The People of the State of New York v. Alex Pintag Muyolima, Defendant. (2026)

By way of an Omnibus Motion, dated May 15, 2026, Defendant moves for the following relief: (1) dismissal of the Assault in the Third Degree charge as facially insufficient; (2) preclusion of unnoticed statements; (3) a Huntley hearing to determine the voluntariness of noticed statements; (4) a Mapp/Dunaway hearing; (5) an order striking the People's Certificate of Compliance ("COC"); (6) preclusion of the 911 call as a discovery sanction pursuant to CPL § 245.80; (7) a Sandoval/Ventimiglia hearing; and (8) a reservation of rights to file additional pre-trial motions.

In rendering this Decision, the Court read and considered Defendant's Motion papers, and ADA Michael Levin's Affirmation in Opposition, dated June 4, 2026, and accompanying Memorandum of Law and exhibits. Defendant did not submit a Reply. The Court also considered the parties' oral arguments in court on June 30, 2026 and July 7, 2026. After conceding that the 911 recording had been disclosed prior to the filing of the People's COC, in court Defense Counsel withdrew the portions of Defendant's motion seeking to strike the COC and preclude the 911 call.

Facial Insufficiency Claim

On November 9, 2025, Defendant was arraigned on one charge of Assault in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 120.00[1]), based upon allegations that he intentionally caused physical injury to [A.R.T.], his intimate partner on November 8, 2025.

On or about December 23, 2025, the original accusatory instrument was replaced by a Superseding Misdemeanor Information ("SMI") in which Defendant was charged with the assault on [A.R.T.], as well as two counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child (Penal Law § 260.10), and one count of Harassment in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 240.26[1]).

The SMI is signed by Police Officer Boyd and asserts (as pertinent here) that on or about November 8, 2025, at approximately 11:27 pm, at [REDACTED], White Plains, NY, Defendant "did assault the complainant, [A.R.T.], who is his intimate partner and [mother] of [his] children, when he intentionally grabbed her hair with his hand and dragged her to the ground causing the complainant to experience pain and sustain bruising to her elbow and pain to her head."

It is accompanied by [A.R.T.'s] sworn statement. In the statement, she attests that at the time and place of the incident, Defendant came home "very drunk," they

started to have an argument in the kitchen and [Defendant] then threw a lid of a pot to the ground. [Defendant] appeared to be angry and I told [him] to go lay down and go to sleep. [Defendant] then grabbed my hair with his left hand and dragged me to the ground. [Defendant] then dragged me by my hair from my apartment in the third floor to the second floor. Once [Defendant] had dragged me to the second floor a police officer arrived and stopped [Defendant] from pulling my hair. . I did receive bruising and pain to my right elbow and pain to my head.

[A.R.T.] Sworn Statement, dated November 9, 2025.

Defendant challenges the facial sufficiency of the third-degree assault charge and moves for its dismissal. He contends that the allegations in the accusatory instrument "are conclusory in nature" and do not adequately establish the element of "physical injury" as they "do not sufficiently demonstrate impair[ment] of physical condition or substantial pain" (Hersh Aff., paras 21-22). Defendant also argues that the People have not provided "medical records, photographs, or other corroborating evidence of the injury to support the allegations contained" in the SMI (Hersh Aff. at para 23).

In response, the People argue that the SMI contains sufficient non-hearsay allegations to provide reasonable cause to believe Defendant committed Assault in the Third Degree. They point to the SMI's sworn allegations of the victim, which set forth that Defendant pulled her down a flight of stairs by her hair, which caused her to "receive bruising and pain to [her] right elbow and pain to [her] head." The People argue that the victim did not need to use the term "substantial pain" in her statement for the Court to conclude she suffered "physical injury."

It is well-settled that the factual part of a misdemeanor information must allege " 'facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges' (CPL 100.15 [3]; see, CPL 100.40 [1] [a]); that the 'allegations of the factual part ... together with those of any supporting depositions ... provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged' (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]); and that the '[n]on-hearsay allegations [of the information and supporting depositions] establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof' (CPL 100.40 [1] [c]; see, CPL 100.15 [3])." People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 (2000); see also People v Dumas, 83 NY2d 729, 731 (1986). The "non-hearsay requirement is met so long as the allegation would be admissible under some hearsay rule exception." Casey, 95 NY2d at 361. " 'Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense' exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely that such offense was committed and that such person committed it." CPL § 70.10(2). Thus, the prima facie case standard for an accusatory instrument is not as high as "as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial." People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 680-681 (1999) (citations omitted). It is also lower than the legally sufficient evidence standard required to survive a motion to dismiss at trial. People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 (2009).

For this reason, the allegations in an information "should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading." Casey, 95 NY2d at 360 (citations omitted). The information need not "contain the most precise words or phrases most clearly expressing the charge"; rather, it must only provide facts sufficient to "give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense . . . and prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense." People v McConnell, 11 Misc 3d 57, 60 (App Term, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2006); Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; see also Dreyden, 15 NY3d at 103 ("The test is, simply whether the accusatory instrument failed to supply the defendant with sufficient notice of the charged crime to satisfy the demands of due process and double jeopardy."). Additionally, in analyzing the sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, the People are entitled to rely on the fair inferences to be drawn from the facts contained therein. See Casey, 95 NY2d at 360.

The SMI readily satisfies this standard. Assault in the Third Degree is committed when, "[w]ith the intent to cause physical injury to another person, a person causes such injury to such person or to a third person." Penal Law § 120.00(1). Thus, the elements include (1) intent to cause physical injury to a person, and (2) actually causing physical injury to that person or another. Penal Law § 10.00(9) defines the "physical injury" element as "impairment of physical condition or substantial pain." Notably, that is "a term which simply means 'more than slight or trivial pain.' " People v McIntyre, 61 Misc 3d 127(A), 2018 NY Slip Op 51347(U) (App Term, 1st Dept 2018) (citing People v Chiddick, 8 NY3d 445, 447 [2007]). Here, [A.R.T.'s] sworn statement provides non-hearsay allegations establishing those elements. She avers that after they had an argument, Defendant intentionally dragged her to the ground by her hair and then, continuing to pull her by her hair, dragged her down a flight of stairs and only stopped when police arrived and intervened. Her sworn statement (which accompanies the SMI) asserts that Defendant's conduct caused her to experience pain on her head, as well as bruising and pain on her elbow. Common sense more than supports the inference that such actions would cause "substantial pain" as contemplated by Penal Law § 10.00(9). See Chiddick, 8 NY3d at 448; People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 681 (1999). Thus, [A.R.T.'s] assertions satisfy the physical injury element. Moreover, there is no requirement that the People must file medical records, photographs, or anything else to corroborate [A.R.T.'s] allegations in order to meet the "reasonable cause" requirement for a facially sufficient information. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss the third-degree assault charge for facial insufficiency is DENIED.

Motion for Preclusion of Non-Noticed Statements and Suppression of Noticed Statements

Defendant moves to suppress any noticed-statements, or in the alternative, obtain a hearing pursuant to People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 (1965), to determine their voluntariness. Additionally, for any statements for which notice was not properly served pursuant to CPL § 710.30(1)(a), Defendant moves for preclusion under CPL § 710.30(3). The People do not contend that they gave any CPL § 710.30(1)(a) statement notice in this matter. Rather, they argue that Defendant's statements did not require notice. Therefore, they assert that preclusion does not apply and there is no basis for suppression either because Defendant's statements, which were captured on body worn camera footage, are "uncontestably voluntary." People's Mem. of Law, p. 2.

Pursuant to CPL § 710.30(1)(a), "[w]henever the people intend to offer at a trial evidence of a statement made by a defendant to a public servant, which statement if involuntarily made would render the evidence thereof suppressible upon motion pursuant to subdivision three of section 710.20 they must serve upon the defendant a notice of such intention, specifying the evidence intended to be offered." If the People fail to serve notice within fifteen days of arraignment, without "good cause" for the delay, then the non-noticed statement is precluded. CPL §§ 710.30(2) and (3); see also People v O'Doherty, 70 NY2d 479, 487-89 (1987).

In this matter, Defendant made statements that were not noticed by the People. The People assert that the statements consist of Defendant shouting and cursing at the victim while and after being handcuffed. They further contend that the police were not questioning Defendant, and that his "semi-coherent outbursts" were unsolicited. Relying on People v Cox, 215 AD2d 684 (2d Dept 1995), the People argue that there is a "narrow exception" to the notice requirement for "statements which are 'not the product of police questioning but spontaneous and uncontestably voluntary.' " People's Mem. of Law, p. 2 (quoting Cox, 215 AD2d at 685). Cox, however, in turn, relied on the Appellate Division's decision in People v Chase, 199 AD2d 405, 406 (2d Dept 1993), the pertinent portion of which was rejected by the Court of Appeals. See People v Chase, 85 NY2d 493 (1995). In modifying the Appellate Division's ruling, and finding that defendant's non-noticed "spontaneous" statement in the police car while being transported should have been precluded, the Court of Appeals held:

It is for the court and not the parties to determine whether a statement is truly voluntary or is one in which the actions of the police are the functional equivalent of interrogation causing the statement to be made. . In People v Greer, 42 NY2d 170, 397 NYS2d 613, 366 NE2d 273 [1977], we noted that the CPL 710.30(1)(a) notice need not be served on a defendant where "there is no question of voluntariness" (id., at 178, 397 NYS2d 613, 366 NE2d 273). In that case even though this Court found that the statement in question was completely voluntary (when discovered by the police in the midst of sexual intercourse, defendant claimed the act was consensual rather than rape but, in response to the officer's question, did not know the victim's name), it precluded the statement for failure of the People to give the required notice. Since the statement here was made to a law enforcement official and the defendant had the right to have a court review the circumstances under which the statement was given and to determine its voluntariness, including whether it was truly spontaneous or the functional equivalent of interrogation defendant was entitled to notice under CPL 710.30(1)(a).

Chase, 85 NY2d at 500; see also People v Pulliam, 62 AD3d 814 (2d Dept 2009). Similarly, here, although the People argue that Defendant's statements were spontaneous and voluntary, that is not for them to decide. On the People's conclusory assertions alone, this Court is not able to make a factual finding that Defendant's statements (whatever they were) fall into a category of statements that do not require CPL § 710.30(1)(a) notice. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to preclude is held in abeyance until after a pre-trial preclusion hearing is conducted. Since the People did not serve notice of any statements, there are no statements for which a pre-trial Huntley suppression hearing would be warranted.

Suppression of Physical Evidence

The branch of Defendant's motion which sought to suppress all seized physical evidence pursuant to Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961), is denied as moot. The People assert no physical evidence was recovered in this matter; therefore, they do not intend to introduce any physical evidence at trial.

Tainted Fruit Suppression

The branch of Defendant's motion which sought to suppress statements, police observations, and any other evidence that was the tainted fruit of an unlawful arrest or detention is granted, with the People's consent, to the extent of ordering a hearing to be conducted prior to trial in accordance with Dunaway v State of New York, 442 US 200 (1979).

Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia Hearing

The branch of Defendant's motion which sought a hearing pursuant to People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 (1974), People v Molineux, 168 NY 265 (1901), and People v Ventimiglia, 52 NY2d 350 (1981), as to evidence related to Defendant's prior arrests, convictions, or bad acts, is referred to the trial court for resolution.

Right to Make Additional Motions

The branch of Defendant's motion which sought to reserve the right to make additional motions is denied at this time, subject to the rights under CPL § 255.20(3) to move for leave upon good cause shown.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the above, Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of Assault in the Third Degree as facially insufficient is DENIED; a pre-trial preclusion hearing and Dunaway suppression hearing is ordered; relief pursuant to Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia is referred to the trial court; and the right to make additional motions is denied at this time.

DATED: July 14, 2026

White Plains, NY

ORDERED:

HON. MARY JO L. BLANCHARD

CITY COURT JUDGE

Mary Jo L. Blanchard, J.