PEOPLE v. CRUZ (2026)

OPINION

In 2003, Samuel Anthony Cruz and a few of his fellow gang members shot and killed two rival gang members. Cruz was charged with two counts of murder, and he later pleaded guilty in a negotiated disposition to two counts of manslaughter. One of Cruz's fellow gang members, Juan Becerra, went to trial and was convicted of two counts of murder.

In 2022, Cruz filed a petition seeking to vacate his manslaughter convictions and to be resentenced. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6.)¹ The People opposed the petition, and at an evidentiary hearing, the People entered into evidence the transcripts from Becerra's trial. The trial court denied the resentencing petition because it found that Cruz is liable for two counts of murder under current law. Cruz has filed the instant appeal.

Cruz does not challenge the factual basis of the trial court's ruling. Cruz also does not dispute an earlier opinion of this court holding that under the plain language of section 1172.6, a codefendant's trial transcripts can be entered into evidence. (See People v. Ramos (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 174, 185, 337 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 (Ramos).) Cruz further does not dispute that at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6 a petitioner does not have a Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. (See Id. at p. 190, 337 Cal.Rptr.3d 401.)

Instead, Cruz claims that when the trial court considered the testimony from Becerra's trial—a trial for which he was not present—the court violated his right to due process of law. We disagree.

“ ‘ “[D]ue process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1093–1094, 333 Cal.Rptr.3d 557 (Lewis).) “ ‘[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ ” (Id. at p. 1094, 333 Cal.Rptr.3d 557.)

A person who files a petition for resentencing can “offer new or additional evidence” at the evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6 (d)(3).) That is, at the evidentiary hearing, Cruz could have subpoenaed and examined the witnesses who testified at Becerra's trial, testified on his own behalf, or potentially introduced any new or additional exculpatory evidence.

We hold that Cruz's right to procedural due process was not violated because he had “a full and fair opportunity to contest the People's opposition to his resentencing petition.” (See People v. Robinson (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 854, 873, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373 (Robinson), review granted Feb. 26, 2025, S288606, [admission of a grand jury transcript at a section 1172.6 hearing did not violate the petitioner's right to due process of law].)

Thus, we affirm the order of the trial court, which denied Cruz's section 1172.6 petition.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of July 26, 2003, a group of 7th Street gang members, including Cruz and Becerra, drove into rival F-Troop gang territory. The group spotted several suspected F-Troop gang members, including Michael R. At this point, Becerra and two other 7th Street gang members fired shots against the rival gang members. Cruz then fired a single shot into Michael's head. Michael died at the scene.

Later that evening, a group of 7th Street gang members, including Cruz and Becerra, again drove into F-Troop gang territory. The group spotted a car with three suspected F-Troop gang members; Angel G. was the driver. Becerra started shooting at the car. When another 7th Street gang member also tried to shoot at the car, Cruz stopped him and said, “ ‘[Becerra's] got it.’ ” Angel was struck by the bullets and died at the scene.

Court Proceedings

In December 2007, the People filed an information charging Cruz with two counts of murder. The information also alleged related crimes, gang, and special circumstance enhancements. Cruz later pleaded guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter with enhancements, and two counts of gang participation. The trial court sentenced Cruz to a negotiated term of 21 years, eight months.

In February 2022, Cruz filed a petition for resentencing. (§ 1172.6.) The trial court issued an order to show cause (OSC) and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.

In July 2022, the People filed a brief seeking to admit the transcripts from Becerra's 2007 jury trial at the hearing. Cruz filed an opposition. The trial court granted the People's request.

In March 2025, after considering transcripts from Becerra's trial, the court denied Cruz's section 1172.6 petition. The court found Cruz to be one of the actual shooters in the murder of Michael R., and a direct aider and abettor in the murder of Angel G.

II.

DISCUSSION

Cruz claims that when the trial court considered the testimony from Becerra's trial—a trial for which he was not present—the court violated his right to due process of law. We disagree.

An alleged due process violation is a question of law that we review de novo. (See, e.g., People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1194, 298 Cal.Rptr.3d 150, 515 P.3d 1210; see also Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 206, 213, 341 Cal.Rptr.3d 252.)

In this discussion, we shall: A) review proceedings under section 1172.6; B) review general principles of due process; and C) analyze whether the admission of a codefendant's trial testimony at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing violates a petitioner's right to procedural due process.

A. Section 1172.6 Proceedings

Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended sections 188 and 189, which substantially narrowed the liability of accomplices to murder: “It is a bedrock principle of the law and of equity that a person should be punished for his or her actions according to his or her own level of individual culpability.” (People v. Ramirez (2019) 41 Cal.Ap.5th 923, 931.)

“With this purpose in mind, [the Legislature] ‘amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448, 315 Cal.Rptr.3d 495, 538 P.3d 993.)

The Legislature also enacted section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95), which created an ameliorative process for those convicted of murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter to seek vacatur and resentencing if they were convicted under now obsolete legal theories.

“Petitioners seeking relief under section 1172.6 must, first, file a facially valid petition that states the statutory requirements for relief (id., subd. (b)), and second, make a ‘prima facie showing’ (id., subd. (c)), before a court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on the ultimate question of resentencing at which the People will bear the burden of defending a conviction under the amended law (id., subd. (d)).” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 556, 330 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 564 P.3d 596.)

As far as the evidentiary hearing, the statute provides: “The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6 (d)(3), italics added.)

Many of the protections available to criminal defendants do not apply to the ameliorative procedures under section 1172.6. (See People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 44–45, 313 Cal.Rptr.3d 204 [“A petitioner under section 1172.6 does not possess many of the constitutional rights afforded to a criminal defendant at trial”]; People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 444, 300 Cal.Rptr.3d 409 [“section 1172.6 is an act of lenity in which the petitioner has no Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial”]; People v. Silva (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 505, 531 & fn. 10, 287 Cal.Rptr.3d 376 [the right to confront adverse witnesses under the 6th Amendment does not apply at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6].)

In Ramos, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at page 180, 337 Cal.Rptr.3d 401, a different panel of this court held that under the plain language of section 1172.6, a codefendant's trial transcripts can be entered into evidence at a petitioner's evidentiary hearing. Agreeing with another appellate court, this court further held that a petitioner does not have a Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. (See Id. at p. 187, 315 Cal.Rptr.3d 495, 538 P.3d 993, citing Robinson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 871, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373; but see People v. Ocobachi (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1181, 326 Cal.Rptr.3d 452 [the hearsay exception under section 1172.6 does not extend to a grand jury proceeding transcript].)

The Supreme Court declined to grant review in Ramos, but in a concurring statement, Justice Liu raised the possibility of a future due process challenge: “While this court has not specified what constitutional rights apply to petitioners seeking relief at a section 1172.6 hearing, they almost certainly have a right to due process ․” (Ramos, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 191, 337 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 (conc. stmt. of Liu, J.), review den. Oct. 1, 2025, S292224 [declining to take position on merits of due process claim where in the lower courts “Ramos articulated his objections to the transcripts from [his codefendant's] trial as a matter of statutory interpretation and under the state and federal confrontation clauses, not the due process clause”].)

B. Due Process of Law

The federal and state Constitutions prohibit the state from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 7.) “An individual bringing a due process claim must demonstrate: (1) a protected liberty or property interest and; (2) a lack of adequate procedural protections.” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1093, 333 Cal.Rptr.3d 557.)

“ ‘ “[D]ue process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1093, 333 Cal.Rptr.3d 557.) However, “procedural due process does not require a trial-type hearing in every instance.” (Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1999) 20 Cal.4th 371, 392, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 975 P.2d 663.)

“ ‘[T]he procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause must be determined with reference to the rights and interests at stake in the particular case.’ [Citation.] ‘[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands ․ [N]ot all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he extent to which due process relief will be available depends on a ․ balancing of the interests at stake in each context.’ ” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094, 333 Cal.Rptr.3d 557.)

The long-standing balancing test adopted by the United States Supreme Court takes into account: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, ․ and [third], the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18.)

C. Application and Analysis

In Robinson, following grand jury proceedings, the People filed an indictment charging defendant Robinson with attempted murder, related crimes, and enhancements. (Robinson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 860, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) Robinson pleaded no contest as part of a negotiated disposition. (Id. at pp. 859–860, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) Years later, Robinson filed a section 1172.6 petition. (Id. at p. 861, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) At an evidentiary hearing, the trial court considered the grand jury transcripts, and Robinson testified on his own behalf. (Id. at pp. 861–863, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) The court denied the petition, finding the People had proven the attempted murder charge under current law beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 864, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) Robinson filed an appeal arguing, among other contentions, that the admission of the grand jury transcripts violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him, and violated his right to due process of law. (Id. at pp. 872–874, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the lower court's ruling. (Id. at p. 875, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.)

The Court of Appeal held that “the Constitution did not require the Legislature to authorize resentencing relief, nor did it compel a jury trial as part of that procedure. [Citation.] Accordingly, the Legislature was free to condition resentencing relief on the nonjury procedure contained within the statute. [Citation.] Like the right to a jury trial, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not apply in the context of a section 1172.6 hearing.” (Robinson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 873, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) The court reasoned that “if the Constitution required new jury trials with the full panoply of rights protected thereby, the Legislature might have reconsidered its decision to grant retroactive relief.” (Ibid.)

“This is not to suggest that Robinson is without any constitutional rights at the section 1172.6 [evidentiary] hearing. However, those rights are grounded in Robinson's procedural due process rights to a full and fair opportunity to contest the People's opposition to his resentencing petition.” (Robinson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 873, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) The court went on to apply the three-factor due process balancing test outlined by the Supreme Court in Matthews, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. (Robinson, at pp. 873–874, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.)

As far as the first factor—the private interest—the Court of Appeal found that “the private interest is whether Robinson is entitled to a reduced sentence after having already admitted to having committed attempted murder.” (Robinson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 873, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) As far as the second factor—the risk of an erroneous deprivation—the court found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of Robinson's private interest was low given the procedural protections in place: the People have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; section 1172.6 limits the evidence to that which is admissible under current law; Robinson could have subpoenaed the witnesses that testified at the grand jury proceeding; and Robinson, in fact, testified on his own behalf, “thus, the procedure provided an opportunity to challenge the grand jury testimony.” (Robinson, at pp. 873–874, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.) As far as the third factor—the government's interest—the court found that “the administrative burden the government would face if required to present live testimony in lieu of the grand jury testimony would be immense.” (Id. at p. 874, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.)

“Having balanced these factors, we find the risk of erroneous deprivation caused by Robinson's inability to have originally cross-examined the witnesses from the grand jury hearing is countered by the procedural safeguards inherent in the section 1172.6 hearing, including Robinson's ability to present new evidence (including but not limited to his calling those witnesses himself). [Citation.] We find this is an appropriate balance in light of the competing interests at stake.” (Robinson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 874, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.)

We agree with the due process analysis in Robinson. Its reasoning applies directly to what is at issue here: the admission of testimony from a codefendant's trial in a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.²

As far as the first factor, the private interest is whether Cruz was entitled to a reduced sentence after he already admitted to committing two counts of voluntary manslaughter. As far as the second factor, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Cruz's private interest was low given the procedural protections in place. That is, the prosecution had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution was limited to introducing evidence that is admissible under current laws, Cruz could have subpoenaed and examined the witnesses from Becerra's trial, Cruz could have testified on his own behalf, and Cruz could have sought to introduce any new or additional exculpatory evidence. As far as the third factor, we agree with Robinson that “the administrative burden the government would face if required to present live testimony in lieu of the ․ testimony” from Becerra's trial “would be immense.” (Robinson, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 874, 327 Cal.Rptr.3d 373.)

In sum, we find that the risk of erroneous deprivation of Cruz's private interest is sufficiently countered by the procedural safeguards inherent in a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. Most especially, the safeguard that provides: “The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6 (d)(3).)

Thus, we affirm the ruling of the trial court that denied Cruz's petition for vacatur and resentencing. (§ 1172.6.)

Cruz argues that probationers and parolees generally have a due process right to confront the witnesses against them at a probation or parole revocation hearing. (See, e.g., Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 610, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636.) Based on this, Cruz argues: “A due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses should apply equally at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).” We disagree.

The crucial fact that Cruz seems to overlook is that under the provisions of the statute, Cruz essentially did—in fact—have the right to confront any of the witnesses who testified at Becerra's trial by subpoenaing them to testify during the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.

In short, Cruz's argument on appeal does not alter our analysis that the section 1172.6 proceedings did not deny him due process of law.

III.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the order of the trial court, which was a denial of Cruz's section 1172.6 petition for vacatur and resentencing.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. We shall also generally omit the word “subdivision” or its abbreviation.

2.   Becerra and Cruz are not actually “codefendants” since they were charged in separate pleadings; however, the parties have referred to them as such, and for the sake of clarity, we will occasionally do the same.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR: DELANEY, J. MACAULAY, J.