People of the State of New York, v. Leanne M. Parks, Defendant. (2026)

On or about September 21, 2025, the Defendant was charged with the following offenses:

1. Aggravated Driving While Intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(2)(AA);

2. Driving While Intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3); and

3. Equipment Violation: Failed to Dim in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3);

This Court arraigned the Defendant on October 10, 2025. On March 17, 2026, the Defendant filed an omnibus motion. The Court issued a written decision on March 23, 2026, granting the requested hearings.

On June 8, 2026, the Court held a suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of any evidence seized as a result of the Defendant's encounter with the police, (Dunaway / Mapp), and to assess the voluntariness of her statements (Huntley).

The Court received testimony from Investigator Nicholas Baxter of the New York State Police.

Four items were received into evidence:

People's Exhibit # 1 Flash drive containing BWC footage of Inv. Baxter

People's Exhibit # 2 Inv. Baxter's SFST Certification

People's Exhibit # 3 Miranda Warnings Card

Defendant's Exhibit A Supporting Deposition of Inv. Baxter

The parties submitted memorandums of law following the hearing in further support of their arguments. The Defendant filed her memo July 22, 2026. The People filed their memo on August 14, 2026.

Summary of Testimony

a. NYSP Investigator Nicholas Baxter

Inv. Baxter testified on direct examination as follows: He has been employed by the New York State Police for approximately four and a half (4 ½) years and currently ranks as an Investigator. He attended the six-month Police Academy and is trained in enforcing New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law, including conducting driving while impaired investigations.

On September 21, 2025, Inv. Baxter patrolled in uniform in a marked patrol car alongside NYSP Zone Sergeant Eric Lacovissi. He worked the 9:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. shift. Inv. Baxter indicated his typical duties at that time included patrolling and taking calls of service.

Inv. Baxter testified that at approximately 12:44 a.m. while patrolling the area of State Street in the City of Utica, he observed a white SVU, later identified as a Ford Explorer, traveling northbound. Inv. Baxter testified that the SVU passed him and failed to dim its high beams in violation of the NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law. Inv. Baxter conducted a traffic stop and spoke with the operator of the Ford Explorer, who identified herself by her NYS Driver's License as Leanne Parks, the Defendant. The Defendant stated that she was traveling home after being at Pizza Boys where she works as a bartender.

While speaking with the Defendant, Inv. Baxter testified that she exhibited slurred speech, droopy eyelids, and watery, bloodshot eyes. Inv. Baxter also testified that he detected a faint odor of an alcoholic beverage. Based on these observations, he asked the Defendant to step out of the vehicle.

Investigator Baxter then asked the Defendant whether she would submit to Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs), and she agreed. He testified that he administered several tests: the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, the walk-and-turn test, the one-leg stand test, and the alphabet test. Inv. Baxter acknowledged that the alphabet test is not standardized because it lacks defined performance criteria. He nevertheless testified that the Defendant failed all three standardized tests.

Thereafter, Inv. Baxter asked the Defendant to submit to a preliminary breath test, to which she complied. The breath test yielded a positive result for the presence of alcohol.

By this point, Inv. Baxter testified that his approximate thirteen-minute observation of the Defendant led him to conclude that she was intoxicated. Inv. Baxter then took the Defendant into custody and placed her under arrest for Driving While Intoxicated.

Following the arrest, Inv. Baxter testified that he asked the Defendant to submit to a chemical breath test upon arriving at SP Marcy, to which the Defendant agreed. Inv. Baxter indicated he did not read the Defendant any formal DWI Warnings from a card but instead asked the Defendant these questions from memory.

Inv. Baxter then read the Defendant the Miranda warnings from his card. (see People's Exhibit # 3). Inv. Baxter testified that the Defendant indicated she understood the Warnings and agreed to speak with the officers. Inv. Baxter then transported the Defendant to the NYSP barracks in Marcy, NY.

The Court notes it reviewed People's Exhibit # 1, body-cam footage of Inv. Baxter from the incident. The Court's analysis from its independent review of the BWC is discussed in detail below.

Arguments by the parties

The Defendant argues in her Omnibus motion and post-hearing memorandum of law that all evidence obtained as a result of her unlawful seizure and subsequent unlawful arrest should be suppressed. Additionally, the Defendant argues that the Court must suppress any statements included in any CPL § 710.30 Notices because officers obtained those statements after placing her in custody and before giving her Miranda warnings. The Defendant argues that any statements were involuntary.

The People oppose this relief, asserting that the arrest occurred as a result of lawful police action, that the evidence seized stemmed from lawful police action, that the Defendant made all statements freely and voluntarily, that she remained out of custody at the time of her statements, that the statements responded to investigatory questions rather than custodial interrogation, and that Inv. Baxter administered Miranda warnings subsequent to her arrest.

Conclusions of Law / Findings of Fact

Now, upon consideration of the testimony elicited at the suppression hearing, and submissions herein, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. Determination of the Motion Seeking Suppression of Evidence as a Result of Unlawful Seizure (Ingle) or Unlawful Arrest (Dunaway).

"At a Mapp/Dunaway hearing, the People have the initial burden of going forward to establish facts that demonstrate the arrest of the defendant was supported by probable cause, and the contested evidence was legally obtained. In effect, the People must make out a prima facie case providing a legal basis for the police action. The burden then shifts to the defendant to persuade the court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the seizure was in reality unlawful." People v. Chesley, 27 Misc 3d 1227(A) (citing People v. Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]).

"In evaluating police conduct, the court must determine whether the action taken was justified in its inception and at every subsequent stage of the encounter" People v. De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 215 (1976).

The Defendant, citing People v Meola, 7 NY2d 391 (1960), contends no probable cause existed to believe the Defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3). In People v Meola, the Court of Appeals held: "Two elements are necessary to prove this offense: (1) the use of high beams when an approaching vehicle is within 500 feet, and (2) interference with the vision of that driver by reason of such high beams."

At the hearing, the People failed to present any proof as to the distance between the vehicles when Inv. Baxter observed the Defendant with her high beams on. Nor did the People establish that the Defendant's high beams interfered with Inv. Baxter's vision or that of any other drivers. Further, Inv. Baxter did not testify that he had to slow down or pull over, or that any other vehicles reacted to the Defendant's use of her high beams. Inv. Baxter's supporting deposition, received into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit A, similarly contains no factual allegations regarding the interference element of VTL § 375(3).

For an officer to lawfully stop a vehicle based on the driver's failure to dim their headlights, the People must confirm there existed an objective and noticeable impact on the officer's driving. This might include an actual change in the officer's driving behavior, such as swerving, changing lanes, slowing down, or pulling off the road. People v. Yankovich, 2013 NY Slip Op 50530(U); see also People v. Costa, 168 N.Y.S.3d 285 (J. Ct. 2022). It is insufficient that a motorist's high beams simply bother the officer.

Furthermore, the Court rejects the People's argument that, even if the record does not establish the elements of VTL § 375(3), the officer nonetheless had probable cause for the stop based on a mistake of law under People v. Guthrie, 2015 NY Slip Op 02867. The Court finds this contention misplaced.

Guthrie concerned a stop-sign violation where the stop sign was unregistered, and the Court held that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the Defendant violated the VTL and that law enforcement officers are not "chargeable with knowledge" of a stop sign's registration status. By contrast, the present case involves an officer's direct observations of the Defendant's vehicle. The officer is expected to know that a violation occurs only when the Defendant's use of high beams affects the ability of the officer or another driver to operate their vehicle. As the People acknowledge in their own memorandum of law, "The inquiry is not whether the officer's belief was ultimately correct or provable to a certainty, but whether it was objectively reasonable based on what the officer observed at the time." Here, the Court concludes that the officer's belief that the Defendant violated VTL § 375(3) failed to meet the standard of objective reasonableness, as neither his supporting deposition nor his testimony demonstrate that the Defendant's alleged failure to dim her headlights interfered with his ability to operate his vehicle.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the People have not met their burden of establishing probable cause for the seizure of the Defendant under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375(3). As a result, the stop and detention of the Defendant's vehicle proved unlawful.

Even if this Court accepted the stop and detention of the Defendant as lawful under VTL § 375(3), its review of the admitted evidence—particularly Inv. Baxter's body-worn camera—still does not justify the Defendant's arrest.

In determining whether probable cause exists, courts apply an objective rather than a subjective test. See People v. Robinson, 97 NY2d 341 (2001).

Investigator Baxter testified that he stopped the Defendant for an alleged violation of VTL § 375(3) and then asked her to step out of the vehicle and submit to standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs) as well as a preliminary breath test (PBT). He stated this request arose from several observations of the Defendant, including an odor of an alcoholic beverage, slurred speech, droopy eyelids, and watery, bloodshot eyes.

However, the Defendant's appearance on the body-worn camera (BWC), including her conversation with Inv. Baxter prior to the SFSTs, would lead an ordinarily prudent and cautious person to conclude there existed no impairment. Even assuming the Defendant or her vehicle smelled alcohol, the striking absence of any physical signs of impairment while at the scene compels the conclusion that the objective facts did not provide reasonable suspicion that the Defendant's physical abilities were impaired.

Moreover, a review of the BWC does not substantiate the claim that the Defendant exhibited slurred speech, droopy eyelids, or watery and bloodshot eyes. The only potentially valid indicator of impairment rests on the odor of an alcoholic beverage - a fact the Court cannot independently confirm.

However, the odor of alcohol on a motorist's breath, standing alone, does not provide an officer with probable cause to believe the motorist operated a vehicle while impaired. See People v. Cruz, 48 NY2d 419 (1979); Matter of DeMichele v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles of NY State, 136 AD3d 629 (2d Dep't 2016); People v. Alberto, 22 Misc 3d 786 (Dist. Ct., Suffolk County 2008). An average person can consume some alcohol without impairing their ability to drive safely.

Even assuming the odor of alcohol is enough for probable cause, an investigatory detention requires reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. In this case, the level of information available to Inv. Baxter at the time he detained the Defendant to conduct field sobriety tests needed to support an ordinarily prudent and cautious person's belief that the Defendant operated her vehicle while impaired.

If the Court determines that the People have made a prima facie showing establishing a lawful basis for the police action, the burden then shifts to the Defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the seizure occured unlawfully. People v. Chesley, 27 Misc 3d 1227(A) (citing People v. Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]).

Here, the Court finds the Defendant adequately established that Inv. Baxter's BWC contradicts his testimony and undermines any claim of probable cause for the arrest. People v. Sanchez, 2025 WL 1215427 (NY City Crim. Ct. 2025).

The Defendant is clearly visible on the BWC for several minutes prior to the field sobriety tests. Defendant spoke with Inv. Baxter in a clear and ordinary manner, without slurring her speech. Her eyes did not appear droopy, watery, or bloodshot. Her demeanor reflected no signs of intoxication.

Even if the Court disregarded the above, the BWC similarly contradicts Inv. Baxter's testimony that the Defendant failed any of the three SFSTs.

During the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, the Defendant's eyes, clearly visible, move slowly toward the stimulus with no visible jerking.

During the walk-and-turn test, the Defendant followed all directions, maintaining a heel-to-toe stance, counting succinctly in line with her steps, and making the proper turn. At no point did the Court observe the Defendant use her arms for balance. Additionally, the Court observed only one slight miss of heel-to-toe at the very beginning of the test, potentially attributable to the Defendant wearing flip-flops.

As to the one-leg stand test, the Defendant again followed all instructions, keeping her foot lifted off the ground for the entirety of the test without swaying or losing her balance. Again, the BWC does not support the contention that the Defendant used her arms for balance at any point.

Finally, while the alphabet test is not standardized, the Court notes the Defendant's unsuccessful attempts at completing the test did not point to potential impairment but rather demonstrated difficulty in completing a test objectively challenging even for a sober individual.

In sum, the BWC depicting the Defendant's appearance and performance on the field sobriety tests carries sufficient weight and persuasiveness to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment, and experience that it is unreasonable to conclude the Defendant's ability to drive had been impaired.

As such, the Court determines that the Defendant met her burden of establishing the unlawful nature of the investigative detention.

For the numerous reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to suppress any evidence obtained following her unlawful stop and detention.

2. Determination Regarding the Voluntariness of Statements Noticed Properly Pursuant to CPL § 710.30 (Huntley).

Turning to the Defendant's motion to suppress statements included in any CPL § 710.30 notices, the Court notes the People have not filed any CPL § 710.30 notices.

Regardless, a Defendant claiming she involuntarily made statements to law enforcement is entitled to a hearing to determine voluntariness. At such a hearing, the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant voluntarily made the statements.

Illegal arrests lacking probable cause make any directly resulting evidence - whether physical or verbal - inadmissible as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

Since the Court has determined that law enforcement unlawfully stopped and detained the Defendant, any statements she made to the officers during the stop are inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to suppress the Defendant's statements.

The Court will conduct a virtual pre-trial conference on September 1, 2026, at 1:00 PM.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated:

HON. JOSEPH A. SABA

UTICA CITY COURT JUDGE

Joseph A. Saba, J.