation "by attempting to flee and physically pull himself away from your deponent." It is unclear what is meant by attempting to "physically pull himself away." That phrase can be used to denote when distance is established between a person and something else, such as when a runner pulls away from the pack or a car pulls away from a curb. Thus, running away can be described as physically pulling away. As a result, there does not seem to be a factual distinction between the two allegations, and as discussed above, a defendant does not have to cooperate in an investigation and may run from the police without violating Penal Law 195.05.

However, physically pulling away could also refer to an act of extricating oneself from another person's hold. The accusatory instrument does not allege that Detective Ramirez was physically holding Defendant or that Defendant was legally detained or arrested by Detective Ramirez. Nor does it charge Defendant with Resisting Arrest, which would typically be included if Defendant had physically pulled his arms away from Detective Ramirez while being handcuffed or if Defendant ran after being arrested. Given the lack of factual allegations explaining what Detective Ramirez was doing to conduct his "investigation," it would require this Court to speculate that Detective Ramirez's investigation required him to have a physical grasp on Defendant. The Court would further have to jump to the conclusion that holding onto Defendant somehow advanced the investigation and that Defendant physically interfered by trying to escape the grasp. While the accusatory instrument need not "contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charge" (McConnell, 11 Misc 3d at 60), without some additional averments concerning the nature of the "investigation" and further explaining what is meant by alleging Defendant was trying to "pull away," this Court would be forced to engage in mental gymnastics before it could conclude that Defendant engaged in some form of "physical interference" other than running away, however slight, such that criminal liability should attach. Matter of Davan L., 91 NY2d at 91. Ultimately, this Court finds that the allegations concerning the manner of purported physical interference are too vague to give Defendant notice sufficient to prepare a defense. Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 103.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the factual allegations fail to demonstrate that Defendant, by means of physical force or interference, or any independent unlawful act, intentionally interfered with an official police function. Therefore, the charge of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree is DISMISSED.

In light of this Court's ruling, there is no need to address the remaining claims in Defendant's omnibus motion at this point in time.

THIS DECISION CONSTITUTES THE ORDER OF THE COURT

Dated: April 2, 2026

White Plains, NY

ORDERED:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD

CITY COURT JUDGE

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.