JUDGMENT ON APPEAL v. 21453 (2010)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

from the SUPERIOR COURTOPINIONhowever, argues that “automated enforcement system” refers not to the entirety of all automated cameras located at intersections throughout the City, but rather to the set of photographic equipment installed at each individual intersection, and that his conviction should be reversed because no warning notices or public announcements were issued pursuant to section 21455.5, subdivision (b, with respect to the intersection at which the violation occurred in this case.  The case thus presents a clearly defined issue of statutory construction.  “Our task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent.  [Citation.]  We begin by examining the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning and construing them in the context of the statute as a whole.  [Citations.]  If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and does not involve an absurdity, the plain meaning governs.  [Citations.]  If the statute is ambiguous, the court may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including the apparent purpose of the statute.  [Citation.]”  (Leonte 1ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc. (2004 1 123 Cal.App.4th 521, 526-527.1  Although no published decision has directly addressed the meaning of subdivision (b 1 of section 21455.5, the Leonte opinion, in discussing the statute, appears to have assumed that “system” refers to the automated enforcement equipment at each intersection:  “Former Vehicle Code section 21455.5 (Stats.2001, ch. 496, § 1 11authorized the use of automated traffic enforcement systems at intersections where drivers are required to stop.”  (Leonte, at p. 526.  B. Plain Meaning of the Word “System” The trial court's construction of Vehicle Code section 21455.5, subdivision (b is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word “system” as used in Vehicle Code section 21455.5, as well as in related statutory provisions.  Section 21455.5, subdivision (a, provides that “the intersection ․ may be equipped with an automated enforcement system,” and requires a governmental agency utilizing “the system” to “[i]dentif[y] the system by signs that clearly indicate the system's presence and are visible to traffic approaching from all directions․”  (Id., subd.(a (1. Based upon this intersection-specific usage, “automated enforcement system” in section 21455.5, subdivision (b cannot refer to a municipality's overall automated enforcement plan, but must instead refer to each individual set of automated equipment operated at an intersection within the municipal jurisdiction.  Other references to “system” and “equipment” within the statutory scheme are consistent with this construction.  Vehicle Code section 21455.7, subdivision (a prescribes change intervals for yellow lights “[a]t an intersection at which there is an automated enforcement system․”  Section 21455.5, subdivision (d, permitting specified operational aspects of “the system” to be contracted out if a governmental agency “maintains overall control and supervision of the system,” does not necessarily refer to the entire aggregation of automated enforcement equipment operated by a governmental agency, inasmuch as the agency may elect to “contract[ ] out” the operation of intersection-specific systems within its jurisdiction to multiple contractors.  Similarly, because the statute does not require governmental agencies to grant operational responsibilities exclusively to a single contractor, the prohibition in section 21455.5, subdivision (d, against contracting out certain operational activities “to the manufacturer or supplier of the automated enforcement system” is not evidence of a legislative intent for each agency to operate a single “system.”  Contrary to amicus curiae's assertion, Vehicle Code section 21455.6, subdivision (a, does not require municipalities to conduct a public hearing every time use of an automated enforcement system is proposed;  it requires the governing body to hold such a hearing only “prior to authorizing the city or county to enter into a contract for use of the system”;  if a system is installed at a new intersection pursuant to an existing contract, there is no need for a hearing.  An intersection-specific construction is also consistent with the common definition of “system” as a group of regularly interacting or interdependent items forming a unified whole.  (See Merriam-Webster OnLine Dict. [as of Jul. 23, 2010].  Although automated enforcement equipment operating at a particular intersection must interact in a manner necessary to produce photographic images of a violation, sets of equipment operating at different intersections within a municipality need not interact with each other in order to fulfill that function, and a municipality might even elect to operate incompatible types of equipment at different intersections.  Tellingly, one of the People's own trial exhibits, a hearsay document containing information regarding the automated enforcement equipment operated by the City, refers to “each intersection where an Automated Red Light Enforcement System is installed” and to “[t]he intersections where the Automated Red Light Enforcement Systems are operated.”  C. Legislative History Even if use of the word “system” in Vehicle Code section 21455.5 were ambiguous, the legislative history of section 21455.5 demonstrates that the word was intended to refer to the set of equipment installed and operated at an individual intersection and not to a municipality's entire aggregation of such equipment.  Section 21455.5 was originally enacted in 1995 (Sen. Vehicle Code section 21362.5, subdivision (a, enacted in conjunction with Vehicle Code section 40518 in 1994, refers to the same “system” in a clearly intersection-specific context:  “Railroad and rail transit grade crossings may be equipped with an automated rail crossing enforcement system if the system is identified by signs clearly indicating the system's presence and visible to traffic approaching from each direction.” (§ 21362.5, subd.(a. The purpose of these warning requirements was also described in intersection-specific language in the legislative findings and declarations of the Rail Traffic Safety Enforcement Act (Sen. An amendment to Vehicle Code section 21455.5 proposed in 2003 (Sen. It would make little sense for the scope of the 30-day warning period to be limited temporally and to be defined arbitrarily by the geographic size of the local jurisdiction, inasmuch as the legislatively stated purpose of the warning requirement is to deter red light violations.  This purpose is best achieved by the issuance of new warnings and announcements to proximate users each time automated enforcement equipment commences operation at an intersection.  CONCLUSION Because the record in this case shows a lack of compliance with the requirement of Vehicle Code section 21455.5, subdivision (b, that a municipality utilizing an automated enforcement system at an intersection comply with the prescribed warning requirements “[p]rior to issuing citations,” the conviction must be reversed.  (See RalphPolice Court (1948 84 Cal.App.2d 257, 258-259;  PeopleMunicipal Court (Pellegrino (1972 27 Cal.App.3d 193, 206.  DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed, with directions that the charge be dismissed.  GREGORY H. LEWIS, Judge I concur.  JOSEPHINE S. TUCKER, Acting Presiding Judge I concur in the judgment.  KAREN L. ROBINSON, Judge People

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Subdivision (b) of the cited 2001 version of section 21455.5 was identical to the current subdivision..  FN1. Subdivision (b) of the cited 2001 version of section 21455.5 was identical to the current subdivision.