DAVIS v. Gene Mann et al., Interveners and Respondents. (1988)

Article XXXIV, section 1, of the California Constitution provides that “No low rent housing project shall ․ be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by voting in favor thereof․”  We are called upon in this case to determine what information regarding a proposed low-income housing project a state public body must submit to the voters when seeking authorization under article XXXIV, and whether defendant City of Berkeley (hereafter the City or Berkeley) provided such information when it sought approval of the project here in dispute.

Plaintiffs are five residents of Berkeley who challenge the construction of a 75–unit low-income housing development on neighborhood property.   They contend that ballot propositions passed by the City's voters in 1977 and 1981, which sought general authorization for the construction of 500 low-income units but provided no information regarding any specific housing project, failed to sufficiently identify the project here challenged to authorize its development under article XXXIV.   Berkeley and various amici curiae conversely maintain that article XXXIV prescribes authorization of housing projects before any development occurs, which necessarily requires that a municipality secure voter assent at the earliest possible juncture and in the most general of terms.   They contend that the 1977 and 1981 ballot measures thus satisfied the requirements of the constitutional provision.

While we reject plaintiffs' contention that the specific site and design of each proposed housing development must be submitted for voter approval, we conclude that the relationship between the undifferentiated block of 500 units approved by the City's electorate and the subsequently developed 75–unit project is so attenuated as to effectively empty of all significance the required authorization of “such project” under the terms of article XXXIV.   As we shall explain, a proposed project must be identified to voters at least in the limited terms herein specified to give the constitutional language meaning and effect.   We determine, however, that the mandamus relief sought by plaintiffs would impose a substantial and unjust hardship on the public, and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal denying issuance of the writ.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 1977 the City submitted to its voters a ballot measure seeking authorization for the construction of 200 units of low-income housing.   Section 2 of Measure D, entitled “Specific Authorization for Public Housing,” provided in relevant part:  “(a) Any public entity ․ shall be empowered to develop, construct, or acquire public housing for the purpose of renting such housing to low income or moderate income persons in the City of Berkeley, provided such development, construction or acquisition is financed through local, state, federal or private sources, or any combination thereof․  [¶ ] (d) In no event shall any development, construction or acquisition of public housing, as defined and authorized herein, exceed 200 units.”   In 1981, Berkeley submitted to the electorate an essentially identical ballot measure seeking authorization for an additional 300 units of low-income public housing.   Neither measure made reference to the housing project at issue in the case at bar, and both passed by substantial margins.

On June 29, 1984, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (hereafter HUD) announced that it was accepting applications until August 1, 1984, for preliminary funding to be used in the development of low-income housing projects.¹  The announcement specified that local housing authorities could seek funds for projects no larger than 75 units.   By resolution dated July 17, 1984, the Berkeley City Council authorized the submission of an application by the Berkeley Housing Authority (hereafter the BHA) for a preliminary loan in the amount of $1,056,000 “for surveys, planning, site acquisition and other predevelopment costs in connection with low-rent housing projects of not to exceed 75 dwelling units.”   Submitted with the BHA's application was certification that Berkeley had obtained article XXXIV authorization for the project, citing the 500 units approved in 1977 and 1981.²  Thereafter the city council and the BHA executed a cooperation agreement providing that the City would exempt the proposed development from local taxes and supply certain public services without charge, as required for final federal funding.  (See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(e)(2).)

In December 1984 HUD approved the preliminary loan application and reserved funds for the construction of the project.   In July 1985 the BHA submitted a final proposal specifying the location and design of the planned development.   (See generally 24 C.F.R. § 941.404.)   HUD approved the proposal in April 1986, contingent on the commencement of construction by April 1987.   Construction is now virtually completed.

Shortly after submission of the final proposal, plaintiffs requested that the BHA place the project before the City's voters for their approval pursuant to article XXXIV.   The request was denied.   They then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court seeking to compel defendants City, the BHA, the Berkeley City Council, and the Berkeley Planning and Community Development Commission to obtain voter authorization for the project and to halt its development in the interim.   Two potential beneficiaries of the project filed a complaint in intervention.   On cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court granted judgment to defendants and interveners (hereafter referred to collectively as defendants) and denied the petition for mandate.   The Court of Appeal affirmed, and we granted review.

II. Discussion

 Article XXXIV was adopted by initiative measure in November 1950.   In determining whether its terms countenance Berkeley's practice of banking large blocks of authorized low-income units for the future development of unspecified housing projects at unspecified times, we must “keep[ ] in mind the familiar and basic tenet that constitutional provisions adopted by the people are to be interpreted so as to effectuate the voters' intent.”  (Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980) 27 Cal.3d 855, 863, 167 Cal.Rptr. 820, 616 P.2d 802.)   To discern the intent of the electorate, we begin with the language of the provision itself.  (ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1985) 37 Cal.3d 859, 866, 210 Cal.Rptr. 226, 693 P.2d 811.)   Only if the language is ambiguous will we then turn for assistance to extrinsic aids.  (Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198, 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148.)

As will appear, the language of article XXXIV unambiguously requires us to reject the City's purported authorization of the housing project in the case at bar.   To ascertain more precisely the requirements of the constitutional provision, however, we shall then turn to extrinsic materials indicative of the voters' intent.

A. The Language of Article XXXIV

 We accord the words of a constitutional provision their “natural and ordinary meaning” (Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281) unless it appears they are employed in a technical sense.  (Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 327, 134 Cal.Rptr. 367, 556 P.2d 729.)  “The words used in a constitution ‘must be taken in the ordinary and common acceptation, because they are presumed to have been so understood by the framers and by the people who adopted it.’ ”  (Kaiser v. Hopkins (1936) 6 Cal.2d 537, 539, 58 P.2d 1278.)

Defendants assert that certain pivotal words in article XXXIV appear in a highly technical context requiring that they be defined with reference to their use in various state and federal statutes;  plaintiffs conversely contend the words should be given their ordinary and natural meaning.   The distinction, however, makes no difference with respect to the constitutionality of Berkeley's authorization procedure:  under either an ordinary or a technical definition of the words of article XXXIV, the City's 1977 and 1981 enabling measures failed to comport with the requirements of the Constitution.

1.

Section 1 of article XXXIV provides that “No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by any state public body until[ ] a majority of the qualified electors ․ approve such project․”  “Low rent housing project” is defined therein as “any development composed of urban or rural dwellings, apartments or other living accommodations for persons of low income” that is financed or assisted by the federal government or a state public body.   Plaintiffs' claim turns on the meaning of three of these words:  “project,” as the object of the prescribed voter approval;  “developed,” as the action that cannot be undertaken until such approval is obtained;  and “development,” used to define “project” for purposes of the provision.   We turn to their ordinary and natural meaning.

 As the object of the required referendum, the word of most significance to our analysis is “project.”   While its multiple definitions range from “a devised or proposed plan” or “a specific plan or design” to “a systematically built group of houses or apartment buildings;  [especially] one that ․ has been socially planned with government support to serve low-income families” (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 1813), each involves some isolable undertaking that has been more or less concretely realized.   Even if we presume that the voters intended the word to be used in its least concrete sense as a “proposed plan” rather than as a “systematically built group of houses or apartment buildings ․ planned with government support to serve low-income families,” it is impossible to conclude that Berkeley submitted such a “project” to its voters for authorization.   The 1977 and 1981 enabling measures sought general authority for the construction of up to 500 units of low-income housing, which the City has since utilized to build several unrelated projects over a period of more than a decade.   Nothing approximating a “proposed plan” for actual public housing was approved by the electorate;  instead, Berkeley requested prospective authority to generate and execute a variety of such proposals within relatively expansive bounds.³  An endorsement of the City's ongoing authority to formulate and implement public housing policy, however, is not synonymous with an endorsement of any “proposed plan” subsequently generated pursuant to that policy-making prerogative.   The constitutional text plainly contemplates the latter.

This conclusion is corroborated by the use of the phrase “any development” to define “low rent housing project” for purposes of article XXXIV.   A standard reference defines “development,” inter alia, as “the act, process, or result of developing,” “the state of being developed,” or “a gradual unfolding by which something ․ is developed.”  (Webster's New Internat. Dict., supra, p. 618.)   Relying on these definitions, defendants mistakenly contend that the 500 units approved in 1977 and 1981 were simply the beginning of the “process ․ of developing” the challenged project and thus that it was properly authorized under article XXXIV.   The argument is flawed for three reasons.

First, the context of the phrase “any development” in article XXXIV suggests something far more concrete than the nascent stages of a generalized planning process:  the provision defines a low-rent housing project as “any development composed of urban or rural dwellings ․”  (Italics added.)   The emphasized language modifying “any development” demonstrates that the phrase refers not to a planning process but rather to its result;  if we attempt to construe the language otherwise, we must read the word “composed” out of the provision in violation of our obligation to “give significance to every word in the constitutional text.”  (ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 867, 210 Cal.Rptr. 226, 693 P.2d 811.)   Second, even if we posit that “development” in article XXXIV refers to the earliest stages of the “process ․ of developing,” such a process nevertheless assumes some object.   When the City obtained general authorization to construct up to 500 low-income units, the object of its development process obviously could not have been the specific housing project here at issue, which was not conceived until three years after passage of the last enabling measure.   Finally, defendants overlook the definition of “development” that is evidently most applicable to its use in article XXXIV:  “a developed tract of land;  [especially] a subdivision having necessary utilities․”  (Webster's New Internat. Dict., supra, p. 618.)   Implicit in this definition is a degree of project specificity that the language of the City's enabling measures did not begin to approximate.

Defendants maintain that their position is nevertheless supported by language requiring that voter approval be obtained before a housing project is “developed ․ in any manner․”  They argue in essence that any effort to specify the details of a particular project requires that it be “developed” to some extent.   They accordingly maintain that to identify a specific project in a referendum election presupposes a violation of article XXXIV.   This contention is clearly untenable in its implications:  if one cannot specify any aspect of a project absent article XXXIV authorization, then the very conception of the project itself is barred absent voter approval.   But how can the electorate authorize a housing project that has not yet been conceived?   The argument confuses the development of a project with its articulation;  the two are not synonymous, and the mandated authorization of the former presupposes existence of the latter.

 We conclude the ordinary meaning of the constitutional language demonstrates that article XXXIV contemplates voter approval of specific housing projects rather than the prospective authority of a municipality to broadly formulate public housing policy.   The technical meaning of the language, as will be shown, yields the same conclusion.

2.

Defendants argue that the words of article XXXIV appear in a technical context and can be understood only with reference to their use in related state and federal statutes.   We have often observed that “In the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative or popular intent, terms used in a constitutional amendment are normally construed in light of existing statutory definitions or judicial interpretations in effect at the time of the amendment's adoption.”  (Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 487, 229 Cal.Rptr. 324, 723 P.2d 64;  accord, County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 850–851, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593.)   The statutory definitions and judicial interpretations cited by defendants, however, provide no support for their assertion that the City's 1977 and 1981 general authorization measures complied with the constitutional provision.

The national program of public housing originated with the United States Housing Act of 1937 (former 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., now 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq., hereafter the 1937 Act), which established a federal mechanism for funding “the development, acquisition, or administration of low-rent-housing or slum-clearance projects” by local housing agencies.  (Former 42 U.S.C. § 1409;  see generally Note, The New Leased Housing Program:  How Tenantable a Proposition? (1975) 26 Hastings L.J. 1145, 1148–1157.)   One year after passage of the 1937 Act, the California Legislature enacted the Housing Authorities Law (Stats. 1938, Ex.Sess., ch. 4, p. 9) establishing procedures for the development of public housing in the state and creating local housing authorities to receive and administer the newly available federal funds.  (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 34200–34402.)  Article XXXIV was adopted against the administrative backdrop created by these statutes.

At the time of the enactment of article XXXIV, the 1937 Act defined “development” as “any or all undertakings necessary for planning, land acquisition, demolition, construction, or equipment, in connection with a low-rent housing project.”  (Former 42 U.S.C. § 1402(5).)   Section 3, subdivision (i), of the Housing Authorities Law (now Health & Saf.Code, § 34212) concurrently defined “housing project” as “any work or undertaking to be financed in whole or in part by the Federal Government or to which the Federal Government extends assistance by supplying all or part of the labor, by guaranteeing the payment of liens, or otherwise:  ․ to provide decent, safe and sanitary urban or rural dwellings, apartments or other living accommodations for persons of low income․  The term ‘housing project’ also may be applied to the planning of the buildings and improvements, the acquisition of property, the demolition of existing structures, the construction, reconstruction, alteration and repair of the improvements and all other work in connection therewith.”  (Stats. 1945, ch. 433, § 1, pp. 922–923.)

Defendants argue that the application of these definitions to the language of article XXXIV demonstrates the constitutional validity of Berkeley's authorization measures.   In support they cite the holding of the court in Blodget v. Housing Authority (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 45, 243 P.2d 897, which considered article XXXIV's exclusion of “any [low-rent housing] project where there shall be in existence on the effective date hereof, a contract for financial assistance between any state public body and the Federal Government in respect to such project.”   The issue in Blodget was whether a project not yet constructed on the effective date of article XXXIV, but for which assistance contracts existed, was excluded from the constitutional provision.   Relying on the definitions of the 1937 Act and the Housing Authorities Law, the court concluded that “the term ‘development,’ as defined, means any and all undertakings necessary for the planning, financing, land acquisition and construction of low-rent housing projects;  that the term ‘housing project’ may be applied to the planning of buildings and improvements or the acquisition of property.”  (Id. at p. 51, 243 P.2d 897.)

Far from supporting the enabling measures passed by the City, the decision in Blodget merely rejected the assertion that “the term ‘low-rent housing project,’ as defined in the constitutional exception, must be interpreted as meaning an existing tangible group of dwellings, apartments or other living accommodations.”  (Id. at p. 50, 243 P.2d 897.)   The project challenged in Blodget was well under way on the effective date of article XXXIV, with financing secured, contracts executed, and money expended.  (Id. at pp. 48–50, 243 P.2d 897.)   While the court's definition of “low rent housing project” encompassed the preconstruction stages of the challenged undertaking, the opinion nowhere intimates that a project exists within the meaning of article XXXIV when a municipality has done nothing but select the total number of low-income units it wishes to build in the indefinite future.

Indeed, the statutory definitions relied on by the Blodget court require the contrary conclusion.  “Development” under the 1937 Act includes “any or all undertakings necessary for planning, land acquisition, ․ construction, or equipment, in connection with a low-rent housing project.”   The first act in this chronology of undertakings is “planning ․ in connection with a low-rent housing project.”   Planning cannot sensibly occur “in connection with” a project that has not yet been conceived;  activities preceding its conception instead constitute the planning of housing policy.   Likewise, the definition of “housing project” in the Housing Authorities Law encompasses “any work or undertaking to be financed ․ by the Federal government ․ to provide decent, safe and sanitary urban or rural dwellings, apartments, or other living accommodations․  The term ․ also may be applied to the planning of the buildings․”  It can hardly be argued that the City's very conception of the project here at issue constituted planning “to be financed ․ by the Federal Government,” thus requiring article XXXIV authorization under defendants' theory.   The funded “planning ․ of buildings” included in the statutory definition plainly refers to the development of housing projects that already exist as articulated proposals.

Defendants turn finally to the judicial interpretation of the phrase “low-rent ․ housing project” as used in a provision of the Housing Authorities Law requiring city councils to approve such projects prior to their development by local housing authorities.   Section 8, subdivision (b), of the Housing Authorities Law (hereafter section 8(b)) provided at the time of article XXXIV's adoption that “no low-rent housing or slum-clearance project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or owned by an authority except after consultation with the school district in which such project is located, and until the governing body of the city or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop, construct, or own the same, approves said project by resolution duly adopted.”  (Stats. 1945, ch. 766, § 1, pp. 1450–1451;  now Health and Saf.Code, § 34313.)   Because section 8(b) predated article XXXIV and shares strikingly similar language, defendants urge that the judicial interpretation of “low-rent ․ housing project” as used therein should control our understanding of the words as they appear in the constitutional text.   They accordingly direct our attention to the holding of this court in Drake v. City of Los Angeles (1952) 38 Cal.2d 872, 243 P.2d 525.⁴

Drake involved a challenge to the validity of the Los Angeles City Council's authorization of a proposed 10,000–unit housing project under section 8(b).   The plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, “that submission of the plans for the proposed location, development and construction of the project to the city planning commission for report and recommendation [to the city council] was required as a condition of valid approval․”  Rather than awaiting such detailed information, the city council passed an ordinance that generally “approved the 10,000 unit low-rent housing project and authorized the execution of the cooperation agreement with the housing authority and the latter's application to the federal agency for preliminary loans and annual contributions.”  (38 Cal.2d at p. 873, 243 P.2d 525.) ⁵

Upholding the council's early authorization of the challenged project, we concluded that “At the time when approval is required by the city council no surveys or plans have been made or undertaken to determine the location or details of construction in connection with the project.   In fact no work on a proposal for the development, construction or ownership of the project by the housing authority could be undertaken until the city had given its approval.   The housing authority could take no step to conduct surveys and formulate plans until the city approved the project and authorized an application to the federal agency for the preliminary loans and contributions which would enable the authority to proceed.   Sites for the project were not acquired nor required to have been selected prior to the city's approval.”  (Id. at p. 876, 243 P.2d 525.)

While this analysis supports the proposition that section 8(b) anticipates approval of a housing project before development begins, the decision presupposes that a specific project proposal exists to be approved and developed.   Such was the case in Drake, in which the 10,000–unit project approved by the city council was submitted two days later to the federal government for preliminary funding.  (See Housing Authority v. City of L.A. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 853, 857, 243 P.2d 515 [companion case to Drake, supra, 38 Cal.2d 872, 243 P.2d 525].)   Although detailed specifications of the project were not presented to the council, it nevertheless considered an articulated proposal rather than a broad plan for the long-range development of public housing.  (Ibid.)  Drake simply establishes that specific project details need not be submitted for council approval under section 8(b), beyond the limited identifying information required to secure a preliminary federal loan.   Nowhere does the opinion sanction approval of a low-rent housing project years before its conception.

3.

The words of article XXXIV, understood in either their ordinary sense or with reference to the language of related statutes, thus require that an articulated proposal for the development of a specific housing project be submitted to voters for approval.   The remaining and more difficult question, however, is the degree of specification required of a project proposal under article XXXIV.   Must a state public body identify the specific site and design, as plaintiffs contend, or instead is it sufficient to identify a project roughly in the terms necessary to secure preliminary federal funding, as we held in Drake with respect to the authorization required under section 8(b)?   The nearly identical words used in section 8(b) and article XXXIV ordinarily would suggest that we interpret the constitutional provision in a manner consistent with the antecedent statute.  (County of Sacramento v. Hickman, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 850–851, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593.)   There are two difficulties, however, in concluding that a low-rent housing project under article XXXIV need not be identified to voters with any greater specificity than required for approval of such a project under the terms of section 8(b).

First, we have already noted that the crucial judicial interpretation of section 8(b) did not occur until two years after the enactment of the constitutional provision.  (See fn. 4, ante, at p. 846 of 253 Cal.Rptr., at p. 53 of 765 P.2d.)   Thus we cannot say that the phrase “low-rent housing project,” as used in the antecedent statute, “comes to the Constitution clothed in [the] special meaning” assigned to it by our decision in Drake.   (66 Cal.2d at p. 851, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593.)   Second, we cannot rely on an antecedent statute to interpret similar constitutional language if “the context indicates that they were intended to convey a different idea.”   (People v. Lynch (1875) 51 Cal. 15, 28.)   An examination of the analytic premise in Drake suggests that the contexts of the two provisions are not sufficiently analogous to require their joint interpretation.

The analysis of section 8(b) in Drake turns on the relationship between the Housing Authorities Law and the 1937 Act.   Beginning with the premise that the Housing Authorities Law “was expressly intended to make available the means for proceeding under the United States Housing Act of 1937,” the court noted that federal funding would be seriously impeded by an interpretation of section 8(b) requiring specification of project details.   (Drake v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 876, 243 P.2d 525.)   As the court observed, “the state Legislature unquestionably intended to cause the provisions of the statute to conform with the provisions of the federal act and intentionally included the prerequisites required by the latter with procedural means to execute them.   The approved application required under the federal act for loans to finance the cost of surveys and plans obviously assumes that plans have not yet been formulated․  There is therefore no merit in the contention that the submission of plans to the planning commission prior to approval of the housing project by the city was required․”  (Id. at pp. 876–877, 243 P.2d 525.)

To rely on this construction of section 8(b) to interpret article XXXIV necessarily involves the assumption that the constitutional provision shares a similar relationship with the 1937 Act, since the statutory analysis in Drake rests exclusively on the procedures and definitions set forth in the federal statute.   Although the Court of Appeal in the case at bar concluded that Drake was apposite because “Both the statute and the constitutional provision serve as checks on the authority of a public agency to proceed with the planning and development of public housing,” our analysis in Drake hinged on the premise that section 8(b) was part of a broader legislative effort to facilitate, not to check, the development of public housing under the 1937 Act.   In view of the significantly distinguishable intention that presumably motivated the voters who adopted article XXXIV, the Drake court's interpretation of section 8(b) cannot control our understanding of the constitutional provision.   We therefore turn to extrinsic materials to discern the intent of the electorate.  (ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 868, 210 Cal.Rptr. 226, 693 P.2d 811.)

B. Extrinsic Aids to Construction

Plaintiffs and defendants look to three extrinsic sources to construe the intent of the voters who adopted article XXXIV:  the historical circumstances leading to the enactment of the provision, ballot arguments and related indicia of the voters' intent, and subsequent interpretations by the Legislature and administrative agencies.   In reviewing these extrinsic aids we are guided by the principle that “the provisions of our Constitution ‘ “must receive a liberal, practical commonsense construction” ’ and be ‘construed where possible to meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the people.’ ”  (Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Public Util. Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 863, 869, 31 Cal.Rptr. 463, 382 P.2d 583, citations omitted.)  “Strained interpretation, or construction leading to unreasonable or impractical results, is to be avoided.”  (Fields v. Eu, supra, 18 Cal.3d 322, 328, 134 Cal.Rptr. 367, 556 P.2d 729.)   Consideration of the extrinsic materials in light of these principles compels the conclusion that article XXXIV requires the identification of housing projects in terms similar to those required for a preliminary request for federal funding.

1.

As we observed previously with respect to another ambiguity in the language of article XXXIV, “Where, as here, a constitutional amendment is subject to varying interpretations, evidence of its purpose may be drawn from many sources, including the historical context of the amendment․”  (California Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci (1978) 22 Cal.3d 171, 177, 148 Cal.Rptr. 875, 583 P.2d 729.)   Faithful to this instruction, we consider the historical circumstances leading to the enactment of article XXXIV with the passage of Proposition 10 on the November 1950 ballot.

The parties agree the proposition was inspired by a controversy that arose when voters in the City of Eureka sought to review by referendum the city council's authorization of a proposed housing project.   Pursuant to section 8(b) of the Housing Authorities Law, the city council had approved an application by the local housing authority “for a preliminary loan in the amount of $150,000 to cover the costs of surveys and planning in connection with the development of 500 dwelling units of low rent housing.”  (Housing Authority v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 550, 553, 219 P.2d 457.)   Thereafter “a referendum petition ․ was presented to the clerk of the city of Eureka, praying for the submission to the electorate of the question of acceptance or rejection of the resolution of the city council approving the [housing authority's] application for a loan.”  (Id. at p. 554, 219 P.2d 457.)   When the city clerk refused to file the petition, certain voters brought a mandate action to compel him to do so.   On appeal, we held that the city council's action was administrative in nature insofar as it implemented locally the statewide legislative policy of the Housing Authorities Law, and was thus not subject to referendum.  (Id. at pp. 557–559, 219 P.2d 457.)   Within six months of our decision, the voters adopted article XXXIV.   (James v. Valtierra (1971) 402 U.S. 137, 138–139, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 1332, 28 L.Ed.2d 678.) ⁶

This historical sequence is of evident significance to our analysis.   If the administrative act that the voters of Eureka sought to review was the submission of a preliminary loan application “to cover the costs of surveys and planning” in connection with a proposed housing project, and if Proposition 10 was intended to secure for local voters the prerogative denied the Eureka electorate, then it necessarily follows that article XXXIV requires voter authorization of housing projects that are specified at a level of detail similar to the proposal challenged in Eureka.   The historical event precipitating article XXXIV's enactment thus strongly suggests that a proposed housing project should be specified to voters roughly in the terms required for the purposes of preliminary requests for funding.  (See 24 C.F.R. § 941.302(f);  HUD, Application for Pub. Housing Project, Form HUD–52470 (9–80) [hereafter HUD Application].)

2.

Another important extrinsic aid for the construction of an ambiguous constitutional amendment is the ballot argument supporting the measure and related indicia of the voters' intent.  (See California Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 177–178, 148 Cal.Rptr. 875, 583 P.2d 729.)   Significantly, the ballot argument favoring Proposition 10 suggests that article XXXIV requires voter approval of project details similar to those demanded for the purposes of preliminary requests for funding.

As we stated in California Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 178, 148 Cal.Rptr. 875, 583 P.2d 729, “the proponents of article XXXIV were moved by two primary concerns, the direct drain on a community's finances and the effect on its aesthetic environment, represented by the tax exempt publicly owned low income housing of that day․  Newspaper and campaign literature concerning Proposition 10 emphasized that the issues were the effect of public housing on a community's property tax rolls and aesthetic values.”

The bulk of the ballot argument is devoted to the financial effect of tax-exempt public housing on local communities.⁷  The concern expressed is the danger of incurring significant “hidden debt” in the form of public subsidies, such as free municipal services and exemptions from ad valorem property taxation, without the prior consent of local voters.   For their evaluation of a project's financial impact, voters do indeed require information regarding the scale, location, and type of the development and the period within which a state public body intends to construct it.⁸  But they do not require such information in great detail.

Consistent with this understanding of article XXXIV is the apparent reference in the ballot argument to the controversy precipitating Proposition 10.   The argument states that “Passage of [Proposition 10] will restore to the citizens ․ the right to decide whether public housing is needed or wanted in each particular locality.   Such is not the case at present.”  (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1950), italics added.)   Since it was our decision in Housing Authority v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.2d 550, 219 P.2d 457, that evidently took from citizens “the right to decide whether public housing is needed or wanted,” and since the right withdrawn by that decision consisted of the power to consider by referendum a preliminary loan application, we must presume that the right to be “restore[d]” is coextensive.

Finally, the ballot argument's reference to voter approval of revenue bonds is instructive.   The argument states that “the financing of public housing projects is an adaptation of the principle of the issuance of revenue bonds.   Under California law, revenue bonds, which bind a community to many years of debt, cannot be issued without local approval given by ballot.   Public housing and its long years of hidden debt should also be submitted to the voters to give them the right to decide whether the need for public housing is worth the cost.”  (Ballot Pamp., op. cit. supra.)   It was settled at the time of article XXXIV's enactment that “public bodies may submit bond propositions in broad and general terms.”  (Sacramento M.U. Dist. v. All Parties, etc. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 197, 202, 57 P.2d 506.)   Bond elections “are required ․ to obtain the assent of the voters to a public debt, to the amount, and for the object, proposed.   The amount must, of course, be stated on the ballot;  the general purpose must be stated with sufficient certainty to inform the voters and not mislead them, as to the object intended;  but the details of the proposed work or improvement need not be given at length in the ballot.”  (Clark v. Los Angeles (1911) 160 Cal. 317, 320, 116 P. 966.)   Insofar as article XXXIV is an “adaptation” of the voter authorization required for issuance of revenue bonds, it follows that ballot measures under the constitutional provision require a similar degree of specification of “the details of the proposed work.”

While the bulk of the ballot argument supporting Proposition 10 is devoted to the financial effect of public housing, “Newspaper and campaign literature”—as we stated above—“emphasized that the issues ․ [also included] aesthetic values.”  (California Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 178, 148 Cal.Rptr. 875, 583 P.2d 729.)   Thus, concern was expressed not only for “the direct drain on a community's finances” but also for “the effect on its aesthetic environment.”  (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs argue that the concern for aesthetic values supports the inference that the proposition was intended, in part, to provide voters with information about the specific site and design of a proposed housing project.   We do not agree.   As stated above, the events leading to the passage of the constitutional provision strongly suggest that the measure demands only that the proposed project be specified roughly in the terms required for the purposes of a preliminary request for funding.   Such a request calls for information about possible locations and types of structure;  it does not require identification of a specific site and design.  (See 24 C.F.R. § 941.302(f);  HUD Application, supra, p. 1.)

In sum, the extrinsic materials documenting the legislative history of Proposition 10 tend to corroborate the conclusion that article XXXIV secured to voters the rights denied the Eureka electorate by our decision in Housing Authority v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.2d 550, 219 P.2d 457.   Further, the evidence suggests that voter approval of proposed projects, specified roughly in the terms required for preliminary requests for funding, adequately addresses the concerns motivating the voters who enacted article XXXIV.

3.

We consider in conclusion the subsequent interpretation given to article XXXIV by the Legislature and two state agencies concerned with public housing—the California Housing Finance Agency and the California Department of Housing and Community Development.   Defendants cite recent interpretations by the agencies which explicitly recommend the type of enabling measures utilized by Berkeley and rejected above on the basis of article XXXIV's plain language.   Clearly erroneous administrative constructions, however, are not relevant to our interpretative task.  (Whitcomb Hotel, Inc. v. Cal. Emp. Com. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 753, 757, 151 P.2d 233.) ⁹  We thus turn to the Legislature's interpretation of the provision.

In 1976 the Legislature enacted legislation interpreting and applying article XXXIV.  (Stats.1976, ch. 1339, pp. 6074–6078.)   The purpose of one group of provisions, entitled “Validation Procedures” and codified at Health and Safety Code sections 36000–36005,¹⁰ is specified in section 36001:  “The Legislature ․ finds that certainty as to the validity of actions previously taken by state public bodies, as well as the actions to be taken in the future, requires the validation of actions previously taken and the establishment of means for determining the validity of those actions to be taken in the future.”   In furtherance of this objective, section 36003 provides:  “An action may be brought ․ to determine the validity of the action of a local public entity in giving preliminary or final approval to a proposal or application which may result in housing assistance benefiting persons of low income without obtaining prior referendum approval pursuant to Article XXXIV of the State Constitution.”   With respect to most housing projects initiated prior to August 20, 1976, section 36004 bars actions challenging the validity of their authorization under article XXXIV.   With respect to projects initiated after that date, section 36005 provides:  “No judicial action attacking or otherwise questioning the validity of the action of a local public entity in giving final approval to a proposal or application which may result in housing assistance ․ without obtaining prior approval pursuant to Article XXXIV ․ shall be brought prior to the adoption of a resolution or ordinance by the legislative body of the local public entity approving the proposal or application, nor may any such action be brought at any time after 60 days from the date of adoption of the ordinance or resolution approving the proposal.”

Plaintiffs argue that section 36005 impliedly identifies the “adoption of a resolution or ordinance ․ [finally] approving [a] proposal or application” as the critical act that must be submitted to voters for referendum approval under article XXXIV.   They thus maintain that a public entity can seek article XXXIV authorization only after its legislative body has finally approved a “proposal or application” for federal funding, presumably pursuant to section 34313 (former section 8(b)).   This is untenable.

The implication of section 36005 is not that voter approval must be sought after adoption of a resolution finally approving a specific funding request, but rather before:  the violation occurs when a resolution or ordinance giving final approval is passed without prior authorization.

Section 36005 thus impliedly requires voter authorization prior to the final approval and submission of a “proposal or application which may result in housing assistance benefiting persons of low income․”  Although the statute does not define “proposal” or “application,” we have already observed that the words are terms of art that specify the two types of federal funding requests.  (See fn. 1, ante, at p. 841 of 253 Cal.Rptr., at p. 48 of 765 P.2d.)   An “application” is thus the initial submission used by HUD to rank proposed projects and allocate preliminary funding to local agencies for site identification, plans, surveys, and related undertakings required to prepare a more detailed project “proposal.”   If the Legislature requires voter authorization of a proposed housing project prior to the final approval and submission of an “application,” it follows that the Legislature requires the local public entity to provide the electorate with only that kind of information that is available at the stage of a preliminary request for funding.

For their part, defendants argue that section 36003 impliedly recognizes that article XXXIV “referendum approval” must be obtained “prior” to “the action of a local public entity in giving preliminary ․ approval to a[n] ․ application which may result in housing assistance benefiting persons of low income”—and therefore at a time at which the project is undefined.   We acknowledge that the language of the provision might possibly be construed to bear such a meaning.   This construction, however, cannot be accepted.   As explained above, article XXXIV requires voter approval of a housing project after it has been conceived and articulated.   Before the preliminary application stage, however, a project cannot be deemed conceived and articulated for purposes of the constitutional provision.   Moreover, before that stage the local public entity would apparently not have taken any official action that could serve as the subject of a referendum.

A second group of provisions contained in the 1976 legislation is entitled the “Public Housing Election Implementation Law” and is codified at sections 37000–37002.   While most of these provisions do not bear on the question before us, plaintiffs argue that the declaration of findings regarding the purpose of article XXXIV strongly substantiates their claim.   Section 37000 declares in part that article XXXIV was enacted as a result of “concern regarding the development, acquisition, or construction of federally subsidized conventional public housing projects.   Such developments typically were different from and inconsistent with housing developments provided by the private sector.   Such differences included architecture, design, and locational standards as well as the level of amenities provided.   Such developments were occupied entirely by persons of low income, and usually were not subject to ad valorem property taxes.”   Plaintiffs argue that the voters' declared concern over these differences implies that the relevant details must be submitted to the local electorate for approval.

As discussed above, the determination that voters were motivated in part by concern over the aesthetic effect of public housing projects leaves unanswered the crucial question:  what information did they intend to require?   Insofar as the conclusion urged by plaintiffs conflicts with our interpretation of section 36005, it must be disfavored under the rule that “the language of a particular code section must be construed in light of and with reference to the language of other sections accompanying it and related to it with a view to harmonizing the several provisions and giving effect to all of them.”   (Johnson v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 573, 582, 205 Cal.Rptr. 605.)

C. Conclusion

We conclude that the plain language of article XXXIV requires voter approval of specific housing projects;  it is not enough for a locality to obtain prospective authority to formulate and implement public housing policy within broadly defined limits.   The City's 1977 and 1981 enabling measures therefore failed to conform with the requirements of the Constitution.

The historical circumstances leading to the adoption of article XXXIV, coupled with evidence of legislative history and its subsequent construction at the hands of the Legislature, nonetheless demonstrate that the required voter authorization should be obtained prior to the submission of a preliminary request for funding and thus without specification of all the details of a proposed project.

 Accordingly, we conclude that voters should be informed of a proposed project in terms roughly parallel to those required to identify a “specific project” (24 C.F.R. § 941.302(a)) for purposes of a preliminary federal funding request or “application”—insofar, of course, as those terms are relevant to article XXXIV.   Specifically, they should be told at a minimum the size, household-type, and structure-type of the project and also the community in which it will be developed.  (Id., § 941.301 et seq.) ¹¹  They should also be told whether “There are suitable sites for the proposed project for which appropriate and adequate facilities and services are available” (HUD Application, supra, p. 1), and if so, what in general those sites are.   We leave it to the Legislature in the first instance to define more precisely the minimum factors required for project identification in an article XXXIV referendum.   We expect that it will bring its expertise to bear on the issue as it has previously brought it to bear on the issues of article XXXIV's validation procedures (§ 36000 et seq.) and its application to mixed-income housing developments (§ 37000 et seq.).¹²  In this regard, we refer to the federal requirements for illustrative purposes only.

As interpreted by the Legislature, article XXXIV furthermore requires that voter authorization be obtained prior to the adoption of a resolution or ordinance finally approving an application or proposal.   But authorizations sought years in advance of some unspecified funding process thwart the primary purposes of the constitutional provision, which seeks to promote meaningful voter consideration of both the public costs incurred in the development of public housing and the evolving aesthetic character of local communities.   State public bodies thus must proceed with due diligence to initiate the funding process once voter approval of a specific proposed project has been secured pursuant to article XXXIV.   Approval accordingly should be sought only in anticipation of the proximate development of a particular project.

Mindful of the admonishment that we interpret the Constitution in a practical manner reflecting the growing and changing needs of the people (Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Public Util. Com., supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 869, 31 Cal.Rptr. 463, 382 P.2d 583), we emphasize that our holding should be understood to allow localities reasonably broad discretion to develop public housing in the manner they determine to be most effective and appropriate.   If, for instance, relatively minor administrative modifications such as a reduction in the number of units in a proposed project are unforeseeably required after voter authorization, a state public body need not return to the electorate for reauthorization.   Nor need a public body seek reauthorization if a location not specified at the time of authorization is subsequently selected as the site of the project, so long as the body properly disclosed the locations then known to it to be available.   But localities may not be permitted to completely disregard the plain language of article XXXIV, which requires voter approval of low-rent housing projects prior to their development.

III. Disposition

 As stated above, plaintiffs seek a writ of mandate compelling the City to, inter alia, submit the disputed housing project—which is now virtually completed—for voter approval.

To justify issuance of a writ, it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to establish that a defendant failed to perform his ministerial duties with respect to article XXXIV.   Insofar as the proceeding is equitable in nature (Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 671, 56 Cal.Rptr. 265, 423 P.2d 193), we must additionally consider the equities involved in granting the requested relief.  “The writ of mandate will not issue where it will work injustice, or introduce confusion and disorder, or operate harshly, or where it will not promote substantial justice.”  (Board of Education v. Common Council (1900) 128 Cal. 369, 371, 60 P. 976.)   If we were to compel Berkeley to submit the virtually completed housing project to its electorate for referendum review at this late date, the writ would operate in a manifestly harsh and disorderly fashion, threatening the possible abandonment or destruction of a multimillion dollar public asset.   In view of our responsibility to promote substantial justice, we conclude that the issuance of a writ in this matter would be an unsound exercise of our discretion.  (See Fawkes v. City of Burbank (1922) 188 Cal. 399, 401–402, 205 P. 675.)

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.   Plaintiffs shall recover costs.

I concur in the majority's conclusion that the writ of mandate should be denied, but respectfully dissent from its determination that the low-rent housing ballot propositions submitted to, and approved by, the voters of Berkeley in 1977 and 1981 did not comply with the requirements of article XXXIV of the California Constitution.

Although it may not be immediately apparent from a reading of the majority opinion, the interpretation of article XXXIV which the majority now adopts represents a radical departure from the way article XXXIV has been uniformly interpreted for the 38 years that this constitutional provision has been in existence.   As explained more fully below, from the very outset of the enactment of this initiative measure in 1950, municipalities throughout California—from the cities of Los Angeles, Sacramento, Inglewood and Modesto to the counties of San Joaquin, Fresno and Yolo—have regularly submitted to their local electorates ballot measures virtually identical to the ballot measures at issue here to secure the voter approval required by article XXXIV.   Indeed, over the past four decades literally scores of ballot measures of this nature—i.e., measures seeking voter approval of a designated number of low-rent housing units without tying the approval to a specific proposed grant application or specifying potential sites for the units—have been approved in local elections throughout the state, and many thousands of housing units have been constructed pursuant to these measures.

Until the present decision, the validity of this form of article XXXIV ballot proposition had been uniformly approved by every governmental entity which considered the matter over the entire 38–year history of this constitutional provision.   The specialized administrative agencies which have been created to assist local entities in the development of low-rent housing in compliance with article XXXIV—the California Department of Housing and Community Development and the California Housing Finance Agency—have consistently interpreted the constitutional provision as permitting this type of ballot proposition and have specifically advised local entities in published guidelines to draft article XXXIV ballot propositions in just this format.   The Attorney General, in a number of formal opinions, has also confirmed that voter approval of a designated number of low-rent housing units, prior to the selection or approval of a specific development, is permissible under article XXXIV.   The Legislature, in drafting legislative provisions to implement and facilitate the application of article XXXIV, has similarly recognized the validity of this type of early, general voter approval of a designated number of low-rent housing units, prior to even the preliminary application for specific federal funds.   And finally, past judicial decisions have also upheld virtually identical ballot measures which were submitted to the voters to secure compliance with article XXXIV.

It is difficult to understand why the majority pays so little heed to this long-standing and well-established application of article XXXIV.   Perhaps there would be a legitimate basis for repudiating even such a firmly based interpretation of a constitutional provision if there were a clear indication that the interpretation flouted the underlying purpose of the constitutional clause, but there is no basis for drawing any such conclusion in this case.   As a review of both the historical background of article XXXIV and the ballot arguments which accompanied the measure reveal, article XXXIV was intended to assure that a locality would not proceed with the public development of low-rent housing without the prior approval of its voters, but there is no indication that the proponents of the measure felt that the kind of voter approval that the City of Berkeley sought and overwhelmingly obtained in the present case—i.e., approval of a designated number of low-rent housing units to be developed in the future—would be inadequate.   Indeed, in the 1950 case which prompted the drafting of the article XXXIV initiative measure—Housing Authority v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 550, 553, 219 P.2d 457—the voters of Eureka were in fact simply seeking the right to vote on a low-rent housing measure which, like the Berkeley measures, designated a specific number of low-rent housing units without identifying a specific or alternative sites at which the units would be constructed.   Thus, the history and purpose of article XXXIV, as well as its uniform application over nearly four decades, fail to support the majority's interpretation.

Finally, the majority opinion totally fails to come to grips with the practical implications of its repudiation of the well-established interpretation of article XXXIV.   As the facts of this case make abundantly clear, if article XXXIV is interpreted to preclude a municipality from obtaining voter approval of a designated number of low-rent units in advance of the decision to apply for a specific federal grant or of the identification of potential sites, California municipalities will, in realistic terms, often find it impossible to obtain federal funds for low-rent housing, even when voters are fully supportive of such efforts.   As the majority recognizes in passing, current federal policy requires a California locality to certify, in its application for a federal grant, that it has already obtained article XXXIV approval for the housing that is to be planned or developed with the grant funds;  given the very limited amount of federal housing funds available nationwide, it is not surprising that federal officials demand assurance at the outset that scarce funds will not be invested in a project that still faces the uncertainty of a local ballot election.   And because of the very brief period of time between the federal agency's invitation of applications and the typical deadline for filing such an application—in this case little more than a month—there is absolutely no way Berkeley could have qualified for the federal grant if, as the majority now holds, article XXXIV approval could not properly have been sought or obtained prior to, and independent of, the announcement of the specific federal preliminary funding grant.   Thus, the majority's reinterpretation of article XXXIV will not only overturn 38 years of settled law, but it will transform the constitutional provision from a means of giving voters a say in local low-rent housing decisions into a practical barrier to the obtaining of federal low-rent housing funds, even when—as was apparently the case in Berkeley—the citizenry strongly favor such housing.   I cannot join in such a holding.

I

Article XXXIV originated as an initiative measure, and was adopted by the voters of California at the November 1950 election.   The measure was apparently proposed in response to this court's June 1950 decision in Housing Authority v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.2d 550, 219 P.2d 457.   In the Housing Authority case, the voters of Eureka had sought to hold a referendum election on a city council resolution approving an application by the Eureka Housing Authority for a preliminary loan from the federal government “to cover the costs of surveys and planning in connection with the development of 500 dwelling units of low rent housing” in the city.  (35 Cal.2d at p. 553, 219 P.2d 457.)   The Eureka voters had circulated petitions and gathered the requisite number of signatures to support a referendum, but the city clerk refused to accept the petition, concluding that the city council's decision was not subject to referendum.   On appeal, this court affirmed the clerk's decision on the ground that the application for a federal loan was an administrative, rather than a legislative, act, and thus was not subject to referendum.

Immediately after the Housing Authority case was decided, the article XXXIV initiative measure was proposed to reverse the decision and to require local entities to obtain the approval of local citizens, through the electoral process, before undertaking a publicly supported low-rent housing project.   To this end, article XXXIV, section 1 provides in relevant part:  “No low rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by any state public body until a majority of the qualified electors of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to develop, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that purpose, or at any general or special election.”

Although the provision makes it clear that public entities are required to obtain voter approval before undertaking a “low-rent housing project,” there is nothing in the language of article XXXIV which purports to prescribe what information an article XXXIV ballot proposition must or should contain.   The provision does not say whether a ballot measure must relate to a short-term, as opposed to a long-term, housing “project,” or whether a ballot measure must specify the number of units contemplated, the size of the units, the location or value of the site or sites on which the units may be developed, the anticipated number of residents, the proposed architectural design or any of the other innumerable facts that could logically be relevant to a voter's decision.   The simple truth is that this constitutional provision, drafted as an initiative measure to assure that local voter approval would be required before public low-rent housing was undertaken in a community, did not specifically address itself to the details which the voter approval should include.  (Accord 18 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 103, 104–107 (1951) [determining the geographical area in which an article XXXIV election should be held].)

If article XXXIV had just been enacted, perhaps we would have no option but to attempt an exegesis of the dictionary definitions of the measure's language to determine whether or not a particular ballot measure satisfied the provision, although even then I think we would be on much sounder ground if we started from the purpose of the provision as revealed by its history and the accompanying ballot arguments, rather than by turning to Webster's.  Article XXXIV, however, has not just been enacted, but has been in place for more than a third of a century, and we have a wealth of practical applications of the measure to guide us in interpreting the provision.   I do not know why the majority opinion eschews any reliance on the long-established understanding of the requirements of article XXXIV, as reflected in scores of article XXXIV elections that have been conducted throughout the state over the 38–year history of this constitutional provision.   Those elections reveal quite clearly how the requirements of article XXXIV were viewed both immediately after the measure was adopted and throughout the lengthy duration of its existence.

In November 1951, the year after article XXXIV was enacted, the County of Yolo placed a number of separate low-rent housing measures on the ballot in different cities in the county.   The following measure, submitted to the voters in the Town of Esparto, was typical of all of the measures, asking the voters simply:  “Shall the development ․ of a low rent housing project ․ for not more than Sixteen (16) dwelling units for families of low income, to be situated within the ․ Town of Esparto ․ be approved?”   The measures did not identify a particular site or sites and did not set a date when the approval would expire, but simply asked the voters whether they approved or disapproved the development of no more than a designated number of low-rent housing units in a particular town.

That same election, November 1951, the City of Los Angeles also placed an article XXXIV measure on the ballot, asking the voters of that city:  “Shall initiation ․ of a low-rent public housing project or projects, consisting of approximately 10,000 dwelling units, on sites selected by the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles ․ be adopted?”   Again, the measure simply identified the number of housing units for which approval was being sought.

For the more than three and one-half decades that article XXXIV has been in existence, this form of low-rent housing ballot measure has been utilized repeatedly in cities and counties throughout California.   The record contains a host of examples of similarly worded ballot measures that have been placed before the voters throughout the 1950's, 1960's, 1970's and 1980's by local entities, large and small, urban and rural, in every part of the state.¹

Over this lengthy history, no prior judicial or administrative ruling has found, or even intimated, that such a ballot proposition—i.e., a ballot proposition which asks the electorate to approve a particular number of low-rent housing units—is inadequate to satisfy the requirements of article XXXIV.   Indeed, precisely the opposite is true.   Every governmental body which has previously addressed the matter has confirmed the validity of this form of article XXXIV ballot measure.

To begin with, the California Department of Housing and Community Development Department, the state agency specifically created by the Legislature to assist communities in the development of low and moderate income housing (Health & Saf.Code, § 50400 et seq.), has consistently interpreted article XXXIV as authorizing the type of ballot measure which Berkeley submitted to its voters in 1977 and 1981.   The Department has published a pamphlet for the use of public entities—entitled “Article 34:  Legal Issues and Ballot Measures”—which specifically advises cities and counties in drafting article XXXIV ballot measures to utilize just the form of ballot language which Berkeley used in this case.  (See Cal.Dept. of Housing & Community Dev., Article 34:  Legal Issues and Ballot Measures (1980 rev.) pp. 18–19.)   Similarly, the California Housing Finance Agency, which administers a number of legislative provisions relating to the financing of article XXXIV housing, has also consistently interpreted article XXXIV as authorizing the type of ballot measures at issue here.

The Attorney General has likewise confirmed the validity of such a ballot measure.   In 1976, the Attorney General was asked to give a formal opinion as to whether, when the voters of a city “have approved a ballot measure for the development of a ‘low rent housing project of up to 100 dwelling units' [and] ․ the city did not plan to immediately develop such project itself and ․ the measure on its face did not identify what agency would develop the project,” another agency, such as the State Department of Transportation or a redevelopment agency, could develop a low-rent housing project pursuant to the authority granted by the prior ballot measure.  (59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 211, 212–213 (1976).)   The Attorney General concluded that so long as the ballot measure by its terms had not limited the authority granted to a particular public body, such a proposition would authorize the future development of up to the designated number of units by another body.   The opinion stated:  “[I]f the electors of a city give blanket authority for a 100 unit low rent housing project, the constitution would not prevent the development by any ‘state public body’ as defined in article XXXIV. ”   (Emphasis added.)  (Id. at p. 213.)   Thus, this Attorney General opinion clearly recognized the propriety of a ballot measure granting “blanket authority” for a designated number of low-rent housing units which was approved by the voters prior to the adoption of any specific plan for development.   A subsequent Attorney General opinion reiterates the general propriety of this form of article XXXIV ballot measure.  (66 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 205, 209–210 (1983).)

The actions of the Legislature demonstrate that it, too, has interpreted article XXXIV to authorize the kind of early and general voter approval of a designated number of low-rent housing units that the City of Berkeley obtained from the voters in this case.   As the majority opinion notes, in 1976 the Legislature—in order to provide greater certainty with regard to the validity of local governmental actions in the public housing sector—enacted a series of provisions establishing a “validation procedure” for testing the validity of local actions vis-a-vis article XXXIV.  (See Health & Saf.Code, §§ 36000 to 36005.)   In both the provision authorizing the bringing of a “validation action” (see Health & Saf.Code, § 36003) and the provision prescribing the time limits in which such an action may be prosecuted (Health & Saf.Code, § 36005), the act makes it clear that the Legislature contemplated that the voter approval of low-rent housing required by article XXXIV would be obtained prior to the time a local entity gives even preliminary approval to the submission of a general, non-site-specific “application,” which initiates the federal funding procedure.²  In other words, the Legislature anticipated that a local entity would proceed in the very fashion Berkeley proceeded in this case, and would seek and obtain general voter approval for the development of a designated number of low-rent housing units before going forward to the preliminary application stage.   Although the majority opinion struggles to fit its interpretation of article XXXIV into the procedural framework established by sections 36003 and 36005, the language of the sections cannot be squared with its approach.

Finally, while there is no direct judicial holding on point, in several cases courts have upheld the validity of article XXXIV ballot propositions which were framed in much the same language as the Berkeley propositions at issue in this case, without any suggestion that this form of voter approval was constitutionally suspect.  (See, e.g., Housing Authority v. Peden (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 276, 281, 28 Cal.Rptr. 11 [upholding validity of ballot measure which read, in relevant part:  “Shall the Housing Authority of the County of Kings ․ develop ․ within the County of Kings ․ a low-rent housing project or projects of not to exceed two hundred and seventy five (275) dwelling units for persons of low income including eligible elderly persons of low income?”];  Housing Authority v. Monterey Senior Citizen Park (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 348, 355, 210 Cal.Rptr. 497 [upholding validity of ballot measure “permitting the Housing Authority to acquire 150 low-rent housing units (including the Property) for senior citizens and handicapped persons of low income”].   See also Drake v. City of Los Angeles (1952) 38 Cal.2d 872, 874–877, 243 P.2d 525 [upholding city council approval of similarly worded low-rent housing “project” pursuant to Health & Saf.Code, § 34313].)

In sum, the record establishes that over its entire 38–year history, article XXXIV has consistently been interpreted as authorizing a local entity to submit a low-rent housing ballot proposition to its electorate in the precise form that was utilized in this case.   In my view, the majority seriously errs in largely ignoring this long-standing interpretation.

II

The majority's repudiation of the settled understanding of this provision might be explicable if the legislative history of article XXXIV demonstrated that this type of ballot proposition was clearly incompatible with the intent or purpose of the constitutional provision.   But nothing in the background or legislative history of article XXXIV supports such a conclusion.

As noted, the initiative measure which added article XXXIV to the California Constitution was apparently proposed in response to the decision in Housing Authority v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.2d 550, 219 P.2d 457, in which the court held that a resolution of the Eureka City Council approving an application for federal planning funds for low-rent housing was not subject to referendum.   The public housing “project” on which the residents of Eureka were seeking an opportunity to vote in the Housing Authority case, however, was in reality no more specific than the Berkeley ballot measures at issue here.   The proposal at issue in that case simply identified a specific number (500) of low-rent housing units for which planning funds were sought, without designating a specific site or sites for the units, the size of the units, the value of the property, the time frame over which the units were to be built, or any other details.  (See 35 Cal.2d at p. 553, 219 P.2d 457.)   Other cases demonstrate that at that time this was the typical manner in which a proposed “low-rent housing project” (see Health & Saf.Code, § 34313) was described in a preliminary loan application.  (See, e.g., Housing Authority v. City of L.A. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 853, 857–858, 243 P.2d 515 [describing preliminary loan application approved by the Los Angeles City Council in 1949];  Blodget v. Housing Authority (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 45, 48, 243 P.2d 897 [describing preliminary loan application approved by the Kern County Board of Supervisors in 1949].)   Thus, the factual background of the 1950 initiative does not suggest that the drafters of the measure intended to require any more specific ballot measure than that submitted to and approved by Berkeley voters in this case.

Further, the ballot argument of the proponents of article XXXIV which accompanied the proposition in the 1950 ballot pamphlet similarly does not support the claim that the constitutional provision was intended to require voter approval of a particular loan application or of specified, potential sites of a low-rent housing development.³  The ballot argument discloses that the proponents were primarily concerned with the fact that, under the then-existing law, a municipality could make a substantial fiscal commitment to public low-rent housing without any vote of the people;  analogizing the matter to the issuance of revenue bonds, the proponents argued that, as with such bonds, prior voter approval for public housing should be required.   Nothing in the argument, however, suggests that voter approval of a ballot measure authorizing the future development of a designated number of low-rent housing units would be inadequate to satisfy the constitutional provision.

Although the majority opinion asserts that this type of voter authorization “thwart[s] the primary purposes of the constitutional provision” (ante, p. 854 of 253 Cal.Rptr., p. 61 of 765 P.2d), it provides no persuasive support for that assertion.   This form of ballot measure—which, again, has regularly been utilized by local entities for 38 years as a means of complying with article XXXIV—affords local voters the opportunity to decide whether their local community needs low-rent housing at all and whether the voters are willing to accept the fiscal costs associated with a designated number of low-rent housing units.   Since this is precisely the type of decision which the citizens of Eureka were seeking to have submitted to a vote in the Housing Authority case, supra, 35 Cal.2d 550, 219 P.2d 457, there is no basis for asserting that such a measure thwarts the purpose of article XXXIV.

Of course, article XXXIV does not prescribe a single form of ballot measure, and if local voters are unwilling to approve a general authorization for a specified number of low-rent housing units they may always vote against such a general measure and may insist that a more specific and limited proposal be submitted.   In the past, opponents of article XXXIV measures have often advocated a “no” vote on just such grounds, and some measures have apparently been defeated on this basis.   But if local voters are willing to approve their community's pursuit of a long-term low-rent housing project by authorizing a specified number of units, as Berkeley's electorate was in this case, there is nothing in the history or purpose of article XXXIV which indicates that such approval should not be given effect.

The majority also suggests that there is something improper in the fact that the ballot measures at issue here—like all of the comparable ballot measures noted above—contained no built-in deadline after which voter authorization of the specified number of units would lapse.   Again, however, there is nothing in article XXXIV which requires that all low-rent housing measures contain a “sunset” provision or which suggests that local voters should not have the option of granting a local housing agency the flexibility provided by a continuing authorization.   If it is important to local voters that the low-cost housing authorized by a specific ballot proposal be built within a specified period of time or not at all, they may, of course, refuse to vote in favor of any measure that does not contain a cut-off date.   Further, so long as the development process for particular units has not already begun, there appears to be no reason why local voters could not, through the initiative procedure, rescind any unused article XXXIV authorization if they conclude that such low-rent units are no longer needed or warranted.

III

Finally, the majority opinion glosses over the inconvenient fact that the adoption of its interpretation of article XXXIV will—in light of current federal policies—frequently make it impossible for California municipalities to compete for scarce federal low-rent housing funds.

Although the majority opinion leaves it somewhat unclear as to exactly what form a ballot measure must take to comply with its view of article XXXIV (ante, at p. 853–854 & fn. 11 of 253 Cal.Rptr., at p. 61 & fn. 11 of 765 P.2d.) the opinion does specify that voter approval may only be sought “in anticipation of the proximate development of a particular project.”   (Emphasis added.)  (Ante, p. 854 of 253 Cal.Rptr., p. 61 of 765 P.2d.)

Under the majority's approach, the City of Berkeley could never have obtained the federal funds for the 75–units of low-income housing at issue in this case.   The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued the initial announcement of the potential availability of such funds on June 29, 1984;  that announcement contained the first indication of the size of the project—75 units—which could qualify for such funds.   The announcement also specified that local entities had only until August 1, 1984—that is, one month—to apply for such funds.   Finally, the applicable federal rules required any application filed by a California public entity to include a certification by the entity that article XXXIV authorization had already been obtained for the low-rent housing for which the federal grant was being sought.

If, as the majority opinion indicates, the city could not properly have sought article XXXIV authorization until it had a particular project in mind for which it intended to apply for preliminary federal funding, the federal deadline could clearly never have been met.   Even if the city had voted to call a special election on the very day the HUD announcement was first released, the election could not have been held in time.  (See Elec.Code, §§ 3710, 4020 [special election may not be held earlier than 88 days after the passage of a special election ordinance].)

As the facts of this case suggest, over the 38 years in which article XXXIV has been interpreted to permit public entities to obtain voter authorization for public housing in just the manner Berkeley followed in this case, many federal and state statutory and administrative practices have been established which are dependent upon the settled interpretation of article XXXIV and which have accommodated the complex procedure for obtaining federal housing funds to the requirements of this unique constitutional provision.   In overturning the established reading of article XXXIV, the majority opinion will, I fear, not only seriously set back the on-going development plans of dozens of municipalities throughout the state which have relied on precedent in securing article XXXIV approval, but will also make it extremely difficult, and in many cases impossible, for this type of low-rent public housing to be successfully developed in the future, even when the voters of a community strongly favor such development.

Because there is, in my view, no sound basis for repudiating the well-established interpretation of article XXXIV, I dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Federal funding of low-income housing projects is governed by a detailed administrative scheme set forth at 24 Code of Federal Regulations, section 941.101 et seq.   A local housing agency initiates the funding process with the submission of an “application,” defined as “a preliminary submission ․ which addresses local housing need and development priority.   The application is used by the field office to determine the extent that public housing funds will be allocated to specific allocation areas and which of several [public housing agencies], competing for contract authority within an allocation area, should be given the first opportunity to submit a proposal for developing a project.”   (Id., § 941.103.)   Each application must be for the development of a specific project (id., § 941.302(a)), which must be identified to HUD in the following terms:  “(1) Community for which the housing is proposed;  [¶ ] (2) Development method;  [¶ ] (3) Housing type;  and [¶ ] (4) Number of units by household type, unit size (number of bedrooms) and structure type.”  (Id., § 941.302(f).)When funds become available, those housing agencies whose preliminary applications have received “a high priority rating” are invited to submit project “proposals” (id., § 941.301(b)), defined as “a detailed ․ submission ․ of all information, including identification and evidence of site control, necessary for the field office to approve a public housing project.”  (Id., § 941.103.)   Upon approval of such a proposal, HUD executes an “annual contributions contract” with the local housing agency to fund the project.  (Id., §§ 941.103, 941.402(d), 941.403(d).)   In certain circumstances, HUD will provide preliminary or “front-end” funding for the development and submission of the proposal itself, based on an agency's preliminary application.  (Id., §§ 941.402(c), 941.403(c).)  Berkeley's 75–unit project received preliminary funding in this manner.

2.   Of the 500 units originally approved, 424 remained undeveloped at the time of the application.   Two previous housing projects, one consisting of 14 units and another of 62, had already been constructed by the City based on the authorization of the 1977 and 1981 ballot measures.

3.   The ballot arguments in support of the 1977 and 1981 measures, as well as the city attorney's ballot analysis of each, make clear that the issue before the voters involved not an authorization of any particular housing proposal but rather the City's prospective authority to formulate public housing policy.   In both 1977 and 1981, the ballot arguments submitted by various city council members and citizens in support of the measures stated that “Passage of this measure does NOT constitute approval of any specific development.”  (Capitalization in original.)   The 1981 ballot analysis by the city attorney similarly observed:  “This measure has no direct financial impact.   There are no proposed housing developments that would require Article 34 authorization at the present time.”   Finally, the 1977 ballot analysis stated that “The only actual proposed housing development affected by this measure is the Savo Island Project, a cooperatively-owned 55–unit development to be financed by federal and local funds․  [¶ ] No other residential developments are pending at this time.”   It was subsequently determined that the Savo Island Project was not subject to article XXXIV, and has not been counted against the units approved by the Berkeley electorate in 1977.

4.   As will appear, the holding of the court in Drake does not support defendants' contention.   Even if it did, however, the opinion would be of doubtful significance to our analytic task.   We interpret constitutional language in light of judicial interpretations existing at the time of enactment.  (Heckendorn v. City of San Marino, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 487, 229 Cal.Rptr. 324, 723 P.2d 64.)  Drake was decided two years after article XXXIV was adopted by vote of the people;  its interpretation of “low-rent housing project” as used in section 8(b) thus could not have affected the understanding of those who earlier adopted the constitutional provision.

5.   At the time, federal funding under the 1937 Act was available in one of two forms:  “preliminary loans ․ for surveys and planning in respect to ․ low-rent housing projects” (former 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7)(a)), and grants or loans “to assist the development, acquisition, or administration of low-rent housing or slum-clearance projects” (id., §§ 1409–1411).  (Blodget v. Housing Authority, supra, 111 Cal.App.2d at pp. 47–48.)   The current two-step federal funding practice thus parallels the administrative procedure existing when article XXXIV was enacted.   (See fn. 1, ante, at p. 841 of 253 Cal.Rptr., at p. 48 of 765 P.2d.)

6.   In this regard, we note an article in the September 1950 edition of California Real Estate Magazine urging passage of Proposition 10.   It states, inter alia, that “Proposition No. 10 has been placed on the ballot at the election on November 7th because the people of the cities of Oakland and Eureka awoke one morning to find that they had unwittingly lost their right to bring a referendum upon this issue when adopted by their local city councils.   This normal right to referendum was destroyed by the wording of the State Housing Authorities Law․”  (Shattuck, Realtors Face Facts (Sept.1950) California Real Estate Magazine.)   We also note a campaign brochure prepared by the Committee for Home Protection, proponents of Proposition 10, entitled Protect Your Home From Debt!   It states in relevant part:  “The Supreme Court has ruled that city or county boards—subject as they are to minority pressure groups and bureaucrats holding public housing jobs—may contract huge local debts for public housing projects, and their actions are not even subject to referendum by the voters․  [¶ ] Proposition 10 restores Constitutional protection against long-term debt.”

7.   The ballot argument reads in relevant part:  “A ‘YES' vote for this [proposition] ․ is a vote for the future right to say ‘yes' or ‘no’ when the community considers a public housing project.  [¶ ] Passage of [Proposition 10] will restore to citizens ․ the right to decide whether public housing is needed or wanted in each particular locality․  [¶ ] Time after time within the past year California communities have had public housing projects forced upon them without regard either to the wishes of the citizens or community needs.   This is a particularly critical matter in view of the fact that the long-term, multimillion-dollar public housing contracts call for tax waivers and other forms of local assistance, which the Federal Government says will amount to HALF the cost of the federal subsidy on the project as long as it exists.  [¶ ] For government to force such additional hidden expense on the voters at a time when taxation and the cost of living have reached an extreme high is a ‘gift’ of debatable value.   It should be accepted or rejected by ballot.  [¶ ] If, on the other hand, certain communities are in such dire need of housing that the cost of long-term subsidization is deemed worth while, local voters, who best know that need, should have the right to express their wishes by ballot.  [¶ ] In either case, a ‘YES' vote ․ will strengthen local self-government and restore to the community the right to determine its own future course.  [¶ ] Furthermore, the financing of public housing projects is an adaptation of the principle of the issuance of revenue bonds.   [Revenue bonds] cannot be issued without local approval given by ballot.   Public housing and its long years of hidden debt should also be submitted to the voters to give them the right to decide whether the need for public housing is worth the cost.  [¶ ] A ‘YES' vote for [Proposition 10] is a vote for strong local self-government.   It is an expression of confidence in the community's future and in the democratic process of government․”  (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen.Elec. (Nov. 7, 1950), capitalization in original.)

8.   Berkeley conceded at oral argument that the construction of its block of authorized units could “theoretically” take place at any time over the next 50 or more years.   Indeed, even with the construction of the challenged project, Berkeley will have utilized less than one third of the authorized units within the seven years following passage of its last enabling measure.   Without any knowledge of the period within which the City intended to construct the units, its voters could not have had any meaningful sense of the present value of the public costs incurred by their authorization.   This practice cannot be reconciled with the objectives of article XXXIV as articulated in its ballot argument.

9.   Defendants argue that we should also defer to the longstanding interpretation given to article XXXIV by various localities throughout the state, which have consistently obtained voter authorization through general enabling measures.   Although “Not lightly vacated is the verdict of quiescent years” (Cardozo, C.J., in Coler v. Corn Exchange Bank (1928) 250 N.Y. 136, 141, 164 N.E. 882, affd. (1930) 280 U.S. 218, 50 S.Ct. 94, 74 L.Ed. 378), “such guides are not conclusive, and a clearly erroneous administrative construction will not govern interpretation by the court.”  (Cal. M. Express v. St. Bd. of Equalization (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 237, 240, 283 P.2d 1063.)   Furthermore, the localities are not administrative agencies charged with enforcing article XXXIV but rather the very subjects of its proscription.   We decline to accord significance to their permissive construction of the constraints imposed upon them by the constitutional provision.

10.   All further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.

11.   Federal regulations currently require the following identifying information for a preliminary HUD application:  “(1) Community for which the housing is proposed;  [¶ ] (2) Development method;  [¶ ] (3) Housing type;  and [¶ ] (4) Number of units by household type, unit size (number of bedrooms) and structure type.”  (Id. at § 941.302(f).)   Only information contained in the first and last of these four requirements is pertinent to article XXXIV;  the remaining data refer to specialized administrative classifications.(1) “Community for which the housing is proposed” is defined as “A municipality or other general purpose political subdivision below the county level.”  (Id., § 941.103.)   This information obviously must be provided to voters in any article XXXIV referendum.(2) “Development method” refers to the three different administrative procedures through which a local housing agency may develop a housing project:  “conventional,” “turnkey,” and “acquisition.”  (Id., § 941.102.)   Each describes a detailed financing and development process of little relevance to article XXXIV authorization.(3) “Housing type” refers to “new construction,” “rehabilitation,” and “existing housing.”  (Id., § 941.103.)   Again, this classificatory information is tangential to the purposes of voter review under the constitutional provision.(4) Included in the final requirement is the number of units;  the “household type,” defined as either “elderly and handicapped,” “family,” or “large family” (id., § 941.103);  the unit size;  and the “structure type,” which is not defined in section 941.103 but which elsewhere is designated to include such classifications as “detached and semidetached, row, walkup, elevator.”  (§ 941.204(b).)   This type of preliminary information could add important content to an article XXXIV authorization measure.

12.   Section 2 of article XXXIV expressly invites the Legislature to interpret and apply the measure.   It reads:  “The provisions of this article shall be self-executing but legislation not in conflict herewith may be enacted to facilitate its operation.”

1.   The following is a sampling of other communities throughout the state which have submitted similarly worded ballot propositions:City of Antioch (June 1976 elec., Measure G) [“Shall the Housing Authority of the County of Contra Costa be authorized to ․ develop ․ up to 100 dwelling units of low-rent housing ․ within the City of Antioch?”].City of Brawley (Apr.1984 elec., Prop. A) [“Shall the City of Brawley ․ develop ․ public housing for low to moderate income families ․ of not more than two hundred (200) units?”].City of Fresno (Nov.1972 elec.) [“Shall the Housing Authority of the City of Fresno ․ develop ․ in the City of Fresno ․ low rent housing projects of not to exceed eight hundred dwelling units ․?”];  (Mar.1979 elec.) [“Do the qualified electors of the City of Fresno pursuant to Article XXXIV ․ approve the development ․ within the City of Fresno of not more than 1,000 dwelling units ․ for low to moderate income families?”].City of Inglewood (Apr.1975 elec.) [“Shall the City of Inglewood ․ develop ․ within the City, Senior Citizen Housing ․ not to exceed 500 dwelling units in total throughout the City?”].City of Modesto (Nov.1978 elec., Measure D) [“Shall ․ the Housing Authority of the County of Stanislaus develop ․ low rent housing in the City of Modesto of not more than 400 dwellings ․?”];  (June 1972 elec.) [“Shall the Housing Authority ․ develop ․ in the City of Modesto and Modesto Elementary School District ․ low rent housing, of not to exceed in the aggregate three hundred (300) dwelling units ․?”].City of Pleasanton (Apr.1972 elec., Measure No. 2) [“Shall the Housing Authority ․ construct within the City of Pleasanton low rent housing not to exceed 150 units ․?”].City of Richmond (May 1969 elec.) [“Shall the Housing Authority ․ develop ․ within the City of Richmond ․ a low rent housing project of not to exceed in the aggregate two hundred (200) dwelling units ․?”];  (May 1961 elec.) [“Shall the Housing Authority ․ develop ․ within the City of Richmond ․ a low rent housing project of not to exceed in the aggregate one hundred fifty (150) dwelling units ․?”].City of Sacramento (Nov.1968 elec., Measure A) [“Do the qualified electors ․ approve the development ․ of low rent housing projects within the City ․ to provide not to exceed 800 dwelling units ․?”];  Nov.1975 elec., Measure D) [“Do the qualified electors of the City of Sacramento approve the development ․ of low rent housing projects within the City to provide not more than 1,000 dwelling units ․?”].City and County of San Francisco (Nov.1968 elec., Proposition H) [“Shall the Housing Authority ․ develop ․ within the City and County of San Francisco ․ a low rent housing project or projects of not to exceed in the aggregate three thousand (3,000) dwelling units ․?”].City of Stockton (June 1956 election) ] [“Shall the Housing Authority of the County of San Joaquin develop ․ in the City of Stockton ․ a low rent housing project of not to exceed in the aggregate 300 dwelling units ․?”];  (June 1960 elec.) [“Shall the Housing Authority ․ develop ․ in the City of Stockton ․ a low rent housing project or projects of not to exceed in the aggregate 200 dwelling units ․?”].

2.   Section 36003 provides:  “An action may be brought ․ to determine the validity of the action of a local public entity in giving preliminary or final approval to a proposal or application which may result in housing assistance benefitting persons of low income without obtaining prior referendum approval pursuant to Article XXXIV of the State Constitution.”  (Emphasis added.)Section 36005 provides:  “No judicial action attacking or otherwise questioning the validity of the action of a local public entity in giving final approval to a proposal or application which may result in housing assistance benefitting persons of low income without obtaining prior approval pursuant to Article XXXIV of the State Constitution shall be brought prior to the adoption of a resolution or ordinance by the legislative body of the local public entity approving the proposal or application, nor may any such action be brought at any time after 60 days from the date of adoption of the ordinance or resolution approving the proposal.”As the majority opinion notes (ante, at p. 852 of 253 Cal.Rptr., at p. –––– of ––– P.2d), the words “proposal” and “application” are terms of art in the public housing field;  “application” refers to “a preliminary submission ․ which addresses local housing need and development priority ․ [and which is] used by the [HUD] field office to determine ․ which of several [competing public housing authorities] ․ should be given the first opportunity to submit a proposal for developing a project” (24 C.F.R. § 941.103), while “proposal” refers to “[a] detailed ․ submission ․ of all information, including identification and evidence of site control, necessary for the field office to approve a public housing project.”  (Ibid.)

3.   The ballot argument in favor of the initiative read in full:  “A ‘YES' vote for this proposed constitutional amendment is a vote neither for nor against public housing.   It is a vote for the future right to say ‘yes' or ‘no’ when the community considers a public housing project.“Passage of the ‘Public Housing Projects Law’ will restore to the citizens of a city, town, or county, as the case may be, the right to decide whether public housing is needed or wanted in each particular locality.   Such is not the case at present.“Time after time within the past year California communities have had public housing projects forced upon them without regard either to the wishes of the citizens or community needs.   This is a particularly critical matter in view of the fact that the long-term, multimillion-dollar public housing contracts call for tax waivers and other forms of local assistance, which the Federal Government says will amount to HALF the cost of the federal subsidy on the project as long as it exists.“For government to force such additional hidden expense on the voters at a time when taxation and the cost of living have reached an extreme high is a ‘gift’ of debatable value.   It should be accepted or rejected by ballot.“If, on the other hand, certain communities are in such dire need of housing that the cost of long-term subsidization is deemed worth while, local voters, who best know that need, should have the right to express their wishes by ballot.“In either case, a ‘YES' vote for this proposed amendment will strenghten local self-government and restore to the community the right to determine its own future course.“Furthermore, the financing of public housing projects is an adaptation of the principle of the issuance of revenue bonds.   Under California law, revenue bonds, which bind a community to many years of debt, cannot be issued without local approval given by ballot.   Public housing and its long years of hidden debt should also be submitted to the voters to give them the right to decide whether the need for public housing is worth the cost.“A ‘YES' vote for the ‘Public Housing Projects Law’ is a vote for strong local self-government.   It is an expression of confidence in the community's future and in the democratic process of government.   To strengthen the grass roots democracy which has made America protector of the world's free peoples, vote ‘YES' on the Public Housing Projects Law.”   (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1950) pp. 12–13.)

MOSK, Justice.

PANELLI, EAGLESON and KAUFMAN, JJ., concur.