The People of the State of New York v. Carlos Becerra Luzquinos, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant moves to dismiss the instant prosecution on the grounds that the accusatory instrument charging Assault in the Third Degree and Menacing in the Third Degree is facially insufficient. Upon review of the parties' submissions  ¹ and court file, Defendant's motion is DENIED in its entirety.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Factual Background

On June 8, 2026, Defendant was arraigned on one count of Assault in the Third Degree under Penal Law 120.00(1), and one count Menacing in the Third Degree under Penal Law 120.15. Each charge was based upon an accusatory instrument signed by Police Officer Shaw, which was accompanied by the supporting deposition of [Y.R.C. (hereinafter "the complainant")].

Police Officer Shaw's accusatory instruments assert that he was informed by the complainant, that on June 7, 2026, at approximately 11:00 pm, at [REDACTED], White Plains, NY, Defendant "intentionally shoved" [Y.R.C.], "causing her to fall to the floor," which in turn caused her "to [strike] her head and knees on the floor," and suffer "substantial pain to her head and knees." Police Officer Shaw also asserted that he was informed by [Y.R.C.] that Defendant's actions caused her to "fear further imminent physical injury." Police Officer Shaw further averred that he "observed visible abrasions, and contusions to the complainant[']s knees," and that he "observed the complainant to be crying, appearing nervous and fearful."

In [Y.R.C.'s] supporting deposition, she attests that at the time and place of the incident, she and Defendant, who is the father of her child, were having a discussion about a computer while he was laying on the couch, and he "became angrier and angrier and started to yell and call me a 'Puta'." She tossed a "small portable tablet" onto him, asked "Why are you always mean to me?", and walked away. She then

heard footsteps behind me and that is when [Defendant] shoved me with all his force with both hands, by my lower shoulders and I immediately fell onto the floor hitting the front right temple of my head and hitting both of my knees causing pain and swelling and bruising. My lower right shoulder hurts. It hurt a lot because [Defendant] is six feet tall and I am only five feet tall and he is much bigger than me. When he pushed me, I was scared for my safety because he was never like this.

[Y.R.C.] Supporting Deposition, dated June 7, 2026.

Defendant challenges the facial sufficiency of each count and moves for dismissal. He contends that the People have not disproved the defense of justification, the allegations pertaining to physical injury are "conclusory" and do not include information on "after-effects or of medical treatment being necessary" or the "severity" of the injuries, and that the menacing charge is also defective because the allegations do not establish "reasonable cause to believe the [D]efendant would cause physical injury after the initial exchange" since this was self-defense and Defendant had not previously been physical with [Y.R.C.] (Def's Mem. of Law, p. 5-6).

The People oppose dismissal. They argue that justification is a defense at trial, and they are not required to disprove it at the pleading stage in order to have a facially sufficient accusatory instrument. They further assert that the allegations in the information are sufficient to support the inference that [Y.R.C.] suffered a "physical injury" and that Defendant caused her to fear for her physical safety.

Legal Conclusions

A misdemeanor information must allege " 'facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges' (CPL 100.15 [3]; see, CPL 100.40 [1] [a]); that the 'allegations of the factual part ... together with those of any supporting depositions ... provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged' (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]); and that the '[n]on-hearsay allegations [of the information and supporting depositions] establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof' (CPL 100.40 [1] [c]; see, CPL 100.15 [3])." People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000); see also People v Dumas, 83 NY2d 729, 731 (1986). " 'Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense' exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it." CPL 70.10(2). Thus, the prima facie case standard for an accusatory instrument is not as high "as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial." People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680-681 (1999) (citations omitted). It is also lower than the "legally sufficient" evidence standard required to survive a motion to dismiss an indictment (People v Suber, 19 NY3d 247 [2012]) or to dismiss at trial. People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 (2009).

For this reason, the allegations in an information "should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey, 95 NY2d at 360 (citations omitted). The information need not "contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charge"; rather, it must only provide facts sufficient to "give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense . . . and prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense." People v McConnell, 11 Misc 3d 57, 60 (App Term, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2006); Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 103 ("The test is, simply whether the accusatory instrument failed to supply the defendant with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy."). Additionally, in analyzing the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, the People are entitled to rely on the fair inferences to be drawn from the facts contained therein. See Casey, 95 NY2d at 360.

Adjudged by this standard, both charges in the information are facially sufficient. To begin, Defendant's assertion that the People must disprove the defense of justification within the accusatory instrument is incorrect. While it is true that the People bear the burden of disproving a defense of justification beyond a reasonable doubt when it is raised "at trial" (Penal Law 25.00[1], 35.00), that burden does not apply to the pleading stage of a misdemeanor information. See CPL 100.15 and 100.40. So long as the factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom would provide reasonable cause to believe that a defendant committed every element of the charged offenses, an information is facially sufficient. The only additional requirement is that the allegations be supported by non-hearsay evidence. Unlike the legal sufficiency analysis for an indictment or conviction after trial, neither corroboration nor competent evidence are prerequisites for a facially sufficient misdemeanor information. See Suber, 19 NY3d at 251-52; Kalin, 12 NY3d at 230. Nor is the facial sufficiency standard on par with proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for a trial conviction. Henderson, 92 NY2d at 680-681. Ultimately, Defendant's contention that tossing a small tablet onto him as he was laying down justified shoving [Y.R.C.] in the back as she walked away is an argument that is more appropriately addressed to the legal sufficiency or weight of the evidence after trial. But that is not the current stage of these proceedings.

As for Defendant's claim that the elements of each charge were not sufficiently pled, that is also rejected. Assault in the Third Degree is committed when, "[w]ith the intent to cause physical injury to another person, a person causes such injury to such person or to a third person." Penal Law 120.00(1). Thus, the elements include (1) intent to cause physical injury to a person, and (2) actually causing physical injury to that person or another. Penal Law § 10.00(9) defines the "physical injury" element as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain." Notably, that is "a term which simply means 'more than slight or trivial pain.' " People v McIntyre, 61 Misc 3d 127(A), 2018 NY Slip Op 51347(U) (App Term, 1st Dept 2018) (citing People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 [2007]).

In the information, the People allege that Defendant intentionally shoved [Y.R.C.] (who is significantly smaller than him) from behind "with all his force with both hands," causing her to fall to the ground and strike her right temple and knees. [Y.R.C.] averred that she had "pain and swelling and bruising" and that "[i]t hurt a lot." Notably, this occurred after a discussion in which Defendant was getting "angrier and angrier," and called [Y.R.C.] a "Puta." Further, Police Officer Shaw also averred that he observed "visible abrasions, and contusions to the complainant[']s knees."

Relying on People v Oquendo, 134 AD2d 203 (1st Dept 1987), Defendant argues that the allegations are insufficient because they are "conclusory" and do not indicate whether there were any "after-effects," whether medical treatment was needed, or specify the "severity" of the injuries (Def's Mem. of Law, p. 6). Defendant's reliance on Oquendo is misplaced. Oquendo evaluated the legal sufficiency of a conviction after trial, not the facial sufficiency of an information's pleadings. Legal sufficiency and facial sufficiency are evaluated under different standards. As recognized by the Court of Appeals in Henderson, the requirement for a facially sufficient pleading of physical injury is less demanding than the requirement for legally sufficient proof of it. Typically, an accusatory instrument and its supporting deposition are secured very soon after a criminal incident. "A victim would not necessarily know with any certainty, shortly after an attack, what its lasting effects will be." Henderson, 92 NY2d at 680-681. Accordingly, there is no requirement that the People must allege the "after-effects" of an assault. Allegations of "pain and swelling and bruising," visible contusions and abrasions, and that it "hurt a lot" after the complainant was shoved to the ground by Defendant "with all his force" suffice for a facially sufficient pleading of "substantial pain." See id.; Chiddick, 8 NY3d at 448. Further, "physical injury" only requires "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain," not medical treatment. Penal Law 10.00(9). So long as the injury is more than slight or trivial pain, it satisfies the standard. Here, common sense more than supports the inference that Defendant's actions caused [Y.R.C.] to suffer "substantial pain." Accordingly, the allegations are facially sufficient to support the third-degree assault charge.

The allegations are also facially sufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe Defendant committed Menacing in the Third Degree. Under that statute, the People must allege that, "by physical menace," Defendant "intentionally place[d] or attempte[d] to place" [Y.R.C.] "in fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury." Penal Law 120.15. To satisfy these elements, the People alleged that, after an argument, where defendant was getting "angrier and angrier" and called [Y.R.C.] a "Puta" (meaning "bitch" in Spanish), Defendant (who is larger than [Y.R.C.]) shoved [Y.R.C.] to the ground "with all his force," causing her to suffer the injuries described above, and causing her to cry and be "scared" for her physical safety. The information further alleges that Police Officer Shaw observed [Y.R.C.] to be "nervous," "fearful" and "crying." Notwithstanding these allegations, Defendant argues that the charge is facially insufficient because [Y.R.C.] also avers that this was the first time that Defendant had been physical with her. That fact, however, in no way diminishes the sufficiency of the allegations that amply support reasonable cause to believe Defendant, by physical menace, intentionally placed or attempted to place [Y.R.C.] in fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the above, Defendant's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor information as facially insufficient is DENIED.

DATED: August 18, 2026

White Plains, NY

ORDERED:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD

CITY COURT JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

1.   The submissions consist of Defendant's Notice of Motion, dated June 29, 2026, and accompanying Affirmation of David J. Ortiz, and Memorandum of Law; and ADA Michael Levin's Affirmation in Opposition, dated July 30, 2026, and accompanying Memorandum of Law. Defendant did not submit a Reply.

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.