SCHMIDT v. VALLEY MOBILE PARK INVESTMENTS (1987)

We address here the meaning and validity of a statute that authorizes a mobilehome park owner to enforce a rule limiting residence to “adults only.”   (Civ.Code, § 798.76.)   As will appear, we conclude that the statute permits such residence to be limited to persons 18 years of age or older, and that as so construed it is constitutional.

Petitioners (hereafter plaintiffs), two sisters and a daughter, sought to purchase a mobilehome that was to remain in a mobilehome park managed by real parties in interest (hereafter defendants).   The sale was conditioned on defendants' acceptance of plaintiffs' application to rent space for that purpose.   Defendants rejected the application, however, citing a rule that permitted only persons age 25 or older to live in the park.   Plaintiffs, who were all under the age limit, brought suit for declaratory relief and damages, alleging that defendants had violated their constitutional rights and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ.Code, § 51 et seq.).¹

The court, in denying a motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs, ruled they were not entitled to prevail under any set of facts.   Plaintiffs petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate.   Referring to the public policy in favor of providing housing for families and eschewing discrimination against children, that court construed the statute relating to mobilehomes to permit the exclusion of nonadults only when the park is specifically designed for senior citizens.   It therefore issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to reconsider its ruling.

I.

 The central question in this case is whether a mobilehome park has the right to restrict residence to adults.   Defendants contend that section 798.76 disposes of the issue.   That section is embodied in an article of the Mobilehome Residency Law relating to the transfer of a manufactured house.  (§§ 798.70–798.80.)   When a mobilehome is to remain in the park, management has the right to prior approval of the purchaser, although it may exercise its right only on narrow grounds.  (§ 798.74.)   Management may also require the purchaser to adhere to the terms of a rental agreement.  (§ 798.75.)   Section 798.76 adds that “The management may require” that such a purchaser “comply with any rule or regulation limiting residence to adults only.”   There is no doubt that plaintiffs are or aspire to be “purchasers” of a mobilehome.   Defendants urge us to hold that when the Legislature permitted a mobilehome park to enforce a rule limiting residence to “adults,” it meant exactly what it said.

We agree that as a matter of ordinary language the section's reference to “adults” must surely be understood to encompass those at least 25 years old.   Our society makes numerous fundamental age-based distinctions between children and adults.   As with many such classifications, ambiguity is possible at the intersection of the two categories.   The status of one who is 17 or 18 years old may not always be clear, but a person who is 25 years or older undoubtedly falls within the definition of an adult.   Even more to the point, the Legislature itself has declared that all persons 18 years of age or older are adults.  (§ 25.1, subd. (b).) ²  Defendants' rule that new residents must be at least 25 years old is thus, both as a matter of plain meaning and according to the Legislature's own definition, a “rule or regulation limiting residence to adults only.”

One of the basic principles of statutory construction is that courts must give effect to statutes according to the ordinary import of the language used in framing them.  (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College District (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.)  “If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.”  (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 183, 217 P.2d 1;  accord, California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College District, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 698, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.)

Plaintiffs nevertheless urge us to look to the legislative intent behind section 798.76.   They argue that in spite of ordinary meaning, other statutes and public policy compel the conclusion that the section's reference to “adults” must be construed to mean “senior citizens.”

Before proceeding, we note that recourse to the plain meaning of the statute or to the legislative intent are not, as they might seem, contradictory principles of statutory construction.   It is true, of course, that the former concentrates on the language of the statute itself, while the latter looks to matters extrinsic to the statute.   But both principles aim to effectuate the legislative intent.   As in interpreting any language, we begin with the presumption that the words chosen are used in a conventional manner and communicate the intent of the speaker.   Only when there is some reason to believe that the speaker is not using a term in its literal sense, or when there is ambiguity, is it necessary to look beyond conventional meaning.   We therefore must presume that when the Legislature referred to adults, it meant adults.   Because there is no doubt that the conventional meaning of the term includes persons over 25 years of age, we should deviate from that construction only for compelling reasons—for example, if it can be clearly established that the Legislature did not intend the word to be understood in its ordinary sense.

Plaintiffs contend that the Unruh Civil Rights Act (§ 51 et seq.) requires a construction of “adults” to mean senior citizens.  Section 51 declares that “All persons ․ no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”   We held in In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 216, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992, that the identification of particular bases of discrimination in section 51 is illustrative rather than restrictive.   In Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, a majority of this court held that the Unruh Act prohibited the blanket exclusion of families with children from an apartment complex.   Marina Point observed, however, that age-based restrictions might be permissible when they reflect a compelling societal interest.  (Id. at pp. 742–743, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.)   By way of example, the opinion suggested that a housing facility specifically designed to meet the needs of older citizens would not violate the prescripts of the Unruh Act.   (Ibid.)  In O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427, a majority of this court held that a condominium association likewise cannot limit residency to adults without good reason.   The Legislature subsequently clarified the decisions in Marina Point and O'Connor by adding section 51.2 to the Unruh Act;  the section prohibits a business establishment from conditioning the sale or rental of housing on the age of the purchaser or renter, but specifically allows such discrimination in the case of housing “designed to meet the physical and social needs of senior citizens.”   Thus in the absence of section 798.76, there could be no doubt that defendants would not be entitled to exclude plaintiffs from their mobilehome park, because the park is not designed for senior citizens.

Rather than viewing section 798.76 as an exception to the general provisions of the Unruh Act, plaintiffs contend that we must construe the section to be consonant with the act.   Understanding “adults” to only refer to senior citizens, they urge, would accomplish that result:  mobilehome parks would be barred from age discrimination unless they catered specifically to senior citizens.   But such a construction would render section 798.76 entirely without effect, because the section would then merely restate the restrictions of the Unruh Act as applied in Marina Point.   A construction of a statute that renders some of its words surplusage or redundant is to be avoided.  (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, 157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836;  Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233, 273 P.2d 5.)   Here, plaintiffs' proposed reading would render the entire statute superfluous;  nothing new or significant would have been added by its adoption.   To give meaning to section 798.76 we must conclude that “adults” refers to adults and that the Legislature intended the section to be an exception to the general prohibitions of the Unruh Act.

Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this conclusion by suggesting that the Unruh Act has been elevated to what might be described as quasi-constitutional status, and that it is therefore entitled to great deference.   They also place much emphasis on the state's public policy of providing affordable housing for families.   We do not dispute that the Unruh Act is entitled to appropriate respect and that the provision of housing to middle- and lower-income families is a matter of serious public concern.   Nor do we doubt that mobilehomes are an increasingly important source of shelter for the growing number of this state's citizens unable to afford the traditional single-family suburban house.   But the Unruh Act is legislative in origin.   Even though it expresses an important public policy, as a legislative enactment the act does not override inconsistent subsequent legislation.   What the Legislature giveth, it legitimately taketh away.

Indeed, the court specifically observed in Marina Point that section 798.76 authorized an “adults only” restriction for mobilehome parks (marina point, ltd. V. wolfsoN, supra, 30 cal.3d at pp. 735–736, fn. 7, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115), implying that the Legislature is entitled to carve out exceptions from the broad prohibitions of the Unruh Act and suggesting that it had done so in the case of section 798.76.   Similarly, when the court majority held that the Unruh Act prohibits a boys' club from excluding girls, it noted that the Legislature had the power to amend the act to allow the club to maintain its boys-only policy.  (Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72, 77, 219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212.)

Any lingering doubts regarding the Legislature's intent to permit mobilehome parks to cater exclusively to adults are eliminated by noting that it codified the decisions in Marina Point and O'Connor in 1984.  (§ 51.2, added by Stats. 1984, ch. 787, § 1.)   Two years later, the Legislature added a provision to Health and Safety Code section 18300, subdivision (g)(1), contemplating that local governments might establish locations for both “family mobilehome parks” and “adult mobilehome parks.”  (Stats.1986, ch. 123, § 1.)   Surely if the Legislature intended that the Unruh Act, which it created, banned adult mobilehome parks, it would not have expressly permitted local governments to provide for such parks.

For these reasons we hold that when it enacted section 798.76, the Legislature meant exactly what it said:  the management of a mobilehome park may require that the mobilehome purchaser who is to remain in the park comply with a rule limiting residence to adults, i.e., to persons 18 years of age or older.   We now turn to plaintiffs' claim that as so construed the statute runs afoul of their constitutional rights.

II.

Plaintiffs contend that a statute authorizing mobilehome parks to cater exclusively to adults violates equal protection of the laws.  (Cal.Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)  California's equal protection clause is substantially the equivalent of the federal guarantee, although the state protection possesses an independent vitality that may, in a given case, lead to a different result.  (Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 764, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929;  People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 951, fn. 4, 123 Cal.Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753.)   In the case at bar, however, our analysis and conclusion are based on our state standard;  reference to federal authority is illustrative rather than controlling.

 Defendants argue at length that there can be no constitutional violation here because there is no state action.   It is incontrovertible that the mandate of the equal protection clause applies only to actions taken, directly or indirectly, by the government itself.  (Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank (1974) 11 Cal.3d 352, 366–367, 113 Cal.Rptr. 449, 521 P.2d 441.)   The exclusion of children from a mobilehome park is normally a purely private act to which the requirements of equal protection do not adhere.   But the gravamen of plaintiffs' claim is that the statute, by drawing a distinction between children and adults, is unconstitutional.   While defendants' private act may not trigger equal protection scrutiny, the Legislature's adoption of a statute that discriminates on its face is plainly state action.

 State equal protection analysis, of course, has traditionally proceeded on either of two levels of judicial scrutiny of a challenged governmental action, depending on the importance of the interest to be protected and the likelihood of discrimination against a particular group.  “In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose.   [Citations.]  [¶]  On the other hand, in cases involving ‘suspect classifications' or touching on ‘fundamental interests,’ the court has adopted an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny.  [Citations.]  Under [this standard], the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.”  (Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784–785, 87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487, vacated on other grounds (1971) 403 U.S. 915, 91 S.Ct. 2224, 29 L.Ed.2d 692;  also see Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 597, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241;  Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313.)

Plaintiff first invites us to hold age classifications “suspect,” thus requiring us to strictly scrutinize section 798.76.   We cannot accept the invitation.   Courts that have considered the issue have declined to extend heightened review to differential treatment based on age.  (See, e.g., In re Nancy C. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 747, 757, 105 Cal.Rptr. 113;  Ames v. City of Hermosa Beach (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 146, 153, 93 Cal.Rptr. 786;  Manson v. Edwards (6th Cir.1973) 482 F.2d 1076, 1077;  Wurtzel v. Falcey (1976) 69 N.J. 401, 354 A.2d 617, 618;  Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976) 427 U.S. 307, 313–314, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566–2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520;  Cleburne, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 441, 105 S.Ct. at p. 3255.) ³

Nor are we persuaded that we should interpret the California equal protection clause to require strict scrutiny of age-based classifications.   The rationale for according a particular group the status of suspect class is that it comprises a “discrete and insular” minority (United States v. Carolene Products Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 144, 152–153, fn. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783–784, fn. 4) that may need protection from the whims of those who wield political power.   A suspect class is one “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”  (San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16;  accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 313, 96 S.Ct. at p. 2567.)

Children are, in the first place, not a discrete and insular group.   The line between relevant age differences is neither fundamentally fixed nor predetermined, but rather may be drawn at various points on the continuum from infant to centenarian, depending on the purpose of the distinction.   Furthermore, everyone living a normal lifespan goes through every stage.   Those in charge of the political process are unlikely to discriminate against adults, since they are themselves part of this group.   And they are equally unlikely to impermissibly burden the young—all were themselves children at one time, most have or had children, and virtually all will be dependent on a younger workforce to produce their ultimate social security benefits.   Finally, young people have none of the stigma generally associated with a suspect class.   The troubling persistence of racism, although often masked by a rhetoric of tolerance, leaves no doubt that even today many racial or ethnic groupings are treated at times as inferiors by the dominant culture.   Minors are not stigmatized in this fashion.   If anything, children are highly valued;  the virtues of the family are extolled by political figures, sanctified by religious organizations, and subsidized by income tax laws.

III.

Plaintiffs next contend that the exclusion of nonadults from a mobilehome park infringes on their right to privacy.   They argue that defendants' rule divides people into two classes—those with children and those without—in regard to their fundamental right to live together as a family.   Thus, under either a due process or a “fundamental interest” equal protection analysis, plaintiffs insist that strict scrutiny be applied.

The fundamental right of the family to live together as a unit was established, for the purposes of the United States Constitution, in Moore v. East Cleveland (1977) 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531.   A city ordinance in East Cleveland defined “family” in such a manner that the plaintiff was unable to live under one roof with her grandson.   The Supreme Court, in striking down the ordinance, commented that “the choice of relatives in this degree of kinship to live together may not lightly be denied by the State.”  (Id. at pp. 505–506, 97 S.Ct. at p. 1939.)

A subsequent federal case examined the rights of a family to live together in an apartment complex that had a policy of excluding children.  (Halet v. Wend Inv. Co. (9th Cir.1982) 672 F.2d 1305.)   Holding that the state action requirement could be met, the court reversed the district court's ruling that there was no constitutional violation, instructing it to determine whether a “genuinely significant deprivation” of a fundamental right had occurred.   (Id. at p. 1311.)   If so, the lower court was to strictly scrutinize the complex's rule.  (Ibid.)

A similar issue arose in Hameetman v. City of Chicago (7th Cir.1985) 776 F.2d 636, in which a municipal employee challenged a regulation requiring him to reside within the city limits.   The employee claimed that it was necessary for his hyperkinetic child to remain in the Indiana school system, and that compelling him to live in Chicago would thus sever the familial bonds.   The court held that a regulation was not invalid merely because it had the incidental, or unintended effect of inducing family members to live apart.   (Id. at p. 643.)

 To the extent these decisions are consistent with one another, they stand for the proposition that under the federal Constitution governmental action that directly creates a substantial burden on a family's right to live together must be strictly scrutinized.   Because defendants' rule in the matter before us or its implementation is plainly not state action, we must focus instead on the legislative enactment of section 798.76 to determine whether it so burdens plaintiffs' right to privacy.

We note, first, that the statute does not directly regulate the family, as did the ordinance in Moore, supra, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, but merely draws a distinction between adults and nonadults.   It does not authorize a mobilehome park to impose restrictions on who lives with whom, aside from insisting that they all exceed a stated age.   And the impact on the family is also indirect in that the statute simply allows, rather than mandates, age-based restrictions.   In addition, the effect of the statute on familial privacy is relatively insubstantial.   It may be, as plaintiffs claim, that all the mobilehome parks in the area in which they live have similar rules.   But the doctrine of familial privacy does not go so far as to guarantee them a fundamental right to live together in a mobilehome in a location of their choosing.   Furthermore, it appears that before they attempted to buy the mobilehome in defendants' park, the family lived together nearby and that they continue to reside, the family intact, in the same general area.   Because the statute thus has only an indirect and minimal impact on plaintiffs' right to privacy, strict scrutiny is not appropriate.

 Plaintiffs likewise contend that their exclusion from the mobilehome park violates their rights under the state Constitution, which accords privacy the status of an inalienable right.  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.)   Although similar to federal privacy protection, California's right to privacy differs in two important respects.   First, the federal right appears to be narrower than the guarantee of privacy added to the California Constitution in 1972.  (City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130, fn. 3, 164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436.)   Second, the state right protects also against nongovernmental intrusion.  (Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 829–830, 134 Cal.Rptr. 839;  Chico Fem. Women's Hlth Cr. v. Butte Glenn Med. S. (E.D.Cal.1983) 557 F.Supp. 1190, 1202–1203.)

But while the scope of human activity falling under the rubric of “privacy” may be broader under the express mandate of our state Constitution, any activity alleged to violate this right must—as appears to be true in federal law—directly create a substantial burden on the protected interest.   Insignificant intrusions into private life should not be elevated to the status of impairments of a fundamental right.   For the same reasons that section 798.76 only indirectly and insubstantially burdens plaintiffs' right to live together as a family, so also defendants' private action in excluding nonadults from their mobilehome park has only a minor impact on that right.   This action does not prevent the family from residing together in general, or within a particular area or zone;  its only effect is to prevent plaintiffs from renting a space in a particular mobilehome park.

 Because there is no basis for subjecting section 798.76 or defendants' action pursuant to the statute to strict scrutiny, we need determine only whether the section is rationally related to a legitimate state goal.   We conclude that it meets this test.   The Legislature could well have found that mobilehome parks, often constructed as an alternative to more expensive traditional housing, should not be required to assume the cost of providing facilities and protection for children when most residents would make no use of such facilities.   Also, many mobilehomes are small and ill-suited to housing families, being more appropriate for couples or single persons.   And the close proximity of many mobilehomes to one another, as well as a general lack of soundproofing, means that the play of young children and the music of their teenage siblings might inordinately disturb the tranquillity of their neighbors.⁴

We do not deny that in the case of some mobilehome parks these conditions may be absent.   Nor do we express any opinion on the wisdom of the Legislature's balancing of interests on this subject.   We hold only that the legislative goal is legitimate and its means of reaching that end is rational.

IV.

 Plaintiffs contend that under our construction section 798.76 is an invalid restraint on alienation.   The contention is without merit.   The rule against restraints on alienation (§ 711) is not absolute, but bars only unreasonable restraints.  (Wellenkamp v. Bank of America (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, 948, 148 Cal.Rptr. 379, 582 P.2d 970.)   We note as an initial matter that section 798.76 does not in any way restrain the right of a mobilehome owner to sell his unit to whomever he chooses, including those who are not adults.   The Mobilehome Residency Law simply requires that a purchaser desiring to maintain a mobilehome in a park must agree to abide by the terms of the rental agreement (§ 798.75) and to comply with any rule or regulation limiting residence to adults only (§ 798.76).   This is not a restraint on alienation, but merely a limitation on whether a purchaser may rent a space in the park.   To the extent that the restriction may inhibit sales to younger buyers or families with children, it is merely a byproduct of a statute that is a reasonable exercise of legislative power.   The minimal impact of requiring adherence to legitimate provisions in a rental agreement, which applies only when the mobilehome is to remain in the park, does not unreasonably interfere with the right of sellers to alienate their mobilehomes.

 Plaintiffs' final objection to section 798.76 is that the law improperly delegates the state's zoning powers to private individuals.   Zoning is an exercise of the state's police power that circumscribes the permissible uses of real property within a particular area.   The restrictions that a private owner imposes on his own property cannot be construed to be an exercise of that power, even when those restrictions are authorized by the state.   Voluntarily limiting the use of one's own property is simply not a legislative act.

For all the above reasons we conclude that section 798.76 is a valid legislative enactment permitting mobilehome parks, on the transfer of a mobilehome, to require that a buyer intending to move into the park comply with a rule limiting residence to persons 18 years and older.   In reaching this conclusion we are not unmindful of the difficulties faced by many citizens of this state in finding adequate affordable housing and the special burden this shortage creates for families of limited means.   As ever more people seek dwellings in or near major urban areas, competition for the limited available space will only intensify.   But the courts are unsuited to address social problems of this nature.   While we may sympathize with plaintiffs' plea for an increased supply of adequate housing for families with lower or moderate incomes, the solution lies with the Legislature, not with the courts.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed with directions to deny the petition for writ of mandate.

I agree with the majority's conclusion that Civil Code section 798.76 does not violate the state or federal Constitutions.   However, I cannot subscribe to the conclusion that the state is never required to have more than a rational reason to create age-based classifications.   I do not believe that the resolution of this case requires such an expansive holding.

Children share some, but not all, of the characteristics of traditional suspect classes.   In this sense, they are not closely analogous to any other class of persons.  (See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 451–452, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3260–3261, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).)   While they are completely excluded from the political process, they have not historically been the objects of invidious prejudice.  (See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1293–1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16.)   Moreover, their special needs and abilities often justify differential treatment.   Accordingly, age-based classifications which promote the interests of children should be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.   On the other hand, the vulnerability and powerlessness of children suggest that state action which singles them out for special treatment should, under certain circumstances, be closely examined.   For example, a classification which completely deprives a class of children of an important interest, or one which promotes a state interest wholly unrelated to the characteristics of children might well warrant closer judicial scrutiny.

The majority unnecessarily lock the courts into an inflexible analysis which precludes consideration of the nature or effect of the challenged classification.   Here, we are asked to determine the constitutionality of a statute which permits private parties to restrict residence in mobilehome parks to adults.   The statute is not mandatory;  it does not authorize the state to discriminate;  and it does not completely deprive children of housing.   Moreover, the classification at issue and the state interest it furthers are relevant to the characteristics of children as a class.   The state has a legitimate interest in promoting the availability of affordable housing.   The Legislature could reasonably have found that mobilehomes are uniquely ill-suited for children because of problems with space, privacy and safety.   In short, the circumstances which would prompt the application of heightened scrutiny are not present in this case.   I would restrict our holding to the statute at issue, and otherwise preserve the flexibility necessary to address the distinct features of other age-based classifications.

I concur in the majority's conclusion that the mobilehome-park rule at issue in this case does not violate the applicable California statutes.   In its 1984 amendments to the Unruh Act directly addressing the age-discrimination-in-housing question (Civ.Code, § 51.2, Stats.1984, ch. 787, § 1, p. 2781;  § 51.3, Stats.1984, ch. 1333, § 1, pp. 4681–4683), the Legislature—in “clarifying” the application of this court's decisions in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115 and O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427—defined the term “housing” as used in Civil Code section 51.3 to mean “all residential accommodations other than mobilehome developments.”  (Emphasis added.)  (Civ.Code, § 51.3, former subd. (c)(3), Stats.1984, ch. 1333, § 1, p. 4681.)   I believe the only sensible interpretation to be given to the express exclusion of mobilehome developments in this subdivision is that the Legislature intended to exclude such developments from the reach of the new Unruh Act provisions and to leave the earlier statute governing mobilehome parks—Civil Code section 798.76—intact.¹

I also concur in the majority's conclusion that the governing statutory scheme is not unconstitutional.   In this case, plaintiffs are not contending that the state has itself discriminated against them on the basis of their age or the age of their family members, as would be the case, for example, if the state had limited residency in a public housing project to those who are 25 years or older.   Instead, plaintiffs are in effect complaining that the state has not gone far enough in its statutory prohibition of age discrimination in private housing, prohibiting such discrimination in most residential contexts but stopping short in the mobilehome park setting.   In essence, plaintiffs are contending that since the state has barred age discrimination in the sale or rental of houses and apartments generally, it is constitutionally required to extend that antidiscrimination legislation to mobilehomes as well.

In Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 491–492, 156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592, plaintiffs raised an analogous constitutional claim, arguing that the state had violated the equal protection clause by prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race or religion but in failing to extend that prohibition to discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual preference.   In rejecting the contention, this court relied on the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan (1966) 384 U.S. 641, 657, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1727, 16 L.Ed.2d 828, which explained that “the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights ․ is inapplicable [when the constitutional challenge relates only to] a limitation on a reform measure․  Rather, in deciding the constitutional propriety of the limitations in such a reform measure we are guided by the familiar principles that a ‘statute is not invalid because it might have gone further than it did,’ ․ that a legislature need not ‘strike at all evils at the same time,’ ․ and that a ‘reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.’ ”   The court in Gay Law Students concluded that “[u]nder these principles, the [Fair Employment Practices Act] cannot be struck down as unconstitutional simply because the Legislature has declined to extend its remedies to all potentially aggrieved groups.”  (24 Cal.3d, supra, at p. 492, 156 Cal.Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592.)

I believe a similar analysis applies here.   The Legislature is not constitutionally compelled to extend reform legislation aimed at curtailing private age discrimination to all circumstances in which such legislation might, on principle, apply.   Because, as the majority explains, there is at least a noninvidious, “rational” basis on which the Legislature could have concluded that children would pose a greater problem for mobilehome parks as a class than for other residential accommodations—the smaller size of the units, the more substantial potential lack of privacy, and the greater expense that might have to be incurred in rendering such a park safe for children residents—I conclude that it was not unconstitutional for the Legislature to decide that by barring age discrimination in other forms of housing it would sufficiently alleviate the housing problem for families with children so that it was not yet necessary to take the extra “step” of extending that prohibition to mobilehome parks as well.

I fully concur in the judgment and I agree with much of what is said in the majority opinion.   I am unable to ascribe, however, to the implication in the majority opinion that the rule here limiting occupancy to persons 25 years or older would necessarily be invalid under the Unruh Act except for Civil Code section 798.76.

First, as the majority opinion appears to recognize, the same result would flow from Health and Safety Code, section 18300, subdivision (g)(1), which contemplates local governments establishing locations for “adult mobilehome parks” as well as “family mobilehome parks.”   Secondly, in my view the Unruh Act does not and never did prohibit rational age-based differences in treatment or accommodation;  under the Unruh Act differential treatment based on genuine differences in need is permissible unless it is arbitrary, capricious or invidious on its face or as applied.  (Sunrise Country Club Assn. v. Proud (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 377, 380–381, 235 Cal.Rptr. 404.)

FOOTNOTES

1.   All references hereinafter, unless noted otherwise, are to the Civil Code.

2.   An exception applies to the use of alcoholic beverages:  then 21 is the adult age.  (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 25658.)

3.   Although we invalidated an age-based distinction as to the length of sentences for public offenses in People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375, that case was decided on the ground that the classification involved a fundamental interest in liberty.

4.   In Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at page 743, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, the court rejected many of the same proffered justifications for an apartment complex's blanket exclusion of children.   But when a private exclusionary policy is defended against the mandates of the Unruh Act, the blanket exclusion must serve a “compelling societal interest.”  (Ibid.)  The rational-basis test applied in the case at bar is a less strict standard.   Furthermore, when scrutinizing social or economic regulations such as this, we presume the measure is constitutional.

1.   In 1985, the definitional provisions of Civil Code section 51.3, subdivision (c) were revised and the definition of “housing” was moved to section 51.3, subdivision (c)(4), which now reads in full:  “ ‘Dwelling unit’ or ‘housing’ means any residential accommodation other than a mobilehome.”  (Emphasis added.)  (Stats. 1985, ch. 1505, § 2, p. ––––.)  This amendment evidences the Legislature's continuing intent to exclude mobilehomes from the coverage of the Unruh Act's age-discrimination-in-housing provisions.

MOSK, Justice.

LUCAS, C.J., and PANELLI and EAGLESON, JJ., concur.